The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gauṭama

Volume I

Mahāmahopādhyāya
GAṄGANĀTHA JHĀ

This is a reprint of the English Translation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, the versatile Sanskrit scholar who will ever be remembered for his dedicated and selfless pioneer work and immense contribution in the field.

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This reprint of the great work is issued in response to the increasing demand of the scholars.

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THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUṬAMA

THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUTAMA

WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF VĀṬSYĀYANA AND THE VĀRṬIKA OF UḌḌYOṬAKARA

Translated into English

With notes from Vāchaspaṭi Mishra's 'Nyāya-Vārṭika-Ṭāṭparyaṭikā', Uḍayana's 'Parishuḍḍhi' and Raghūṭṭama's Bhāṣyachandra

by

MAHĀMAHOPĀḌHYĀYA

GAṄGĀNĀṬHA JHĀ

Vol. I

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

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We are offering with great pleasure to the inṭerested readers this reprint of the great work in response to the increasing demand of the scholars and believe that it will be received in a befitting manner.

It may here be noted that the system of transcription used when this work was written more than half a century ago, has a few variations, some rather odd-looking, from the system in use now.

They are:

ऋ	ṛi	ड	d	ध	ḍh
च	ch	ढ	dh	ष	sh
छ	chh	त	ṭ		
ट	t	थ	ṭh		
ठ	th	द	ḍ		

PREFACE.

Not being learned in the 'Science' or 'Art' of 'Chronology,' I have secured a contribution on that subject from my colleague, Pandit Gopinatha Kaviraj, which is printed here as the 'Introduction'; and I am thankful to him for having thus removed a serious defect from the present work. It remains for me only to indicate in brief the materials that I have made use of in preparing this translation. For the Bhāṣya I have relied mainly upon the Edition published in the 'Vizianagram Sanskrit Series' and for the Vārtika on the Edition in the 'Bibliotheca Indica'; for the latter I was also helped, after having finished Adhyāya I, by the Second Edition (or rather 'reprint') of the work in the Benares Series. In the case of the former I was helped by the following manuscripts :—

I. Palm-leaf styled in the notes as 'Puri Ms. B' which contains the Bhāṣya from 1-2-4 to the end.

II. Palm-leaf styled as 'Puri Ms. A,' containing the Bhāṣya from the beginning to 3-2-42.

III. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Sūṭra only.

These three were kindly lent to me by the revered Shaṅkarāchārya of Govardhanamatha, Puri.

IV. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Bhāṣya, Adhyāya V only—styled 'C.'

V. A palm-leaf Ms. of the Bhāṣya, Adhyāya V only—styled 'D.'

VI. Paper Ms. of the Sūṭra only belonging to Jagadish Mishra.

VII. Paper Ms. of Sūṭra only belonging to Babu Govindadasa.

Every one of these manuscripts was found to be quite correct, specially the first two, which proved of incalculable help in fixing the text of the Bhāṣya in several places.

For the *Tatparya* I have used the edition in the 'Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.'

For the *Parishuadhi*, I have had to rely upon a manuscript secured for me several years ago from Madras, by my friend Babu Govindadāsa.

Of the *Bhāṣyachandra*, I had a single manuscript, obtained from Babu Govindadāsa's valuable collection.

In addition to these I have also used, for my notes, (*a*) the *Bodhasiddhi* also called *Nyāyaparishiṣṭa* of Udayana, and the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha* of Vardhamāna;—manuscripts of both of them having been secured for me by Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Vindhyeshwari Prasad Dube of the Sanskrit College Library.

The translation of Vātsyāyana was taken up in sheer "bravado," if the use of such a term be permissible in this connection. The first scholar to try his hands on it was the late Dr. Ballantyne, who handed down the task to his pupil Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Keshavashastri, who carried on the work up to a few pages and then apparently gave it up. Subsequently the work was taken up by a friend of mine at Calcutta; but when I asked him, after a few years, how far he had progressed, he told me frankly that the work was terribly difficult and so he had given it up. Then and there I made up my mind to undertake the work,—and to make the task still more difficult, and hence worth doing—I took up the *Vārtika* also.

How far I have succeeded in this audacious task, it is for the learned to judge, and in their hands I leave it, desiring no better tribunal to adjudicate upon my work and upon my reputation.

With this brief preface I lay my work at the feet of those to whom I owe all I am and all I have—

पित्रोस्तीर्थदत्ता—तीर्थनाथयोरिदमर्पितम् ।
भ्रातुः श्रीविन्ध्यनाथस्य प्रभोर्लक्ष्मीश्वरस्य च ॥

SANSKRIT COLLEGE, BENARES,
January 20, 1920.

GANGANATHA JHA.

INTRODUCTION.

I.—PRELIMINARY.

The Works, of which an English translation has been offered for the first time in the following pages, consist of (*a*) Nyāya-sūtras by Gotama, (*b*) Nyāya-bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana and (*c*) Nyāya Vārtika by Uddyotakara. Vāchaspati Miśra's Tātparyatikā, Udayana's Tātparyapariśuddhi and Raghūttama's Bhāshyachandra, have been utilised only in so far as they have been deemed useful for illuminating the more obscure points in the Sūtras or in their Commentaries.

The history of Nyāya remains still to be written, and it is not known with certainty how and when this system came to be associated with Vaishēṣika. In the Nyāya-bhāsya, and naturally in all subsequent works based upon it, we find the two systems generally mixed up. The Vaishēṣika categories are everywhere tacitly assumed in Nyāya, and, though on certain points, metaphysical (*e. g.* 'pīlupāka' *versus* 'pitharapāka') and epistemological (*e. g.* recognition of the number of pramāṇas, *viz.* four in Nyāya and two in Vaisēshika), the two schools diverge from each other, their general harmony is still very remarkable and would seem to be fundamental.* In the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to discriminate the two systems with any degree of accuracy, except by characterising one as mainly logical and methodological and the other as metaphysical. And besides this there are other factors to be counted. There have been theological influences at work in the elaboration of the ideas of each school. The allied Jain and Buddhist thought of the age must also have had some effect

* Cf. in this connection Dr. D. Faddegon's "The Vaiceṣika System," pp. 48-49.

on the system as a whole. The age in which the early Nyāya literature was written was an age of polemics, and until the history of contemporary thought, especially what is revealed in the oldest Buddhist and Jain literature, comes to be written, all speculations regarding the fundamental character of this literature are bound to be more or less unsuccessful. Then again, there is the almost insurmountable difficulty of determining, in the case of the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya, whether the whole work proceeded from one author or consists of parts ascribable to different authors belonging to different times. The subject is complicated, and a study of the Bhāṣya and of the Vārtika is calculated to be very helpful in this direction.

II.—THE NYĀYA SŪTRAS AND VĀTSYĀYANA BHĀSHYA.

(1) Opinions of Scholars.

(i) *On Nyāya Sūtras.*

The Nyāya system of philosophy, like every other Indian system, is based upon a body of aphoristic sayings, called 'Sūtras,' which are ascribed by tradition to one Akṣapāda (called in Chinese *soc-mock*, lit. 'foot-eye'), more popularly known as Goṭama or Gautama. Who this Goṭama was and in what time and country he flourished are questions to which no satisfactory answer can be given. Scholars have of course attempted to offer an answer, but all in different ways.

(*a*) Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstri (J. A. S. B., 1905, pp. 177-180) tries to show, on Chinese evidence, that Akṣapāda, the "founder" of Nyāya, was a pre-Buddhistic teacher, but he adds that the Sūṭras as we have them are comparatively modern, being probably post-Mahāyanic in age. He places them in the 2nd Century A. D.

(*b*) Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūshaṇa (Introduction to "The Nyāya Sūtrās of Goṭama,"

S. B. H., pp. v-viii; Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 161-162) believes that the author of the Nyāya Sūtras, who was identical with the author of Gautama Dharma Sūtras and of the Pitrimedha Sūtras and was an inhabitant of Miṭhila, lived in the 6th Century B. C. and was a contemporary of Buddha. He was the author of the *first* chapter of the work, the later chapters being subsequent additions.

(*c*) Professor Jacobi (J. A. O. S., XXXI, 1911, pp. 2, 13) says that the Sutras and the Bhāṣya are later than the origin of S'ūnya Vāda (*i. e.*, end of 2nd Century A. D.) and earlier than that of Vijñānavāda (*i. e.*, end of 5th Century A. D.), and that the interval between the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya need not be supposed to have been more than a generation. He assumes, it seems, that the whole Bhāṣya is one uniform work (*cf.* Ibid, p. 6).

(*d*) Professor Stcherbatskoi ("Epistemology and Logic as taught by the later Buddhists," as summed up in J. A. O. S., 1911, pp. 4-5), on the contrary, sees in the Sūtras and the Bhāṣya marks of acquaintance with Buddhist Idealism, whence he declares them both to be posterior to 500 A. D. This view has been refuted by Jacobi.

(*e*) Bodas (Introduction to Tarkasangraha, B. S. S., pp. xxx-xxxii) says that the work of Kaṇāda, as we possess it, can not be anterior to 400 B. C. and posterior to 500 A. D., which is the date of Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana under Ny. Sūt. 2-2-36, refers to Vaiś. Sūt. 3-1-16. The Sūtras of Gotama are older than those of Kaṇāda. He says definitely that Gotama's text belongs to 400 B. C. on the ground that Shabara Svāmi (Bib. Ed., p. 10) quotes from Upavarṣa a passage shewing that Upavarṣa was familiar with Gotama's system. If this Upavarṣa be identical with the minister of Nanda there is no inconsistency in placing Gotama in the 4th Century B. C. or a little earlier.

(*f*) Professor Suali (Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia Indiana, p. 14) accepts in the main Jacobi's conclusion but remarks that though the time of Vātsyāyana may be accepted as right, that of Gotama is doubtful. One generation is too short an interval to be placed between the Bhāṣya and the Sūtras. He would suggest an interval of 100 years, if not more, thus referring the Sūtras to about 300 or 350 A. D.

(*g*) Professor Garbe (Die Sankhya Philosopie, p. 33) considers Nyāya to be the latest of the six orthodox systems and says that no trace of it is to be found before the Christian Era. He states no grounds for his conclusion, but he notes that the Nyāyadarśana as such was known to Pañchaśikha whom he believes to have been a contemporary of Śabara, living sometime between 100 and 300 A. D.

(*ii*). *On Vātsyāyana Bhāsya.*

Regarding the Bhāṣya too there is a wide diversity of views.

(*a*) First of all we may refer to the theory of Dr. Windisch who, in his excellent pamphlet "Über Das Nyāya Bhāshya," pp. 14-15, has sought to prove that the Nyāyabhāshya must be ascribed to the same period in which the Mahābhāshya was written, *i. e.*, about 200 B. C. He shows by means of illustrations that both the works are more or less similar in structure and style and that both contain a number of pregnant sentences which are of the same type. In the case of Mahābhāshya, Kielhorn has established this satisfactorily (*cf.* his booklet "Kātyāyana and Patañjalio"). These sūtra-like short sentences never end in इति and must be the work of a predecessor. It is interesting to find that the explanations of these generally end in इति। These explanations, in the case of the Nyāyabhāshya, usually end in वचनीयम् or वाच्यम्, resembling the वक्तव्यम् of the Mahābhāshya

which Kielhorn showed as belonging to the explanation-part and not to the Vārtika itself. The sūtra-like sentences would in course of time (as their origin was forgotten) come to be regarded doubtfully as Sūtra or Bhāshya This has been, we know, really the case.

(*b*) Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa (Introduction, p. X) places Vātsyāyana, whom he makes a native of Southern India, about the middle of the 5th Century A. D. or (Bhandarkar Volume, p. 163; Ind. Ant., 1915) about 400 A. D. The whole work is evidently by one author. The Nyāya Sūtras 4-1-39, 4-1-48, 2-1-19, 4-2-32, 2-1-37 and 4-2-26, 3-2-11 are interpolations from Mādhyamika Sūtra and Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which somehow crept into the text before or during the age of Vātsyāyana.

(*c*) Mm. H. P. Śāstri (J. A. S. B., 1905, p. 178) makes Vātsyāyana post-Mahāyānic, *i. e.*, a successor of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

(*d*) Stcherbatskoi's view (*loc. cit.*) is that Vātsyāyana lived long after 500 A. D. Both the Sūtras and the Bhāshya are supposed to contain references to Vijñāna Vāda and must be posterior to the date of its origin in the 5th Century.

(*e*) Jacobi (*loc. cit.*) places Vātsyāyana about the beginning of the 6th Century or earlier. He accepts Windisch's Vārtika theory and allows an interval of about a generation between the Sūtras and the Bhāshya.

(*f*) Suali (*loc. cit.*) accepts Jacobi's date for Vātsyāyana, as already noted.

(*g*) Bodas (Introduction, p. XLI) assigns Vātsyāyana to the end of 500 A. D. on the ground that "he preceded the well-known Buddhist teacher, Diṅnāga, who is said to have lived in the early part of the 6th Century."

(2) Review and Remarks.

We have attempted to give above the views of some of the best authorities on the chronology of the Nyāya Sūtras and Vātsyāyana's Commentary upon them. The time of the Sūtras is found to range from the pre-Buddhistic or Buddhistic age to about 600 A. D. So about Vātsyāyana the dates assigned vary from 200 B. C. to about 700 A. D. This wild confusion is a sure indication of the fact that we are travelling on insecure ground. And as a matter of fact it is not possible to be quite precise when the premisses are so shaky. The Sūtras and the Bhāshya do not seem to have yet been studied with that minuteness and thoroughness which their nature demands A critical edition of the Sūtra-pāṭha of Nyāya, based upon a collation of all available Mss. of different recensions and of the Sutras as accepted by the various glosses and commentaries still existing, is the greatest desideratum of the day, and until this is done it is vain to endeavour to determine the *sūtratva* of a particular aphorism. In the translation efforts have been made to determine this, as far as possible. From the very nature of the present work, the translator has had to rely upon the verdict, direct or implied, of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika*, and the *Tātparya*, and also upon Vāchaspati Miśra's *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*; but help was also derived from two old manuscripts, obtained from two different sources.

The question of Bhāshya is even more complicated, as Mss. of this work are comparatively very rare. In these circumstances therefore all such theories as have a bearing more or less direct on the character of the text have to be accepted as only tentative. Then again there is the inevitable danger of a tendency to read modern thought into old words. If there be a passage illustrating an old theory which has died out but which survives in its developed form in a recent but better known *Vāda* it is very likely that we

shall understand it as representing the latter. The early history of Indian thought being not known in detail it becomes really very hard at times to identify a particular doctrine.

Professor Stcherbatskoi's theory does not seem to call for any new comments. Jacobi has already treated it at some length and tried to shew that neither the Sūtras nor the Bhāshya can be proved to contain allusions to Buddhist Idealism, so that they must be earlier than the age of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (500 A. D.). Vāchaspati's interpretation of Sūtras 4, 2, 26 35 as directed against Vijñānavada is erroneous. So far it is all right. But Jacobi, Vidyābhūshaṇa, H. P. Śāstrī and Suali all find in the Sūtras and Bhāshya traces of Śūnyavāda. This seems to me problematic. That there is a doctrine much allied to the later Buddhist Śūnyavāda need not be gainsaid. But it does not seem to have yet been established that this doctrine is really the same as the so-called Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna's school. And even if it is there is no necessity to assume *a priori* that the whole work proceeded from one pen and belongs to one, *viz.*, the post-Nāgārjuna, period.

(3) *The Age of the Sūtras an the Bhāshya.*

Assuming that all the Nyāya-sūtras, as we have them to-day, are not genuine and that some of them may possibly represent later interpolations*, there is no reason to deny that the general framework of the system is of a much earlier date. There is nothing to contradict Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa's view that the Sūtras belong to 600 B. C. Mm Śāstrī's opinion that Akshapāda was pre-Buddhist and was the founder of the school is also acceptable, but where is the proof to shew that *all* the Sūtras came after the development of the Mahāyānic School and that even some of them were not composed by Akshapāda himself ?. The suggestion of the

*Cf. Faddegon, "the Vaiçeşika System," pp. 46-47.

Sūtras having passed through several redactions may be accepted in the main, but this does not militate against the antiquity and genuineness of some parts of the work at any rate. The introduction of Yoga in a work on Nyāya is not altogether inexplicable, if we remember that both Yoga and Nyāya (including Vaiśeshika), as systems of theological philosophy, belonged to the Śaiva School. The very word Īśvara, (as distinguished from 'Purushottama' of Sāṅkhya which, as Haribhadra points out, was affiliated to Vaishṇavism) signifies *Śiva*. Even in later times the Śaiva Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (800 A. D.) introduced Yoga in his Nyāya tract, *viz.*, Nyāya Sāra. The section on Yoga in Gotama's work (Sūtras 4, 2, 38-48) does not bear on it any special mark of later development. The "peculiar character" referred to by the Śāstrīji is not apparent to me.

It is interesting to observe that the several doctrines which have been introduced in the 1st Lecture of Chapter IV as पूर्वपक्षाः does not refer explicitly either to Śūnya Vāda or to Vijñāna Vāda. They may well stand for theories so widely current in Buddhistic and post-Buddhistic (but generally pre-Christian) times, and a detailed examination of these in connection with the history of contemporary thought is sure to be highly profitable and enlightening. The Sūtras and the Bhāshya must be subjected to such an examination before any final opinion regarding their age can be fitly pronounced.

This is not the right place to enter into a discussion of this kind, but we may just note a word or two here briefly in order to suggest that this line of pursuit is likely to yield valuable results.

(1) First of all, we may refer to the doctrine as stated in Sūtra 3-1-52, which states that त्वक् 'touch' is the only sense-organ, the other so-called sense-organs being only modifications of it. This is a queer, but a very old view, and we find it as early as 500 B. C. in Greece, where Democritus

(and later on Aristotle too) advocated a similar theory. And even in modern Nyāya, though the unity of sense-organs has been rejected as such the importance of त्वक् and its distinctive character have been strongly emphasised. The doctrine of त्वङ्मनोयोग, *i. e.* the view that relative consciousness is possible only when there is contact between *manas* and *tvak*, is based upon the recognition of the fact that the function of त्वक् in our mental life is unique.* But the doctrine as mentioned in the sūtra asserting that त्वक् is the only sense-organ stands by itself. It is unknown to any of the existing systems of philosophy. But we know that it is the old Sāṅkhya theory. Both Ratnaprabhā and Bhāmatī under Ved. Sūt. 2-2-10, attribute it to Sāṅkhya. It does not exist in the Kārikā of Īśvarakrishṇa and appears to be much older than this author. The date of Īśvarakrishṇa is uncertain. Dr. Keith (Sankhya System, p. 69) places him about 450 A. D. and Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa's opinion is very much the same (Med. Logic, p. 83). For reasons into which I cannot enter here I feel inclined to assign a much earlier date to the work. Probably the publication or Māṭhara Vritti undertaken by Dr. Belvalkar will help to clear up much confusion on the matter. At any rate it seems probable that the view on त्वक् was very old and Gotama's allusion to it is a probable sign of the antiquity of the Sūtras.

(2) Then we may pass in review the various Vādas discussed in the 4th Chapter, Lecture 1. We should remember that these were all extremist theories (एकान्तवादाः) in connection with the origin and nature of the world.

(i) The first Vāda (4. 1. 14-18) which affirms the origin of things from pre-existing अभाव, is as old as the Upani-

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* It is for this reason that in Sushupti or dreamless sleep, when the *manas* happens to be within the 'purītat' beyond the sphere of त्वक् it enjoys rest and there is abeyance of conscious life altogether. For details see my forthcoming work 'Nyāya Vaiśeshika System of 'Thought' (Part III, Section on Psycho-physics, &c).

shads and is found in the Pali literature. It amounts to a denial of what is technically called उपादाननियम ।

(ii) The next Vāda known as Īśvaravāda (4. 1. 19-21) declares that the Ultimate *Nimitta* of production is God and not पुरुषकर्म or पुरुषकार* । This is the ultra-theistic position which disavows the efficiency of human will altogether and assigns every product to the direct intervention of a Divine Resolve. The human will is said to be efficient in subordination to actuation from Above. The Ancient Pali and Prakrit literature is replete with accounts of similar theories. The statement अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः । ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥ (M. Bht. वनपर्व, 33. 28) says plainly that pleasure and pain, *i. e.* the fruits (फल), come directly from God and not from human effort, for the simple reason that man as such is ignorant (अज्ञ) and impotent (अनीश) in regard to his pleasure and pain. The प्रेरक is God. Such ईश्वरवाद exists in the Upanishads, † and we may detect it in some shape in the Pāśupata Darśana of Mādhavāchārya's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha. This is of course slightly distinguished from the Iśvaravada of which the Śveta° Up° (1. 2) speaks.

(iii) The next theory (4. 1. 22-24) leads us to a denial of all kinds of *nimittas*. This is evidently an aspect of स्वभाववाद । *Cf.* Aśvaghosha's Buddhacharita, 9. 52. Here too the freedom of will is repudiated. This doctrine is really the same as अधिच्चसमुप्पन्निकवाद described in the Brahmajālasutta of Dīgha Nikāya. In the Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī (1. 118) Buddhaghosha explains the term as 'springing up without a cause, and in the Udāna (6. 5) it is said to signify negation of origin from a cause, whether intrinsic (स्वत उत्पत्तिः) or extrinsic (परत

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* Probably this was a reaction against the extreme Mīmāṁsā theory of Karma. The theory is as old as Buddha's day. And it is not impossible though not likely, that the word कारणं in the phrase 'ईश्वरः कारणं' etc. implies material (उपादान) as well. In that case it would be an allusion to the early Brahmavāda. In this connection the reader is referred to the notes given in the present translation *in loco*.

† *Cf.* Kaush. Up., 3. 9.

उत्पत्तिः). This is स्वभाववाद् pure and simple, and was an old doctrine, associated, in one of its phases, with the name of Makkhaliputta Gosāla who denied not only freedom of will (पुरिसकारे) but also all forms of causality, हेतु or प्रत्यय*. This doctrine is also called अहेतुकवाद् and was one of the three views which the Com. on Dhammasangani characterises as incorrigible and hopeless.

(iv) Now the rejection of स्वभाव, own nature or individuality of a thing ends in अभाववाद्—a doctrine which is discussed in Sūtras 4. 1. 37-40. This अभाववाद् is the preliminary to the historical Śūnyavāda.

(v) This is closely related to the other doctrine, *i.e.* सर्वानित्यतावाद्, *viz.*, that everything is impermanent. This is the logical antecedent of *technical* क्षणिकवाद् of subsequent centuries and was an old view. This view is a truism of Buddhist Literature and need not be stated in detail.

(vi) The opposite doctrine, *viz.*, सर्वनित्यतावाद् (Sūtras 4.1 29-33), was also current very widely in early times. The name शाश्वतवाद् used sometimes to be given to an aspect of this doctrine, though of course with a slightly different shade of meaning. The सर्वास्तिवाद्, *i e.*, the belief that 'Everything *Is*,' of which the Satkāryavāda of Sāṅkhya was a later modification, was the earliest and most general form of this doctrine. Professor Garbe, in his 'Sāṅkhya Philosophie,' notes that the Śāśvata Vāda as discussed in the BrahmajālasUtta is the Sāṅkhya view. That Garbe is right would appear from the following declaration in Vyāsabhāshya (under Yoga Sūt. II. 15): उभयप्रत्याख्याने (*i.e.*, on denial of उच्छेदवाद् and हेतुवाद् both) च शाश्वतवादः, इत्येतत् सम्यग्दर्शनम्। And on the other hand we observe that the सर्वनित्यवाद् discussion turns on a view which from the very language of its expression we recognise at once to be of the Yogins. *Cf.* Nyāya Bhāshya :

* Sāmaññaphala Sutta in D. Nik., 2. 20; Uvāsagadasāō 7. 166 (Hoernle's Ed., p. 97).

अवस्थितस्योपादानस्य धर्ममात्रं निवर्त्तते धर्ममात्रमुपजायते, स खलु उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्विषयः। यच्चोपजायते तत् प्रागप्युपजननादस्ति। यच्च निवर्त्तते तन्निवृत्तमप्यस्तीति (under Nyāya Sūtra 4-1-32).

(vii) सर्वपृथक्त्ववाद (Suts. 4.1.34-36) was also known to the earlier Buddhist literature. This view is intimately connected with पुञ्जवाद and therefore with अवयवावयविवाद in general. The notion that the whole is a mere aggregate of parts and not a distinct entity from them, *i.e.*, that द्रव्य is only a name given to a definite collocation of guṇas, was very old indeed. Away from the Buddhist philosophers it was also partly recognised by Patañjali in his Mahābhāshya (*c.f.* गुणसमवायो द्रव्यम्).

(viii) The संख्यैकान्तवाद is very mysterious. Vātsyāyaṇa's interpretation is not clear. It was a doctrine of number, propounded to account for the origin or nature of things. The word एकान्त implies that it was an extreme view. Could it have any connection with the Vedic notion of छन्दः or with some form of the Pythagorean Theory of Number?

All this is guess-work, but very probable. At all events it is plain that the thesis regarding the late origin of some of the Sūtras, especially those referring to the several doctrines, is not conclusively demonstrated, though it may be admitted that interpolations *do* exist in the Sūtra and in the Bhāshya. The similarity of ideas, and even in some cases of stray words, does not necessarily prove, as Pandit Phaṇibhūshaṇa Tarkavāgīśa rightly remarks in his introduction (P. 34) to his excellent Bengali translation of Nyāya Sūṭra and Bhāshya, reference to any particular theory of later years, unless it is clearly stated. We know from a study of Indian philosophy and Literature that certain stereotyped sayings have come down from ancient times, and though these may be found in different works they need not be ascribed to any of them. By way of illustration it may be said that Nyāya Sūtra 4-2-32 reminds one of a similarly-worded saying in Patañjali's

Mahābhāshya (under Pan. 4-1-1) : असत्तु मृगतृष्णावत् गन्धर्वनगरं यथा । आदित्यगतिवत् सच्च वस्त्रान्तर्हितवच्च तत् । Even this verse which is split up into 4 parts and commented on by Patañjali is apparently older than his own time.

What is said of the Sūtras applies to a certain extent to the Bhāshya also. The interval between the two is not known, but it is certain, as Windisch has already established, that the Bhāshya was not the immediate successor to the Sūtras. There had been a Vārtika of which some fragments exist, not only on the 1st but even on subsequent chapters. *Cf.* the vartika : गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः , तस्यात्मकल्पात् कल्पान्तरानुपपत्तिः under Sūtra 4-1-21. This piece has been explained by Vātsyāyana which practically exhausts the whole Bhāshya on the Sūtra. Considering this fact, a space of 300 or 400 years would not be an unreasonable interval to suppose between the Sūtras and the Bhāshya. In other words Vātsyāyana may be assigned to the 2nd or 3rd Century B. C. *

This date would not be incompatible with the general style and structure of his language. The peculiar use of certain particles, *viz.*, इति, अथ, खलु and more particularly of वै would seem to be an indication of the antiquity of the work. The use of वै in prose, which reminds one of the Brahmans and Pali texts, in remarkable and almost decides the question.

As to the further question of his identity with Kauṭilya and with the author of Kāmasūtra a negative answer has to be given. There does not seem to be any historical evidence in support of this identity. Kautilya's attitude towards आन्वीक्षिकी and his style of composition are in direct antithesis to the Nyāya Bhāshya ; and as for the Kāmasūtra it is decid-

* It must be confessed that this view too, like the others contested, is no better than a tentative assumption, but it works better on the whole. Any definite conclusion regarding the date of these works must be put off till the results of researches into the history of *Pre*-Christian thought of India are available to us.

edly a later composition. The testimony of lexicographers where these names are put together as synonymous does not go far enough.

III.—NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA.

The date of Uddyotakara, the author of Nyāya Vārtika, is capable of more exact determination. It is beyond doubt that his Nyāya Vārtika was intended to be a defence of the Bhāshya against the attacks of the Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga, whose time is now generally believed to have been the end of the 5th Century A. D. Thus the age of Diṇnāga establishes the *terminus a quo* for the date of Uddyotakara, and the *terminus ad quem* is furnished by a reference to his name in Subandhu's Vāsavadattā: न्यायस्थिति-मिवोद्योतकरस्वरूपाम् (Hall's Edition, p. 235). Subandhu was unquestionably prior to Bāṇa (700 A. D.) who eulogises on his Vāsavadattā in the Harshacharita (*e. g.* कवीनामगलद्दर्पो नूनं वासवदत्तया), and probably, as Dr. Gray says (Introduction to the Eng. translation of Vāsavadattā, pp. 8-12), he may have lived in the latter part of the 6th Century or beginning of the 7th Century. From these evidences it would follow that Uddyotakarā's literary activities belonged to a period in 600 A. D.

The statement of Vāchaspati with reference to the Vārtika (उद्योतकरगवीनामतिजरतीनां समुद्धरणात्) is not however quite intelligible. From what he says it seems that even as late as Vāchaspati's day the Vārtika had been an old and antiquated work and apparently fallen into discredit. The expressions समुद्धरणात् and दुस्तरकुनिबन्धपङ्कमग्नानाम् read together imply that the work had been already overloaded with wrong interpretations. All this involves a long interval of time between Uddyotkara and Vāchaspati, though the date for Vāchaspati as given in his Nyāyasūchinibandha be understood to refer to Śaka Era (898=976 A. D.), instead of Saṁvat which to me seems the most agreeable assumption.

Till Subandhu's day Uddyotkara's work had been in the height of its glory, after which some powerful Buddhist Logicians directed their polemic attacks against it in defence of Diṅnāga, and overthrew its reputation. Who these Buddhist Logicians were we do not know. Dharmakīrti might have been one of them, and there might have been others from the Buddhist Universities, *viz.*, Nālandā and Vikrama Silā. The Buddhist Logic was in its fullest vigour in those days. But it is certain that in this pretty long interval there arose no eminent scholar* who could come forward and champion the cause of Orthodox Logic—a task which was left for Vāchaspati in the 10th Century (or more probably in the 9th Century) to accomplish. The word अतिजरतीनां would therefore imply great antiquity (which though not *very* great would appear as such on account of the neglect of the text) of the Vārtika as well as the unsettled condition to which it was reduced. Udayana informs us that in the work of restoration of Uddyotakara's text Vāchaspati was indebted to (his teacher or विद्यागुरु as Vardhamāna says) Trilochana.

Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa's identification of Vādavidhi and Vādavidhānaṭikā with Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya and Vinīta Deva's Vādanyāya Vyākhyā is not more than an assumption. Dharmakīrti was a later writer who did much, it seems, to throw Uddyotākara's work into disgrace. If Dharmakīrti's date be accepted as 635 A. D. (Med. Logic, p. 105)—a date which synchronises with the time of S'rī Harsha, the patron of Bāṇa, who refers to Subandhu in whose romance, as we have seen, the name of Uddyotakara occurs as the author of a Nyāya treatise—Uddyotakara must be pushed back much earlier. The hypothesis that all these famous writers were contemporaries does not rest on any

* Udayana refers to this fact उद्योतकरसम्प्रदायो अमूषां (गवीनां) यौवनं, तत्र कालवशात् गलितमिव । *Tat. Pari.*, *P.* 9.

positive basis.* The two works mentioned in Nyāya Vārtika can not yet be determined. Pandit Phaṇi Bhūshaṇa's suggestion that Vādavidhānaṭīkā might have been a commentary on a work by Subandhu—the Buddhist Naiyāyika who had been one of the main objects of Uddyotakara's assaults—is indeed a happy suggestion† but no *definite* conclusion can be arrived at from these uncertain data.

Uddyotakara was very deeply and widely read in Buddhist philosophy (post-Mahāyānic), and we find everywhere in his work the unmistakeable stamp of a learned and eloquent personality. There are several quotations and hidden allusions to Buddhist literature in the Vārtika which are yet untraced, and it will be some time perhaps before any light can be expected to be thrown upon these obscure passages. What for instance was the Sarvābhisamaya Sūtra to which the Vārtika refers (Ben. Ed. p. 339) and from which it has taken an extract? It seems from the language to have been one of the earlier Buddhist Sūtras and was devoted to the exposition of *pudgalavāda* against *nairātmyavāda*. May it be identical with the well-known 'Bhārahāra Sūtra' mentioned in Prajñākara Mati's Bodhicharyāvatārapañjikā (P. 474) and other Buddhist works? *Cf.* Ponosin's note in J. R. A S., P. 308.

IV.—TĀTPARYAṬĪKA, TĀTPARYA PARIŚUDDHI AND BHĀSHYA CHANDRA.

(*a*) TĀTPARYAṬĪKĀ.

Vāchaspati's age is too well-known to call for any special notice. But the identification of the era mentioned in his Nyāyasūchīnibandha, *viz.*, 898 (वस्वङ्कवसु) is an open question still; some hold that it stands for Vikrama Saṁvat, while others protest against this view and accept the Śakābda.

* For Dr. Vidyābhūshaṇa's arguments *See* J. R. A. S., July, 1914; Bhandarkar Com. Volume, pp. 163-164.

† *See* his Introduction, p. 39.

In the former alternative the year corresponds to 841 A. D. and in the latter to 976 A.D. On grounds which I have stated elsewhere at length I should prefer the former equation and assign Vāchaspati to the middle of the 9th Century. He was a voluminous author and extremely learned in all the systems of philosophy (orthodox and heterodox), on each of which he is said to have written commentaries.*

(b) Tātparya pariśuddhi.

Udayana belonged to the latter half of the 10th Century. He himself mentions 906 Śakābda or 984 A. D. (तर्काम्बराङ्क) as the year of the composition of Lakshaṇāvalī. His Tātparyapariśuddhi is a valuable Commentary on Vāchaspati's work. But he was, more than anything else, an intense and original thinker, and it is in such works as the Nyāya Kusumāñjali and Ātmatattvaviveka that we can find his genius at its best. Besides the Pariśuddhi, in which he had to confine himself to the traditional way of interpretation, Udayana wrote also an independent commentary. named बोधसिद्धि or न्यायपरिशिष्ट on the Sūtras of Gotama, which work also has been utilised in the notes on Chapter V.

(c) Bhāshya Chandra.

Not very long ago, Babu Govindadāsa of Benares discovered among a heap of manuscripts said to have belonged to the great Vedānta teacher Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a manuscript of an entirely unknown commentary on the Nyāya Bhāṣhya, by one Raghūttama. This unique find he made over to the translator of the Bhāṣya, who has utilised it in his 'notes.' The manuscript however extends

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* There is no evidence, as far as I know, to support this tradition. Apart from the Buddhist systems even the Vaiṣeshika has been left untouched. Nor does any indication exist in his other commentaries to shew that he wrote on Vaiṣeshika or on the Buddhist philosophy. That he was a master of all the systems 'सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र' stands of course uncontested.

to only the middle of Adhyāya III, and as the copy appears to be in the author's own handwriting, there is no hope of securing a complete copy. Such as it is, it is being published for the Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, and Dr. Gaṅgānatha Jhā expects to be able to supply the deficiency in the '*Chandra*' with his own gloss, which bears the humble title of '*Khadyota*.'

V.—CONCLUSION.

The Nyāyabhāshya and the Nyāya-Vārtika are extremely difficult works, not only for obscurity of style and relative frequency of elliptical expressions (specially in the former) but also for the comparative obsoleteness of many of the doctrines which have been therein introduced. The neglect into which the books were allowed to fall during the last millenium, more particularly on the advent of Navya Nyāya in the 13th or 14th Century, helped only in adding to this obscurity. It is a matter of no small congratulation therefore that we have at last an English translation of these abstruse scholia from the mature pen of a veteran and distinguished scholar, and it may be fairly hoped that the publication of these works, now in their English garb, will bring on a revival of interest in the study of ancient Nyāya Śāstra of India.

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THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUṬAMA

WITH

THE BHĀṢYA OF VĀṬSYĀYANA* AND THE VĀRṬIKA†

OF UḌYOṬAKARA.

With notes from the Nyāyavārṭikaṭāṭparyaṭīkā of Vāchaspaṭi Mishra ‡ and the Ṭāṭparyaparishuḍḍhi of Uḍayanāchārya.

DISCOURSE I.

DAILY LESSON I.

LECTURE (1) §

Enunciation of Subjects, Purpose and Connection of the Treatise.

INTRODUCTORY—BHĀṢYA.

The Instruments of Right Cognition || must be regarded as rightly effective, because it is only when a thing is known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition that there is a possibility of its giving rise to fruitful and effective exertion. As a matter of fact, nothing can be known except through an Instrument of Cognition; nor can fruitful exertion be aroused, except when things have been known; as it is only when the agent has cognised a thing by means of an Instrument of Cognition that he desires either to acquire or to get rid of it; and the effort of the agent stimulated by this desire to acquire or get rid of the thing known is what is called 'exertion'; and this exertion is called 'fruitful' when it becomes related to a result; that is to say, when the person putting forth exertion, on desiring either to

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* 'Vizianagram Sanskrit Series,' No. II.

† 'Bibliotheca Indica.'

‡ 'Vizianagram Sanskrit Series,' No. 15.

§ This division of the 'Daily Lessons' into 'lectures' is in accordance with the '*prakaraṇas*' of the *Nyāyasūchīnibanḍha* of Vāchaspaṭi Mishra.

|| This word '*pramāṇa*' is used both in the sense of 'instrument of right cognition (in which case the right cognition is the direct *fruit*, and ultimate exertion only the indirect fruit), and in that of 'right cognition,' in which case the exertion is the direct *fruit*. In the present context we take the word to mean 'instrument of right cognition' because of what follows in lines 7-8 below, where the '*pramāṇa*' is distinguished from *pramiṭi* or Right Cognition.

acquire or get rid of the thing, comes, by that exertion, actually to acquire or to discard it, his exertion becomes 'fruitful.'

The 'object' or 'thing' (cognised by means of the Instrument of Cognition) is of four kinds: *viz.* either, (1) pleasure, or (2) a source of pleasure, or (3) pain, or (4) a source of pain. These objects of the Instrument of Cognition are innumerable; owing to the fact of the number of living creatures being infinite. It is only when the Instrument of Right Cognition duly operates with regard to an object, that due success can belong to the 'cogniser', (who then only can have any idea of the object),—to the 'cognised object' (which then only can have its true character known),—and to the 'right cognition' (which then only can lead to the due comprehension of the object); because there is no possibility of the object being accomplished, so long as the most effective cause is not present [and it is the *Instrument* of Cognition which is the most effective cause].*

'Cogniser' (*Pramāṭri*) means that person who is stimulated to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the object; that by means of which the person obtains the right cognition of the thing is called the 'Instrument of Right Cognition' (*Pramāṇa*); that thing which is rightly known is called the 'cognised object' (*Pramēya*); and the comprehending or knowledge of the thing is called 'right cognition' (*Pramiṭi*). It is on all these four factors that the real nature of things is dependent (for its being accepted, or rejected, or treated with indifference).

"Now what is this 'real nature' (of things)?"

Bhā. Page 2. It is nothing else but 'being' or 'existence' in the case of that which *is* (or exists); and '*non*-being' or 'non-existence' in the case of that which *is not* (does not exist). That is to say, when something that 'is' (or exists) is apprehended as *being* or *existent*—so that it is apprehended as what it really is, and not as something of a contrary nature (*i. e.* as 'non-being')—then that which is thus apprehended constitutes the 'true nature' of the thing. And analogously, when a non-entity is apprehended as such—*i. e.* as what it really is, not as something of a contrary nature,—then that which is thus apprehended, constitutes the 'true nature' of the thing (of the non-entity).

* '*Ānyaṭamārṭhaḥ sāḍhakaṭamārṭho ḍraṣṭayaḥ*'—*Vārṭika.*

"But how is it possible for the latter,—*i. e.*, the non-entity, that which does not exist—to be cognised by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition?"

This is possible, we reply; because as a matter of fact, at the time that the existent thing is cognised (by means of the Instrument of Knowledge), the non-existent thing is not cognised. That is to say, there is non-cognition of the non-existent, only at the time that there is cognition of the existent; and this shows that it is only by means of the Instrument of Cognition, whereby the *existent* is cognised that we cognise also the non-existence of the *non-existent.** We illustrate this by reference to a lamp: when the lamp illumines, and renders visible, something that is visible,—that which is not seen in the same manner as that visible thing, is regarded to be *non-existent*; the mental process being as follows: 'if the thing existed it would be seen,—as it is not seen, it must be concluded not to exist.' In the same manner, at the time that the existent thing is cognised by means of an Instrument of Knowledge, if, at the same time, something else is not equally cognised, the conclusion is that this latter does not exist, the mental process being as follows: 'if the thing existed, it would be cognised,—as it is not cognised, it must be concluded not to exist.' Thus we find that the same Instrument of Cognition which manifests—makes known—the existent thing, also manifests or makes known, the non-existent thing.

The 'Entity' is going to be described by means of a comprehensive group of sixteen.

*The only difference thus between the *existent* and the *non-existent* is that, while the former forms the object of the Instrument of Cognition *directly*, the latter does so only *indirectly*,—*i. e.* through something that exists.

VĀRṬIKA—INTRODUCTORY.

'This treatise is being written by me for the purpose of removing the blemish of error cast by inferior logicians* upon that body of doctrine which the chief of sages, †Akṣapāḍa propounded for the peace and welfare of the world'.

'From the true knowledge of the categories,—*i. e.* the *Instruments of Right Cognition* and the rest,—follows the attainment of the highest food';—such is the first aphorism of the Treatise (Shāsṭra; body of doctrine) propounded by Gauṭama; and this aphorism serves to point out the ‡connection (and purpose) of the Treatise.

The opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is—'*An Instrument of Right Cognition must be regarded as rightly effective, &c., &c.*' § And this sentence serves to reiterate the connection of the Treatise with its purpose (the attainment of the Highest Good); inasmuch as the science does actually set forth what is the Good of Man.

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* The 'logicians' here referred to are Diṅnāga and others.

† Another name for Gauṭama. The origin of the name is thus explained: The sage Gauṭama used to be so completely absorbed in his logical problems that, having his eyes closed on that account, he one day fell into a well. God, taking pity, there upon bestowed upon his feet the power of vision; ever since he came to be known as 'akṣpāḍa'—'One who has eyes in his feet.'

‡ The true knowledge of the categories is the subject to be described; and the Treatise is what describes them; this is the relation or connection of the Treatise with its subject, which is indicated by the first Sūṭra. Another thing that is indicated by it is the relation of cause and effect between the treatise and the Highest Good. These are the two 'connections':—(1) that of the *described* and *describer* between the Treatise and Right Knowledge of Categories: and (2) that of *cause and effect* between the Right Knowledge and the Highest Good.

§ The Categories being capable of being known, it could not be argued that the Science has no connection with the Highest Good; because as a matter of fact the Science does describe that Good, along with the means of attaining it. All then that could be doubted is the possiblity of our carrying into effect, practically, what is laid down in the Science as such means; and it is this doubt that is set aside by the opening sentence of the Bhāṣya, which, by showing this possibility, establishes upon firm basis the desired connection between the Science and the Highest Good.

The term 'Treatise' (*shāsṭra*) here denotes the duly co-ordinated aggregate of *words descriptive of the *Instruments of Right Cognition*, and the other categories. The 'word' is an aggregate of letters; an aggregate of words constitutes an 'aphorism' (*Sūṭra*); an aggregate of aphorisms forms a 'Lecture' (*prakaraṇa*); an aggregate of lectures is a 'Daily
Vār. Page 2. Lesson' (*Āhnika*); an aggregate of daily lessons forms a 'Discourse' (*Aḍhyāya*); and the aggregate of five discourses forms the 'Treatise' (composed by Gauṭama). What is set forth by the 'words' of this Treatise is the sixteen categories,—*viz.*, the *Instrument of Right Cognition* and the rest. What the 'Treatise' ('body of doctrine') ultimately is concerned with is the Highest Good of Man. For the special characteristic of a 'Shāsṭra' is that it explains the real nature of such things as are not truly cognised by the ordinary means of knowledge, *i.e.* Perception and Inference; and the subject-matter (viṣaya) of a Shāsṭra thus is the real nature of things not known by ordinary means. And the man entitled to study the Shāsṭra is that disciple who is equipped with the requisite inner qualities (of head and heart).

A 'man' belongs to one of four classes—he either has true knowledge (is *wise* and *learned*); or is destitute of knowledge (altogether *ignorant*); or he is in a state of doubt as to the true nature of things; or he has altogether perverse notions. Among these four the 'learned' man only is in a position to teach; the rest, standing in need of knowledge are men to be taught. In cases where such men depend on the contact of the sense-organs with objects, they learn through Perception; where they depend on the perception and remembrance of certain characteristic features of things, they learn through Inference; and finally, where they require verbal instruction (*viz.* in the case of matters not to be

* This includes the *definition* of the categories, as well as the examination of hose definitions, and such other details connected with the subject-matter.

known through Perception and Inference (*e. g.* the Highest Good of Man), the Shāsṭra steps in and imparts knowledge.

The 'Good' of Man (for the attaining of the highest form of which, the means are to be sought for in these scientific treatises) is of two kinds—*pleasure* and *cessation of pain*. *Each of these two kinds again is of two kinds—*seen* and *unseen*. The *cessation of pain* is both *absolute* and *non-absolute* ('relative' or 'partial'). The *partial* cessation of pain is that which is brought about by the removal of such temporary causes of pain as a thorn and the like; the *absolute* cessation of pain, on the other hand, is brought about by the removal of all the twenty-one kinds of pain. These *twenty-one* kinds of 'pain' are:—(1) the body, (2-7) the six sense-organs, (8-13) the six kinds of cognitions, (20) pleasure and (21) pain. Of these, the Body is regarded as 'pain', because it is the abode of all painful experiences; the Sense-organs, the Objects and Cognitions are so regarded, because they constitute the agency though which painful experiences come; Pleasure is regarded as 'pain', because it is always accompanied by certain sources of pain†; and Pain is so regarded by its very nature. The 'removal' of all these is possible only by abandoning such agencies as those of *ḍharma* (merit, or righteousness) or *aḍharma* (demerit, or unrighteousness); all future merit and demerit are 'abandoned' by not

* The reading here is questionable; the passage as in the text would mean—'Pleasure is the *seen* good, and cessation of pain is the *unseen* good';—this, in the first place, would not be true; and in the second place, this would not be in keeping with the explanation give by the *Ṭāṭparya*. It says—'The *seen* pleasure is that produced by such visible things as garlands &c.; the *unseen* pleasure is in the form of heaven and the like; similarly the *good* in the shape of cessation of pain also is both *seen* and *unseen*.

† The sources of pain present in all Pleasure consist—(1) in the fact that man has not full control over the means whereby the pleasure is attained, (2) the transient character of the pleasure, (3) the desire or hankering that one feels toward the pleasure.

being produced (by any acts of the agent); and those that have been produced are 'abandoned' by becoming exhausted in consequence of the person having passed through all the pleasurable and painful experiences consequent upon the said merit and demerit.

[The author now proceeds to show in what manner the *cessation of pleasure*, which has been classed as 'pain,' may constitute the 'good' of man.]

Persons are of two kinds—those that are possessed by attachment, and those that are free from attachment; 'attachment' consisting in the desire for objects; and 'non-attachment' in the absence of all desire for objects. And in accordance with this two-fold division of men, Vār.—Page 3. human activity also is of two kinds: the activity of those who are free from attachment is of only one kind,—being always for the purpose of avoiding the undesirable *; all their activity arising from the motive expressed in the form 'may I avoid the undesirable;' these people have no desire for any object (for the acquiring of which they would have recourse to the other form of activity). The activity of men possessed by attachment, on the other hand, is of two kinds: (1) for the attaining of the desirable, and (2) for the avoiding of the undesirable; the man who desires a certain object acts with the motive of attaining that object; and he ceases from activity towards the acquiring of another object for which he has no desire, to which, in fact, he is averse.

[The *Vārṭika* proceeds to explain the clause '*pravṛiṭṭi-sāmarṭhyāṭ*,' '*there is a possibility of its giving rise to fruitful exertion.*']

The exertion or activity of men possessed by attachment is again two-fold, according as it is †*fruitful* (*samarṭha*)

* For these people, pleasure also is a form of the 'undesirable.'

† The word '*Samarṭha*' in this connection has been explained by the commentators as equivalent to '*samyagarṭh*,' *i. e. arṭhāvyabhichāri*, not disagreeing with its objective; and it is only the *fruitful* action that is in due consonance with its objective.

or *not fruitful* (*asamarṭha.*) The exertion or activity of persons with attachment is thus both fruitful and not fruitful. When urged by the motive of attaining a desired object, the man puts forth exertion or activity, and does obtain that object, his exertion or activity is said to be 'fruitful'; similarly it is called 'fruitful' when acting under the motive of getting rid of an undesirable object, he succeeds in getting rid of it. On the other hand, if, in the former case, he does not attain the desired object, or if, in the latter case, he does not succeed in getting rid of the undesirable object,—his activity is said to be 'not fruitful.'

There is yet another classification of activity under two heads, according as the * Pramāṇa (leading to the activity) is *rightly effective* (*arṭhavaṭ*) or *not rightly effective.* [It might be questioned how *Pramāṇa* can be *not rightly effective*; but the explanation is as follows:—] The true Pramāṇa is rightly effective; because through it objects are apprehended in their true nature;—the false Pramāṇa, on the other hand, is termed *Pramāṇa* in a figurative or secondary sense, inasmuch as it resembles the true Pramāṇa in a certain general feature (and it is this latter Pramāṇa which is *not rightly effective*).

"But what is that general feature which enables us to class the false Pramāṇa as a *Pramāṇa* at all?"

Through both of them, we reply, 'generalities' (general characters; sāmānya) are apprehended. That is to say,

* We may note here that the word '*pramāṇa*' is somewhat promiscuously used. It stands for the 'instrument of Right Cognition' when the *right cognition* is regarded as the *fruit* of Pramāṇa; but when the exertion of the cogniser is regarded as the *fruit*, it is the *right cognition* itself that is spoken of as '*Pramāṇa*.' The word in the present context is used in this latter sense; because it is the exertion that is spoken of as the *fruit*; though in the former case, even though the Right Cognition is the desired fruit of the Pramāṇa, the resultant activity is the ultimate fruit; but only through the cognition. And in view of this in the present context also the word may stand for the 'Instrument of Right Cognition.' The commentators however give preference to the former view (see next *note*). The Vārṭika specially favours the interpretation of 'pramāṇa' as *Valid Cognition*—See Vār. *Text* p. 4, l. 14.

it is well known that generalities are apprehended through the *real* Pramāṇas; and through the *unreal* Pramāṇas also generalities are apprehended*.

In view of the above twofoldness of *Pramāṇas*,—when the man acts after having apprehended his object by means of the *real Pramāṇa*, his activity or exertion is *samartha* or 'fruitful'; but when he acts after apprehending his object by means of the *false Pramāṇa*, his activity is *asamartha* or 'not fruitful.' And it is by virtue of this (inciting of *fruitful* activity) that the Pramāṇa is called 'rightly effective.'

Against the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*—'*An Instrument of Right Cognition must be regarded &c.*'—the following objection is raised :—"As there is mutual interdependence, neither of the two propositions can be established." The answer to this is that the objection has no force, 'on account of there being no beginning.' The sense of the objection is

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* In the stock example of the *apparently* valid, but really wrong, cognition—when we know the piece of shell as silver—the wrongness of the cognition is proved by the subsequent recognition of the object as *shell*, this recognition being regarded as *valid*; but when picked up, the object turns out to be *shell* and not *silver*. Now what is the difference between these two—the first invalid cognition of silver, and the second valid cognition of shell? The *Parishuddhi* remarks that the real form in which the cognition of silver is present in the mind of the observer is—'This, bright white substance, is silver'—in which there are two factors, the general one 'the bright white substance', and the particular one 'silver.' Similarly the form in which the subsequent valid cognition of shell is present in the mind is—'This bright white substance is shell,'—wherein also there are two factors, the general, one, 'the bright white substance,' and the particular one, 'shell.' Thus then, the *general* factor is common in both; this is what is meant by the 'apprehension of generalities' that has been declared in the text to constitute the similarity of the *valid* and *invalid* cognitions. The above explanation holds good if we take the word '*pramāṇa*' as standing for 'instrument of right cognition.' When we take it to stand for 'right cognition,' however, the explanation has to be extended one step further: the 'instrument of right cognition' in both the above cognitions is 'Sense-perception'; and how in both cases the cognition brought about is 'valid' or 'right' is to be explained as above.

further clearly explained* :—"In the opening sentence under discussion, is has been declared that *it is only when a thing is known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition that there is possibility of its giving rise to fruitful exertion*; and yet the assurance that a thing has been known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition can be obtained only on finding that it gives rise to fruitful exertion; such being the case, we ask—which of these two comes first, and which later? If it is the *Cognition of the thing by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition* that comes first,—how can there be any such definite cognition, until its capability of giving rise to fruitful exertion has been ascertained? If, on the other hand, it is the *knowledge of the capability of giving rise to fruitful action* that comes first, how can there be any exertion (towards the acquiring or getting rid of an object) unless the thing has been duly Cognised? Thus we find that it is not possible to ascertain which of the two, *the fruitful exertion*

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* The *Tāṭpārya* explains the objection thus :—

"The mere cognition of an object cannot be the cause of any fruitful exertion; it is only the assured definite cognition of the object as being of a kind that accomplishes a desirable purpose, that can give rise to any exertion; this assurance being based upon an inferential cognition of a number of things of that kind being the cause of the fulfilment of desired purposes; this therefore is all that can be meant by the first part of the sentence in question; this definite assured cognition of the object is not possible until the observer has ascertained the *validity or rightness* of the Instrument whereby that Cognition has been got at. At the same time, the fact that the Instrument of Cognition is *valid*,—as also the fact that the things of the same kind as the one under question are conducive to the fulfilment of desired purposes,—can be ascertained only by, and after, finding that the exertion to which they lead, is fruitful; and it has already been pointed out that the fruitful exertion itself is not possible without the ascertainment of the aforesaid two facts. This is the *interdependence* that is meant."

The *Parishuḍḍhi* sums up thus :—"The *assured cognition* and the *inference* are not possible without the ascertainment of the validity of the Instrument of Cogniton, or without the recognition of the universal character of the proposition that all things of the kind are conducive to the fulfilment of desired ends; neither of these last is possible without exertion;—the exertion again is not possible without the assured cognition and inference aforementioned."

or *the Cognition by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition*—comes before and which after."

The answer to this is that the objection does not hold; because the world has had no beginning, as we shall prove later on, under *sūtra* 3-1-19. If the world had a beginning, then only would there be any force in the objection embodied in the question which of the two comes first—the cognition of the object by means of the Instrument of Right Cognition, or the possibility of giving rise to fruitful exertion; as however the world is beginningless, such interdependence is necessarily implied in many worldly processes; and hence it is not right to take objection to any one process on that ground alone. In reality however all that is meant by the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* in question is to point out the capabilities of the '*pramaṇa*' * (Instrument of Right Cognition) and the '*pravṛiṭṭi*' (exertion), with a view to ascertain their relative effective force in the accomplishing of their desired ends [and not to point out the precedence or sequence of the one to the other]: the sense of the sentence thus is that, ordinarily, when a man has to put forth an exertion, he cognises the object by means of an Instrument of Cognition, and then puts forth the exertion; and having put forth the exertion he obtains the fruit of that exertion.

† A question is here raised [bearing upon the order of treatment adopted by Gauṭama]:—" Does the *capability* (to accomplish the Highest Good) belong to the *cognition of objects by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition*? or to the *exer-*

* The *Ṭāṭ*. reads '*prāmāṇya*' for *prāmāṇa*; this reading however is not satisfactory.

† What this question drives at is that the attainment of the Highest Good being the declared aim, the proper order should have been to explain the details of *exertion* and not (as Gauṭama has done) those of the Instruments of Right Cognition; because as a matter of fact the Highest Good is attained, not by the mere definite Cognition of things by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition,—but by such exertions and activities as (1) the *contemplating* of all objects as being the source of pain, and (2) the *meditating* upon the true essence of the soul.

tion?" * The answer to this is that both are *capable*, inasmuch as both are equally necessary conditions (of the accomplishment of desired ends). And what the opening sentence of *Bhāṣya* does is to point out this fact (of both being *capable*) and also to indicate what the result is (with relation to which they are capable).

Or, lastly, the opening sentence may be taken as explaining what happens in ordinary practice: the sense being—[Inasmuch as *Instruments of Right Cognition must be regarded as rightly effective, because it is only when a thing is known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition that there is a possibility of its giving rise to fruitful exertion*] what happens in ordinary practice is that every cognitive agent obtains the desired result, when he puts forth his exertion on having cognised the object by means of the Instruments of Cognition.

[The *Vārtika* proceeds to supply another interpretation of the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.] The four kinds of things denoted by the word '*Arṭha*' or 'object' are—† (1) that which has to be got rid of or avoided, (2) the direct cause of the avoiding of (1), (3) that which accomplishes (2), and (4) the ultimate end sought to be attained. To the *first* category belongs *pain* described (above), as also the *sources of pain*,—*viz.* ignorance and desire, and merit and demerit;—to the *second* category belongs the *knowledge of truth*, by which is meant the knowledge of things as they really exist;

* The sense of the reply is that, it is true that it is exertion that is the direct and immediate cause of the accomplishment of the desired result; but it is also equally true that the exertion is effective only when it follows upon the right cognition of things brought about by the Instruments of Cognition. The natural order thus is—*first* the right Cognition, *second* the Exertion, and *third* the attainment of the desired end. It is a well known fact that an exertion proceeding from a cognition, that is not obtained by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition, never accomplishes the result. Hence the order adopted by Gauṭama is the right one.

† As pointed out in the Bhāṣya, pp. 2—3.

it is this that is spoken of as '*pramāṇa*'; to the *third* category belongs the *Shāsṭra* or *Treatise*; this also has already been described above;—to the *fourth* category belongs *Deliverance*, which consists in the absolute cessation of pain. Among these four, the most important is the *Pramāṇa*; and it is this all-importance of *Parmāṇa* * [not only among the four enumerated above; but also among another set of four: (1) the *Pramāṇa* or Instrument of Right Cognition, (2) the *Pramā* or Right Cognition, (3) the *Pramēya* or the object of Right Cognition, and (4) the *Pramāṭṛi* or the cogniser] that is meant to be emphasised by the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*.

A question is raised—" In what way can the sentence of the *Bhāṣya* be made to indicate (the importance of *Pramāṇa* among) this latter set of four, *Pramāṇa*, *Pramā*, *Pramēya* and *Pramāṭṛi* ?" † The answer to this is that, as for the first three of these four—*viz*: *the Instrument of Right Cognition*, the *Right Cognition* and *the Object Cognised*,—are mentioned directly by the words of the *Bhāṣya* itself; then as for the *Cogniser*, this is indicated, inasmuch it is a factor inseparably connected with those three; for certainly, without

* The particle 'cha' in the Vārṭika indicates that the Bhāṣya points out the importance of Pramāṇa, not only among the four factors described above, but also among another set of four factors: (1) *Pramāṇa* (Instrument of Cognition), (2) *Pramā* (Right Cognition), (3) *Pramēya* (Object of Cognition) and (4) *Pramāṭṛi* (the Cogniser). The all-importance of *Pramāṇa* among the former set is due to the fact that it is the direct cause of the attainment of the Highest Good; and that among the latter set is due to the fact that the three last depend for their very existence upon *Pramāṇa*.

† The *Parishuḍḍhi* (Ms. pp. 75-76) thus explains how they are mentioned by the words of the Bhāṣya. The Bhāṣya in the opening sentence mentions the word '*arṭha*', which, as declared in the Bhāṣya itself (pp. 2-3), includes the four (1) *hāna*, (2) *hēya*, (3) *upāya* and (4) *apavarga* Of these the '*hāna*' includes the *pramāṇa*, as already pointed out in the *Vārṭika*; because until we know a thing to be *pramāṇa*, we cannot recognise it as '*āna*'. Similarly the *pramēya* is included in the '*hēya*'; as until the object is *cognised*, it cannot be recognised as '*hēya*'; among the '*pramēyas*' (which are identical with the '*hēya*') the Sūṭras mention '*buḍḍhi*' or 'Cognition' also; and thus Cognition also becomes included in the '*hēya*' of the *Bhāṣya*.

the *Oogniser*, there can be no *Oognition* (or *Instrument*, or *Object*, *of Oognition*).

We now are going to explain each part severally, of the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* :—

'*Pramāṇaṭaḥ*'—the *Bhāṣya* uses this form as including all the *numbers*—singular, dual and plural,—as well as two declensional significations, of the Ablative, as denoting *causality*, and of the Instrumental, as denoting *instrumentality* [while '*pramāṇāṭ*' would have included only the *singular*, and that too of the *Ablative* only.] "But, how can it be possible to use the affix '*ṭasi*' in any sense other than the pure Ablative [its use being restricted to this latter by *Pāṇini* 5. 3. 7]?" It is possible, we reply, to use it in the sense of other declensional terminations also; inasmuch as the affix has been regarded as applicable too all declensional significations, from the nominative downwards [as pointed out by *Pāṇini* 5. 3. 14]. "What is the purpose that is secured by the use of this particular affix ?" In the first place, the *inclusion of all numbers* serves to make the word *comprehensive*, and at the same time *restrictive*—'*comprehensive*' as it implies the sense of all the three words '*pramāṇēna*' '*pramāṇābhyām*' and '*pramāṇaiḥ*' (*i. e.* the instrumentality of one, two, as well as three, *pramāṇas*) ; and '*restrictive*' as it implies the instrumentality of the *pramāṇa* only, (and not that of any thing else). In the second place, the *inclusion of the two declensional significations* (of the Instrumental and the Ablative) serves the purpose of denoting the *cause* as well as the *instrument* ; the '*pramāṇa*' being regarded as the *cause* because it is *from* the *Pramāṇa* that the cognition of objects proceeds ; and it is regarded as the *instrument* because the *cogintion of objects is accomplished *by means of*

* The Ṭāṭparya explains '*arṭham*' as equivalent to '*arṭhāḍhigaṭim*'.

pramāṇas; which points to the fact of *pramāṇas* being the *Instrument*, or most effective means, of accomplishing Cognitions. An objection is raised :—* "Inasmuch as the objects of different *pramāṇas* are distinct from one another, it is not right, or possible, for a number of *pramāṇas* to be spoken of comprehensively or collectively (as is sought to be done by the use of the affix 'ṭasi')." The answer to this is that this is not admitted. The objection is further explained :—"As a matter of fact, each *pramāṇa* has an object entirely distinct in character from those of other *pramāṇas* ; Sense-perception has for its object *specific individualities* ; while Inference apprehends *generalities* ; and certainly a distinction has to be drawn between *specific individuality* and *generality* ; and Sense-perception is never found to apprehend generalities ; nor is Inference ever found to apprehend specific individualities [And there is no other *pramāṇa* besides these two, Sense-perception and Inference.]" The answer to the above objection is that none of the propositions advanced by the objector is admissible ; that is to say, we do not admit that there are only *two pramāṇas* ; nor that there are only two kinds of objects apprehended by them ; nor that there is no commixture of *pramāṇas* (with reference to the same object of Cognition). Our reasons are as follows :—In the first place, the number of *pramāṇas* is *four* ; secondly, the objects apprehended by the *pramāṇas* are of *three* kinds—generality, particuliarity† (*i. e.* individuality,

* This objection emanates from the Bauddha who accepts only two Pramāṇas, Sense-perception and Inference; and according to whom what is apprehended by Sense-perception is only the *svalakṣaṇa* or *specific individuality* of the object; and another factor that enters into our conception of objects, according to him, is that an object is in essence only the *negation of other things*; this is the most *generic* conception that we can have of things; this is what is regarded by the Bauddha as the generality or '*sāmānya*', and it is this that forms the Object of Inference.

† The word *vishēṣa*' as used here is in the sense of the ultimate individuality, as well as the intermediate particularising qualities ; and not in that of the 'specific individuality' only.

final as well as intermediate) and that which is possessed of the peculiarity; thirdly, there is a commixture of *prāmaṇas* also, one and the same object being cognised by means of more than one *pramāṇa*; as we find in the case of the sense-organ for instance: the sense-organs, being Instruments whereby things are manifested (rendered cognisable), are *pramāṇas*; and among these we find that while each of them has its own specific object, there are many objects that are common to a number of them; for instance, *odour* is the specific object of the olfactory organ; whereas the *earth* is an object that is common to two sense-organs [being perceived by means of the eye as well as by the nose], while the cognition of 'being', as also the generic conception of 'quality', is derived through the agency of all the sense-organs.

[Against this 'commixture' of *pramāṇas* an objection is raised]—"If the object has been already cognised by the agency of one *pramāṇa*, the other *pramāṇa*, would be absolutely useless." It is not so, we reply; because the cognition obtained by the agency of one *pramāṇa* is of a character entirely different from that obtained by the agency of another. The objector explains his position further:—"If there be a commixture of *pramāṇas*, then, inasmuch as the object would have been already cognised by the agency of one *pramāṇa*, the agency of any other *pramāṇa* would be absolutely useless (in regard to the cognition of that same object); as if the latter *pramāṇa* were to bring about the cognition of that same object which had been already cognised by the agency of the former *pramāṇa*, then its operation would be as useless and superfluous as the pounding of the grain that has already been pounded." The answer to this is that what we mean by the 'commixture' of *pramāṇas* is not that the object cognised by means of Inference and the rest is of the same kind (and is cognised in the same manner) as that cognised by means of Sense-perception; because as a matter of fact,

we find that * when an object is cognised by means of Sense-perception, it is in contact with the sense-organs (and the cognition is obtained by means of this sense-contact); but when the same object is cognised by means of Inference, it is not in contact with the sense-organ (and the cognition is obtained by means other than sense-contact);—so also when that same object is cognised only as bearing a certain name (or as denoted by a certain word) | this cognition is got at through similarity, and not either through sense-contact, or through the circumstances attendant upon Inference];—and lastly, †when that same object is cognised by means of trustworthy assertion, is is through the agency of words [and not through any of the aforesaid agencies]. [Nor can the different *pramāṇas* be regarded as superfluous simply because there are cases of commixture of them; because] when pertaining to different objects, there is a distinct line of demarcation between the *pramāṇas*; and it is not that in all cases there is commixture of the *pramāṇas*.

Thus then, it is established that the affix '*ṭasi*' (in the word '*pramāṇaṭaḥ*') serves the purposes of *including all numbers and a both* (Ablative and Instrumental) *declensional significations*.

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* The translation of this passage is in accordance with the explanation of the Ṭāṭparya and the Parishuḍḍhi, which take it as referring to the case of the commixture of different Pramāṇas, as bearing upon one and the same object. This interpretation is supported by what follows in the Vārṭika itself, on p. 6, line 1. The sense is that even when the same object is cognised by different *pramāṇas*, it is cognised by each of these in a distinct aspect. For instance, when we perceive the jar by the eye as well as by the nose, what the eye perceives is the colour, while the nose apprehends the smell; under the circumstances, if, as the objector would have it, the eye were to cease to function because the jār had been already perceived by the nose,—then the colour of the jar would never be cognised. The manner of cognition too is different in the case of different pramāṇas. Thus it is found that in cases of commixture of *pramāṇas* there are distinct differences in the matter and manner of the cognitions; and there is no 'pounding of what has been already pounded.'

† The reading here in the printed text is defective.

[The sense of the affix *ṭasi* in the word *'pramāṇaṭaḥ'* having been explained] it becomes necessary now to ascertain the real character of what is expressed by the word *'pramāṇa'*. The first question that naturally arises is—what is it that constitutes the character of the *pramāṇa*? And what is it that is meant by the word *'pramāṇa*?'

The answer is that *pramāṇa* is the cause of cognition *; and consequently the *character of pramāṇa* consists in its being the cause of cognition. An objection is raised against this definition—"The definition proposed cannot be the right one; because it is applicable in common to other things also: that is to say, if *pramāṇā* be defined only as the *cause of cognition* then,—inasmuch as the *pramāṭṛi* (Cogniser) and *'pramēya* (Cognised Object) are *causes of cognition*,—these also would have to be regarded as endowed with the character of *pramāṇa*. If this is not intended, then, some difference (between *pramāṇa* on the one hand, and the Cogniser and the Cognised on the other, should be pointed out)." † The answer to this is that the difference lies in this that the *Cogniser* and the *Cognised* have

* The Ṭāṭparya notes that this definition would be too wide,—all doubts and misconceptions also being 'cognitions';—if the whole enquiry had not been prefaced by the qualification *'arṭharaṭ'*—'in consonance with the real nature of the object,' *i. e.* *'valid.'*

† The *first* distinction in thus explained in the Ṭaṭ:—'The operation of all agents lies in the operating of the instrument, and never directly in the bringing about of the ultimate result. The instrument is of two kinds—(1) that which already exists, *e. g.* the sense-organ, and (2) that which has to be brought into existence, *f. i.* the contact of the object with the organ; and in the case of cognition all that the Cogniser does is to set into activity these two kinds of instruments; these instruments on the other hand, have no other function save the direct bringing about of the Cognition. As regards the *Object Cognised*, it does not appear as *cause* in any other kind of Cognition save those in the form of Sense-perception; in all other Cognitions it appears only as the object upon which the instrument operates; in the case of Sense-perception also, all that the object does is to accomplish the *sense-contact* necessary for the Cognition; and it does not operate directly in the bringing about of the cognition which is brought about directly by the *sense-organ*, of course as aided by the aforesaid *contact.*

their function fulfilled elsewhere; that is to say, the function of the *Cognising Person* and the *Cognised Object* lies in, and is duly fulfilled by, the inciting of the *pramāṇa* (the cognitive instrument) into activity; this *instrument*, on the other hand, does not have its function fulfilled (except by the bringing about of the Cognition); for this reason it is the *pramāṇa* (and not the *pramātṛi* or the *pramēya*) that is regarded as the real *cause* (or instrument) *of the Cognition*. A further objection is raised—"In that case the *pramāṇa* itself would be without an instrument; that is to say, if the *pramāṇa* (the instrument) is itself brought into existence by the Cognising Person and the Cognised Object, then the coming into existence of the *pramāṇa* would be without an instrument [which is absurd, as without the intervening agency of the Instrument, no Agent can operate upon anything, even the *pramāṇa*.]" It is not so, we reply; because the contact of the object with the sense-organ would be the requisite *instrument* *; that is to say, the coming into existence of the *pramāṇa* is not without an *Instrument*; inasmuch as it is by the *instrumentality* of the contact of the object with the

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Thus it is proved that neither the Cognising person nor the Cognised object are the *direct cause* of Cognitions; it is the Cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*) alone that is the *direct cause*.

The second distinction between Pramāṇa on the one hand and the Pramāṭṛi and Pramēya on the other is explained in the Text, on p. 7. line 10.

* It is in this connection that the *Tāṭ* brings out clearly the confusion attaching to the use of the word *pramāṇa*:—If the cognition is regarded as the pramāṇa, then the sense-contact of the object is the *instrument* by which it is brought about; and in this case the acceptance or rejection of the cognised object is the *fruit*. When however it is the senseorgan that is regarded as the '*pramāṇa*', then the cognition itself is the *fruit*.

It may be noted here that the point of the objection was not against the case when the cognition is regarded as '*pramāṇa*', as in that case there could be no question of its having the contact for its instrument. The objection raised is with regard to all cases of '*pramāṇa*; and the answer given does nor refer to that case when the sense-organ is regarded as the '*pramāṇa*'. The answer in reference to this,—as also with regard to all cases of pramāṇa—would be that the *pramāṇa* is not brought into existence by the *pramāṭṛi* and the *pramēya;* these latter only serve to set it into activity towards the bringing about of the cognition.

sense-organ that the *pramāṇa* is brought into existence by the Cognising Person and the Cognised Object. The opponent raises a further objection:—"If, in the bringing abcut of the *pramāṇa*, the Cognising Person and the Cognised Object depend upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object, what do they depend upon in the bringing about of this contact [which also is regarded as a *pramāṇa*, an *instrument of Cognition*] ?" Well, in this, they depend upon the *Sense-organ*; so on, the series of *agents* and *instruments* goes on *ad infinitum*; that is to say, what comes afterw rds depends upon that which has gone before it, and so on the dependence of the agent upon the instrument may be traced back without beginning or end. A further objection is raised:—"It has been declared that the *pramāṇa* is brought into existence by the *pramāṭri* (the cognising person) and the *pramēya* (the object cognised), which two latter therefore must exist before the *pramāṇa* is brought into existence; well, as a matter of fact we know that until the *pramāṇa* is there, no person can be recognised as the 'Cogniser', nor can any object be known as the 'Cognised'; and thus it is not possible for either the *Cogniser* or the *Cognised* to have any existence prior to the appearance of the *pramāṇa*. Because the word '*pramāṇa*' is one that, by its formation, denotes some sort of practical relation to an action; and so also are the words '*pramāṭri*' and '*pramēya*'; and it is a well-recognised fact

Vār Page 7. that no such words are possible without some sort of action (the relation with which, of the thing denoted by the noun, would be implied by the word); * because it is not possible for any *substance per se* (without some action) to be a *kāraka* (*i. e.* a word bearing a practical relation to an action); nor is it possible for any mere *action per*

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* For example, Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa does not come to be regarded as an active efficient agent—a wood-cutter for instance—until he acually cuts the wood. Nor are his mere auxillary acts of raising and letting fall the axe regarded as that *afficient agent*.

se to be a *kāraka*; * in fact, all words denoting practical relation to actions are used with reference to (and as expressing) that which is operative towards the accomplishing of the principal action concerned, by being the substratum of those auxillary actions that lead to that final action; and inasmuch as the two words '*pramātṛi*' and '*pramēya*' are both words denoting practical relation to an action (*viz*: the action of *Cognising*), they could never be used without reference to that action." † The answer to the above objection is as follows: ‡ As a matter of fact, all *kāraka* words (words expressive of practical relation to actions), like 'Cooker' ('*pāchaka*') and the rest, pertain to the past, present and the future; that is to say, we do not admit that *kāraka* words are used only when actually related to the action *at the time*; what we hold is that they are used in regard to all three points of time (*i. e.*, as related to the action in the *past*, or *at the same time*, or in the *future*); if they depended for their

* For example, in the case of the *cutting of the piece of wood* being the principal action, (1), the *agent*, the wood-cutter, who is the *first kāraka*, is the substratum of such auxilliary actions as the raising and letting fall of the axe; (2) the *objective*, the wood that is cut, which is the *second* kāraka, is the substratum of the auxilliary actions of coming into contact with the falling axe; (3) the instrument, the axe which is the *third* kāraka, is the substratum of the auxilliary actions of rising and falling; and so on, every form of kāraka, or practical relative to actions, is dependent upon some sort of *action*.

† That is, without the *pramāṇa* there can be no *pramā* or cognition; and without the *pramā*, there can be no *cogniser* or *cognised*.

‡ Says the Ṭāṭ—'All agents—kārakas—are endowed with a two-fold potency tending to the bringing about of their respective effects: one potency consists in the very form or nature of the agent itself, and the other in the presence of auxilliary forces. In the case of the पाचक, he is the agent of cooking by his own nature, as also through the auxilliary in the shape of his actually doing the act of cooking; hence it follows that all kāraka words are capable of being used, even in the absence of the second potency, which would consist in their actual doing of the action,—the use in this case being dependent upon the primitive or primary potency of the words which is existent at all times; while the secondary potency exists at the time of the action only. Thus then, even though the *pramātṛi* and *pramēya* may not actually have brought about the *pramāṇa*, the words *pramātṛi* and *pramēya* would be capable of being used in that sense, on the basis of their primitive potency.

use upon their relation to *present* action only, then they could never be used in the absence of such action; as a matter of fact, however, we find the words so used [as when we speak of 'the *cooker* having cooked two days ago', or of 'the *cooker* going to cook two days hence', in both which cases the action of *cooking* is not *present* at the time that the *kāraka* word 'Cooker' is used]; and the reason for such usage lies in the (expressive) potency of the word itself; and this potency is present *at all times* (and not only at the time that the related action is actually *present*); in the same manner there need be no incongruity in the assertion that 'the *pramāṇa* is brought into existence by the *pramāṭṛi* and the *pramēya*.'

* There is yet another distinction between *pramāna* on the one hand and *pramāṭṛi* and *pramēya* on the other, whereby there is no possibility of any admixture among them (as to their instrumentality towards cognition) :—† This distinction lies in the fact that the *pramāṇa* is the most efficient and direct cause of cognition [while the *pramāṭṛi* and the *pramēya* are only *indirect* causes, bringing about the cognition, as they do, only through the *pramāṇa*.] That is to say, there is no possibility of any such contingency as that urged above,—*viz.*, that 'the *pramāṭṛi* and the *pramēya*, being *causes of cognition*, may be regarded as *pramāṇa*'; because it is the *pramāṇa*, and not the *pramāṭṛi*, or the *pramēya*, that is the most efficient and direct cause (of cognition).

"What is the meaning of *the most efficient cause*? When it is asserted that the *pramāṇa* is the *most efficient cause*, it is a mere verbal jugglery; and it does not express any meaning at all."

* This is another answer to the objection urged in the *Text*, p. 6, ll. 5-7.

† The Pramāṭṛi and Pramēya bring about the Pramāṇa, which brings about the cognition. Thus it is the *pramāṇa* that is the *direct* cause of cognition; while the former two are only *indirect* causes.

* In answer to this question, we proceed to explain what is meant by *pramāṇa* being *the most efficient cause*:—(1) The *most efficient cause* is that whose presence and absence regulate the presence and absence of the effect; thus for instance, as regards the *pramātṛi* and the *pramēya*, it is true that when these are absent, the *pramā* (cognition) does not appear (is absent); and it is also true that it is only when the former two are present that the cognition appears; but this does not mean that when they are present, the cognition *must* (always) appear; while as regards the *pramāṇa*, when this is present (and operative) the cognition must appear †; this peculiarity in the *pramāṇa* is what makes it *the most efficient cause* (of cognition). (2) Or, the peculiarity in the *pramāṇa* which makes it *the most efficient cause* may be regarded as consisting in the fact that it is only when equipped with the *pramāṇa* that one can have any cognition; ‡ that is to say, it is only when the *pramāṇa* is there, and never when it is not there, that one has any cognition. (3) Or, the peculiarity in the *pramāṇa* whereby it is recognised as *the most efficient cause* may consist in the fact that, even though the two factors—*pramātṛi* and *pramēya*—are present, they do not have any causal efficiency towards the bringing about of the cognition, until the *pramāṇa* appears. (4) Or, the peculiarity may

* There are *seven* different explanations of what constitutes the 'most efficient cause.'

† The operation of the Pramātṛi and Pramēya is taken up by the setting into activity of the Pramāṇa, which thereupon brings about the cognition. Thus being one step removed, there is always the likelihood of obstacles intervening between the Pramātṛi-Pramēya and the cognition; there being no interruption between the functioning of the Pramāṇa and the appearance of the cognition, there is no chance of any obstacles coming in.

‡ This explanation has to be added as the cognising observer has to be equipped with some *object* also. But it is not that when the object is present then *alone* can there be any cognition; as in the case of many inferential cognitions the object is not present at all. On the other hand, there are no cognitions at all when the *pramāṇa* is absent.

consist in the fact that like the final contact, it is the *pramāṇa* that is the last to appear (and operate); that is to say, in the case of a substance which is brought about by a number of contacts of the component particles, it is the last of these contacts that is regarded as the *most efficient cause* in the production of that substance;—in the same manner, in the case of cognition,—which is brought about by a number of agencies in the shape of the *pramāṭṛi*, the *pramēya* and the *pramāṇa*—it is the agency of the *pramāṇa* that comes last; and on that account it is the *pramāṇa*, and not the *pramāṭṛi* or the *pramēya*, that is regarded as *the most efficient cause* in the bringing about of that cognition. (5) Or, the peculiarity of the *pramāṇa* may lie in the fact that (of all agencies) it is that of the *pramāṇa* which is followed *immediately* by the cognition; the peculiarity in this case consisting of this *immediate*

Vār P. 8. *sequence*. (6) Or, the peculiarity may lie in the fact that it is the *pramāṇa* that forms the *specific* cause of each individual cognition; the *pramāṭṛi* is a cause that is *common* to all kinds of cognitions (perceptional, inferential, analogical and verbal, that the man may have); the *pramēya* also is *common* to the cognitions of all men (the same object being cognised by all); thus neither of these two is found to be the specific cause of any individual cognition; the *pramāṇa*, on the other hand, pertains to each individual cognition that is brought about; thus it is the *pramāṇa* that is regarded as the *principal* cause of each cognition; and it is on account of this predominance that the *pramāṇa* comes to be called *the most efficient cause.* (7) Or, the peculiarity may consist in the fact that it is the *pramāṇa* that specifies or individualises the contact leading to the cognition; that is to say, the contact (of mind and soul) which leads to cognition (and as such is common to all cognitions, like the *pramāṭṛi* and the *pramēya*) becomes specified, or individualised or restricted, to any one particular cognition, only through the *pramāṇa*; and

for this reason the *pramāṇa* comes to be called the '*most efficient cause**.'

[Of the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, the first word, '*pramāṇaṭaḥ*', has been explained; the *Vārṭika* proceeds to explain the next word '*arṭha*']—The word '*arṭha*', 'thing', is mentioned,—†*firstly* for the purpose of precluding the cognition (*praṭipaṭṭi*) which has the *pramāṇa* for its object; as a matter of fact, what urges the man to have recourse to an exertion towards the fulfilment of a desired end, is, not the cognition of the *pramāṇa*, but the cognition of the *thing* (*arṭha*) *as such* ‡ (*i. e.* as desirable); that is to say, it is only when the man cognises the thing as something desirable that he betakes himself to activity (tending either to the attaining or to the discarding of the thing cognised); —*secondly*, the mention of the word '*arṭha*' serves the purpose of excluding the cognition of such objects as deserve only to be disregarded; as a matter of fact, the cognition of an object which deserves to be disregarded (and which does not inspire the man with the desire either for obtaining or discarding it) does not urge the man to any exertion or activity; what does urge him to activity is the cognition of the thing as the source of either pleasure or pain; it is only when the man cognises the thing to be the source of pleasure

* Says the *Ṭāṭ*—'The *pramāṇa* is said in the text to be *aṭishyashabdavāchya*; though what is meant is that it is the *aṭishayin*; the use of the word in the text is explicable only on the ground that the two—*aṭishaya* and *aṭishayin*—are held to be *identical*.

† When a man knows a thing as something desirable, he takes to the activity tending to the acquiring of that thing; the mere cognition of *pramāṇa* does not lead to any activity; and as the author of the Bhāṣya had to speak of what leads to activity, he had to add the word '*arṭha*'; without this word, the word *praṭipaṭṭau* only could have included the cognition of things as well as of *pramāṇas*, or of any and every matter that may be cognised.

‡ '*Ṭaṭhābhāva*'—*arṭhaṭva*—*arthanīyaṭva*; the word 'arṭha' being literally *that which is desired*, *arṭhyaṭē iṭi*; this *desirability* applies to pleasure as well as pain—the former being desirable for acquiring, and the latter for discarding.

or pain that he betakes himself to activity (tending to the obtaining of that which is cognised as the source of pleasure, and to the discarding of that which is cognised as the source of pain).

An objection is raised:—"There is no necessity for the mention of the word '*pramāṇa,*' inasmuch as what is intended to be expressed by this word [viz: the cause of fruitful activity or exertion] would (as shown in the above paragraph) be implied by the word '*arṭha*' itself." The answer to this is that the word '*pramāṇa*' serves the purpose of indicating the distinctive feature of *pramāṇas*. What the objection means is that,—if the *Bhāṣya* passage had stood simply as—*it is only the cognition of an arṭha that is capable of giving rise to fruitful exertion*,—this alone would have implied the agency of *pramāṇas*, inasmuch as there can be no cognition without *pramāṇa*. But this is not right; because even so, the addition of the word '*pramāṇaṭaḥ*' is not wholly useless; as, in the first place, it serves to indicate the distinctive feature of *pramāṇas*: that is, in ordinary usage, we find the word '*pramāṇa*' used promiscuously, being sometimes applied to real *pramāṇas*, and often also to such instruments of cognition as are not real *pramāṇas* (instruments of *Right* Cognition), but which are yet called '*pramāṇa*' on account of their similarity to real *pramāṇas* (in that both are *instruments of cognition*); [and the mention of the word '*pramāṇa*' serves to indicate this distinctive feature of the real *pramāṇa*, as compared to what is only spoken of as such, the sense being that] * the cognition of things that is *brought about by the real*

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* It is true that the mere *pramāṇa* in general would be implied in the word '*arṭha*'; but that would not be enough; what is really capable of giving rise to fruitful exertion is not mere *pramāṇa* in general, but only such pramāṇa as is the cause of the cognition of things; and it is only when the thing is cognised by the real *pramāṇa* that it gives rise to fruitful exertion, and not when it is cognised by the unreal *pramāṇa*. The printed text reads '*ṭaṭhāha*'; this does not give any satisfactory meaning; the *Ṭāṭparya* reads '*ṭadyāha*' which is adopted in the translation.

pramāṇa proves this real *pramāṇa*,—and not anything else—to be capable of giving rise to fruitful exertion. Another useful purpose served by the addition of the word '*pramāṇa*' is that, if this word were not used, it would not be possible to use the Ablative affix '*ṭasi*' ; and the ablative affix serves useful purposes (as already shown above, *Text*, p. 14, ll. 20, &c.)

[The *Vārṭika* proceeds to criticise the interpretation offered by other *Naiyāyikas*].—Some *Naiyāyika-Ēkaḍēshīs* offer the following explanation of the word '*arṭha*' (as occurring in the Bhāṣya) : —" The word '*arṭha*' denoting sources of pleasure and pain, the addition of this word serves the purpose of including *all things* that are *desired* (*arṭhyamāna*) ; all things, including the *pramāṇas* and all the rest, are *sources of pleasure or pain* ; and as such, all these are *desired* ; and as *desired*, they all fall under the word '*arṭha*'." This explanation is not right ; as this would involve—(1) a *contradiction*, (2) the undesirable contingency of *expressing what is not intended* and other incongruities ; because, in the first place, one who asserts that *all things*, *pramāṇa* and the rest, are *sources of pleasure or pain* (and as such denoted by the word '*arṭha*') would contradict the statement in the *Bhāṣya* (*Text* page 2, *l.* 7 and *p.* 3 line 1) to the effect that—' what are denoted by the word *arṭha* are the four things—*hēya* (pain and also pleasure as tainted with it), *hāna* (true knowledge as putting an end to pain), *upāya* (the scientific treatises as bringing about true knowledge) and *aḍhiganṭavya* (Release, as the final end to be attained).'*—Then again, the discarding

* Another 'contradiction' involved is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭ*—If *all things*—including *pramāṇas*, the *shāsṭra* and even Release—were *sources of pleasure and pain* (pleasure also being classed under *pain*, as shown in the *Bhā* p. 2, l. 16), they would all be *sources of pain* ; and as such they would all come under *hēya*, *things to be discarded* *i. e.* Even the *shāsṭra* and the *pramāṇas* whereby all knowledge is attained, would all come to be classed under that same category; and while contradicting the *Bhāṣya* and the *Suṭra*, this would involve a palpable absurdity.

of *pramāṇa* and the rest, is not possible *—and (even if possible) the discarding of such things as *pramāṇa* (Release) and the rest is not what is intended to be said (by the authors of the *Sūṭra* or the *Bhāṣya*) whose declared purpose lay in the explanation of the means to Release). For these reasons, the above interpretation must be rejected as incorrect. What are really denoted by the word *'arṭha'* are only all those things which are either themselves *pleasure and pain*, or are the cause of these; that this is so is also proved by the fact that it is only these things whose cognition can give rise to the 'fruitful exertion' that forms the topic of the context (as declared by the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*); [that the word *'arṭha'* cannot mean *all things* is also proved by the fact that, if it did so, it would include the *cognition* also;] as a matter of fact however, the cognition could not be so included; (1) because [it does not constitute either *pleasure* or *pain* or the *cause of these*, and as such] it does not form the topic of the context;—(2) † because the cognition by itself

* This second objection against the interpretation is indicated by the particle '*cha*' (in the *Text.*, p. 9, l. 1) which we have rendered above by the phrase 'and other incongruities.' The sense is that *pramāṇa*, being a source of pain, would be included under '*hēya*'; but the only means of discarding the 'hēya' consists in the shāsṭra of which the *pramāṇas* constitute the integral part; so if the *pramāṇas* have to be discarded, they would be avoided by means of themselves, which is an absurdity.

† If evey cognition were the object of a further cognition, then the series of every single cognition would go on *ad infinitum*; and so the whole lifetime of a person would not be enough for one cognition even. It is for this reason that some point in the series, some one cognition, should have to be regarded as not being the objective of a further cognition. And thus by its very nature cognition cannot be regarded as always forming the objective of actions; consequently it could not be regarded as 'hēya'—object to be discarded—which forms one of the factors denoted by 'arṭha'; nor can it be an object to be *acquired*; because it is an end in itself.

This is the interpretation is accordance with the *Ṭāṭparya*; and this is the only possible interpretation of the reading as it stands. But the last sentence is not very clear—because cognition is an *end in itself*, that is all the more reason why it should be sought after. If we read '*aphalaṭvāṭ*', the meaning becomes clearer: that which cannot form the *objective*, *can never form a phala*; and that which is *not a phala* can never be *sought after*, *arṭhyamāna*.'

is not capable of forming the *objective* of actions: it cannot be '*hēya*' (object of the action of *discarding*) as it is neither *pleasure* nor *pain*, nor the *cause of these*; nor can it be an object to be sought after, because it forms an end in itself.

Says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 1, line 6)-'*So'-yam pramāṇārṭho*-'*parisaṅkhyēyaḥ*';—some commentators have explained this to mean that 'it is not possible to enumerate the precise number of the objects on which the *pramāṇas* operate, because the number of such objects is infinite.' This interpretation is not correct; because the *Bhāṣya* has actually enumerated both * kinds of '*arṭhas*' (in the preceding sentence): it has been actually mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* that the *pramāṇārṭha* (the object of the *pramāṇas*) consists of the following four:—pleasure, pain, the cause of pleasure and the cause of pain;—and inasmuch as here we find both kinds of '*arṭha*' actually enumerated, it is not right to interpret the passage in question (which follows immediately after the enumeration) to mean that such enumeration is not possible;—another reason why we cannot accept this interpretation is that, in support of the assertion '*pramāṇārṭho*' *parisaṅkhyēyāḥ*,' the *Bhāṣya* puts forward the reason '*prāṇabhṛidbhēḍasyāparisaṅkhyēyaṭvāṭ*' (*because the number of living creatures is infinite*'); and if the above interpretation were correct, the sense of the *Bhāṣya* would come to be this—'the objects of *pramāṇas* cannot be enumerated, because the number of living creatures is infinite,'—an entirely incoherent assertion! There is however, no real incoherency in the *Bhāṣya*:—what the word '*arṭha*' means is 'purpose' or 'motive', *prayojana*; and not '*object*', *viṣaya*; the sense of the *Bhāṣya* thus being that *the purposes served by a pramaṇa cannot be enumerated.* "How do you know that this is the real meaning of the Bhāṣya?" [For the simple reason that the reason given in support of this

* 'Both'—the two kinds consisting of (1) Pleasure and Pain, and (2) the cause of pleasure and pain.

assertion fits in with this meaning: the sense being that '*the number of living creatures being infinite*'] the same thing may be the cause of pleasure to some and the cause of pain to others [hence it cannot be definitely enumerated or stated that the *pramāṇa* pertaining to any one object serves the purpose of causing pleasure only, or that pertaining to another object serves that of causing pain only.]

[*Bhā.* p. 1, line 7.] *It is only when the Instrument of Right Cognition duly operates* * *with regard to an object, that due success belongs to the Cogniser.* [In support of this assertion the *Bhāṣya* puts forward the reason '*anyaṭamāpāyē'-rṭhasyānupapaṭṭēḥ*,' and in this clause] the word '*anyaṭama*' must be taken to mean the *most efficient cause*; because this is the meaning that fits in with the context: what is sought to be asserted in the context is that among the four—*Pramāṇa*, *Pramāṭṛi*, *Pramēya* and *Pramā*,—it is the *Pramāṇa* that forms the most predominant factor; such being the case, if we took the clause in question to mean what the words signify in ordinary parlance [*i. e.* if the sentence were to mean that 'the object would not be accomplished *if any one of the four were absent*,' taking the word '*anyaṭama*,' in its ordinary sense of 'any one of the number'], in what way would that prove the predominance *of the Pramāṇa*? [As in that sense, the clause would prove every one of the four to be equally important]. For this reason, we must take the word '*anyaṭama*' in the sense pointed out above (that of *the most efficient cause*) [the clause thus meaning—'because there is no possibility of the object being accomplished so long as *the most efficient cause* is not present.']

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*The word '*arṭhavaṭ*' is explained as—(1) '*samyagarṭha*' 'right', 'in due accordance with the real nature of the thing cognised', and (2) also as '*shakṭa*', 'capable', 'operative'; hence it has been considered proper to translate the word as *duly operates*, which combines both ideas.

[Among the four, the *Pramāṭṛi* is the first to be mentioned and described in the *Bhāṣya*; so the *Vārṭika* proceeds to define the *Pramāṭṛi.*]—The *Pramāṭṛi* or Cogniser is one who is self-sufficient or independent. "In what does this *independence* consist?" (I) The 'independence' of the *Pramāṭṛi* consists in the fact of his being the enjoyer or experiencer of the results brought about by the active agencies pertaining to the action (of cognition): as a matter of fact, it is the Cogniser who becomes related to the results brought about by the active agencies tending to the action of cognition. * (II) Or, the 'independence' of the Cogniser may be regarded as consisting in the fact that it is he in whom inheres the action (proceeding from the active agencies): as a matter of fact, it is the Agent who becomes the receptacle or substratum of that action which is brought about by all the active agencies (operating towards that action). † (III) Or, the 'independence' of the Cogniser may consist in the fact that it is the Agent who sets into activity (or operates) the active agencies;—or' in that it is he who is urged to activity by the active agencies; that is to say, it is the Agent who operates the active agencies whose potency (with regard to the action contemplated by the agent) has been duly ascertained,—and who himself is urged to activity by such agencies.

[The *Bhā.*, p. 1, line, 11, says—'*chaṭasriṣu chaivamvidhāsu arṭhaṭaṭṭvamp arisamāpyaṭē.*'—'It is on all these four that the *real nature* of things is dependent;'—in this passage]

* The *Agent* has been defined as one who experiences the results of the action of which he is the agent. As a matter of fact however, all agents do not always enjoy the result of their actions; for instance, the cook, who is the *Agent* in the action of cooking, does not experience the results of cooking; as the food cooked is eaten, not by him, but by his master. In view of this defect in the definition the author puts forward another definition.

† That is to say, the Agent is that person whose direct action is denoted by the verb.

what is meant by '*ṭaṭṭvaparisamāpṭi*,' dependence of the *real nature*, is that it is through the four factors described (*Pramāṭri* &c.) that things become capable of either being *used* or *disregarded*. That is to say, the 'dependence' Var. Page 10. must consist in the fact that it is only when a certain thing has been duly *cognised* (by means of the fcur factors enumerated) as being the source of either pleasure or pain, that it becomes capable of being *used*—*i.e.*, either *acquired* or *discarded*;—or, when it is cognised as being the source of neither pleasure nor pain, that it becomes capable of being *disregarded* (treated with indifference).*

[The *Bhā*, has used the word, *taṭṭva*, *real nature*, or *thatness*.] On this the question is put—" what is that '*ṭaṭ*'?" The answer is that the *entity* and the *non-entity* constitute the 'ṭat or 'that.' What the questioner seeks to urge is that the word '*ṭaṭṭva*' ('that-ness') being an abstract noun formed from '*ṭaṭ*' ('that'), and as such meaning 'the character or essence of that,' it should be explained what the 'ṭaṭ' is, whose 'essence' (or character) is expressed by the abstract noun '*thatness*.' Our answer to the question, therefore, is that what is meant by '*ṭaṭ*' is *that which exists* (entity) and *that which does not exist* (the non-entity); that it must be these that are meant [and not the Prakṛiṭi, Puruṣa, &c., of the other systems] is proved by the fact that what forms the avowed topic (of the Sūṭra and the *Bhāṣya*) is *that which forms the object of the pramāṇas*, and, as a matter of fact, *entities* and *non-entities* are what form the 'object of *pramāṇas*'; it is for this reason that the word 'ṭaṭ' must stand for '*entities* and *non-entities*'; the 'nature' (or 'character') of these constitute '*saḍasaṭṭva*,'—including (*a*) '*saṭṭva*' (*existence*, the character of the entity) which con-

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*'*Ṭaṭprāpṭi*'=Acquiring the thing, and '*ṭaṭprapṭiṣēḍha*'—the contrary of the former, *i.e.*, discarding. But the *Ṭāṭ*. *makes* '*ṭaṭ*' (in *ṭaṭpraṭiṣēḍha*) equivalent to both *acquiring* and *discarding*, and '*praṭiṣēḍha*' as referring to the negation of both these,—*i.e.*, *disregard* or *indifference*.

sists in being the object of the *positive pramāṇa*, and (*b*) '*asattva*' (*non-existence*) the character of the nonentity, which consists in being the object of the *negative pramāṇa*. The *entity* and the *non-entity* are of two different characters —the one is affirmed and the other is denied; it may so happen that the same thing that is *affirmed* in one place (where it exists) is *denied* in another place (where it does not exist); *e.g.*, odour is *affirmed* in reference to Earth, but *denied* in reference to Water. "If both are *objects of pramāṇa*, then there comes to be absolute non-difference between the *entity* and the *non-entity*." This reasoning is by no means conclusive, we reply. In connection with what we have been saying people may have the notion that, if the *entity* and the *non-entity* are both apprehended by *pramāṇa*, then, both, being equally *objects of pramaṇa*, must be non-different. But this is not right; as the reason put forward (in support of non-difference) is by no means conclusive (being not universally true); because as a matter of fact, we find that all such things as the cow, the jar and the like are *apprehended by pramāṇas*, and yet they are *different*; which distinctly shows that the premise, that 'whatever things are apprehended by *pramāṇas* are all non-different,' is not universally true. There is a distinct difference between the *entity* and the *non-entity*; inasmuch as, while the *entity* forms the object of *apprehension*, and that too *independently* by itself, the *non-entity* forms the object of *non-apprehension*,* and that also only through something else; that is to say, the *entity* forms the substratum or object of *pramāṇas* independently by itself, while the

* The non-entity is said to be the 'object of non-apprehension,' because 'non-apprehension' is only the apprehension of the non-existence of the non-entity; and the non-existence of a certain thing is apprehended through the apprehension of the existence of something else at the place. Though in both cases, we have *apprehension*, yet the apprehensioon of *non-existence* has been called 'non-apprehension' for the purpose of distinguishing it from the apprehension of existence,—the two apprehensions being of entirely different kinds.

non-entity forms the object of *pramāṇas*, through something else,—*viz.*, through *negation*.

[In support of the view that the non-apprehension of the non-entity is dependent upon the apprehension the entity, the *Bhāṣya* has cited the instance of the 'lamp']; what is meant by this instance of the 'lamp' is—that, in a chamber, the lamp, while making known (perceptible) such things as the jar and the like that exist in the chamber, makes known also those other things that do not exist there; and no other means (save the lamp) is adopted for the knowing of what does not exist there; what happens is that, when the jar and other things existing in the room are seen, this is followed by the following cogitation in the mind of the observer —'in this room there is no other thing, save those that I see, of the same kind; for if any such had existed, it would certainly have been seen like the jar, &c.; as a matter of fact, however, I do not see any such things; and therefore conclude that no other things exist in this room';—just as such is the case in the case of the 'lamp,' so is the case with *Pramāṇas* also; when *what exists* has been cognised by means of *Pramāṇas*, there appears in the mind of the cogniser the following cogitation—'in this place there is no other cognisable object,—if any such had existed, it would have been cognised,—as a matter of fact, no such object is cognised,—therefore, we conclude that, there being no cognition of any such thing, no such thing exists'.—Thus it is that '*the Instrument of Cognition which manifests (or makes known) the existent thing also manifests the non-existent thing*' (as declared in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 2, lines 7—8).

And [though both the *entity* and the *non-entity* form the object of *pramāṇas*, yet] the various non-entities (or non-existent things) are not described in the *Sūtra*, because they are never apprehended independently by themselves.

* In reality, however, we must accept the *Sūṭras* as mentioning those non-entities, or Negative Entities, which are in any way helpful in the attaining of the Highest Good; and the Negative Entities that it omits are only those that are not so helpful, and as such do not fall within any of the 'four purposes of man'; and this is exactly what the Sūṭra has done with regard to the Positive Entities, of whom also it describes only those that are conducive to the Highest Good. † That some of the Negative Entities (as

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* The passage appears to be confused; but the printed text is what is supported by the *Parishuḍḍhi*. The translation follows the explanation given by the *Ṭāṭparya*; The *Parishuḍḍhi* recognises the difficulty in the original passage, and remarks that the reason given, 'because not fulfilling the four ends of man,' does not prove the conclusion in the form of '*uḍḍiṣto vēḍiṭavyaḥ*'; it offers the following interpretation of the reasoning—'the Sūṭras must be regarded as describing the negative entities that are conducive to the Highest Good,—because these come within the four purposes of man,—like those positive entities that are so conducive'.

† The reading of the printed text is not very satisfactory; the word '*prapañcha*' is not only superfluous; but it spoils the sense of the whole passage. In this sentence, the words '*bhāva*' and '*abhāva*' do not stand for Positive and Negative Entities respectively; but for the *presence* and *absence* (respectively) of the capability to help the attainment of the Highest Good. This is how the Ṭāṭ. explains it; the reading adopted by it is—*abhāva upadiṣto vēḍiṭavyaḥ*. How the Sūṭra does make mention of *negative entities* also is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭ*: (1) *Pramāṇa*, the very first category described in the Sūṭras, is both *positive* and *negative*;—*negative*, e.g., when the *absence* of the cause is accepted as a '*pramāṇa*' for the absence of the effect; (2) among *Pramēyas* also, which form the second category, the most important is *apavarga*, Final Release, which, as consisting in the *negation of pain*, is a purely *negative* entity; and so forth. It is the reading and interpretation of the Ṭāṭ, that has been followed in the translation. The passage as it stands in the printed text may be rendered as follows—'The Negative Entities become explained indirectly by the explanation of the Positive Ones; and for this reason they are not mentioned separately'. It has to be admitted however that this passage, if interpreted thus, would confuse the preceding passage still further; as if all Negative Entities are so included, how are we to explain the reasoning based upon the Negative Entities not coming under any of the 'four ends of man'?

The whole confusion into which the passage has been thrown has been due to the attempt made by the commentators (the Ṭāṭparya and the Parishuḍḍhi) to connect '*chaṭurvargānanṭarbhāvāṭ*' with what follows. In the Translation it has been thought right to follow the lead of these old commentators. If however we do not mind these, the passage becomes tolerably clear; and may be rendered thus:—

well as Positive Entities) are not conducive to the attainment of Highest Good is proved by the fact that the Sūṭra distinctly mentions those Entities (*positive as* well as *negative*) that are conducive to it. It is for this reason that the *Sūṭra* makes no mention of those *Negative Entities* that are not useful (in the attaining of the Highest Good). *The Entity is gcing to be described by means of* (*as constituting*) *a comprehensive group of sixteen* (says the Bhāṣya ; p. 2, l. 8).

The negative entities are not mentioned,—(1) because they are known independently by themselves :—(2) because the negative entities do not fall within any of the four ends of man ;—and (3) because the explanation of the negative entities is in a way included in that of the positive entities ; inasmuch as when the Sūṭra describes the positive entities (Pramāṇa and the rest, the knowledge whereof is conducive to the Highest Good), it includes among these the negative entities also (whose knowledge is equally conducive to the same end) ; it is for these reasons that the Sūṭra has not mentioned the negative entities separately ; the positive entities are pointed out (in Sū. 1) as forming a group of sixteen.'

II.

[*First Aphorism Explained.*]

BHĀṢYA

[P. 2, L. 9 to P. 3, L. 2.]

From among (endless) entities (*e.g.*, *Pramāṇa* &c., and many such other things as the grains of sand &c.),—

It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the Highest Good——(1) The Means of Right Cognition; (2) The Objects of Right Cognition; (3) Doubt; (4) Motive; (5) Example; (6) Theory; (7) Factors of Inference; (8) Hypothetical Reasoning; (9) Demonstrated Truth; (10) Discussion; (11) Disputation; (12) Wrangling; (13) Fallacious Reason; (14) Perversion; (15) Casuistry; and (16) Clinchers. (Sūṭra 1.)

* When expounding the compound in which the above categories are mentioned, each of them should be stated by means of words having the singular, dual or plural form in accordance with the actual number of the category concerned, as described later on. The compound is the *Dvandva* of the *copulative* class. The genitive ending at the end of the compound word '*Parmāṇaprarmēya.........ṭaṭṭva*' has the force of the '*shēṣa*'† (that is, signified relationship in general); the genitive ending involved in the compound '*ṭaṭṭvajñāna*' (which is equivalent to '*ṭaṭṭvasya jñānam*'),—as also that involved in the compound '*nishshrēyasādḥigamaḥ*' (*nishshrēyasasya adḥigamaḥ*),—has the sense of the *accusative*.

Those enumerated in the Sūṭra are the entities or categories for the true knowledge of which the present treatise has been propounded. Thus the present *Sūṭra* should be taken as stating in brief the purport of the whole treatise;—this purport being that the Highest Good is attained by the knowledge of the essence of such things as the Soul and the rest; this same idea is further elaborated in the next Sūṭra—the sense of which is that the Highest Good is attained when one has rightly understood the real nature of—(*a*) that which is

* The Vārṭika makes the sentence '*chārṭhē dvandvasamāsaḥ*' precede '*nirḍēsheyaṭhāvachanam vigrahaḥ*'. This also appears to be the natural order: the explanation of the particular form that the *vigraha* is to take can come only after the particular compound has been noted.

† '*Shēṣa*' is a grammatical technical name given to that which does not fall within any of the case-relations denotative of active agency towards an action. In the case of the Genitive, when no case relation is found possible, it has to be taken as expressing mere relationship in general.

fit to be discarded (*e.g.*, *pain*) along with its causes, (*i.e.*, *ignorance and desire, merit and demerit*, as leading to pain), (*b*) that which is absolutely destructive (of pain, *i.e.*, *true knowledge*), (*c*) the means of its destruction *i.e.*, the scientific treatises), and (*d*) the goal to be attained (*i.e.*, Highest Good); these being the four classes or kinds of objects dealt with (by all philosophical treatises).

Bha. Page 3.

VARṬIKA II.

[P. 11, L. 8 to P. 13, L. 10.]

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 2, L. 8) having declared that *the entity is going to be described by means of a comprehensive group of sixteen*, what the Sūṭra means is that the categories enumerated are the said kinds of 'entity'.

The compound in the Sūṭra is said to be of the Copulative class, because it is that compound alone in which each member is of equal importance (and none is subordinated to any other). "What do you mean by this?" The meaning simply is that every one of the categories, Pramāṇa and the rest, should be properly understood. If the compound were taken to be of any other kind, all the categories, Pramāṇa and the rest, (with the exception of the last, the 'Clincher') would become subordinate adjuncts (to the last), which would mean that none of those are *things to be understood* [which would be absurd].

Each of the members of the compound should be mentioned by means of words having the singular, dual or plural forms &c., says the *Bhāṣya*, (p. 2, l. 13). The same grounds that we have for using different 'numbers' in connection with the several categories on the occasion of defining them (later on in the Sūṭra), hold good here also, (when we are called upon to resolve the compound into its component factors).

The genitive ending at the end of the compound has the force of the 'shēṣa',—says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 2, l. 13.—14).

" What is this *shēṣa*?" When none of the case-relations is intended to be expressed, we have what is called '*shēṣa*'; that is to say, when what is intended to be expressed (by the termination) is neither a *case-relation* nor any *primary action* (which is the invariable concomitant of every case-relation), we have what is called '*shēṣa*'; as for instance, in the case of the genitive in the expression '*brāhmaṇasya kamaṇḍaluḥ*' (the Brāhmaṇa's vessel', where the genitive denotes mere *relationship*, and no *action* of the Brāhmaṇa, or any case-relation of his to any action).

[The compound in question as explained above has two factors—(I) '*Pramāṇapramēya......nigrahasṭhānāni*' and '*ṭaṭṭvam*'; on this point an objection is raised].—" The compound is open to objection, inasmuch as there are incongruities when 'ṭaṭṭva' is regarded as different from 'Pramāṇa' and the rest; and also when it is regarded as not different from these; for example, if the '*ṭaṭṭva*' is something different from *Pramāṇa* and the rest, then the 'attainment of the Highest Good' would not follow from the knowledge of *Pramāṇa* and the rest; as what is declared as leading to that attainment is the knowledge *of ṭaṭṭva*; just as when one speaks of '*rāja-puruṣānayana*', the 'bringing' is that of the *puruṣa*, and not of the *rājā*;—if, on the other hand, the *ṭaṭṭva* is the same as '*Pramāṇa*' and the rest, then the word '*ṭaṭṭva*' in the *Sūṭra* would be entirely superfluous: if you do not regard *ṭaṭṭva* as something different from *Pramāṇa* and the rest, then it is absolutely useless to have the word '*ṭaṭṭva*'."

To this objection some people (who are not sure as to the difference or non-difference of the *ṭaṭṭva* from *Pramāṇa* and the rest) offer the reply that in neither of the two cases there is any incongruity. In the first place, if the *ṭaṭṭva* were different from *Pramāṇa* and the rest,—inasmuch as it is not an independent entity by itself, it would carry along with it *Pramāṇa* and the rest (that are mentioned along with it);

just as when we speak of the 'existence of the *fruits*' as being in the pit, inasmuch as *existence* is not an independent entity by itself, it carries along with it the *fruits*;—whence the declaration comes to mean that it is the *fruits* that are present in the pit; in the same manner, when the Sūṭra speaks of 'the attainment of the Highest Good', as following from the knowledge 'of the *taṭṭva* of Pramāṇa and the rest,'—inasmuch as '*taṭṭva*' is not an independent entity by itself,—what is meant is that it is the *Pramāṇa* and the rest (the knowledge *of whose real nature* leads to the said attainment).

Vār. Page 12.

Secondly, if the *taṭṭva* be regarded as the same as Pramāṇa and the rest, the addition of the word '*taṭṭva*' would not be entirely superfluous; as it would serve the purpose of precluding all other things, except Pramāṇa and the rest [this preclusion would not be expressed if the word '*taṭṭva*' were absent]; just as, for example, in the case of the expression 'the fixity of the arrow', even though the *fixity* is nothing different from the arrow, the word serves the purpose of precluding a property (that of mobility) of the arrow. That it to say, just as in the case of the latter expression what is meant is not the arrow merely, but also that the arrow is not something else, *i. e.* a moving thing;—in the same manner the purpose served by the addition of the word '*taṭṭva*' is that it indicates that what is intended to be declared is, not only that the 'attainment' follows from the knowledge of the real character of Pramāṇa and the rest, but also that it does not follow from the knowledge of anything else (in the shape of such character as are only wrongly imposed upon Pramāṇa and the rest).

The above answer to the objection it not right; as it cannot be proved that* *taṭṭva* is the same as *Pramāṇa* and the

* The Ṭāṭ. points out that in the case of the 'fixity of the arrow' also, inasmuch as the 'fixity' which is only *absence of motion*, is a negative entity, it cannot be identical with the arrow, which is a positive entity.

rest. [As will be evident from the facts and reasonings explained in the following paragraphs, from which also the real answer to the objection can be deduced].

Says the *Bhāṣya* (*p.* 2, *l.* 16)—'*Taṭṭvajñānānnishshrēyasādhigamaḥ*', '*the Highest Good is attained by the knowledge of the real nature* (of such things as the Soul and the rest)'. In this clause, the word '*ṭaṭṭva*' (real nature) becomes the *objective*, by being *that which is known*; and '*nishshrēyasa*' (Highest Good) also becomes the *objective*, by being *that which is attained.*

Question:—"(1) What is *real nature* (*ṭaṭṭva*)? and (2) what is the '*highest good*' (*nishshrēyasa*)?"

Answer—(1) That which forms the basis of a certain thing being cognised in its true form constitutes the *real nature* of that thing; that is to say, in the case of every thing it is found that there is something in it in virtue of which the thing comes to be known as what it *is*,—and it is this something that forms the *real nature* of that thing.

(2) As regards the '*nishshreyasa*' or *Good*, it is of two kinds—*seen or preceptible* and *unseen* or *imperceptible*; that which follows from the knowledge of the real nature of Pramāṇa and other categories is the *seen or perceptible good*; because as a matter of fact, we find that whenever any one of these categories is cognised, it does not fail to bring about the idea of either *discarding or acquiring* or *indifference* (and all this is *seen* or *perceptible*.) "But if this view were true, then, *all* the categories would have to be regarded as objects that are *to be known* (for the purpose of attaining good); [while we find the Sūṭra, 1.1.9 later on, specifying only twelve 'objects of cognition']." The fact of the matter is that (while some sort of perceptible good might follow from the knowledge of everyone of the categories, Pramāṇa and the rest, yet) the *highest good* (which is *imperceptible*) follows only from the knowledge of Soul and the

other 'objects of cognition' (specified by the ninth Sūṭra. * The Opponent objects (to the *imperceptible* good):—"As a matter of fact we actually *see* that perceptible *good* results from the knowledge of all the categories, Pramāṇa and the rest; † while on the other hand, there is no proof for—or means of knowing—an imperceptible good that is held to follow from the knowledge of Soul and the rest." It is not true, we reply, that there is no proof for this latter; in fact such is the actual state of things; it is a well-ascertained fact that the Highest Good is attained by the knowledge of Soul and rest; and conversely, when the Soul and the rest are wrongly known, the troubles of birth and rebirth (which constitute the opposite of the Highest Good) do not cease. This we shall explain in greater detail under Sūṭra 2. Then again, if the Highest Good were to follow from the knowledge of Pramāṇa and the other categories, then Release, (which is the Highest Good) could not belong to only those persons who seek it (by the right means); as there is no person who has no knowledge of even one of the categories. From all this it follows that the man who seeks Release has to know only the Soul and such other 'objects of cognition' [It is not only from the very nature of things that Highest Good is attained by the knowledge of Soul and the rest]. That it is only the knowledge of Soul and the rest that leads to the Highest Good is also indicated by the fact that the Soul

*Says the *Ṭāṭ*—It is true that the word *nishshrēyasa* denotes *anything desirable*, and some sort of a desirable result is actually attained by the knowledge of such things as Pramāṇa and the rest. But the *good* that is really meant by the word in the Sūṭra is that *highest* from of it which is attained only by the knowledge of Soul and the rest; and this is *unseen*. The *pramāṇa* &c. are also mentioned as objects to be known for that purpose; as even though it is the knowledge of Soul and the rest only that leads directly to the Highest Good,—yet it cannot be denied that the knowledge of *Pramāṇa* and the rest also aids in that attainment *indirectly*.'

† We have translated this sentence according to the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭparya*; it appears better to translate it thus—' there is no ground for the view that *perceptible* good follows from the knowledge of Pramāṇa &c., while *imperceptible* good results from the knowledge of Soul &c.'

and the other 'objects of cognition' have been separately put forward (by Gauṭama, in Sūṭra 9); if *Pramāṇa* and the other categories were the only 'objects of cognition',—and if the Highest Good followed from the knowledge of these only,—then the author of the *Sūṭra* would not have specifically mentioned the 'objects of cognition'; in the shape of *Soul* &c. as in that case, all the 'objects of cognition' having been already mentioned in the opening Sūṭra, it would be extremely foolish of the author of the Sūṭra to specify in a further Sūṭra (I. 1. 9) only a few things (Soul, &c.) as the 'objects of cognition.'

Says the *Bhāṣya* (*pp.* 2—3)—'*The same idea is further explained in the next Sūṭra, the sense of which is that the highest good is attained &c. &c. &c.*' 'That which is to be discarded' is *pain*; the 'causes' of pain are *ignorance* and *desire*, as also *merit* and *demerit*; 'that which is absolutely destructive of pain' is *the knowledge of the real nature of things*; 'the means of the destruction (of pain)' are the *scientific treatises*; 'the goal to be attained' is *Release*. These four are called '*Arṭhapadāni*', 'objects dealt with', because it is these that are described and explained by the great teachers in all philosophical treatises.

III

[*Detailed Examination of Sūṭra I.*]

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 3, L. 3, to P. 7, L. 4.]

An objection is raised :—" The mention of *Doubt* and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous; because all these, being included either among 'the Means of Knowledge' or among 'the Objects of Cognition', cannot be regarded as different from these."

This is true; but for the good of living beings have been provided the four sciences [Vedic, Agricultural, Political and Logico-Metaphysical], of which Logic-Metaphysics forms the fourth, also called 'Nyāya', the Science of Reasoning;—each of these sciences deals with a distinct set of sub-

jects, and each has its own distinct method of treatment; and as a matter of fact, Doubt and the rest form the subjects dealt with by the science of Logic-Metaphysics*; consequently, if all these were not distinctly enunciated, it would appear that this science dealt with the Soul only, like the Upaniṣads. It is for this reason (*i. e.*, for the purpose of guarding against this idea) that Doubt and the other categories have been enunciated with a view to indicate clearly the distinctive subjects dealt with by this Science (which thus becomes distinguished from the other Sciences).

[The Author proceeds to show in what manner Doubt and the other categories form integral factors of the Science of Reasoning]. (A) [As regards *Doubt*, the third among the enunciated categories] '*Nyāya*' or 'Reasoning' functions neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are *doubtful*; as is declared in the *Sūṭra* (1-1-41)—'on any matter held in suspense, when the reality of things is ascertained by means of considering the two sides of the question, we have what is called *Demonstrated Truth*';—in this *Sūṭra*, 'suspense' is *Doubt*; the 'considering of the two sides' constitutes the process of reasoning; and 'the ascertainment of the reality of things,' which is 'Demonstrated Truth', forms 'the knowledge of the real nature of things.' The form in which *Doubt* appears is 'or'—'is the thing this *or* that?;'—it is an uncertain idea that we have of things; and thus (*i. e.*, being an *idea*), though it is an *object of cognition*, and thus already included in the second category (Pramēya), it is mentioned separately for reasons indicated above [*i. e.*, because it forms a necessary factor, the very basis, of the process of *Reasoning*].

[B] As regards '*Motive*' (the fourth category);—*Motive* is that on being urged by which man has recourse to activity; that is to say, it is that, desiring either to obtain or to acquire which, man has recourse to an action; and as such, this bears upon (or affects) all living beings, all actions and all sciences; and this forms the basis of all reasoning or investigation (Nyāya) [without some motive, or end in view, no reasoning is had recourse to]. "What do you mean by this *nyāya* or *reasoning*?" It means the examination of

*Thus even though Doubt, &c. may be included under the 'Means' and the 'Objects' of Cognition, it is necessary to enunciate them separately, in order to indicate the several 'subjects' dealt with by the Science.

things by means of proofs,* that is to say, Inference based upon Perception and Verbal Testimony is called 'Nyāya' or 'Reasoning'; it is also called '*Anvīkṣā*' ('investigation') because it consists in the *reviewing* (*anu-īkṣaṇa*) of a thing previously *apprehended* (*īkṣiṭa*) by Perception and Verbal Testimony; the science that proceeds by this 'investigation is called '*Ānvīkṣikī*', '*Nyāyavidyā*', '*Nyāyashāsṭra*', the 'Science of Reasoning' (Logic). That Inference which is contrary to Perception and Verbal Testimony † is not *true* Reasoning; it is *false Reasoning*.

Bhā. P. 4. [It has been asserted that '*Motive* bears upon all living beings, all actions and all sciences'; the author now proceeds to show what *motive* there is in the three kinds of *Discussion*, mentioned among the categories.] That in regard to this (above-mentioned 'false reasoning') Discussion and Disputation serve distinct purposes is well known [Discussion being carried on for the purpose of getting at the truth, and Disputation for that of vanquishing an opponent]; as regards Wrangling, we proceed to examine whether or not it has or serves any purpose. One who has recourse to *wrangling* is called a *wrangler*; and when pressed to state what his motive is, if he states his motive, declaring that such is his standpoint and such his theory (for establishing which he has recourse to the wrangling),—then he abandons his character of *wrangler* (a wrangler being one who does not take up any definite position for himself); if, on the other hand, he does not state his motive, then he becomes open to the charge of being neither an ordinary man of business, nor a serious enquirer;—lastly, if (in order to escape from these contingencies) he declares his motive to consist in the showing of the impossibility or untenability of the position of his opponent (without the establishing of any position of his own),—then too he becomes open to the same contingencies; for instance, when *showing the untenability of the opponent's position*, he has to accept the following four factors—(1) the person *showing* the untenability (*i. e.*, the wrangler himself), (2) the person to whom the untenability is shown, (3) that (reasoning) by means of which he shows the untenability, and (4) that (untenability) which is shown; and in accepting these, he renounces his *wranglership*. [The true *wrangler* being one who does not admit anything]. If, on the other hand,

*The *Tāt* explains that by 'proofs' here are meant the five factors or members of the syllogism.

†The *Tāt* adds 'Analogy'.

he does not admit these four factors, then his assertion—that his purpose lies in the showing of the untenability of his opponent's position—becomes meaningless. Then again, *Sūṭra* 1-2-3 defines Wrangling as *a collection of sentences 'wherein there is no maintaining' (of any definite standpoint)*; now if the wrangler admits what is declared by means of those sentences, then that becomes his *position*, which he has to maintain; if, on the other hand, he does not admit what is meant by the sentences, then, those sentences become absolutely meaningless (for him), and his putting them forward becomes a mere random incoherent babbling*.

[Having proved the presence of some motive in all actions, the author takes up the original subject, and proceeds to show how *Example*, the fifth category, and the rest of the categories enunciated, form integral factors in the Science of Reasoning, and what purposes each of them serves.]

[C] As regards *Example*, the *fifth* category,—it is something that is directly perceived—*i.e.*, which can not fail to be perceived (or known) by all enquirers—ordinary men and learned (and which needs no proof, which is self-evident); this (*Example*) is, from its very nature, an '*object of cognition*' (and thus included in the *second* category); but it has been mentioned separately, because Inference and Verbal Testimony are both dependent upon it; it is only when there is an *Example* (to corroborate the premiss, for instance)—and not otherwise—that there can be a Valid Inference, or Verbal Testimony. It is thus on the basis of an *Example* that all Reasoning proceeds; as in demolishing the Opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to (not compatible with) an *Example* (admitted by both parties); and in establishing one's own position also, it becomes necessary to show that it is corroborated by an *Example*. [There is yet another reason why importance has been attached to *Example*; it is through this that the position of

*The Bhā. only puts forward the arguments *against* there being any motive in Wrangling; it does not show how a motive is present in this form of discussion. This answer has been supplied by the Vārṭika, wherein it is shown that the definition of Wrangling does not mean that the wrangler can have no position of his own; all that it means is that in wrangling his *motive* lies, not in the maintaining of any position that he might hold, but simply in showing the untenability of the opponent's position. Hence even though he admits the four factors enumerated above, he does *not* renounce his *wranglership*.

the atheistic Bauddha becomes doubly untenable]. If the Atheist admits a corroborrative example, he renounces his atheistic (Nihilistic) position [as by Nihilism, all things have merely momentary existence; and hence it is not possible for the *Example*, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time that it is put forward]; if, on the other hand, he does not admit an *Example*, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his Opponent? Further, the enunciation of *Example* among the categories is necessary, because it is only when the *Example* has been described that we can have the definition of the 'Instance corroborrative of the inferential premiss' as propounded in *Sūtras* 1. 1. 36 and 37,—'the *corroborative instance* is that *example* which possessing the properties of the probandum is similar to it' (Sūtra 36), and also it is 'that *Example* which, not possessing the properties of the probandum is dissimilar to it' (sūtra 37). [Thus the description of *Example* is found to be a necessary factor in the art of reasoning].

[D] A proposition or statement of fact asserted in the form 'this is so' is called 'Theory' (or Doctrine). This is an 'object of cognition' (hence included under the second category); and yet it has been enunciated separately by itself, because, it is only when there are a number of different *theories*, and never otherwise, that the three forms of discussion—Discussion, Disputation and Wrangling—become possible.

Bhā. Page 5.

[E] When a certain conclusion has to be proved, a number of words (sentences) have to be used; and the five sentences that are necessary for the proving of the conclusion are called '*Pratijñā*' (Statement of the Conclusion) and the rest; and these five taken collectively are what have been called '*Factors*' (the *seventh* category); all the 'means of knowledge' (or forms of valid cognition) are found to be present among these 'members'; for instance, the 'Statement of the Conclusion' is *verbal*; the Statement of the *Probans*' is *inferential*; the 'Statement of the Instance' is *perceptional*; the Statement of the Minor Premiss' is *analogical*; and the 'Reassertion of the Conclusion' consists in the' indicating of the capability of all the aforesaid Statements to bear upon the same object or purpose. It is this five-fold declaration that constitutes the highest form of reasoning [as it is only when thus stated that the Reasoning succeeds in convincing the unbeliever]. It is on the basis of this form of

Reasoning again that the three forms of Discussion proceed; they cannot do so without it; and the ascertainment of truth also is dependent on this form of Reasoning. It is for these reasons that though the aforesaid 'members of reasoning,' being in the form of words, are included in the second category, 'Object of Cognition', yet they have been mentioned separately.

[F] *Hypothetical Reasoning* is neither included among the four aforesaid 'Means of Cognition'; nor is it a distinct (fifth) 'Means of Cognition'; it however helps the 'Means of Cognition' in that it leads to the ascertainment of their validity or invalidity, and thereby helps in the attaining of true knowledge. As an example of *Hypothetical Reasoning*, we have the following :—There arises a doubt as to whether the birth of man is brought about by a cause that is itself caused,—or by a cause that is uncaused,—or it is merely accidental, without any definite cause; and this uncertainty affords an occasion for the functioning of *Hypothetical Reasoning*, based upon the consideration of the possible causes (and their effects); and it proceeds in the following manner :—'If birth is brought about by a cause that is itself caused, then it is only right that on the disappearance of the cause (which being *caused* is liable to disappearance), there should be cessation of birth;—if birth is brought about by an uncaused cause, then, the disappearance of the *uncaused* entity being impossible, there would be no possibility of any cessation of birth;—if, lastly, it were without a cause, then, as coming into existence without a cause (and as such being *uncaused*, eternal), it could never cease to be; and hence there could be no cause for its cessation; which means that there would be no cessation of birth. The

Bhā. Page 6. 'Means of Cognition' bearing upon the subject-matter of the above tend to indicate that *birth is due to Karma*; and in this they are helped (have their validity established) by the above *Hypothetical Reasoning*; and thus, inasmuch as *Hypothetical Reasoning* serves the purpose of analysing the objects of true knowledge, it is regarded as helping in the attaining of true knowledge. **Hypothetical Reasoning, even though included in the second category, 'Object of Cognition,' is yet enunciated separately, because, along with the 'Means of Cognition' it is of use in Discussion, both in establishing (one's own position) and in demolishing (the position of the opponent).**

[*G*] *Demonstrated Truth* constitutes that true knowledge which is the result of the 'Means of Cognition'; * it forms the final aim of all Discussion; and Discussion is aided by Disputation and Wrangling. It is the last two categories of *Hypothetical Reasoning* and *Demonstrated Truth* that carry on all the business of the world; and it is for this reason that, though included in the 'object of cognition', *Demonstrated Truth* has been enunciated separately.

[*H*] *Discussion* consists in a number of sentences (or declarations) put forward by various speakers, purporting to be reasons in support of several theories, leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of these theories as the 'demonstrated truth'; and it has been enunciated separately for the purpose of indicating its distinctive features; as it is only when it is carried on in accordance with its distinctive characteristics that it leads to the ascertainment of truth.

[*I and J*] *Disputation* and *Wrangling* are different forms of Discussion; they are different from Discussion *proper* [inasmuch as Disputation admits of the use of Casuistry &c., that are not allowed in Discussion; and Wrangling does not tend to the *establishing* of any position, which forms the main purpose of Discussion]; and they have been enunciated separately, because they help in the guarding of the *knowledge of truth* once attained (by means of Discussion).

[*K*] *Fallacious Reasons* are in reality included among the *Clinchers* (the sixteenth category); but they have been enunciated separately, because from among the 'Clinchers', it is these that can be put forward or indicated in Discussions —the other 'clinchers' being indicatable only in Disputations and Wranglings.

[*L, M and N*] *Perverse Reasoning, Casuistry* and *Clinchers* have been enunciated separately, for the purpose of showing what they are; as it is only when the real character of these has been shown that these can be avoided by one in his own assertions, and urged with force against the assertions of others; and also when an opponent

Bhā. Page 7.

* The *Tātparya* points out that it is the *members* of Reasoning that are meant here by 'Means of Cognition'; as it is only in them that we have all the Means of Cognition along with Hypothetical Reasoning. But it adds that in reality Demonstrated Truth is that true knowledge which is led to by Hypothetical Reasoning; and therefore Demonstrated Truth should be regarded as the result of Perception and all the other Means of Cognition, as aided by Hypothetical Reasoning.

has recourse to casuistry, it can be easily refuted and also easily made use of [indicated and explained to the Umpire; only when its real character is known] *

III.

Vārṭika.

[Page 13, L. 10 to P. 22, L. 17.]

An objection is raised—"Doubt and the rest of the categories should not be enunciated separately; as every one of them is included in the second category 'Objects of Cognition'." This is not right, we reply; because the enunciation of these categories serves the purpose of showing the subjects of the Science of Reasoning. You mean to say that, inasmuch as Doubt and the rest are all included in 'the Objects of Cognition' they should not have been enunciated separately; but you are not right; because such enunciation is necessary for the indicating of all the subjects dealt with by the Science we are dealing with. There are four Sciences; and each one of these deals with a different set of subjects; for instance,—(*a*) the science of *Vedic Trinity* deals with such subjects as the offering of the *Agnihoṭra* &c.; (*b*) the science of *Agriculture* deals with the plough and the cart and such other subjects; (*c*) the science of *Government* deals with the distinct duties of Kings, and Ministers; and (*d*) the Science of *Reasoning* with Doubt &c. Such being the case, if Doubt and the rest were not pointed out as forming its subjects, the Science of Reasoning would come to be regarded as merely a Science of the Soul. "What would be the harm, if it did so become?" The harm would be that, if it were a science of the Soul only, it would be nothing more than the science of the *Upaniṣaḍs*;—and as such, this Science becoming included (like the Upaniṣaḍs) in the *science of the Vedic Trinity*, the number of Sciences would be reduced

* Thus then it has been shown that *Doubt* and the other categories, even though included in the first two categories, have been separately enunciated with a view to indicate the *subjects* dealt with in the Science of Reasoning.

to *three* only; and thus we would not have the "Four Sciences" (as mentioned in the scriptures). It is for this reason that *Doubt* and the other categories have been enunciated separately.

[*A*] Of the categories in question, *Doubt* consists in that form of cognition which is uncertain in its character. "To speak of a cognition as *cognition*, and yet call it *uncertain* is a contradiction in terms." There is no contradiction in this; we are actually cognisant of this character (uncertainty) of some cognitions: in course of our experience we actually feel 'I have an uncertain, a doubtful, cognition'; and (it is so called) because (even though it is the 'cognition an object) it does not distinctly apprehend (render knowable) the definite form of that object; and thus it is a *cognition* and at the same time *uncertain*. "In what manner does this form an integral factor in Reasoning?" Because, says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 3, l. 8,) '*Reasoning functions neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to those known definitely for certain*'. "To say that a certain object is *known*, and yet not *known for certain* is a contradiction in terms:* That which is *known* cannot be *not known for certain*; if it is *not known for certain* it is not *known* at all; and hence to say that a thing is *known* and yet *not known for certain* is certainly a contradiction in terms." There is no contradiction here either; as it is quite possible for a thing to be *known* in a general way (in its indefinite form) and yet be *not known for certain* in its specific details. "Even so, the self-contradiction does not cease; as it would certainly involve a self-contradiction to call a thing 'not known for certain' *in that form in which* it is 'known' †"

Vār Page 14.

* The declaration of the *Bhāṣya*—'Reasoning functions neither with regard to things unknown, nor with regard to those known for certain'—means that Reasoning functions with regard to things that are *known* and yet not *known for certain*; and it is in this that the objector finds a self-contradiction.

† If a thing is known in its indefinite form, if one calls it 'not known' *in that form*,—this involves a self-contradiction.

Thus also there is no self-contradiction; for the simple reason that you add the qualifying phrase *in that form which* (which shows that there is some form of the object *known* that is *not known for certain*); if the thing were *known for certair* in all its forms (in which it is known), then there would be no sense in the assertion that the thing is 'known for certain' *in that form in which* it is 'known'. Hence it is quite reasonable to hold that a thing may be *known* in its indefinite form, and yet be *not known for certain* in its definite specific details.

Thus then, it is for this reason—[*i.e.*, because Reasoning never functions either with regard to things unknown or to those that are not known for certain, but it functions only with regard to things with regard to which there is a Doubt]—that, even though included in 'Objects of Cognition' (the second category), Doubt has been mentioned separately by itself.

[B] *As regard Motive*—the question may be asked: "What is *Motive*?" It is in answer to this that the *Bhāṣya* says—"*Motive is that urged by which man has recourse to activity*';—and in this the Bhāṣya declares what is found in ordinary experience. Next comes the question—"What is it by which man is urged to activity?" Some people hold that man is urged to activity by Righteousness, Worldly Prosperity, Desire and Final Release. But we hold that by what man is urged to activity are *attaining of pleasure* and *avoiding of pain*; and it is only because they are the cause of pleasure and pain * that all things urge all conscious beings to activity. *This Motive forms the basis of Reasoning.* (Bhā P. 3, L. 14). "What do you mean by *basis* here? It certainly cannot mean the *receptable* or the *container*." What is meant by *Motive* being the 'basis' of Reasoning is that it is an *aid* to

* The thing causing pleasure urges the man to acquire it; while that causing pain urges him to avoid it.

it; as a matter of fact, the whole process of investigation has its source in a *Motive*; it is only when there is some *Motive* that one has recourse to investigation; and hence it is the *Motive* that sets the investigation into operation. "What do you mean by *investigation*?" 'Investigation' is reasoning. "What then is 'reasoning'?" '*Reasoning*', says the *Bhāṣya*, '*consists in the examination of things by means of proofs*.' (P. 3, l. 15) That is to say, Reasoning consists in the due ascertainment of the real character of a thing by means of all the *Means of Cognition* collectively; * in cases where any single Means of Cognition brings about the apprehension of a thing, it is not called 'Reasoning'; it is only when all the Means of Cognition bring about the apprehension *collectively* that they constitute 'reasoning.' It is this that forms the 'highest form of reasoning', as it is by means of this that one can convince his Opponent,—as we shall explain later on† (*Bhā*. p. 5, *Vār*. p. 18, ll. 9 &c.).

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 3, l. 15) has also defined *Reasoning* as '*inference based upon Sense-perception and Verbal Testimony*.' Here what is meant by the Inference being 'based upon' Sense-perception &c., is that it should not be contrary to facts ascertained by Sense-perception and Verbal Testimony. As a matter of fact, we find that when what is known by means of Inference is corroborated by Sense-perception and Verbal Testimony (as represented in the members of the syllogism), the knowledge attained becomes more clear and precise; on the other hand, in a case where there is no mutual corroboration among the several Means of Cognition, each being presented (in the syllogism) in a form pointing to an entirely different conclusion, we

Vār. Page 15.

* The different 'members' of the syllogism are got at through different 'Means of Cognition'; for instance, the Minor Premiss by Analogy, the Statement of the Conclusion by Verbal Testimony, and so forth.—See *Bhā*. p. 5.

† The Tāt. points out that it is regarded as the 'highest' because it has all the means of Cognition for its auxilliaries.

have what is called a mere 'Muddle' or 'Confusion' of Reasoning; and it is such Confused Reasoning that is put forward as 'ostensible philosophy' (or mere semblance of philosophy) by people seeking after either pecuniary gain, or respect or fame (and not really knowing the truth). This is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya* when it declares that—'*that Inference which is contrary to Perception and Verbal Testimony is not true Reasoning, it is false reasoning.*' (*P.* 3. *l.* 17)

(1) As an Example of 'Inference contrary to Perception,' we have—'Fire is not-hot, because it is a product, like the jar.' "Wherein lies the *contrariness* or incongruity of this Inference?" It lies in this that it has been put forward in regard to a thing which is not a fit object for Inference; that is to say, the Inference pertains to a thing which is not an object of Inference; it is not an object of Inference, because the thing with reference to which the Inference has been put forward (*i.e.*, the non-hot character of fire) is one that has been rejected or negatived by Perception* [and as the operation of Perception precedes that of Inference, by the time that the latter has an opportunity of operating, the object in question has been negatived]. Some people (among others, the Bauḍḍha logician Diṅnāga) cite as an example of 'Inference Contrary to Perception', the following—'Sound is not audible &c., &c.' But these people do not know what forms the true object of Perception or of Inference. "How so?" Because, as a matter of fact, the functioning of all sense-organs is beyond the reach of the senses, and 'audibility' is a function of the sense-organ (of hearing); and as such, how could it ever form

* The translation follows the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭ*. From what the Vārṭika says in regard to the next example of Inference, cited by Diṅnāga, it appears better to translate the passage thus:—'The thing with reference to which the Inference has been put forward—*i.e.*, the touch of fire—is one that lies within the province of Perception (and as such it cannot rightly form an object of Inference).

an object of Perception [and if '*audibility*' is not an object of Perception, how can any Inference of *inaudibility* be 'contrary to Perception'?]

(2) As an example of 'Inference contrary to Verbal Testimony', we have the following—'the human skull is sacred, because it is a part of the animal body, like the conch-shell.' "In what way can this Inference be called *contrary to Verbal Testimony*?"* Our reply is as follows—When one asserts that the human skull is sacred, it becomes necessary for him to explain what is meant by this *sacredness*; that is, what is meant by asserting that the skull is sacred; if it means that if a man touches the skull, no sin accrues to him,—then it should be pointed out for what man there is no sin (in the touching of skull); if in answer to this, the objecting Bauḍḍha should declare that it is he himself to whom no sin accrues by the touch, then, it is quite true: taking his stand, as he does, upon his own scriptures, it would be as he says, with regard to himself [*i.e.*, to *him* the skull will be quite a sacred object]! If, however, he were to assert that it is the believer in the Vedas to whom no sin would accrue by the touching of the skull,—then, inasmuch as all believers in the Vedas accept the Vedas as 'Verbal Testimony', the assertion of the sacredness of the human skull would be a clear case of 'contradiction of Verbal Testimony' [as the Vedas distinctly declare the skull to be an unclean thing.] Then again [to the Bauḍḍha who, independently of Verbal Testimony or Scripture, would seek to establish the cleanliness of the skull by means of Inference pure and simple, we put the following question:—] —What is the meaning of the assertion that 'the human skull is sacred'? This assertion is in the form of a specification; and being a specification, it implies the negation or

* This question emanates from the Bauḍḍha for whom the Shruṭi text that declares the unclean character of the skull, does not constitute 'Verbal Testimony.'

exclusion of all other things; thus then, when you assert that 'the human skull is sacred' (it implies that something else is not sacred); it becomes necessary for you therefore, to point out what is *not sacred* [and this cannot be done by one who rejects all scriptures; as scripture is the only guide on the matter of sacredness and non-sacredness]. If, in order to avoid this contingency, you make your assertion imply that *all things* are sacred (and the assertion be taken as not implying the non-sacredness of any thing),—then the Inference becomes open to the objection that it can have no Corroborrative Instance (a necessary factor in all Inference), for the simple reason that *all things* are made to be included in the 'Subject' of the Inference.

[In describing the *Wrong* Inference, the Bhāṣya has explained it as that which is 'contrary to Perception and Verbal testimony'; against this the following question is raised] —"Wherefore should not Inference be spoken of as *Contrary to Inference* (also)"? The reply to this is that, inasmuch as there is no possibility of two (contradictory) Inferences with reference to one and the same subject, there can be no 'contradiction' (of one Inference by another)*; as a matter of fact, it is not possible that with regard to one and the same thing there should be two Inferences, fully equipped with all necessary negative and affirmative premises; and consequently an Inference can never be 'Contrary to Inference'. "From this same reasoning it follows that Inference cannot be 'contrary to Perception' either." This certainly does *not* follow; because as a matter of fact an Inference fully equipped with negative and affirmative premises is actually rejected (or sublated) by Perception [and this is

Var. Page 16.

* The sense is that whenever there are two contrary conclusions obtained by two Inferences, the one Inference does not reject the other in favour of itself; what happens is that they nullify each other; it is only when of two contrary cognitions, one is by its very nature, more authoritative than the other, that there is that real contradiction whereby one rejects the other.

due to the fact that the latter is more authoritative or trustworthy than the former; and as such there can be no nullification of both, as in the case of two Inferences, which must be of equal strength].

"[Granting that Inference cannot be 'contrary to Perception'] wherefore cannot Inference be 'contrary to Analogy' [and yet the *Bhāṣya* does not mention this]?" * It is not that Inference cannot be 'contrary to Analogy'; and yet the Bhāṣya does not mention it, because it is already included or involved in the contradiction of the former two 'Means of Cognition' (*i. e.* Perception and Verbal Testimony); that is to say, the 'contradiction of Analogy' is involved in the contradiction of the other two 'means of cognition'; for instance, we shall point out later on that † Analogy consists in *the cognition of similarity* (which is *perceptional*) dependent upon (*i. e.* aided by) remembrance due to impressions left by Verbal Testimony (and this latter is *Verbal*); and thus the contradiction of this Analogy would be already included in, and implied by, the 'contradiction of Perception and Verbal Testimony' (mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*).

Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 4, L. 1).—'*That in regard to this, Discussion and Disputation serve distinct purposes is well known.*' In regard to this, an objection is raised—"Why should this subject be introduced in this place? [after 'Motive' has been explained, it was necessary to take up *Example*, which is the next in the list of categories,—and not Discussion &c.]." The answer is that the subject has been rightly introduced by the

* In view of the fact that the Vārṭika does not deny the possibility of Inference being contrary to Analogy, but only makes it follow from the Contradiction of Perception and Verbal Testimony,—the Ṭāṭ. has construed this passage in the manner in which it has been translated.

†The Analogical Cognition—in the form 'this animal is called गवय,—is brought about by the perception of similarity as aided by the remembrance of the trustworthy assertion that 'the animal resembling the cow is called *gavaya*'. Hence every case of 'Contradiction of Analogy' would only be a case of 'Contradiction of Perception and Verbal Testimony.'

Bhāṣya in the present context, with a view to consider what *motive* (or purpose) there is in Discussion and Disputation;—the consideration of this matter being necessitated by the previous declaration of the *Bhāṣya* to the effect that *'Motive bears upon all living beings, all actions, and all sciences'* ; [and thus the discussion started by the *Bhāṣya* actually forms part of the explanation of ' Motive ', and does not introduce the subject of Discussion and Disputation as independent categories.] It is with this view therefore that we have the *Bhāṣya* declaring—*'in regard to this, Discussion and Disputation serve distinct purposes'*;—'in regard to this', that is, in regard to (in connection with) the ' false reasoning' spoken of in the preceding sentence.* [This being universally admitted as regards Discussion and Disputation, the *Bhāṣya* continues]—*'As regards Wrangling, we proceed to examine whether or not it has any purpose* (to serve).' Some people hold that, consisting as it does of mere fault-finding, *Wrangling* cannot have any purpose or motive. This however is not true; because, as a matter of fact, Wrangling is not mere fault-finding ; a man is called a *wrangler* when, though taking up a position, he does not make it his business to establish it (but proceeds merely to demolish the position of the adversary); in fact, if he were not to take his stand upon a definite theory or position, he would be derided and dismissed as a mere madcap. Says the *Bhāṣya* —*If he declares his motive to consist in the showing of the untenability of the position of his opponent, then also he becomes open to the same contingencies* ; and the sense of this is that even so, if he accepts the four factors—mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*, —that constitutes his ' position ' ; and if he does not accept these, then he becomes fit for the merest derision and neg-

* It is only with regard to 'false reasoning' that Discussion and Disputation have their use ; because in both of these the reasonings propounded by both parties cannot be true ; hence it becomes necessary to ascertain whose is 'true reasoning' and whose 'false reasoning'; and this purpose is served by Discussion and Disputation.

lect. *Then again, *Wrangling* has been defined as *that sentence which does not establish any counter-theory*; now if the wrangler accepts the meaning of this *sentence*, that becomes his *position*; if, on the other hand, he does not accept the meaning of the sentence (that he himself pronounces), he makes himself ridiculous. Thus has Motive been explained.

[C] As regards *Example*, it has been defined (in the *Bhāṣya*) as *that which is directly perceived.* "What do you mean by this ?"—asks the Opponent.† What is meant is that a thing, that is not beyond the range of the knowledge of (*i. e.*, incapable of being known by) ordinary men and philosophic enquirers, constitutes an Example. It is only thus that the Soul and the rest become included. That is to say, it is only when the definition of *Example* is interpreted to mean 'that which is not incapable of being known,' that it can include such (imperceptible) things as the Soul and the like (which are actually found to be cited as *Examples* in philsophic treatises); if on the other hand, the *Example* is declared to be such as must be *amenable to Sense-perception*,‡ the *Soul* and such other things become entirely excluded; and this would militate against those aphorisms (of Gauṭama) wherein these things (the Soul and other imperceptible things) are actually cited as *examples*. The *Example*, defined as above, is included in the second category of the 'object of cog-

*The sentences put forth by the Wrangler are intended to show that *the position of the adversary involves certain fallacies*; if he then accepts the truth of this assertion' this may be regarded as the position taken up by himself; if he does not accept its truth, he purposely declares what is false.

†The sense of the objection raised by the questioner is that the definition is so palpably absurd that it must mean something entirely different from what it appears to mean; everything that is directly perceived cannot be an *example*; nor is every example such as is directly perceived, because we find many examples cited as such, which are not *perceptible*, but cognisable by other means of cognition.

‡The printed edition reads '*pratyakṣādi*', but the '*ādi*' appears to be superfluous; as the original definition mentions only '*pratyakṣa*.' If we must retain '*ādi*,' the meaning would be that if any *one* of the various means of cognition be specified' such things as are not cognisable by that means would become excluded.

nition ', because it is actually found to be *cognised;* and yet it has been enunciated separately because all Reasoning is based upon it; as is pointed out by the *Bhāṣya—it is only when there is an example, and not otherwise, that there can be a valid Inference or Verbal Testimony;* the meaning of which is that, as a matter of fact, it is only when a *thing has been perceived* [before, in a well-known substratum, which forms the Example] that it comes to be *inferred* [in another substratum] (which shows that Inference is based upon previously known examples); and it is only what is already known that is spoken of to others * (which shows that Verbal Testimony is based on previously known examples). There is yet another reason why *Example* has been enunciated separately : It is through this that the position of the Atheist is shown to be untenable, involving a self-contradiction if he admits of an example, as well as if he does not admit one; this has been fully explained in the *Bhāṣya.*

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[D] The specification of a definite opinion is what is called '*Theory*',—this 'opinion' being expressed in the form either of 'this' or 'thus'. † The former is the mere mention of a thing in a general way; while the latter points out its distinctive characteristics; when these opinions are specified,—as that 'this is the opinion

*When one has known in a number of cases that a certain word denotes a certain meaning,—then alone is he able to speak of the thing to others by means of that word

†The translation deviates a little from the interpretation of the Ṭātparya. Herein the 'this' is rightly explained as referring to the object; but when it adds that the 'this' refers to opinions common to all philosophical systems,—and thereby is made to take the mention of 'this is the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas, &c. &c.' as only a partial illustration,—it appears to be unnecessarily forcing the interpretation; because if 'this' referred to universally recognised things, how could the Vārṭika say—'this is the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas &c. &c.'? The sense appears to be simple enough:—the, 'this' refers to the mere enunciation or enumeration of the categories, while 'thus' refers to the further delineation of the characteristics of those categories. This interpretation alone makes the following objection possible.

of the Sāṅkhyas', 'this the opinion of the Yogas',—they come to be known as *Theories*. An objection is raised—"[If Theory consisted only in the aforesaid specification, then] in that case the name 'Theory' could not rightly be given to those theories that are common to all systems,—inasmuch as in the case of these no *specification* would be possible; for the simple reason that they do not belong specifically to any particular system." This is not right, we reply; because in the case of such theories, we could have the *specification* in the form—'Such is the opinion of all.' Even though Theory is included in the second category of 'Objects of Cognition', yet it has been enunciated separately, because it forms the subject of all Discussion &c.; it is only when there are different *Theories* (with regard to the same thing) that we have Discussions, Disputations and Wranglings with reference to them.

[E] As for the '*Factors of Inference*' (mentioned as the seventh category), they are various parts of a sentence. "What is this *sentence* of yours?"* [When a number of words are used] there is an idea afforded by the word denoting the *object*; and when this idea is taken along with the remembrance that is afforded by the other word denoting certain qualifications of that object,—by the help of that remembrance we get at the idea of that object as qualified by, or related to, that qualification; and that which is the means of getting at this idea of the *qualified object*, is what we call 'Sentence'. † And it is the 'parts' of such a sentence that have been referred to above as forming the 'factors.' "How many of these *parts* are there?" As many, we reply,

* The sense of the questioner is that all the individual letters having only momentary existence, they can never coexist, and as such they can never coalesce to form what is generally known as 'sentence.'

† "A *sentence* is a conglomeration of such words as give rise—[directly by means of one word and indirectly by the remembrance of the other words]——to one connected idea'—says the *Tatparya*.

as are necessary for the accomplishment of the conclusion. " What do you mean by *conclusion* ?" The *conclusion* consists in the object in question having the particular character that is sought to be proved. " What then do you mean by *accomplishment* ? " It is the cognition or idea of the object as possessed of the character in question.* These 'Factors' are mentioned by name in the *Bhāṣya*, as '*Statement of the Conclusion and the rest.*', [The *Bhāṣya* P. 5, L. 3, *adds* '*all the means of cognition or forms of valid cognition are found to be present among these Factors ; for instance, the Statement of the Conclusion is verbal*, &c., &c. Against this an objection is raised]—" It is not right to say that *the Statement of the Conclusion is verbal* ; because *Verbal Testimony* always affords a certain and definite cognition of the truth or real nature of things ; while what is asserted in the Statement of the Conclusion is something that is yet to be proved (by means of the Reasoning)." The reply to this is that, as a matter of fact, what is sought to be proved (by means of the Reasoning) is that which is known *Verbally* (by means of the Statement if the Conclusion) ; hence there is nothing wrong in the assertion that *the Statement of the Conclusion is Verbal* ;—that is to say, the Statement of the Conclusion is *Verbal*, in so far that by means of the Reasoning, the Reasoner tries to make known to another person what he has himself known by the means of the words (of the Statement of the Conclusion).† Similarly, when the *Bhāṣya*

* The distinction between the two is that the former means only the actual presence of the character in the object ; while the latter means the recognition of that presence, of the object as possessing that character.

† The translation is not exactly in keeping with the commentary. The sense of the reply, according to it, would be as follows—" What the Logician wishes to prove by means of his reasonings are such things as the existence of the Soul &c., &c., all of which he knows' in the first instance, by means of the verbal testimony of the Scriptures. " That such is the sense accepted by the commentary is indicated by the remark—" Even though the statement of the conclusion in all reasonings cannot be *Āgama*, yet what the author has in mind are the reasonings of the

speaks of the *probans* being *inferential*, it applies the name of 'Inference' to the mere perception of the *probans* (independently of its relation to the *subject*); that is to say, the second perception of the *probans* that we have [at the time of the recognising of the Minor Premiss, asserting the presence of the *probans* in the *subject*,—the *first* perception being at the time of the recognition of its concomitance with the *probandum*] becomes the *cause* conducive to the incitement to activity of the mental impression of its concomitance (with the *probandum*,—which concomitance has been perceived on a previous occasion, and an impression whereof has been left upon the mind); and it is for this reason that it has been called '*hētu*' or *cause*; and it is the 'statement' of this 'probans' that has been called figuratively * 'inference'. (in the Bhāṣya). In the same manner, the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the *Instance* as *perceptional*, because it serves to present the *object of remembrance* (*i. e.*, the invariable concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*) to be as certain as if it were actually *perceived*.† That is to say, what the Reasoner does is to remember something (the concomitance) that he has previously perceived, and then puts it forward as the *instance*; and thus, inasmuch as this statement of the *instance* is

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Naiyāyika." It appears better however to take the reply to mean that all that the Statement of the Conclusion does is to make known *verbally* what is sought to be proved by the reasoning.

* Why the *Probans* should be figuratively called 'Inference' is thus explained by the *Parishuddhi*—Inference, as the means of inferential cognition, consists of the two factors of (1) the remembrance of the invariable concomitance of the *probans* with the *probandum*, and (2) the recognition of the presence of the *probans* in the *subject*; now this Inference is helped by the remembrance of concomitance; the *Probans* also, in the bringing about of the recognition of its presence in the *subject* is helped by that same remembrance; it is this similarity that forms the basis for the the application of the name 'Inference' to the statement of the Probans.

† The statement of the Instance has been called *perceptional*, because what it recalls has been previously known by means of Perception, and also because it recalls it in a form as much beyond all doubt as if it were actually before the eyes at the time.

in full accordance with what has been directly perceived before, it is like Perception itself (being as much beyond doubt as any fact of perception; and as such it has been spoken of as *perceptional.* "What do you mean by saying that it is *like Perception?*" What it means is *freedom from doubt*): just as there is no doubt (or difference of opinion) with regard to a fact of Perception, so also there is none with regard to the *instance.* Similarly the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the Statement of the *Minor Premiss* as *analogical*; and this is due to the character of 'analogy' being attributed to that one factor of real Analogy, which consists of the idea of 'as that so this'; that is to say, analogy (pertaining to the animal *gavaya*, for instance) is dependent upon the assertion 'as the cow so the gavaya',—consisting in the apprehension of similarity (between the *cow* and the *gavaya*) before the eyes; this Analogy comes about after the due comprehension of the assertion involving the idea of 'as that so this', and is aided by Perception and Verbal Cognition and Remembrance *; and thus in this, the idea of 'as that so this' forms one of the factors; and to this one factor people figuratively apply the name of 'Analogy' [and it is on the basis of this figurative application of the name

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*The process of analogial cognition is thus explained in the *Tāṭparya*:—First of all the man must have the *verbal cognition* in the shape of the knowledge of the assertion 'as the cow so the gavaya'; (2) knowing this when he goes to the forest, he sees a certain animal before him—this is the factor of *Perception*; (3) then he *remembers* the meaning of the aforesaid assertion; through the aforesaid Perception and Remembrance he perceives the similarity of the cow in the animal before him; it is this cognition of similarity that constitutes *analogy* (Upamāna as the *means* of cognition), which is the *means* of the analogical cognition in the form 'this animal is named *gavaya*.' Thus Analogy is found to be composed of the factors of—(1) verbal cognition in the form 'as that so this', (2) the remembrance of that cognition, (3) the perception of the animal and its similarity to the cow. The *statement of the Minor Premiss* is in the form 'this mountain has fire (just as the culinary hearth has fire)'; in this we have the same notion of 'as that (hearth) so this (mountain),' which notion forms one factor in the analogical process; and, if we apply the name Analogy to this factor, we are justified in saying, that the statement of the Minor Premiss is *analogical.*

that the *Statement of the Minor Premiss* is *analogical*]. Lastly, the Bhāṣya has defined the '*Reassertion* of the Conclusion' as consisting *in the indication of the capability of all the aforesaid statements to bear upon the same object or purpose*. In regard to this the question is raised—"What do you mean by the *statements bearing upon a single object*?" What is meant is that they are treated as 'one sentence' (syntactically connected with one another). "What do you mean by *capability* ?" * What is meant by 'capability' is that every one of the statements in question is dependent upon what is expressed by another ; we shall explain this later on. The word '*Nigamana*' (the technical name for the final *Reassertion of the Conclusion*) also literally means 'that by means of which all the other Factors of the Reasoning are *tied together* (*nigamyantē anēna*), *i. e.* made to bear upon a single object.'

Says the *Bhāṣya*—*It is this fivefold declaration that constitutes the highest form of Reasoning*. Question : —"What do you mean by its being the *highest* form?" What is meant is that it is only when the Reasoning is presented in the aforesaid form (of the five sentences taken together as syntactically related to one another) that it succeeds in convincing, or bringing the conclusion home to, the opponent or the unbeliever. When each of the † statements is put forward

* 'Capability' as here spoken of is a character belonging to the verbal statements; and what is meant is that they are so inter-related that if they are taken severally by themselves, they are found to be *wanting* in some essential feature; and it is only when they are taken as collectively bearing upon a single object or purpose that they are found to be *complete* ; this *one* purpose in the present case consists in the *presenting of the probans complete in all its parts*; and the *capability* referred to is the character of collectively tending to accomplish this one purpose. It may be noted that the commentators base this interpretation upon Jaimini's definition of 'one sentence' contained in his *sūtra* 2. 1. 46.

† From the context it is clear that the word 'pramāṇa' here stands for the various 'factors' of Reasoning,—which have been shown to involve the various Means of Cognition or Pramāṇa ; that this is so is clear from the next sentence. The Ṭāṭparya, on the other hand, takes the word as referring to the Pramāṇas in

by itself, it does not convince the opponent ; on the other hand, when all the five are put forward in a body they do convince him ; and it is in this fact that lies the 'highest' character of the Reasoning.

[With regard to the 'Factors' of Reasoning a further question is raised]—"Do these *Factors* form a *Means of Cognition* other than those enunciated among the *Pramāṇas* ? Or are they included among those same?" What do you mean by raising this question?—we ask. The questioner explains his point:—"If they a form Means of Cognition other than those enunciated, then it is not right to omit the mention of these (among the Pramāṇas); if on the other hand, they are included among those same Pramāṇas, then, the separate mention of the 'Factors' becomes entirely superfluous." Our answer to the above is that the Factors are not distinct Means of Cognition; and yet they have been mentioned separately—(1) because it is only these, when taken together as collectively forming a single sentence (*i. e.* being syntactically connected), that bring conviction to the unbeliever; (thus serving an important purpose, not served by any other means);—and (2) because it is only as distinct (from the well-recognised Means of Cognition) that the Factors serve the purpose of setting going the several forms of Discussion, Disputation and Wrangling ; and as such they form the basis of the ascertainment of truth. "What do you mean by the Factors being the *basis of the ascertainment of truth*?"

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general, and not to only those involved in the 'factors of reasoning'; and this interpretation makes it necessary for the commentary to add the apologetic sentence —"though each of the Pramāṇas, Perception and the rest, is severally found to be sufficient for convincing the people, in regard to all ordinary matters, yet what the text is referring to are such extraordinary subjects as the existence of the Soul, the trustworthiness of the Veda and such other matters relating to the Highest Good;—none of these matters can be brought home to the unbeliever except by means of the five-membered reasonings propounded in the Nyāya treatises."

What we mean is that they are the *cause or means of getting at the true knowledge of the real character of things.**

[*F*] With regard to *Hypothetical Reasoning* the *Bhāṣya* says—*Hypothetical Reasoning is neither included among the four 'Means of Cognition', nor is it a distinct 'Means of Cognition'*; and the reason why this is so lies in the fact that it does not bring about any definite cognition; that is to say, as a matter of fact 'Means of Cognition' always bring about definite cognitions, while Hypothetical Reasoning does not do this; as such, it cannot be included among the 'Means of Cognition'; and for the same reason it cannot be regarded as a distinct 'Means of Cognition'. [And yet it had to be enunciated, because] it serves the distinctly useful purpose of scrutinizing the subject-matter of the Means of Cognition, and thereby helps these latter (*i. e.* makes them truly effective). "It has been said that *Hypothetical Reasoning* scrutinizes the subject-matter of the Means of Cognition,—what do you mean by this *scrutinizing*?" By 'scrutinizing' in this connection we mean the ascertaining of validity or invalidity; that is to say Hypothetical Reasoning helps to ascertain that such and such a cognition in *valid*, and such and such is *invalid*; † all that it

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* Says the *Parishuḍḍhi*—The object, as endowed with the character that forms the *probans*, is known by means of the *factors*, directly,—while as endowed with the character that forms the *probandum* it is known by their means, but indirectly through the knowledge of its former character.

† This passage explains in what manner *Hypothetical Reasoning* operates. The sense is that, as a matter of fact, the Means of Cognition is found to bring about cognitions; and as such being an *Instrument*, it stands in need of a definite procedure whereby it could bring about the cognition. This much-needed procedure is supplied by Hypothetical Reasoning, which, consisting of the consideration of validity and invalidity, helps the Means of Cognition by ratifying the cognition brought about, if it is found to be valid; and it is only the Means of Cognition thus helped that can be truly effective in the bringing about of a right cognition. Hypothetical Reasoning by itself cannot bring about definite cognition; because being hypothetical in its form, it is dependent upon a negation, and as such cannot itself form an adequate *instrument*. Hypothetical Reasoning is said to be hypothetical, &c., because it is found in the form —'if such and such (as indicated by the Means of Cognition) were not the case, such and such would be the incongruities involved.' (*Tāṭparya-Pariśhuḍḍhi.*)

VĀr. PAGE 19. does is to ratify or corroborate (by rejecting all contrary contingencies) that cognition which is found to be valid; and it has nothing to do with the actual cognition of things (which is brought about by the Means of Cognition); and because it does not bring about the Cognition of things, it cannot be regarded as a distinct 'Means of Cognition' by itself. In the example cited in the *Bhāṣya*, the cognition represented as ratified by the particular Hypothetical Reasoning is—'*Birth is due to Karma*';* and with regard to this the Opponent asks—"How do you know that birth is due to *Karma*?" We know that it is so because we find (among living beings) a diversity of characters and conditions. "What is this diversity?" It is found in the form of good and bad circumstances. For instance, in regard to *good circumstances*, we meet with the following diversity (or varying grades); (1) among beings, there are divine and human beings; (2) among human beings, there are males and females; (3) among males, there are Brāhmaṇas and non-Brāhmaṇas; (4) among Brāhmaṇas, some are possessed of efficient organs of perception, while others have only inefficient organs; (5) among those possessed of organs, some belong to high families, while others are born of low ones; (6) among those of high families some have all their limbs intact, while others are maimed; (7) among the former one is learned while the other is ignorant; (8) among the learned, one is self-reliant, while another is timid; (9) among the self-reliant one is independent while another is dependent upon others. Then again, in regard to *bad circumstances*, we meet with such varying grades as the following:——(1) there are animals and hellish beings; (2) among hellish beings, some are only pierced by thorns of the cotton-tree, while others are tortured by being boiled in cauldrons of iron; (3) among

* The Ṭāṭparya explains that '*karma*' here stands for *virtue and vice*, or *merit and demerit*, technically called '*apūrva*'; and *not* for *action*.

animals, one is a cow, while another is something else. This diversity of conditions could not be possible, except through some such cause as is manifold, not momentary and yet not eternal, pertaining to each individual object and to each individual Soul specifically.* "Why so?" Because (if there were no such cause, and the diversity in question were due to the things of the world themselves, as for instance, the Earth and the like) then, inasmuch as all such substances as the Earth and the rest would be common to all men,—and as (*ex hypothesi*) there would no differentiating cause in those substances themselves, all things (and conditions) would belong in common to all men; while as a matter of fact, we actually perceive diversity. For these reasons we conclude that it is *Karma* which is the cause of the specific diversities in question. This *Hypothetical Reasoning* is included under the second category of the 'Object of Cognition', because it is something actually *cognised*. [And yet it has been enunciated separately because it helps the 'Means of Cognition', as explained above, and for a further reason pointed out below, *Text*, P-19, ll. 20-21.]

[G] Says the *Bhāsya—Demonstrated Truth constitutes that true knowledge which is the result of the Means of Cognition.* † The Opponent asks—"When is Demonstrated Truth the result of the Means of Cognition?" It is regarded as the *result* when it is not put forward as the

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* Each of these epithets is thus justified by the Ṭāṭparya—(1) The cause must be manifold, because, if it were one only, then there would be uniformity, and not diversity; (2) it cannot be momentary; as it could not bring about the diversity long after its own existence; and yet such is found to be the actual case; (3) it must be not-eternal; as if it were eternal, the resultant pleasure or pain would also be eternal, which it is not; (4) it must pertain to one individual object, because if the same cause affected several objects, there would be no variety among these objects; (5) it must pertain specifically to such individual Soul; as otherwise there would be no variety in the conditions under which several Souls are born.

† 'The Means of Cognition' as embodied in the Factors of Reasoning. See note from the Ṭāṭ in connection with Bhāṣya above (page 49).

means of getting at the cognition of another object; on the other hand, when it is found to lead to the cognition of something else, it is regarded as the *Means* of Cognition;* and there is no such hard and fast rule as that it must be regarded either as 'result' only, or as 'means' only; this we shall explain later on under *Sūṭra* 2-1-16, where we shall show that one and the same thing comes to be spoken of by means of two words, by reason of its two characters [in the same manner Demonstrated Truth may be spoken of as 'result' and also as 'means', as explained above].

[With regard to *Hypothetical Reasoning* and *Demonstrated Truth* taken together] the *Bhāṣya* says—*It is the last two categories of Hypothetical Reasoning and Demonstrated Truth that carry on all the business of the world* †. The meaning of this is that it is only when the intelligent man acts after arriving at the *demonstrated truth* after due *reasoning* that he is enabled by means of these to discard what he finds fit for being discarded, and to acquire what he finds fit for being acquired.

Demonstrated truth may be regarded as included either among the 'Means of Cognition' (the first category), or among the 'Objects of Cognition' (the second category); that is to say, when it is a *result* it is an 'object of cognition', while when it is a *means* of the cognition of other things, it is a 'Means of Cognition'. [Though thus included, yet it has to be enunciated separately, because,

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* For instance, when we infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke we have the demonstrated truth with regard to the presence of fire; if the process ends with this, we regard this Demonstrated Truth as the 'result'; but if the cognition of the presence of fire leads to the further cognition of the presence of heat, or the possibility of the burning of the mountain, we must regard it as the 'means' of this other cognition.

† The Bhāṣya takes the two together because the two are invariable concomitants of each other.

along with *Hypothetical Reasoning, it helps to carry on the business of the world*, as pointed out above.]

[H] With regard to *Discussion*, the *Bhāṣya* says that it is carried on by various speakers; that is to say, inasmuch as it consists in the presentation of several theories, it is carried on by several speakers (each putting forward and trying to establish his own theory). The *Bhāsya* adds —(the sentences are put forward in discussion) *purporting to be reasons in support of several theories, leading ultimately to the acceptance of one of these theories as the demonstrated truth.* The word '*praṭyaḍhikaraṇam*' in the text of the Bhāṣya means *that which is sought to be proved, i. e.*, a *theory*; and the reasons in support of this are called the '*Sāḍhana*' of this. "What does the *Bhāṣya* mean by this?" What it means is that in *Discussion* both (or all) parties taking part in it should put forward reasons in support of their theories;* and that it must end in one of the theories being accepted as the demonstrated truth;† all this we shall explain later on. "In what form does this Discussion appear". *It consists of a number of sentences*—says the *Bhāṣya*. An objection is raised—"In Sūṭra 1. 2. 1, we find *Discussion* defined as consisting in 'the proving and refuting (of theories) through Pramāṇas and Hypothetical Reasoning'; by '*pramāṇas*' here must be meant *valid cognitions*, because *Sūṭras* 1. 1. 4 *et seq.* speak of *Perception* and the other *Pramāṇas* as 'the *cognition* produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ'; from which it is clear that all '*pramāṇas*' are *cog-*

* This distinguishes *Discussion* from *Wrangling*; in the latter the sole purpose of the Wrangler lies in the discomfitting of his opponent; and he does not concern himself about the establishing of his own position; in fact he does not even put forward any theory of his own.

† This distinguishes *Discussion* from *Disputation*, in which though both disputants have to put forward their theories, it need not lead to the acceptance of either as the demonstrated truth; as the sole aim of each party lies in showing himself as superior to his opponent; their motive does not consist in the finding out of the real truth of the matter.

nitions; then as regards 'Hypothetical Reasoning'; it is mere conjecture; and this also is only a form of *cognition*; [thus according to this definition of Discussion as given in the Sūṭra, it must be regarded as consisting of *cognitions*]; under the circumstances, it is not right to speak of it as *consisting of of a number of sentences* [as the Bhāṣya does]; because a *cognition* cannot be *sentence*." This objection is not well-taken, we reply; because the Sūṭra (1. 2. 1) that has been put forward means something totally different* (from the meaning attributed to it by the Objector); as we shall point out when we are explaining that *Sūṭra*.

[*I-J*] *Disputation and Wrangling are distinct forms of Discussion*—says the *Bhāṣya*. "Wherein lies the *distinction*?" It consists in the excess and deficiency of certain factors,; for instance, in *Disputation* we have the use of Perverse Reasoning, Casuistry and Clinchers; and as such it *exceeds* the limits of 'Discussion' (in which all these are absent); and this same *Disputation*, when without the attempt at establishing the counter-theory, constitutes *Wrangling* (which therefore is *deficient* in this principal factor, which is present in *Discussion*). What is meant by the pointing out of these 'distinctions' is that all the three are only different forms of argumentation (they are not entirely different), differing only in the methods of arguments employed in each; another difference (between Discussion on the one hand, and Disputation and Wrangling on the other) is that with reference to the persons with whom they are carried on: Discussion is carried on with a person who is willing to learn; while Disputation and Wrangling are carried on with persons who are perverse in their ignorance (and too proud to learn).

* The words of the sūṭra—'proving' and 'refuting'—mean not the actual *proof* and *refutation*, but the *statement* of the reasons tending to prove and refute; and certainly there is nothing incongruous in speaking of the 'statements' as 'a number of sentences.'

[*K*] There are four characteristic features of the true Reason (or *Probans*); when certain Reasons are put forward which are wanting in one or more of these features,—and as such are not true Reasons, and are yet put forward as such,—they are called '*Fallacious Reasons*'. In reality these are 'Clinchers'; and as such included in the sixteenth Category; and yet they have been enunciated separately; *because it is these that can be put forward or indicated in Discussions*—says the *Bhāṣya*. This clause of the *Bhāṣya* has been taken to mean that 'because Fallacious Reasons are indicated in Discussions, therefore they are enunciated separately.' But this is not right; in whatever way we take it, there is no necessary connection; that is to say, in the first place, it is not true that whatever is indicated in Discussions must always be enunciated separately; nor, in the second place, is it true that whatever is enunciated separately must be indicated in Discussions;*—because if it were true that whatever is enunciated separately is indicated in Discussions, then all things would come to be indicated in Discussions. "Why so?" For the simple reason that all things are enunciated separately (*i. e.* apart from Clinchers); on the other hand, if it were meant that whatever is indicated in Discussions is enunciated separately,—then, that also would not be universally true; because as a matter of fact, we find that the 'Deficient' and the 'Redundant' reasonings (mentioned among 'Clinchers' and defined in Sūṭras 5-2-12 and 13) are not 'enunciated separately' (as Categories distinct from Clinchers); and yet they are found to be actually 'indicated or urged in Discussions'. For these reasons we conclude that the assertion that the Fallacious Reasons have been enunciated separately 'because they are indicated in Discussions' is not to be taken seriously.† The real purpose of

‡And it is only if one of these propositions is true that there can be any validity in the reasoning read in the *Bhāṣya* passage in question.

†The Vārṭika apparently rejects the reason given in the Bhāṣya, and propounds another reason. The *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi* however regard this rejection

the separate enunciation lies in the pointing out of the various distinct methods of the sciences* [the purpose which the Bhāṣya has mentioned on p. 3, ll. 4 &c. as applying to the separate enunciation of all the categories apart from the 'Means of Cognition' and 'Objects of Cognition'.]

To the question—"Being of the nature of *Clinchers*, why should Fallacious Reason be enunciated separately?"—the answer is—because it is urged in Discussions.† This

as implying the rejection of the sense that has been attributed to the Bhāṣya, by some people Ekadēshinaḥ. Says the *Ṭāṭ*—'The reason for separate enunciation that is meant by the Bhā. is as follows: With a view to the real character of Fallacious Reasons, and also to the real purpose of Discussions, which lies in the getting at the truth, and not the mere discomfiture of the opponent, it must be admitted that it is not possible for us to urge *all* the 'clinchers' in Discussion; it is only a few of these that can be so urged; and the Fallacious Reasons are among those 'clinchers' that can be urged in Discussions; for this reason they are enunciated separately. The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that we thus find that what the Bhā. really means is that the fact of the Fallacious Reason being urged in Discussions affords justification for its separate enunciation; it does not mean that there is any invariable concomitance between 'separate enunciation' and 'being urged in Discussions'; and it is in the supposing of this concomitance that lay the mistake of the *Ekadēshin*. By this interpretation the sentence of the *Vārṭika*—'ēṭaḍēva ṭu nyāyyam pṛiṭhagupaḍēshaprayojanam'—must be taken to mean—'what the Bhā. can be legitimately taken to mean is that what it has pointed out (the urging in Discussions) represents only the *purpose* of separate enunciation (and not simply, invariable concomitance between the two circumstances). It will be readily seen however that this interpretation makes the next word '*viḍyāprasṭhānajñāpanārṭhaṭvāṭ—iṭi*' apparently meaningless. The interpretation of the *Ṭāṭ* appears too far-fetched; specially in view of the '*iṭi*' at the end. The apparent grammatical construction is—'*ēṭaḍēva nyāyyam prayojanam*—(what is it?)—*viḍyāprasṭhānajñāpanārṭhaṭvāṭ iṭi* (this is it).

*By the word 'viḍyā' (Science) here is not meant the *Nyāya—shāsṭra*; but the three forms of *Discussion*, which are called 'viḍyā' because they also lead, though indirectly, to the attainment of the highest good. And the Fallacious Reason is mentioned for the purpose of showing wherein the method of Discussion proper differs from that of the other two forms of it (Disputation and Wrangling) in which latter all forms of 'clinchers' are urged; while in Discussion it is only the Fallacious Reason (and a few other Clinchers) that are urged.

† The whole of this sentence of the Vārṭika appears to be an interpolation. It is not referred to by the Ṭāṭ; as it stands, it does not give any sense. If *pramāṇasāmānyāṭ* is altered into '*vāḍē ḍēshanīyaṭvāṭ*', we have some sense out of it; but it is a

raises the further question—"How can they be urged in Discussions"?* They can be urged, because they have all the semblance of the true Reason [and as such are actually put forward by parties, not indeed knowingly, but under the impression that they are quite *valid* reasons]. That is to say, Valid Reasons are put forward in Discussions, and the Fallacious Reason has the semblance of the Valid Reason; so that on account of this semblance it comes to be put forward in Discussions.

A further question is raised—"It has been asserted that (in Discussion) while some of the *Clinchers* are present others are not found there;—whence this restriction imposed upon things? If it is a mere indicating of things as they actually are,—what is the use of that? If it is only a command of yours addressed to the things in question (Clinchers)—'you be so, you may not be so and so'—then, by commanding things in this manner, you make yourself an object of ridicule. If the thing itself really exists as you represent it to be, and in the assertion in question, you only describe it as it is actually found to exist;—then, it becomes incumbent upon you to explain why a few only of the *Clinchers* are found in Discussions, and others are not."

There is no force in this objection, we reply. Because, that the thing is so is due to its peculiar character; that is to say, things do not follow the commands of those who

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mere repetition of what has already gone before. This repetition might be justified as introducing the next question. The translation has therefore been made with the emendation referred to above.

* The point of this objection is that one party could urge the Fallacious Reason in a discussion only if the other party put forward such reasons; as mentioned in *sūtra*-1-2-1 however, Discussion proper always proceeds by 'pramāṇa' and 'ṭarka', which are all valid; consequently the very nature of Discussion precluding the use of Fallacious Reasons, how could any party urge such against the other The answer is that the party putting forward the reason may not know that it is fallacious, and hence may put it forward as a *bona fide* valid reason; and in this case it becomes possible for the other party to point out the fallacy in the reason.

speak of them ; they are only described (or spoken of) as they are actually found to exist; consequently, when a man speaks of a thing in accordance with its peculiar character, he is not to be reproved as 'commanding' the nature of things. Thus then (the general principle being recognised that things have to be described as they are) in regard to the subject under consideration, we find that the very nature of Discussion proper is such that it is carried on with persons willing to learn; and it follows from this character of Discussion itself that of all the *Clinchers* it is only the *Fallacious Reason* that can be urged (and not such other *Clinchers* as *Embarassment* and the like); and this for the simple reason that the matter under Discussion has to be explained and discussed (with the person willing to learn) so long as he does not come to understand the real truth [and this purpose is served by simply indicating the *Fallacies* that may be involved in the theory taken up by the pupil; and it would not be fair to merely silence him by urging the other *Clinchers*, which, though silencing him, would not enable him to grasp the truth.] * Then again, inasmuch as the *Fallacious Reason* has all the semblance of the valid reason, there is no incongruity in its being met with in *Discussions*. "How so?" Because the making of mistakes is natural to man; and hence when putting forward *valid reasons* it often happens that he propounds reasons which (though

* This anticipates the objection that—inasmuch as according to Su. 1. 2. 1, Discussions are carried on by means of Valid Reasons and Hypothetical Reasoning, there cannot be any possibility of its being used by any party in Discussion proper; and when it cannot be used how can it be urged? The reading in the printed text is not in keeping with the interpretation of the Ṭāṭparya. According to the Com. there is a distinct statement of the objection and the answer he gives with the next sentence only. In accordance with this interpretation the printed text is defective. But as is stands it gives good sense. The sense of the reply is that when the Fallacious reason is put forward it is not done knowingly; he who puts it forward does so knowing it to be *valid*; and it is only when the fallacy is pointed out to him that he becomes *defeated*.

he thinks they are valid) are in reality *invalid* or *fallacious*; and when he does so he is *defeated* [by the pointing out of Fallacies in his reason].

Var. Page 22.

"What sort of *defeat* can there be as between the teacher and his pupil (between whom alone the Discussion proper can be held)?" The 'defeat' in this case simply consists in showing that the view of the party 'defeated' does not express the truth. * [And for this reason what are exposed or urged in Discussions are not only the Fallacious Reasons, but also three other *Clinchers*, viz. the Defective Reason, the Redundant Reason and the Shifting of the Ground, which also like the Fallacious Reason, are obstacles to the perception of, truth.] A question is raised—"How can the three Clinchers—Defective Reason, Redundant Reason, and Shifting of the Ground—be used in Discussions?" Simply because these also have the semblance of the *Valid* Reason; both the *Defective* and the *Redundant Reason* have all the appearance of the *Valid* Reason, their *deficience* or *redundancy* being only due to their statement containing one or more members wanting or in excess of the necessary; and it is by mistake that these defective statements are put forward in Discussions. The Bhāṣya says—'*the other Clinchers being indicatable only in Disputations and Wranglings*'; the meaning is that one whose aim lies in obtaining a victory over—*i. e.* in bringing about the discomfiture of—his opponent, has to have recourse to

* And it is truth which is sought to be got at by means of Discussion; and the indication of Fallacies becomes necessary because unless they are exposed they obstruct the vision of the pupil who is unable to comprepend the truth. Because this is the sole purpose of exposing the Fallacious Reason, therefore we have to note that when the Bhāṣya speaks of the Fallacious Reason being indicated in Discussions, it does not mean that it is only these from among the Clinchers that are to be exposed in Discussions; but all those which are obstacles to the perception of truth, and the exposing of which tends to its due perception; to this class belong the three other *clinchers*—the 'Defective Reason' the 'Superfluous Reason' and 'shifting of the Ground'. Those other *Clinchers* the exposing of which tends merely to the discomfiture of the adversary are not admissible in Discussion proper.

the other two forms of Discussion—*viz*: *Disputation* and *Wrangling*; and in these *all* 'Clinchers' are to be urged, whenever possible;* and the Opponent should not be left alone [until his arrogance has given way to meekness and willingness to learn].

[L, M, N] *Perverse Reasoning*, *Casuistry* and *Clinchers* have to be avoided in the arguments propounded by oneself, and have to be urged against those put forth by the opponent; [and it is for this reason that the separate enunciation of these becomes necessary] *'for the purpose of showing what they are'*, says the *Bhāṣya*; and the meaning of this is that it is for the purpose of making the real character of these duly known to people that they have been separately enunciated.

An objection is raised—"It is not right to assert, as the *Bhāṣya* does, that *Perverse Reasoning*, *Casuistry* and *Clinchers* are *'to be avoided by one in his own assertions'*,—and at the same time to declare that Casuistry can *'easily be made use of,'*; as this involves a self-contradiction. To say that it is to be 'avoided' and yet 'to be made use of' is to make a a self-contradictory statement; if one is to avoid a certain thing, he cannot make use of it; and hence there is a manifest self-contradiction in the *Bhāṣya*."

There is no self-contradiction, we reply; as what is meant is that it serves the purpose of meeting questions; what the *Bhāṣya* means by saying that Casuistry is *easily made use*

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* People who engage in these two forms of Discussion are those who are arrogant and conceited; not those who are willing to learn; hence before they are made acquainted with the real truth, it becomes necessary to relieve him of his conceit; for doing this the worst forms of 'Clinchers' may be called into requisition; for instance, by means of *embarassment* he comes to recognise his weakness, and thus being reduced to meekness, he presents himself as a person *willing to learn*; and then the superior man engages him in Discussion proper and thereby leads him to the knowledge of truth; thus the worst forms of Discussion also indirectly lead to the acquiring of the knowledge of truth.

of' is that it is pointed out for the purpose of meeting the questions (of umpires); that is to say, when the Opponent, in course of Disputation, has recourse to Casuistry, the other party appeals to the umpires saying—'this man has recourse to Casuistry'; thereupon the umpires ask him—'In what way has he recourse to Casuistry? What particular form of Casuistry is it ?'. Being thus questioned, it is only if he knows what Casuistry is that he can answer by indicating the Casuistry—'in such a way has he used Casuistry'—and 'it is this form of Casuistry that he has used'; and it is this indicating of Casuistry to the umpires that is meant by its being 'easily made use of.'

Thus then, it has been shown that *Doubt* and the other Categories, even though included in the first two Categories of '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*', have yet been separately enunciated, for the purpose of indicating the subjects dealt with by the Science.

IV. Bhāṣya.

(*P.* 7. *ll.* 4-8.)

[*Recapitulation of the Introductory Sūṭra—Importance of the Shāsṭra.*]

The aforesaid *Science of Reasoning*, dealing as it does with the *Means of Right Cognition* and the other Categories,—

'is the lamp of all Sciences; it being the sheet-anchor (Means of the Knowledge) of all things; it is the support of all Sciences (being the source of all activity inspired by them), and as such it has been expounded at the very outset (of all scientific investigation)'.

As regards the 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of good' (spoken of in the Sūṭra), it must be borne in mind that there is such 'knowledge' and such 'attainment' dealt with in (and pertaining specifically to) each of the four Sciences (or branches of knowledge), in its own peculiar manner. In the Science we are dealing with here

the Science of the Soul (Logic-Metaphysics), what forms the 'knowledge of truth,' is the knowledge of the Soul and the other objects of cognition ; and the 'attainment of good' is the obtaining of Release.

(END OF BHĀṢYA ON SŪ. 1).

IV. VĀRṬIKA.

[*P. 22, l. 17 to P. 24, l. 8.*]

Says the *Bhāṣya*—'*The aforesaid Science of Reasoning, dealing as it does with 'Pramāṇa' and the other categories, is the lamp of all sciences* ;—it is the 'lamp,' because it manifests, or makes known, things ; that is to say, all other Sciences deal with things that have been made known by *Pramāṇa* &c. (which form the subject-matter of the Science of Reasoning).

"Are there no *Pramāṇa* &c. (dealt with) in the other Sciences?" No, they are not. "Why not?" Because those other Sciences are not meant to deal with those subjects ; that is to say, they have not been propounded for the purpose of explaining *Pramāṇa* &c. ; and yet they deal with things that have been made known by means of Pramāṇa &c. [Thus not dealing with the *Pramāṇas* themselves, and yet dealing with things made known by means of these, the other Sciences are dependent upon the Science of Reasoning, which alone makes it its business to explain *Pramāṇa* &c.]

The *Bhāṣya* next speaks of the Science of Reasoning as the '*upāya*' (sheet-anchor) of all '*karman*' (that which is made *kriyaṭē yaṭ*, i.e. things) ; it is called the 'sheet-anchor' because (in the other Sciences) there is *karaṇa* or explanation of only such things as have been manifested or elucidated (by the Science of Reasoning) ; as a matter of fact, it is only things elucidated by the Science of Reasoning that the other Sciences *make* (their subject).*

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* All other Sciences, in their Explanations and Expositions, only make affirmations or denials in regard to Substances, Qualities and Actions, as leading to desirable or undesirable results ; and thereby urge men to activity ; and all these three—Substances, Qualities and Actions—are elucidated in the Science of Reasoning only.

The *Bhāṣya* next speaks of the Science of Reasoning as the '*āshraya*' (support) of all *ḍharma*; being of great help to all the Sciences, this Science is spoken of as their 'support'; helping the other Sciences, it is their *support*, just as the King is of his servant.*

As regards the 'knowledge of truth' and the 'attainment of good', it must be borne in mind that there is such 'knowledge' and such 'attainment' dealt with in each of the four Sciences,—says the *Bhāṣya*; that is to say, in each of the Sciences, there is 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of good' dealt with in its own peculiar manner. "What is the 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of good' dealt with in the Science of the Vedic Trinity?" In this Science, the 'knowledge of truth' consists in the knowledge of such things as the following:—the proper method of obtaining materials for the Agnihoṭra and other sacrifices, the circumstances that make these materials unfit for use in sacrifices (e. g. their being touched by dogs or cats, &c.); and the 'attainment of good' is in the shape of attaining Heaven; as it is this latter that is mentioned, in the Vēḍas, as the result. "What is the 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of good' in the Science of Agriculture?" The 'knowledge of truth' in this case is the knowledge of the soil,—*i.e.* the knowledge of the soil as free from such undesirable things as thorns and the like; and the 'attainment of good' is the successful harvest, which is the result of agricultural operations. "In the Science of Politics, what is the 'knowledge of truth' and 'attainment of good'?" The 'knowledge of truth' in this case consists in knowing the proper use of the various measures or arts of Conciliation, Gifts,

* 'Ḍharma' here stands for 'activity' which, being the end of all Sciences, is regarded as their 'ḍharma'. Hence the *Ṭāṭparya* takes the clause to mean that the Science of Reasoning is the basis or support of all activity. But the Vārṭika speaks of it as the support of the Sciences themselves; because it is the basis of all activity, which in its turn, is dependent upon all the other Sciences—as the Parishuḍḍhi remarks. Hence what the Bhāṣya means is that the Science of Reasoning supports or helps the other Sciences when these latter lead men to activity.

Punishment and Sowing Dissension, at the right time and place, and in due accordance with one's own powers ; and the 'attainment of good' is in the form of *winning kingdom* (over the Earth).

In the Science we are dealing with here,—i.e. the Science of the Soul—what forms the 'knowledge of truth' is the knowledge of the Soul and the other objects of cognition, and the 'attainment of good' is the obtaining of Release,—says the *Bhāṣya.* In connection with this some people have held that the 'good' meant here cannot be that which proceeds from the true knowledge of Pramāṇa and the other categories ; because the knowledge of all the categories mentioned after Discussion * is such that it is the cause of pride and arrogance; and certainly the knowledge of these could not have any connection with the 'highest good' ; and it cannot accomplish that with which it has no connection ; consequently it has to be concluded that it is not right to assert (as has been declared in Sū. 1) that '*the attainment of the highest good results from the true knowledge of Pramāṇa and the other categories.*' This contention is not right ; you put forward this objection, simply because you have not grasped the real meaning of the *Sūṭra.* Who explains the Sūṭra to mean that the attainment of the Highest Good results *directly* from the true knowledge of Pramāṇa and the rest ? In fact we are going to point out in the next Sūṭra what those things are the true knowledge of which brings about the Highest Good; in fact it has been declared that the Highest Good proceeds from the knowledge of the Soul and certain other 'objects of cognition.' Then again, it has been asserted by the objector that the knowledge of the Categories mentioned after *Discussion* is the *cause of pride and arrogance* ; this also is not true ; because as a matter of fact, we find that pride and arrogance are present also when the knowledge of those Categories is

Var. Page 24.

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* According to the *Ṭāṭ.* the compound '*vādādi*' does not include 'Vāda' itself ; as pure Discussion, being held between the teacher and his pupil, cannot give rise to 'pride and arrogance

absent, and they are absent also when this knowledge is present;* for instance, the impertinent servant (being a low menial) has no knowledge of the Categories in question ; and yet he has pride and arrogance ; and conversely, even though the truth-knowing philosopher has the knowledge of the Categories, he is entirely free from pride and arrogance [which shows that there can be no causal relation between 'pride and arrogance' and the 'knowledge' of *the Categories mentioned after Discussion.*]

END OF SŪṬRA (1).

V.

Sutra (2).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA.

[*P.* 7, *ll.* 9-10.]

Question.—" Does the Highest Good appear immediately after 'true knowledge'?"

Answer.—No; after 'true knowledge'

There is a cessation of each member of the following series—Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Notion—the cessation of that which follows bringing the annihilation of that which precedes it; and this ultimately leads to Final Release.—(*Sūṭra* 2).

* The Sūṭra does not mean that the knowledge of all the Categories enumerated is the *direct* cause of the attainment of Highest Good ; what it means is that the knowledge of these is conducive to that end,—the knowledge of some of them, for instance that of the 'objects of cognition,' Soul, &c., leading to it *directly*, while that *Pramāṇa*, *Doubt* and the rest being conducive to it *indirectly*. As regards Disputation and Wrangling, the discomforture of the opponent is not their sole end; it is only an intervening process in the larger process that ultimately leads to the Highest Good.

INTRODUCTORY VĀRṬIKA.*

[*Pp.* 24-25, *l.* 3.]

[In the *Bhāṣya*, the Opponent is made to raise the question—"Does the Highest Good appear immediately after 'true knowledge'?" The *Vārṭika* proceeds to explain the import of this question.] "Final Release cannot proceed from true knowledge; because in whatever way you look at the matter, there are insuperable objections; for instance, if Final Release appeared immediately after true knowledge, then no further existence would be possible for those who would attain it (*i.e.*, true knowledge and Final Release; as the attainment of Final Release would mean their immediate death); and yet as a matter of fact, we do find such men living (as have acquired the true knowledge of things); that such men do continue to exist after the attainment of true knowledge is proved by the continuity of scientific tradition,—such 'tradition' consisting in the handing down, in unbroken succession, from times immemorial; if Final Release (and death) were to follow immediately after the attainment of true knowledge, then the line of scientific tradition would cease at that point (there being no one to hand down the knowledge to the next generation); because as soon as a person would attain true knowledge (and would thus be fit for transmitting it to his pupil) he would become *released*, (*i.e.* would cease to exist). If (in order to avoid this contingency) it be held that the person who has attained true knowledge does continue to exist, then 'true knowledge' cannot be regarded as the *cause* of Final Release; because the Release (which means cessation of existence) would not be present when the knowledge is present; and there must be something else on account of whose absence, the Release

* The first Sūtra has declared the purpose of the Science to be the attainment of Final Release. The Second Sūṭra proceeds to discuss what connection this Final Release has with the knowledge of things dealt with by the Science.

does not appear, even though the knowledge is present (and it would be that something which would be the real cause of the Release); because the real cause of a thing is that, at whose presence that thing is present, and at whose absence it is absent [and this concomitance is not found to subsist between true knowledge and Release]. Then again, if Release were to appear immediately after true knowledge, the Science itself would in every case (*i.e.*, with each and every man who would know it) be something entirely new, not previously known by any one else [and there would be no tradition to corroborate it]; that is to say, in this case all scientific treatises would be mere 'castles in the air,' put forward by irresponsible persons (not equipped with the requisite knowledge); and they would be totally devoid of any trustworthy sponsor in the person of a man fully equipped with the requisite and true knowledge." [Thus then, whether we hold the view that Release appears immediately after true knowledge, or that it does not so appear, in either case there are insuperable objections]."

* There is no force in the above objection; because of the Highest Good (Final Release) there are two kinds—one higher and the other lower; and it is the lower kind of Release that appears immediately after true knowledge [and this Release does not imply death]; it is with reference to

* When the man attains true knowledge, he becomes free from all defects; whereupon he has recourse to no further activity; thus he creates no further 'karma' for himself; this is called *Release*, inasmuch he has does not forge any fetters for himself, for the future; this *Release* thus comes immediately after true knowledge; and is called 'lower' because the man has to continue to live, for the expiating of all his past 'karma.' It is the wise man who is in this condition that becomes the propounder of Sciences; and those therefore are not mere 'castles in the air.' On the other hand, when, by Yogic processes, the man draws upon himself all his past 'Karma' and goes through the resultant experiences at once, thereby exhausting all his past *Karma*,—and by virtue of true knowledge not creating any further *karma* for the future,—he attains absolute Release; which is regarded as 'higher' because it is no longer necessary for the man to live in the world.

this lower Release that we have the declaration—'the man with true knowledge, *while he still lives*, becomes freed from pleasure and pain;' and it is this lower Release [following immediately after true knowledge] which becomes the cause or basis of scientific instruction [such instruction being imparted by the teacher who has attained true knowledge, and has thereby acquired the lower kind of Release]. The *higher* kind of Release, on the other hand, comes about gradually by degrees; and the present *sūṭra* indicates in due succession the several degrees involved in the process.

[Var. Page 25.]

VI.

Explanation of Sūṭra (2).

BHĀṢYA.

[*P.* 7, *l.* 13 *to P.* 9, *l.* 9.]

[A.] Of 'Wrong Notion' (mentioned in the *Sūṭra* as the first to cease after the attainment of true knowledge), there are various kinds, pertaining as it does to the several objects of cognition, beginning with 'Soul' and ending with 'Final Release.' (*a*) With reference to the *Soul*, the 'Wrong Notion' is in the form 'there is no such thing as Soul';—(*b*) with regard to the *Not-Soul*, people have 'Wrong Notion' when it is regarded as the 'Soul';—(*c*) when *pain* is regarded as pleasure, we have the 'Wrong Notion' of pain; and so on; (*d*) when the *non-eternal* is regarded as *eternal*; (*e*) when *non-safety* is regarded as *safety*; (*f*) when the *fearful* is regarded as *free from fear*;—(*g*) when the *disgusting* is regarded as *agreeable*;—(*h*) when that which deserves to be *rejected* is regarded as worthy of *not being rejected*; (*i*) when with regard to *activity*, we have such notions as 'there is no such thing as *Karma*, nor any result of *Karma*'; (*j*) when with regard to *Defects* we have the notion that metempsychosis is not due to 'defects';—(*k*) with regard to *Death and Birth* (*i.e.*, Transmigration) we have such *wrong notions* as—'there

is no such thing as an animal or a living being, or a being
Bhā. Page 8. or soul, who could die, or, having died, could be born again,' 'the transmigration of living beings is without cause,' 'the cessation of birth is without cause,' 'Transmigration has beginning, but no end,' 'even though caused, Transmigration is not caused by Karma,' 'Transmigration can have no relation to the soul, it consists only in the disruption (at death) and restoration (at rebirth) of the continuous connection of such things as the body, the sense-organs, the intellect and the sensations';—(*l*) with regard to *Final Release* we have such *wrong notions* as 'it is something terrible, involving as it does the cessation of all activity,' 'in Final Release which consists in separation from all things, we lose much that is desirable,' 'how can any intelligent person have any longing for Final Release, in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, nor any conciousness (or sensation) at all?'

(B.) From the above-described *Wrong Notion* proceeds attachment to the agreeable and aversion for the disagreeable; and under the influence of this attachment and aversion, there appear the *Defects*,—such as untruthfulness, jealousy, deceit, avarice and the like.

(C.) Urged by these *Defects*, when the man acts, he commits such misdeeds as,—(*a*) killing, stealing, illicit intercourse, and such other acts pertaining to the body; (*b*) lying, rude talking and incoherent babbling, these pertaining to speech; (*c*) malice, desire for things bel nging to others, and atheism, these pertaining to the mind; such misdeeds constitute the Wrong or Sinful Activity which tends to *Adharma* (Vice, demerit). The right sort of *Activity* consists in the following actions—(*a*) with the body, charity, supporting and service; (*b*) with speech, telling the truth, saying what is beneficial and agreeable, studying the Veda; (*c*) with the mind, mercy, entertaining no desire for the belongings of other people, and faith; this right Activity tends to *Dharma* (virtue, merit). What are meant by 'activity' ('*pravṛitti*') in this connection (in the sūtra) are the *results* of activity, in the form of Merit and Demerit; just as life, being the result of food, we speak of the life of living beings as 'food.'

(D.) The 'Activity' described above (in the form of Merit and Demerit) becomes the cause of disreputable and and respectable *birth* (respectively); and *Birth* consists in the collective appearance (in one congregated group) of the Body, the Sense-organs and the Intellect (*Buddhi*).

(E) When there is *birth*, there is *Pain*; it is that which is felt as disagreeable, and is also known by such names as '*bāḍhanā*' (harrassment), *pīdā* (suffering) and '*ṭāpa*' (affliction).

The above five qualities (or principles), beginning with *Wrong Notion* and ending with *Pain*,* when functioning contiguously (without break) constitute Metempsychosis.

When 'true knowledge' is attained, 'wrong notions' disappear; on the disappearance of 'wrong notions' the 'defects' disappear; the disappearance of 'defects' is followed by the disappearance of 'activity' (merit and demerit); when there is no activity there is no 'birth;' on the cessation of birth there is cessation of 'pain;' and the cessation of pain is followed by Final Release, which is the 'highest good'.

What is 'true knowledge' is explained by the contrary of the 'wrong notion' indicated above. For instance, (*a*) the 'true knowledge' with regard to the *Soul* is in the form 'there is such a thing as Soul;'—(*b*) That with regard to the '*not-Soul*' is in the form 'the not-soul is not the Soul;'—similarly with regard to (*c*) *pain*, (*d*) the *eternal*, (*e*) *safety*, (*f*) the *fearful*, (*g*) the *disgusting*, and (*h*) the *rejectable*, we have 'true knowledge' when each is known in its real character;—(*i*) with regard to *activity* it is in the form 'there is such a thing as *karma*, and it is effective in bringing about results; (*j*) with regard to *defects* it is in the form

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'metempsychosis is due to defects;'—(*k*) with regard to *transmigration* it is in the form 'there is such a thing as an animal, a living being, a being, a soul which, having died, is reborn,—birth has a definite cause,—the cessation of birth has a definite cause,—transmigration is without beginning, but ends in Final Release,—transmigration, having a cause, is caused by activity (merit and

* The order of these as given in the *Sūṭra* has been altered here. (See *Vārṭika* below).

demerit),—transmigration is connected with the soul and operates through disruption and restoration of the continuous connection of such things as the body, the sense-organs, the intellect and the sensations;'—(*l*) with regard to Final Release, it is in the form 'Final Release, involving separation from all things and cessation from all activity, is extremely peaceful,—much that is painful, frightful and sinful disappears on Final Release,—and how can any intelligent person fail to have a longing for it, being, as it is, free from all pain and, entirely devoid of all consciousness of pain? Final Release must be free not only from *pain*, but from *pleasure* also; because all pleasure is invariably connected with some pain, and as such should be avoided, in the same manner as food mixed with honey and poison is avoided.

VI.

Vārṭika.

[*P.* 25, *l.* 6 *to P.* 28, *l.* 16.]

The present *Sūṭra* serves the useful purpose of pointing out the connection that the Science has with the Highest Good. We next proceed to explain the meaning of the words contained in the Sūṭra. The objects to be known are the 'objects of cognition' mentioned in Sūṭra 1. 1. 9, beginning with 'Soul' and ending with 'Final Release'; and with reference to these *there are various kinds of Wrong Notion*—says the *Bhāṣya.* "What is the exact meaning of the word *varṭaṭē* (*are*) as used by the *Bhāṣya* in this passage?" It means that Wrong Notion *has these things for its object.* The diversity of Wrong Notion is as follows:—(*a*) with regard to the Soul it is in the form 'the Soul does not exist'; as a matter of fact, by the force of reasoning and the Means of Right Cognition the Soul having been cognised as something existing, the notion that *it does*

not exist must be regarded as Wrong Notion. An objection is raised—"No such wrong Notion is possible; for the simple reason that there is no similarity between the *existent* and the *non-existent*."* This objection is not right; because it is possible for those to be amenable to (cognisable by) the 'means of cognition'; the objection means that, inasmuch as the *existent* and the *non-existent* have no sort of similarity, there is nothing common between the *existent* Soul and the *non-existent* by virtue of which the character of the *non-existent* could be attributed to the Soul; and for this reason there can be no such *wrong cognition* as that the *Soul does not exist*. As a matter of fact however, we find that both the *existent* and the *non-existent* are amenable to the *Pramāṇas*; and this forms a basis of similarity between them; the dissimilarity or difference between them consisting in the fact that while the *existent* has actions and properties, the *non-existent* is devoid of these; it is these characters of the *non-existent* (viz: being devoid of actions and properties) which one attributes to the *Soul*, and thereby comes to have the *Wrong Notion* that the *Soul is non-existent*.

(*b*) Similarly with regard to the *Not-Soul* in the Body, the *Wrong Notion* is in the from 'the body is the Soul'. *Question*:—"What is the similarity between the *Soul* and the *Non-Soul*, in the form of the Body and other things, by virtue of which the *Non-Soul* comes to be mistaken for the Soul?" The Similarity between the Soul and the Body consists in both of these being spoken of as 'I,'—the difference between them consisting in the fact that while the Soul is the receptacle of Desire and such other qualities, the Body is not so; it is a well-known fact that just as the Soul is spok-

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* All misconception is passed upon some sort of similarity between the thing and that which it is mistaken for; the existent and the Non-existent being contradictories, no sort of similarity is possible between them; and hence the one cannot be mistaken for the other.

en of as 'I' so is the Body also. "How can the Body be spoken of as I?" For the simple reason that the word 'I' is actually found to be used in the same case as, and co-ordinated with, words signifying the body; as for instance, we meet with such assertions as 'I am fair', where what is 'fair' is the *body*;—though herein lies the point of similarity, the difference between the two lies in this that it is only the Soul, and not the Body &c., which is the receptacle of Desire &c.; all this we shall explain later on. It is these qualities of the Soul, Desire and the rest, which one attributes to the Body &c., and thereby comes to have the *wrong notion* 'I am the Body'. Thus then, we find that in all cases, *Wrong Notion* appears when we attribute to a thing characters entirely different from the common and uncommon properties that it is known to possess. "What is *Wrong Notion*?" It is the cognition of a thing as something else (which in reality it is not). The *Wrong Notions* with regard to the other 'objects of cognition' have been described in the *Bhāṣya*.*

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The five principles, beginning with *Pain* and ending with *Wrong Notion* †, *when functioning without break, constitute Metempsychosis*, says the *Bhāṣya*,;—with regard to this a question is raised:—"What is *Metempsychosis*?" ‡ *Me-*

* Wrong Notions with regard to the Sense-organs, Objects, Intellect and Mind have been exemplified in the Bhāṣya, in connection with pain, *non-eternal* &c. &c. down to *that which deserves to be rejected*, i. e. from (c) to (l); The rest of the 'objects of cognition' are mentioned by their own names.

† The Bhāṣya speaks of 'beginning with Wrong Notion and ending with Pain'—while the Vārṭika has reversed the order. On this the Ṭātparya remarks that the Bhāṣya has reversed the order of the Sūṭra, and the Vārṭika has again reversed that of the Bhāṣya,—and all this uncertainty of the order has been intentionally adopted, in order to show that there is mutual causal relation among the principles enumerated; for instance, Pain &c. are due to Wrong Notion; and Wrong Notion is again due to Pain &c.; and thus either the one or the other may be put first; this mutual causal relation being eternal.

‡ The sense of the objector is thus explained in the Ṭāṭparya—'If Pain &c. constitute Metempsychosis, then why should the Sūṭra enumerating the objects of

tempsychosis, we answer, consists in the mutual causal operation among *Pain* and the rest; * and this operation is without beginning; there being no restriction as to which appears before and which after the other; that is to say, we cannot say either that Pain &c. must always precede Wrong Notion, or that Wrong Notion must always precede Pain and the rest.

Says the *Bhāṣya—When true knowledge is attained Wrong Notions disappear'.* *Question*—"Why should they disappear?" *Answer*—Because there is opposition or contradiction between *True Knowledge* and *Wrong Notion* when pertaining to the some object; that is to say, whenever True Knowledge or Right Notion appears with reference to any object, it directly contradicts the Wrong Notion of that object; for the simple reason that one and the same object cannot have two mutually contradictory characters; and it is for this reason that whenever there is True Knowledge of an object, it directly sets aside the Wrong Notion of that object. Objection: "How is it that the Wrong Notion, which appears first, is set aside by True Knowledge which appears later?" This is due to the fact that Wrong Notion is entirely devoid of any support; having nothing to support it, Wrong Notion is set aside; as for True Knowledge on the other hand, it has the support of the object. "How so?" (1) Because True Knowledge is in consonance with the real character of the object: that is to

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Cognition mention 'Transmigration', which is only another name for 'Metempsychosis', as apart from Pain and the rest?'

* Pain &c. do not constitute Metempsychosis; it consists in the mutual causal operation among then; that is to say, when they tend to bring into existence one another, we have what is called Metempsychosis. Without Birth, no Wrong Notion is possible; hence Birth is the cause of this latter. Similarly without Activity (Merit-Demerit) there is no Birth; and Activity is the cause of Birth; Defects also become the cause of Birth, as it is they that tend to Activity. Conversely Defects proceed from Wrong Notion, Activity from Defects, Birth from Activity, and Pain from Birth. The process of this mutual causal operation being beginningless, the theory is not open to the charge of 'mutual dependence.'

say, the object cognised actually exists in the form in which it is apprehended by the True Knowledge (and therefore it supports this latter);—and (2) because True Knowledge has the help (or countenance) of definite Means of Right Cognition; that is to say, Verbal Testimony and such other Means of Right Cognition lend their countenance to True Knowledge; as a matter of fact, we find that when, by the combined aid of Verbal Testimony and Inference,* one forms the conception of an object, and then ponders over it,—*i. e.* with his well-collected and concentrated mind contemplates it,—his contemplation having become fully developed,—*i. e.* his contemplative meditation of the object having become clear and distinct,—he obtains the direct perceptional cognition of the real character of the object; and thus in this case the True Knowledge has for its object something that has been cognised by means of Verbal Testimony, Inference and Sense-perception (and thus True Knowledge is found to be aided by the regular Means of Right Cognition), and it is by reason of this True Knowledge (thus attained) that the Wrong

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Notion with regard to that object becomes set aside. The Wrong Notion of an object, being thus set aside, never appears again; because of its opposition to True Knowledge, as we have pointed out above. "Wherein does this *opposition* lie?" It lies in the fact that the two can never coexist. [When there is True Knowledge, Wrong Notion cannot be there.]

* The sense of this passage is as follows—First of all we come to know of the object—the Soul for instance—by verbal testimony, through the scriptures. Secondly our conception of the object becomes strengthened and further defined by means of inferental Reasoning. Thirdly by due comtemplation and concentrated meditation upon the object, we come to acquire the direct cognition of the object; this direct cognition being of the nature of Perception, being throughly well-defined. It is only after all these three stages have been passed that we get at the *True knowledge* of the object. This True Knowledge has been taken as a typical instance of such knowledge having the effective support of all the three Means of Right Cognition.

On the disappearance of Wrong Notion, Passion and such other Defects disappear, because of the causal relation between them; "Wrong Notion" is the cause of Passion &c.; and without the cause, the effect cannot appear. An objection is raised—"As regards the Passion &c., that have not yet appeared, it is possible that they may not appear, on account of the disappearance of their cause; but how can the disappearance of Wrong Notion bring about the cessation of the Passion &c. that have already appeared?" These latter also disappear by the force of Dispassion. "What is *Dispassion*?" Dispassion has been defined as non-attachment to pleasure; and non-attachment must set aside attachment (and Passion &c. are only forms of attachment.) "In what manner does this Dispassion come about?" It is brought about by the recognition of discrepancies (or undesirable features) in the objects (that afford pleasure,)—this recognition proceeding from the True Knowledge (of things).

On the disappearance of Defects, Activity ceases; that is so say, when in the case of the man who has attained True Knowledge, the Defects have disappeared, then, on the cessation of Defects, all Activity ceases. "What do you mean by this *Activity*?" By *Activity* here are meant *Merit and Demerit*,—these being the cause of Birth; by the word 'activity' (*Pravṛiṭṭi*') in the Sūṭra is not meant *action*, but *Merit* and *Demerit*, as it is these latter that have the character of the cause; as a matter of fact, it is *Merit* and *Demerit*, and not *action*, which form the cause of Birth; because all action is momentary and as such could not be the cause of birth (which comes about long after the action has ceased to exist.) The word 'activity' implies *Merit and Demerit*, by virtue of these latter being the direct results of *Activity*.

"As regards the Merit and Demerit that have not yet come into existence, it is only right that these should not

appear after the Defects have disappeared; but that could not be the case with the Merit and Demerit that are already in existence; because these are present in men who are entirely free from Defects; as a matter of fact we often find that the man who is entirely free from Defects continues to live and to experience the fruits of Merit and Demerit." This objection has no force, we reply; because what has been declared here (as to the cessation of Merit and Demerit) is only with reference to such *Merit and Demerit* as have not yet come into existence (which are yet in the future); the cause (in the shape of Defects) that could bring them into existence having disappeared; what we mean is, not that the Merit and Demerit already existing in the present cease to be on the disappearance of Defects,—but that all *future* Merit and Demerit cease to appear, because of the disappearance of their cause (in the shape of the Defects). As regards the Merit and Demerit that are already in existence, these cease only by the exhaustion of their effects; that is to say, all Merit and Demerit are conducive to some sort of results; and when all the results have been brought about, the Merit and Demerit, to which those results are due, cease forthwith.

The cessation of *Merit and Demerit* leads to the cessation of *Birth*. Here also what is meant is that all future Merit and Demerit of the individual having become impossible, there is no further body for him (in any future birth); and it is not meant that his *present* body ceases to exist. "In what manner then does the present body cease?" By the exhaustion of Faculties, we reply; that is to say, what keeps the body in existence is the Faculty, called by the name of 'Merit and Demerit'; * and so long as this Faculty lasts, the body continues to exist

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* The 'merit and demerit' of the *present* is what is here meant. The exhaustion of this puts an end to the present body; and there being no future Merit and Demerit, there is no more body.

[and when this Faculty has become exhausted on all its results having been brought about, the body drops off.]

When there is no *Birth* there is no *Pain*; for the simple reason that there can be no pain without a body; until there is a subsratum or receptacle for it (in the shape of the body) no pain can appear; this is what has been thus declared by Vedic writers—'So long as there are Merit and Demerit in the Soul, there are also his life, body, sense-organs, and objects (of experience).'

A man is said to be 'free' or 'released' only when he has become free from every one of the group consisting of Wrong Notion and the rest (enumerated in the Sūtra).

What is 'true knwoledge' is explained by the contrary of the 'Wrong Notion' indicated above,—says the *Bhāṣya.* 'True Knowledge' in its comprehensive form (apart from, and including, all the several notions cited in the *Bhāṣya*) consists in the *cognition of things as they really exist.*

An objection is raised (against the view that a man is released' only when he is free from all pain as well as pleasure):—"Why is it that the man who is renouncing (the undesirable factors of Wrong Notion, &c.) renounces pain as well as pleasure,—and does not renounce the pain only, and retain the pleasure?" The reason is that it is not possible to exercise any discrimination at the time of renouncing; we cannot renounce pain after having duly discriminated it from pleasure; consequently, when one seeks pleasure, he must experience pain also along with it; and (conversely) when one renounces pain, he must renounce pleasure also along with it. This is what the *Bhāṣya* means when it says—*all pleasure is invariably connected with some pain, and as such should be avoided.* By 'connection,' here is meant either—(*a*) *invariable concomitance*, the one being present wherever the other is present;—(*b*) or that both have the same causes,

the causes (in the shape of the Body, Sense-organ, &c.) of pain being the same as those of pleasure;—or (c) that both have the same substratum; pain subsisting in the same substratum (the body) in which pleasure subsists;—or (d) that both are experienced by the same agency; pain being experienced by the same agency as that by which pleasure is experienced (*i.e.*, by the agency of the Mind).*

END OF SŪṬRA (2).

END OF LECTURE (1).

LECTURE (2).

Definition of Pramāṇas.

I.

INTRODUCTION TO SŪṬRA (3).

[*Necessity of Further Enquiry.*]

BHĀṢYA.

[*P. 9, l. 9. to P. 9, l.* 14.]

* The Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes,—by *enunciation*, by *definition* and by *examination*. *Enunciation* is the mere mention by name of the categories; *Definition* consists in that character or property which serves to

* According to the *Ṭāṭparya*, there are some more words here—' *Yaṭraikan ṭaṭrēṭaradṛṣṭi vā*,' which the commentary explains to mean that the one is found to appear on the appearance of the same causes of cognition as the other. This reading however is not satisfactory,—(1) because the words in question have already appeared above (ll. 11-12), and the idea now sought to be conveyed by means of these words is already contained in (*b*) above.

* We have explained in what manner the true knowledge of Pramāṇa, &c., is related to the Highest Good. After this the following thought might occur to the enquirer- 'Everyone understands what *Pramāṇa* and the rest mean; and this knowledge would be enough to dispel ignorance and bring Final Release; what then is the necessity of proceeding with this treatise any further?' It is in anticipation of this feeling that the Bhāṣya adds this Introduction; the sense of which is that the mere mention of the categories cannot suffice for true knowledge; for which correct definition and thorough investigation are necessary.

differentiate that which has been enunciated; and *Examination* is the investigation, by means of argumentation, of the question as to whether or not the definition is applicable to the thing defined.

* In some cases, the *definition* is stated after the thing has been enunciated and classified,—*e.g.*, in the case of '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*'; while in other cases, the *classification* is mentioned after the thing has been enunciated and defined; *e.g.*, in the case of the Perverse Reasoning we find the classification in *Sūṭra* 1-2-11, while the enunciation and definition are given in Sūṭra 1-2-10. In the following *Sūṭra* we have the classification or enumeration of *Pramāṇas*, which have been enunciated Sūṭra 1.†

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 28, l. 16 *to* P. 29, l. 6.]

I

Says the *Bhāṣya*—*The Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes—by enunciation, by definition and by examination* Upon this, the question is put—"Whence this three-foldness of the procedure?" It is due to the peculiar character of the end or purpose of the Science; that is to say, it is not the mere wish of the speaker that he imposes

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* It having been declared that Sūṭra 3 contains the classification of Pramāṇas, it might be asked why we have this classification before we have been told what Pramāṇa is; *i.e.*, before Pramāṇa has been defined. In anticipation of this the Bhāṣya proceeds to explain that it is by no means necessary that in every case a regular definition must precede the classification; in some cases we have the definition of a thing after it has been classified; while in others definition precedes classification. As regards this particular Sūṭra, it may be noted that while really propounding the classification of Pramāṇas, it also implies the definition of Pramāṇa; inasmuch as the word '*pramāṇāni*' in the Sūṭra serves the purpose of indicating the characteristic features of Pramāṇas; and *definition* is nothing more than the indication of such features.

† This enumeration being a form of 'Enunciation,' the *three-foldness* of the Scientific process is not violated.

the three-fold character upon things, saying to them 'be ye so'; on the other hand, the peculiar character of the end of the Science itself is such that it proceeds by the three processes. '*Enunciation*' *is the mere mention by name of the categories*—says the *Bhāṣya*. Against this an objection is raised:—"This is not right; because this is contrary to what is done in Sūtra 1. 1. 12; that is to say, in Sūtra 1. 1. 12,—which reads 'the Olfactory, the Gustatory, the Visual, the Tactile and the Auditory are the Sense-organs,'—we have the *definition* of 'Sense-organ'; and yet it is nothing more than a mere *mention of the names* (of Sense-organs) [which according to the *Bhāṣya* should make the *Sūṭra* an *enunciation*, and not a *definition*, as it is regarded to be]."

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This objection is not applicable, we reply; because of the word 'mere' (*māṭra*) in the passage in question; that is to say, the *Bhāṣya* defines *enunciation* as 'the *mere* mention of the names'; while the *Sūṭra* quoted does not contain the *mere* mention of names; inasmuch as the words ['*ghrāṇa*'*, olfactory, and the rest] are not mere *nouns* (denotative of things by themselves), but they are denotative of certain active relations [*i. e.*, the word '*ghrāṇa*' denotes not merely the *nose* as such, but the nose as the *instrument by which odour is sensed, smelt**]; consequently, the assertion of the *Bhāṣya* is not open to the above objection. The enumeration or classification of things *enunciated* proceeds in two ways:—in some cases it is *classified after* being *defined*, while in others it is *classified before* being defined; for instance, in the case of Perverse Reasoning we find that it has been classified before being defined; while *Pramāṇa* and the rest are defined before being classified.

* 'Ghrāṇa' being explained as *jighraṭi anēna* the 'smelling instrument', ceases to be a mere name, and becomes expressive of the differentiating character of the organ and thus constitutes its *definition*.

The following *Sūṭra* is for the purpose of classifying the Pramāṇas which have been enunciated in Sūṭra 1.

II

Preliminary Survey of the Pramāṇas.

Sūṭra (3).

Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the Pramāṇas. (3)

II.

Bhāṣya.

[*Page* 10, *l.* 2 to *page* 11, *l.* 8]

(*A*) *Perception* consists in the functioning or action* of each sense-organ upon a particular object; this 'action' being in the form either of *contact* or of *cognition*; when it is in the form of *contact* then the 'result' is in the form of *cognition* or *right knowledge*; and when the 'action' is in the form of *cognition*, the 'result' is in the form of the idea of the thing being discarded or elected or treated with indifference (disregarded).†

(*B*) *Inference* consists in the after-cognition, of the object—*probandum*—possessed of the 'indicative feature,' obtained through the agency of this indicative feature duly recognised. †

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* In every cause that property of it which is the immediate precursor of the effect, is called its 'action'; *e. g.*, when the yarns bring into existence the cloth, the 'action' consists in the final conjunction of the yarns. In the case in question, when the sense-organs bring about Right Cognition, their 'action' would be in the form of their contact with the object cognised; and when the result brought about by the sense-organs consists in the idea leading ultimately to the object being rejected &c., then their 'action' would be in the form of the *cognition* itself, which is the immediate precursor of the said ideas.

† By the epithet 'duly recognised', all fallacious reasons are excluded. The word 'arṭha' here stands, not for object in general, but that *object* which forms the *probandum* of the inference, that which forms the predicate of the conclusion, the *Ṭāṭparya* explains '*arṭha*' as—'*arṭhyaṭē sādhyaṭē yaṭ*——that which is intended to be proved by means of the inference'.

(C) *Analogy** consists in the cognition of approximation; by 'approximation' here is meant *the presence of common properties, i. e., similarity*; *e. g.* 'as the cow so is this animal, *gavaya*'.

(D) *Word* is that by which the objects are signified, or denoted, or made known.

That the Pramāṇas are *means of cognising things* is indicated by the literal signification of the constituent factors of the name '*pramāṇa*'; that is to say, the word '*pramāṇa*', consisting as it does of the root '*mā*' with the preposition '*pra*' and the instrumental verbal affix '*lyut*', its literal signification comes to be '*pramīyaṭē anēna*', 'that by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognised'; and the names of the particular *pramāṇas* also are similarly explained.†

Question—"Have the *Pramāṇas* their objectives in common? or is the scope of the *Pramāṇas* restricted within mutually exclusive limits?"

Answer—As a matter of fact, we find both ways of functioning among Pramāṇas. For instance, in the case of the Soul we find that——(*a*) it is by means of *Word* that we come to know that the Soul exists;—(*b*) we find Inference operating upon it, when it is asserted that 'the indicative marks of the Soul are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and consciousness' (*Sūṭra* 1. 1. 10) [which means that it is from the presence of these latter that the existence of the Soul is to be *inferred*];——and (*c*) the Soul is also *perceived* by a peculiar contact of the Soul with the mind, this *perception* being the result of Yogic trance, and as such possible only for the Yogin. [Thus Soul is an object which is operated upon by all the Pramāṇas.] Similarly in the case of fire, we find that—(*a*) when a trustworthy person says 'there is fire at such and such a place', we have the cognition of fire by means of *Word*;——(*b*) drawing nearer to the place, if we happen to see smoke issuing, we *infer*, from this, the existence of fire;—(*c*) actually getting at the place, we directly *see* the fire. On the other hand, in the case of certain things we find that one thing is amenable to

Bhā. Page 11.

* This definition pertains to the *Means* of analogical cognition, and not to analogical *cognition* itself.

† '*Anumāna*'-*anumīyaṭē anēna*; '*Upamāna*'—*upamīyaṭē anēna*; '*Shabda*'—*shabdyaṭē anēna*.

only one particular *Pramāṇa* ; as for example, that 'the Agnihotra should be performed by one desiring heaven ' we can know only by the *Words* of the Veda ; the ordinary man of the world does not know of any indicative features of Heaven (by means of which he could have an *inferential* cognition) ; nor is he able to *perceive* it directly ;—similarly when we hear the sound of thunder, from this, we *infer* the source of the sound ; and in regard to this we can have no Perception, nor any Verbal cognition ;—lastly of our own hand we, have a direct *perception*, and no *inference* or *word* is operative in this case.

Among the four kinds Cognition, *Perception* is the most predominant ; because when a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing, if he is told of it by a trustworthy person, and thereby he has the *verbal* cognition of the thing, there is still a desire in his mind to ratify his information by means of inference through particular indicative features ; and even after he has been able to get at the inferential knowledge of the thing, he is still desirous of actually *seeing* the thing with his eyes ; but when he has once *perceived* the thing directly, his desires are at rest, and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge* ; the examples already cited above (the cases of Soul and Fire) serve to make this point clear ; for instance, when the man has to know fire, if several *pramāṇas* come to bear upon it (as shown above) there is a commingling of the *Pramāṇas* (in which case all longing for knowledge does not cease until the appearance of direct Perception) ; whereas if there is a single *Pramāṇa* bearing upon the thing, there is no commingling, but separate functioning [and in this case also it is found that it is only Perception that fully satisfies the inquisitive mind.]

[Here ends the Ṭrisūṭrī-Bhāṣya].

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* This shows that while the other Pramānas are not sufficient to allay all desire for knowledge, it is Perception alone which is self-sufficient ; hence its predominance.

II.

VĀRṬIKA.

[*Page* 29, *l.* 8 *to Page* 32, *l.* 7.]

The meaning of the *Sūṭra* is quite clear.

An objection is raised—" The enumeration of the enunciated (Pramāṇas) is distinctly damaging;* because it involves a self-contradiction: it has been declared in the *Bhāṣya* that '*the Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes of enunciation, definition and examination;*' if after this declaration there is *enumeration of the enunciated*, —inasmuch as this would not come under any of the three processes mentioned before, the employment of it in the present treatise would be distinctly improper. [As this being a *fourth* process, the having recourse to it will involve a contradiction of the law of 'three processes']." There is no such contradiction, we reply; as the *enumeration of the enunciated* is included under 'enunciation' itself.† " How so?" Because of both being of the same character: *Enunciation* consists in the mentioning of things by their names, [and this is precisely what constitutes *enumeration* also]. " What then is the use of having *enumeration* at all [when it is the same as *enunciation*]? *Enumeration*, we reply, is for the purpose of *specifying* (what is mentioned in a general way by the enunciation); for instance, if we had no such *enumeration* as is contained in the present *sūṭra*—'*Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the pramāṇas*' —we could not obtain the specification of *Pramāṇas as four only*.‡ " That the number of *Pramāṇas* is four only could

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* '*Ānarṭhakya*' has been explained as 'the character of bringing about an *undesirable contingency* (*anarṭha*).'

† In *Enumeration*, we have the *specific* mention of each member of the object that had been mentioned *in a general way*, by *enunciation*. Thus then, both being *only mentioned by name*, the former is included in the latter.

‡ This specification could not be got at by the mere Enunciation of Pramāṇas in Sūṭra (1).

be known from the fact that the author of the *Sūtra* supplies us with definitions of only four kinds of Pramāṇa." This could not be; as all that the definition of a thing does is to distinguish it from others; it appears to be imagined that the fourfoldness of Pramāṇas could be learnt from their definitions, the *Sūtras* supplying definitions of only four Pramāṇas. But this could never be the case; because the use of the definition lies in the differentiating of the thing defined; that is to say, all that the definition does is to differentiate the thing defined from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things; it can never serve the purpose of *specifying* things; its scope being entirely different; specially

Var. Page 30. [the definition cannot serve the purpose of sypecifing] because the definition of Pramāṇas (as supplied by the Sūṭra) could never indicate the impossibility of other Pramāṇas; consequently, if the four *Pramāṇas* were not specifically *enumerated*, and if we had only the definitions of the four *Pramāṇas*, there would be a doubt in our minds as to whether other *Pramāṇas* exist and yet they have not been defined, or that they do not exist (and hence have not been defined); and it is for the purpose of settling this doubt that both *enunciation* and specific *enumeration* become necessary.

(A) The *Bhāṣya* has defined Perception as *consisting in the action of each sense-organ upon a particular object;*—here the word '*praṭyakṣam*' has been explained as an *Avyayībhāva* compound (not because it is such a compound, strictly speaking, but) because it is only when so taken that the word can afford the sense attached to it by the Sūṭra [*i.e.*, it is only thus that it can be made to include the action of *all the* sense-organs]. That the Bhāsya does not expound the compound but only explains the sense of it is proved by the fact that the form in which the compound word '*praṭyakṣa*' has been expounded here is different from the strictly gram-

matical form in which an *Avyayībhāva* compound should be expounded; and this must be due to the fact that what the *Bhāṣya* means to state is only the fact indicated by the compound word, and not to expound the compound in its strictly grammatical form; the grammatical form in which the *Avyayībhāva* compound ('*praṭyakṣam*') should be explained would not admit of the Genitive '*akṣasya*,'—[the proper form being '*akṣam akṣam praṭi varṭaṭē*']. "What sort of compound then is the word *praṭyakṣam* (if it is not *Avyayībhāva*)?" It belongs to the compound of the '*Prādi*' class,*—being expounded as '*praṭigaṭam akṣam*' (pertaining to the sense-organ); this compound being similar to the compound '*upaguḥ*' (possessed of cows), which is expounded as '*upagaṭo gobhiḥ*.'

(B) "With regard to *Inference*, the *Bhāṣya* has said that it *consists in the after-cognition of the object-probandum-possessed of the indicative feature, obtained through the agency of the indicative feature duly recognised*; this however is not right; because of the absence of proper results; that is to say, if Inference is defined in this manner, it becomes entirely futile; as the object (sought to be known by it) is already known."† This objection does not touch our position, we reply; *firstly* because an additional '*yaṭaḥ*' (*from which*) is understood in the Bhāṣya passage in question, which really defines Inference as *that from which proceeds the after-cognition*, &c. &c. [which definition applies,

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* The word '*praṭyakṣa*' is treated as a regular adjective, its gender varying with the gender of the noun it qualifies. This variability of gender cannot be possible in the case of the *Avyayībhāva* compound, which is always Neuter.

† As soon as the Inference itself becomes an accomplished entity, the object becomes duly known, in the proposition embodying the conclusion, which forms the last constituent factor of the Inference. And the object thus being known as soon as the Inference is accomplished, there is nothing left unknown, that could be known by means of the Inference *after* its own accomplishment. And thus the Inference becomes objectless,—futile.

not to the entire Inferential process, including the premisses as well as the conclusion, but only to the minor premiss, which states the connection between the *Subject* and the *indicative feature* or the 'middle term'; and thus in this case the *after-cognition* mentioned in the definition becomes the result or effect of the said *Inference*, which therefore ceases to be futile];—secondly (if the above explanation be considered undesirable by reason of the necessity of supplying an additional word), we may explain the definition in the *Bhāṣya* to mean that *Inference* is the cognition obtained through the 'indicative feature' (or Middle Term). "But in this case, the Inference becomes futile as pointed out above." This objection does not apply, we reply; because the 'result' of Inference in this case would be in the form of 'the idea of the object being rejected or chosen or disregarded' [as explained in connection with *Perception*, above]. In fact, in the case of all *Pramāṇas*, when the word '*pramāṇa*' pertains to (or bears upon) itself, it denotes or accomplishes its own being (being regarded as an abstract noun), and is synonymous with 'pramiṭi' or Cognition; when however, it bears upon something else, the word denotes instrumentality,—the word '*pramāṇa*' in this case being explained as the means of Cognition, *pramīyaṭē anēna*', *i. e.* 'that by means of which a thing is cognised' [and in the former case the *result* is in the form of the ideas of *rejection* &c., and in the latter case, it is in the form of the resultant cognition]. "When the word *pramāṇa* is regarded as an abstract noun, what would be its *result*, ?—the object having been already cognised (in the cognitive process itself)." We have already explained above that the result in that case consists in the ideas of the object being rejected or chosen or disregarded; as a matter of fact, it is only after an object has been cognised that there can be any such ideas; that is to say, it is only

after the object has been cognised that there are such ideas as 'this should be discarded,' or 'this should be chosen', or 'this should be disregarded.'

[In connection with *Perception* the *Bhāṣya* has said—*his 'action'* (which constitutes Perception) *being in the form either of contact or cognition*]. On the strength of this passage some people declare that *Perception* consists in *contact* only. But this is not right; because there are no proofs for such an assertion; that is to say, there is nothing to prove that it is *contact only* that constitutes the *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. As a matter of fact, both (*Contact and Cognition* mentioned in the *Bhaṣya*) constitute the *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, for the simple reason that both are definitive in their action; that is to say, both *Contact and Cognition* are productive of definite cognitions as shown by the *Bhāṣya*). The view that *contact alone* constitutes Perception is open to many other objections also.

Vār Page 31. (C) "The *Bhāṣya says—Analogy consists in the cognition of approximation or similarity*; but this is not right; because Analogy has been explained as something entirely different; that is to say, *Analogy* has been declared to be the cognition of the connection of a thing with its name;* and yet in the *Bhāṣya* it is stated that it consists in the *cognition of similarity*; thus we have a clear case of self-contradiction." There is no contradiction, we reply; because as a matter of fact, what is meant is that *the cognition of the connection of a thing with its name* is got at by means of the *cognition of similarity*; what happens in the case of all *analogical* cognitions is that the observer, who has seen the cow and is cognisant of its similarity (to the unknown animal), happening to see that other animal, recalls to his mind the idea that had been afforded to him by means of words (indicating the fact of the two animals

* Analogical Cognition is said to be in the form 'this animal that I see before me is called *gavaya*.'

being similar),—and thereby coming to perceive directly the similarity in the animal before his eyes,—arrives at the cognition that *gavaya* is the name of this animal; wherein he has the 'cognition of the connection of the thing with its name;' and thus we find that the assertion of the *Bhāṣya* involves no contradiction. *

(D) The *Shabda or Word Pramāṇa* consists in the cognition of (the denotation of) words; and the result is to be explained as before (in the case of *Inference*.)†

[The *Bhāṣya* has mentioned the *Pramāṇas* in a definite order]. Some people have accounted for this particular order of sequence, in the following manner:—"*Perception* has been mentioned first, because it is the most important of all the Pramāṇas; after this *Inference* is mentioned, because Inference is always preceded (by based upon) Perception; after Inference comes *Analogy* because of its similarity ‡ to Inference; *Word* comes last because its scope is the vastest of all. §"

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* There would have been contradiction if the definition given in the *Bhāṣya* were intended to apply to *Analogical cognition*; as it is true that this latter consists in the cognition of the connection of a thing with its name. As a matter of fact however, the word 'upamāna' in the *Bhāṣya* stands for *Analogy* (and not Analogical cognition) and this Analogy is the means leading to analogical cognition; and thus there is nothing wrong in the assertion that the *cognition of similarity*, is the *upamāna* (*i.e.* the means of analogical cognition); the *cognition of similarity* is not the *analogical cognition* itself, but only the means to it; as shown in the text.

† The *Tāṭparya* thus explains—'When a sentence is uttered, there arises a cognition of things denoted by the words composing that sentence; and it is this cognition of things denoted by the component words which constitutes *Shabda* or 'word' as the fourth *pramāṇa*; when this aforesaid cognition is the *pramāṇa*, the result consists of the knowledge of the whole sentence; but when the cognition of the meaning of the entire sentence is regarded as the *pramāṇa*, then the result is in the form of the idea of the thing spoken of being rejected or chosen or disregarded.

‡ The similarity between Inference and Analogy lies in the fact of both depending upon *remembrance* of past conceptions; the two are different because Analogy has the further character of being based upon Verbal cognition also.

§ The knowledge of an extensive field is naturally dependent upon the knowledge of lesser fields; hence the latter are mentioned first.

Others have objected to this explanation, declaring that the particular order has been adopted only because when a number of Pramāṇas had to be mentioned, it was only natural that they should be mentioned in some order, one after the other; * such being the very nature of all verbal expression that things cannot be spoken of simultaneously; they further point out that the reason that has been put forward for *Word* being placed last—that "its scope is the vastest of all"—should operate quite the other way; that which has the vastest scope should have been mentioned first. This last view also cannot be accepted, we reply. It is quite true that it is the very nature of verbal expression that things should be spoken of one after the other; but though this would account for some sort of sequence in the mention of the *Pramāṇas*, it could not be the reason for adopting a definite particular order of sequence. In view of these objections it becomes necessary to point out some other reason (for the particular order in which the *Pramāṇas* are mentioned). This reason lies in this that Perception is mentioned first, *because it is the most important*; (as the former of the above two views has pointed out); but it is not right to say (as the second view has said) that *Word* is to be mentioned first because "its scope is the vastest;" because as a matter of fact, both *Perception* and *Word* have vast scope. "How so?" Because by means of *Perception*, as well as by means of *Word*, we have the apprehension of Generalities, of Specialities, and of things possessed of these (generality and speciality). The question then† arises—"Should then *Word* be mentioned first, or *Perception*?" *Perception*, we reply. "Why so?" For the simple reason that all *Pramāṇas* are preceded by (*i.e.*, based upon) *Perception*.‡

* And there is no ulterior motive underlying the adoption of the particular order.

† Both being equally extensive in their scope.

‡ Inference and Analogy both stand in need of *Perception*; without which they are impossible. In Verbal Cognition also the auditory perception—hearing—of the word is absolutely necessary.

The *Bhāṣya* having raised the question—"*Have the Pramāṇas their objectives in common? Or the scope of the Pramāṇas is restricted within mutually exclusive limits?*"—answers it with—*As a matter of fact we find both ways functioning among the Pramāṇas.* How this is so has been shown by us in course of our explanation of the opening word of the *Bhāṣya*—'*pramāṇaṭaḥ.*' *

Var. Page 32.

Says the *Bhāṣya*—*Among the four kinds of Pramāṇa, Perception is the most predominant. Perception* is regarded as the most important, because when a thing has been apprehended by *Perception* (*i.e.*, has been directly perceived), there is no further desire on the part of the cogniser (to have any other cognition of that thing). For example, we find that when the ordinary man is told by a trustworthy person that there is fire in a certain place he has the cognition of fire got by means of *Word*; being moved by a desire for further definite cognition of the fire, he proceeds to the spot indicated; drawing near to it, he perceives the smoke, and through that he apprehends (by Inference) the Fire of which the smoke is a concomitant indicative; (not satisfied by this, and being moved by a desire for further definite cognition) he draws nearer to the place, when the fire is present before his eyes, and he obtains, through this contact of the fire with his organ of vision, the cognition (direct Perception) of fire; and after that he has no desire for any further cognition of that fire; it is for this reason that *Perception* is held to be the most important of the *Pramāṇas.* We have such comparative predominance only in those cases where we have several *Pramānas* bearing upon the same object; in cases however, where there is no such joint operation, and the object is born upon by a single *Pramāṇa*, there is no occasion for considering the comparative predominance or subservience of the *Pramāṇas.*

(Here ends the *Ṭrisūṭrī-Vārṭika.*)

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* *Vārṭika*, Text—pp. '-5.

III.

Perception Defined.

BHĀṢYA (p. 11, l. 10).

Of the Instruments of Right Cognition enumerated above the author proceeds to supply definitions—

Sūtra (4).

Sense-perception is that cognition—(a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ,—(b) which is not expressible (by words)—(c) which is not erroneous,—(d) and which is well-defined.

BHĀṢYA (*p.*11, *l.* 13 *to p.* 16, *l.* 10.)

(*a*) That cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object cognised is *Sense-perception.*

An objection is raised against this :—" If such is the definition of Sense-perception, then it is not right to hold (as the Logician does) that (in all Perceptions) the Soul is in contact with the Mind, the Mind with the sense-organ, and the sense-organ with the cognised object ; [because the *Sutra* lays down only the contact of the sense-organ with the object as the necessary condition of Perception]."

Our answer is that the declaration in this Sūtra is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the factors that enter into the cause of Sense-perception ; it does not mean that what is here mentioned is the only cause of Sense-perception ; all that it does is to indicate that factor which pertains to Sense-perception exclusively, and which distinguishes it from all other forms of cognition ; and it omits to mention the other factors (*e. g.* the contact of the Soul with the Mind, and so on), not because these agencies are not present in Sense-perception, but because they are common to Inference and other forms of cognition also.

" Even so, it should be necessary to mention the contact of the mind with the sense-organ [which is a factor that is present in Sense-perception only, and in no other form of cognition]."

*The *contact of the mind with the sense-organ* is not mentioned in the *Sūtra* because when Perceptional Cognition

*The *Vārṭika* supplies two explanations of this sentence :—(1) The Mind-organ contact is as good a distinctive feature of Perception as the organ-object contact —this is what is meant by '*samānaṭvāṭ*' ; but the Sūṭra does not make it its busi-

is distinguished from other forms of cognition, that contact is as good a distinctive feature of it as the *contact of the sense-organ with the cognised object* [consequently when one has been mentioned, there is no need for the mention of other conditions, as the Sūṭra is not meant to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all the distinctive features of Perception].

(*b*) *[Some people have held the view that there is no such perception as is entirely free from verbal representation; this view may be briefly put as follows]:—" As many things there are, so many also are the names or words expressive of them; and through these names, the things come

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ness to point out all its distinctive features; one is quite enough to differentiate it from all other forms of cognition. The meaning of the sentence would, in this case, be as presented in the translation.

(2) The second explanation is that the Sūṭra mentions only the organ-object contact because this forms the distinctive feature of every individual perception; *when one perception differs from another, this difference does not consist in mind-organ contact; i.e.* individual perceptions are never spoken of in terms of mind-organ contact. In this latter case it is difficult to explain the word '*samānaṭvāṭ*', the explanation given by the *Vārṭika* (see below) being forced. The *Vārṭika* does not pronounce itself in favour of any one of the two interpretations; in the concluding statement (see below) it mentions both.

It is remarkable that the *Ṭāṭparya* notices the latter interpretation only.

*" Every object has a name; there is nothing that is devoid of name; this establishes the identity of the thing with its name; whenever a thing is cognised, it is cognised, as bearing its name; the name is not the means by which the object is known; as the object—cow—when perceived is perceived as 'this is cow', where there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case; thus things being identical with their names, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression"—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The translation has followed the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭparya*. This interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* however appears to be a little forced; the *Ṭāṭparya* found it necessary to have recourse to it, and explain the word '*Shabda*' not as 'verbal' (its ordinary signification), but as 'accompanied by the word or name', as it could not accept the view that cognition of the thing as bearing a name—*i. e.* the *Savikalpaka* cognition—is not included under 'Sense-perception'. The reader is referred to its remarks in connection with the word '*vyavasāyāṭmakam*', below.

It appears much simpler to take the *Bhāṣya* as meaning that whenever the cognition of a thing 'involves its name, it cannot be regarded as *Sensuous*, being as it is *verbal*; and it is with a view to exclude such verbal cognition (which includes *Savikalpaka* cognition also) that the Sūṭra has added the epithet—'which is not expressible

to be cognised as identical with, inseparable from, the words; and it is on such cognition that all usage is based; that is to say, every cognition of objects that is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object is in the form of 'colour,' or 'taste', and so forth; and all these words—'colour' 'taste' and the rest—are names of objects;—by which names the cognition is expressed in such words as—'such and such a person cognises the thing as colour', 'such and such cognises it as taste', and so on; and that which is thus expressed by means of names, must be inseparable from, always accompanied by, words; [whence it follows that there is no Sense-cognition that is free from verbal representation.]"

It is in view of the above position that the author has added the qualification that the cognition should be '*not expressible by words.*' In a case where the relation of the object with a word is not known [*i. e.* when we do not know the name of the object that we perceive], the apprehension of the object that there is is certainly never spoken of by means of any name *; and even when the relation is known, it is known in the form that 'such is the name of the thing I perceive' (where the two are entirely distinct, and not identical). † Even when the fact that 'such is the name of the thing' is known, what happens is that this (notion of the name) is an additional factor superadded on to the apprehension, of the thing,—this apprehension, by itself, remaining as before (entirely independent of the idea of the name). Where the use of the name comes in, is in the communicating of the

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by words'. It has to be admitted however that this explanation would militate against the accepted Logician's view that Sense-perception is of two kinds *Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka.* It is for this reason that we have adopted in the translation the interpretation of the *Tāṭparya*, which also appears to have the support of the *Vārṭika*, which latter however is not quite explicit on the point.

*The reading in the text gives no sense; an additional 'na' being necessary. Such is the reading adopted by the *Tāṭparya* and translated here.

†The translation follows the reading of the printed text. But the *Tāṭparya* reads '*naviṣhiṣyaṭē*', which reading is better; the meaning of the sentence in that case would be that—'Even where its name is known, the cognition of the thing itself does not differ from that cognition of it which we have where its name is not known'. The reading of the 'Pandit' edition is '*arṭhajñānanna viṣhiṣyaṭē.*'

apprehension to others]. *So long as there is no name or appellation or verbal expression for the cognition of the object it cannot be comprehended by others, and thereby put to any practical use, because what is not comprehended cannot serve any practical purpose (such, for instance, as being communicated to others, and otherwise made use of).

†It is for these reasons [i.e. because the thing cognised is something different from its name] that whenever the cognition of things is spoken of by means of names, these names are always accompanied by the word 'as' ('*iṭi*'),—the form in which the cognition is expressed being 'the thing is cognised *as* colour', 'it is cognised *as* taste', and so forth.

For these reasons we conclude that the name is not (necessarily present and) operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative (and useful) only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons. The upshot of all this is that the apprehension of things, produced by the contact of the sense-organ with them is *not verbal*—*i. e.* it is entirely free from all verbal representation.

‡(c) During the summer it often happens that the sun's rays become mixed up with the heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together, flickering at a distance, come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water; now if the definition of *Sense-perception* consisted of only two terms—'that which is produced by the sense-object contact' and 'that which is not representable by words'—then the apprehension of water under the above circumstances would have to be regarded as 'Sense-perception'. With a view to guard against this contingency, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *not erroneous*. That cognition is erroneous, in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not; while when a thing is perceived as what it is, the Perception is *not erroneous*.

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*The sentence given in the foot-note reading is absolutely necessary; as without that the sentence in the text, standing by itself, gives no sense. The *Ṭāṭparya* also accepts the reading of the foot-note; and so does the 'Pandit' edition.

† Here also the reading is defective; that noted in the footnote being the correct reading, accepted also by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The qualification '*avybahichāri*' is necessary in the case of Perception only; as in the case of other forms of knowledge, the *erroneousness* lies in the Perception upon which every one of them is, in one way or the other other, based;—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

(*d*) When the man observes from a distance, and sees (something rising from the earth), the cognition that he has is in the (doubtful) form—'this is smoke, or this is dust'; inasmuch as this doubtful cognition is also *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object*, it would have to be regarded as *Sense-perception*, if this were defined simply as 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' With a view to guard against this, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *well-defined*.*

It will not be right to urge that—"all *doubtful cognition* is are produced by the contact of the Soul with the Mind [and *not* by the contact of the sense-organ with the object]; so that the doubtful cognition would be precluded by the first word of the definition; and for the exclusion of such cognition it would not be necessary to have a further qualification";—because as a matter of fact, it is when one sees the object with his eyes [when there is contact of the object with the eye] that he has a doubtful cognition with regard to it [in the form—'this object that *I see* is this smoke or dust];† then again, just as in all cases of Perception, when a man apprehends the object with his sense-organ, he perceives it also with his mind, so also when he has the doubtful cognition of a thing through his sense-organ, he has the same cognition through his mind also [which shows that in such cases the doubtful cognition, though brought about by the mind, is de-

* The *Ṭāṭparya*, anxious to include the *savikalpaka* Perception under the definition contained in the Sūṭra, remarks that doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification 'not erroneous', as that cognition also is erroneous; consequently we must take the qualification 'well-defined' as meant to include the *Savikalpaka* cognition; so that the phrase 'not expressible by words' applies to the *Nirvikalpaka* or non-determinate or abstract cognition; and the word 'well-defined' applies to the *Savikalpaka*, determinate or concrete cognition. The *Ṭāṭparya* justifies its interpretation by the remark that the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārṭika* have omitted to make mention of this Determinate Perception because it is too plain to need any explanation; and that it has put forward its interpretation, according to the view taken by Ṭrilochana Guru. According to the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārṭika* the Determinate Cognition would not be Perception, the entire definition being applicable to Non-determinate Perception only. It would seem that the Bauḍḍha definition of Perception as *Kalpanāpoham*—abhrānṭam—were a true rendering of Vāṭsyāyana's view. The Vārṭika also, when refuting the Bauḍḍha definition, directs its attack only to the presence of the word 'Kalpanā'.

† Which shows that *all* doubtful cognitions are not independent of sense-operation; even though there are some that are due to the operation of the Mind alone.

pendent upon a sense-operation]; and it is this latter kind of cognition which is brought about by the mind through the agency of the organ,—and which has this additional qualification [over the doubtful cognition, produced by the mind alone by its contact with the Soul]—which is meant to be referred to here by the name 'doubtful'; and not the former kind of doubtful cognition [mentioned by the opponent, as that which is brought about by the contact of the Soul with the mind independently of the operation of the senses].* Thus then in reality, in all cases of Sense-perception, the sense-organ of the perceiver is invariably operative; and the operation of the Mind comes in only subsequently, for purposes of the representative cognition (which recalls the third cognition previously got at through the senses); that this is so is proved by the fact that there is no representative cognition for those whose Sense-organs have perished. [And just as in the case of representative cognitions which are directly due to the Mind-operation, sense-operation is necessary, so in the case of doubtful cognitions also, which are due directly to Mind-operations, the operation of the sense-organ is necessary].

The Opponent raises another objection against the definition :—" It is necessary ", he urges, " to supply a definition of Perception that should be applicable to the † (cognition of) the Soul and (that of) pleasure, &c.; because the cognition of these is not *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object*; [and hence the definition given in the *Sūṭra* cannot apply to it]". Our reply is that the *Mind* [by whose contact the cognition of the Soul, pleasure, &c., is produced] is as good a 'sense-organ' as the Eye, &c., and the reason why the *Mind* is mentioned in the Suṭra, apart from the 'Sense-organs' enumerated (in Sū. 1. 1. 12,) lies in the fact that there are certain marked differences in the character of the *Mind* and the other sense-organs [and not because the Mind is *not* a sense-organ; these differences are the following: all the other 'sense-organs'] (*a*) are composed of material or elemental substances,—(*b*)

* Thus there being many doubtful cognitions brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object, a further qualification was necessary for the exclusion of these.

† '*Āṭman*' and '*sukhādi*' must be taken as equivalent to '*āṭmajñāna*' and '*sukhādijñāna*' according to what the *Vārṭika* says. Pleasure may be produced by sense-object contact; but it cannot be called 'Perception'; it is only the cognition of the pleasure that can be called 'Perception'.

are effective upon only a few specific objects; and (c) *are capable of acting as *organs* only as endowed with certain specific qualities (which they apprehend);—whereas the Mind is (a) immaterial,—(b) effective on all objects,—and (c) capable of acting as an organ, without being endowed with any quality.† And further, we shall show, under Sū. 1-1-16, that even when the contact of more than one sense-organ with their respective objects is present, there is no simultaneous perception of all these objects,—which is due to the fact that while there is proximity or contact of the *Mind* (with one object), there is no such contact of it (with the other objects); [which shows that the operation of the Mind is necessary in every act of perception];—and all this goes to prove that the Mind is a 'sense-organ'; and this obviates the necessity of providing another definition (of Perception, for including the perception of the Soul, &c.). Then again [even though the *Sūṭra* does not mention the *Mind* among the 'sense-organs', the fact that the *Mind* is a 'sense-organ' can be learnt from another philosophical system (the *Vaishēṣika*, for instance); and it is a rule with all systems that those theories of other systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be accepted as true.‡

Thus has Sense-perception been defined.

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* The Eye is an organ of perception, because it is endowed with the quality of Colour which it apprehends; and so on with the Nose, the Ear, the Hand, and the Tongue.

† The *Vārṭika* accepts only one of those three points of difference—viz; that the other sense-organs operate only upon certain specific objects, whereas the Mind operates on all objects.

‡ Diṅnāga, the Buddhist Logician, has objected to this declaration, in his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*, remarking 'if silence was proof of assent, why did the Nyāya-Sūṭra not remain silent regarding the other five Sense-organs also?' (See S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. *Indian Logic*—pp. 86-87, *footnote*).

Vārṭika.

[P. 32, L. 8 to P. 45, L. 17]

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 11, l. 10) has said—*Of the Instruments of Right Cognition enumerated above, the author proceeds to supply definitions.* Of these definitions, that of Perception is given in Sū. 4. This Sūṭra serves the purpose of differentiating Perception from all other things, homogeneous as well as heterogeneous.*

The question is raised—"What is the meaning of the Sūṭra?"

[In answer to this question; the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to explain each of the words separately].

(a) '*That which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ.*' The sense of this is that—' that cognition is *Perception* which proceeds from, or is brought about by, the contact of the object perceived with the sense-organs (spoken of in the Sūṭra) pointed out later on (in Sū. 1-1-12); and the 'objects' also will be pointed out in Sū. 1-1-14. As for 'contact,' this is of six different kinds:—*viz.* (1) *conjunction*, (2) *inherence in that which is in conjunction*, (3) *inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction*, (4) *inherence*, (5) *inherence in that which inheres*, and (6) *the relation of qualification*. To exemplify these—When a certain thing—the jar, for instance,—is seen, the jar which is endowed with colour is the 'object', and the eye the 'sense-organ'; and in this case, the 'contact' of these two is of the form of *conjunction*; because both are *substance* (and as such capable of mutual conjunction) (1)—in the perception of the colour (of the jar) the 'contact' of the eye with the colour, which latter is not a *substance*, is of the nature of *inherence in that which is in conjunction*; because the colour

* Perception is distinguished from Inference, &c., which, as Right Cognitions are 'homogeneous;' and it is also distinguished from Erroneous Cognition, which is 'hetrogeneous' as not belonging to the same class of 'Right Cognition'.

(which is *in contact*) subsists in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye,—this 'subsistence' being of the nature of *inherence* (2).—In the perception of the genus subsisting in the colour, the 'contact' is of the form of *inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction* [the genus *inhering* in the colour, which *inheres* in the jar, which is in conjunction with the Eye] ; similarly in the case of Perception by means of the Olfactory organ, there is *conjunction* with the odorous substance,—in the odour, there is inherence of that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ),—in the genus subsisting in the odour, there is inherence of that (odour) which inheres in that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ) (3). In the case of the perception of Sound, the 'contact' is in the form of *inherence* (4) [Sound inhering in the Ākāsha of the auditory organ, by which it is apprehended]. In the case of Sound, the first * sound that is produced has its source in conjunction and disjunction.

Vār : Page 33.

On this point, there arises the question——" (a) Which Sound has its origin in conjunction ? (b) and which in disjunction ? "

(a) [The *Sound having its origin in conjunction* we find in the case of the beating of the drum; in this case] Sound being the distinctive quality of *ākāsha*, its cause must be a conjunction subsisting in *ākāsha* ;— and it is a well-known law that in the producing of qualities and actions, Conjunction cannot operate independently ; it must depend on something else.—Now what is that upon which it depends ? Well, as a matter of fact, Sound

* 'First '—The Logician's view is that whenever sound is produced, it is produced in the first instance, in the source from which it proceeds ; this sound reproduces itself in the point of Ākāsha nearest to that source ; and so on, it continues to be reproduced until it reaches the auditory organ, where it is perceived ; of this series, it is the *first* one that is produced by conjunctions and disjunctions——of the air with the vocal cords for instance,—the subsequent ones owing their origin to the sound immediately preceding it in the series.

is produced (in the case of the sound of the drum, for instance) by the conjunction of the *ākāsha* with the drum; and this conjunction is aided by (and hence is dependent upon) the conjunction of the drum with the stick (with which it is beaten); and this latter conjunction is also dependent upon the force with which the stick is struck. [From this it does not follow that Sound is produced by the conjunction of the drum with the stick; because] if the cause of Sound consisted in the conjunction of the drum and the stick (and not in that of the drum and *ākāsha*), then the cause of Sound would not be co-substrate with it, [the Sound inhering in *ākāsha*, and the conjunction causing it subsisting in the drum and stick] and if such causal operation were admitted, then it would be possible for sound to be produced anywhere and everywhere; [because the only condition that restricts the effectiveness of causal agencies to particular effects lies in the necessity of their subsisting in the same substrate with the effect to be produced; and hence if this sole restriction were removed, any effect could be produced by any cause anywhere].

(*b*) *Sound produced by disjunction* we find in the case of the splitting of the bamboo; in which case the Sound is produced by the disjunction or separation of the bamboo-fibres from *ākāsha*,—this disjunction being aided by the disjunction among the bamboo-fibres themselves.

Sound thus produced produces other sounds all round—one sound on each side of itself; each of these again sets up another sound;—and so on, till there is produced a sound in that part of *ākāsha* which is enclosed within the ear-drum; and that sound, which inheres, is produced, in the part of *ākāsha* therein enclosed, is perceived through the relation of *inherence* (because the sound inheres in the ear or auditory organ, and this organ is only a form of *ākāsha*).

In the case of the perception of the genus or class-character belonging to these sounds, the 'contact' is in the form of 'inherence' of the inherent (the genus inhering in Sound which inheres in the *ākāsha* of the Auditory Organ). (5)

In the perception of Inherence and Non-existence, the contact bringing about that perception is in the form of the relation of the qualification (Inherence being the qualification of that which is inherent, and Non-existence the qualification of the spot on Earth which is perceived). (6)

Thus then, we find that the Sūṭra has made use of the word '*sannikarṣa*', 'contact', because it includes all those conditions that give rise to Perception—viz., conjunction, inherence and qualification-qualified relationship. And this contact is regarded as the distinguishing feature of Perception, because it is what brings about the Perception.

An objection is raised :—

"If the 'contact of the object and sense-organ' is mentioned in the definition, simply because it is what brings about Perception, then what is mentioned is only a small portion of what should be mentioned: there are many other factors that bring about Perception ; and all these also should be mentioned ; for instance, the contact of the Mind and Soul, the contact of the Sense-organ with the Mind, the contact of the object with light, the colour of the object, the colour of that which is in contact with the object (i. e. the Eye and the Light which, by means of their own colour, render the object perceptible), the large dimension of the object, the multiplicity of the component particles of the object (which, if consisting of only one particle, would be merely atomic and hence imperceptible,) and the faculty (in the Self)* conducive to the perception. 'Why should these be regarded as the cause of Perception ?' For the simple reason

*All cognitions are due to the faculty in the Self caused by past *Ḍharma* and *Aḍharma*.

that Perception appears when these are present, and does not appear when they are absent. Thus then, if the 'Contact of the Sense-organ with the Object' is mentioned because it is the cause of Perception, all the rest just enumerated should also be mentioned for the same reason."

It is not necessary to mention these other factors. The *Sūṭra* is not intended to enumerate all the causes of Perception; it is meant to indicate only those characteristics which serve to differentiate it from other things, homogeneous and heterogeneous; hence the *Sūṭra* mentions only that factor which is the cause peculiar to Perception, and not those that are common to other kinds of cognition.*

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†"In that case", says the Opponent, "it is necessary to mention the *contact of the sense-organ with the mind*,—as this is a factor that is peculiar to Perception."

(A) That is not at all necessary, we reply; as it is already implied by the words of the Sūṭra; that is to say, the purpose that would be served by the mention of *the contact of the sense-organ with the mind* is already accomplished by the mention of that between the Sense-organ and the Object. "How so?" For the simple reason that both of these *contacts* are peculiar to Perception; and it is not intended by the *Sūṭra* to supply an exhaustive enumeration of all the distinctive factors that bring about Perception; the *Sūṭra* mentions only one such factor, as the mention of any one distinctive factor suffices to differentiate Perception from the other forms of knowledge.

(B) Another reason for mentioning only the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object may be that it is this contact that forms the distinctive feature of every individual perception;

*The text reads *nivarṭyaté*', the sense apparently points to '*varṇyaté*-' as the correct word.

†See Bhāṣya p. 12, l. 2.

in every individual perception, born as it is of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived; as every perception is named after one or the other of these two; whenever there is a perception, it is called either after the organ, or after the object; for instance, when we perceive colour, the perception is called either '*visual*-perception' or '*colour*-perception';—and no perception is similarly named after the *contact of the sense-organ with the mind*; for instance, * the perception of colour is never called '*mental* perception'. † "But there are *mental* perceptions arising from the contact of the Mind and the Soul,—and all these *are* called after the Soul, as well as after the Mind". Our answer to this is that everything is named after that which is peculiar to itself; for instance, when a seed sprouts, it is due to a number of factors; such as the particular time of the year, the seed, and so forth; and yet the plant is named, not indeed after the time of the year and such other factors, but only after the *seed*, which is the one factor peculiar to itself, which distinguishes it from all other sprouts: it is called 'the *barley*-sprout';—so also in the case in question, [it is the contact of the *sense-organ* that forms the distinctive feature of Perception, and not that of the *mind*, which is common to all forms of knowledge]. Thus then, there is nothing objectionable in the definition provided by the *Sūṭra*.

(C) Another explanation proposed by one section of Naiyāyikas is that *the contact of the sense-organ with the mind* is not

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* The reading *ṭūpālambanē* is a misprint for *rūpālambanē*

† The Yogin has the perception of his Soul; and this perception is independent of the contact of sense-organs; this perception is called the 'perception of the soul', just like 'the perception of colour'; and it is also called 'mental perception', just like 'visual perception'. Hence the Mind-soul contact is just as distinctive of individual perceptions as the sense-object contact; hence both these contacts should be mentioned.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

mentioned, because it is a factor that is common to Perceptions that are otherwise different; that is to say, the *sense-mind* contact does not differ, it remains the same, in different perceptions (with each of which the *sense-object* contact varies).* "If the mind-sense contact is not mentioned simply because it is the same in all Perceptions, then, for the same reason, the sense-object contact also should not be mentioned; as this also is the same in all Perceptions obtained through any one sense-organ; for instance, when we have the perception of the *white moving bull*, in the form 'the white bull is moving' (even though we have two distinct perceptions, that of the *cow* and that of the *movement*, yet the contact of the sense-organ remains the same)". It is not right to urge this objection; as it has already been answered; we have already given the answer to this objection, when we have said that the *Sūṭra* is not meant to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all that brings about Perception; this answer is quite sufficient so far as our own view is concerned; as regards the view of some Naiyāyikas, against which the present objection has been urged, we simply do not accept that view (and so are not bound to find an answer to it). †

(D) There is yet another explanation for not mentioning the contact of the mind and the sense-organ: It is not mentioned, we say, because it is similar. "It should be pointed out to what it is similar." Well, it is similar to the contact of the Mind and Soul. "What is that *similarity*?" It is this, that the perception is not named after them ‡;—or the similarity may be regarded as consisting in the fact that both subsist in a

* *E. G.* When we see a crowd of men, elephants, horses, &c., the factor of mind-contact is one and the same for all; but the sense-object contact is different with the perception of each of the things perceived.

† This is the *Vārṭika's* own interpretation of *Bhāṣya* passage, p. 12, l. 2.

‡ Just as the Perception is not named after the Mind.

substratum which is imperceptible by the senses : just as the Mind-soul contact has an imperceptible substratum, so also has the Sense-mind contact ;—or the similarity may lie in the fact that neither of the two belongs to the object perceived : just as the Mind-soul contact does not pertain to the perceived object, so the Sense-mind contact also ;—or lastly, the similarity may lie in the fact of both belonging the Mind : just as the Mind-soul contact subsists in the mind, so the Sense-mind contact also.

* Thus then, because the Sense-mind contact is similar to the Mind-soul contact,—or because all that is necessary is accomplished by the mention of any one of these two,—the Sūṭra does not mention both.

†The Opponent now raises an objection to the definition as a whole—" It is not right to define Perception as produced by the *contact* of the sense-organ and the object; as the sense-organs operate upon things without actually getting at them (hence no *contact* of these is possible). For instance, according to some philosophers both the *Eye* and the *Ear* are operative without getting at the object; and in support of this view they put forward two reasons :—The Eye is operative without getting at the object, (*a*) because it apprehends things at a distance from it, and (*b*) because it apprehends things very much larger than itself (and of varying sizes). (*a*) It is a matter of common experience that we see, with our eye, a thing which is lying on a spot at some distance from ourselves; and certainly, in this case the Eye does not get at the thing seen; specially as the organ is only a particular kind of material substance (and as such incapable, by itself, to move up to a thing at a distance) ;

* The *Ṭāṭparya* notes that the first reason is the one that is given in the Bhāṣya; and the second that which the Vārṭika itself propounds.

†This is a fresh objection raised in tue *Vārṭika*, and is not mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*.

that which is called the 'Eye' is only the * material substance in the shape of the dark spot (the *pupil*), which is aided (in its operation) by another material substance (*light*) outside itself, and further depends upon the *desire to see* (on the part of the person to whose body the dark spot belongs) and also upon the past *karman* (of that person, conducive to the particular experience of visual perception);—this fact has been explained in the following words—'The Eye becomes the means of perceiving colour, because it is brought into existence by the *karman* that is conducive to the experiencing of colour as preceded by a desire for that experience'. Similarly with the other sense-organs also. Thus then, the Eye-ball (which, by the above definition, is the visual organ), aided by another material substance (light), cannot possibly *get at* the object (apprehended by its means). Hence we conclude that the Eye is operative without getting at the object, because it apprehends things at a distance. Some people explain the reason '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*' in a slightly different manner: in the case of the Nose and the other organs that operate by getting at objects, things are not perceived as 'this is at a distance from us'; while in the case of the Eye, things *are* so perceived. (*b*) Another reason for regarding the Eye as operative without getting at the object lies in the fact that it apprehends things of larger and varying dimensions; for instance, we see such large things as the city, the forest and the like; while the Eye is never found to be of such large sizes. (*c*) †A further reason for the same view lies in the fact that in the case of perception by the eye, there is mention of the particular direction in which the thing is perceived; (in the form 'the thing that

* The sense of this is that a particular material substance, when making known colour, with the help of the past Karman of the perceiver, is called the *Eye*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† If it were necessary for the Eye to get at its object, we could see only those things that would be exactly of the same size as the Eye; as only such things could be *got at* by the Eye, the Eye can never *get at* the entire forest that is seen.

I see is to the east of me'); if the eye were operative by getting at the object, there could be no such mention of the direction; as we find no such mention in the case of perceptions by means of the Nose and such other organs as operate by getting at their objects. (*d*) A fourth reason in support of the same view is that at one and the same time the Eye apprehends near as well as remote things: anything that has motion, when it continues to move, it gets at the nearer object sooner than it does at the remoter one; whereas in the case of the Eye, we find that we see the branch of the tree (which is near us) at the same time that we see the moon (far off from us); all which goes to prove that the Eye has no motion; and hence cannot be operative by getting at the object."

Vār. Page 36.

To the above, the author offers the following reply:—

(*a*) The first reason given is '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*— '*because we see with our Eye, a thing which is lying on a spot at some distance from the Eye;*'—this reasoning is not sound; as it does not stand an examination of the several alternative explanations of which the expression is capable: What, we ask, is the meaning of the expression *sānṭaragrahaṇa?* (1) Does it mean *the perception of the ṣānṭara*—of that which, being at a distance, is not got at? (2) Or the perception of the thing *along with distance* (anṭara)? We shall take the former first. We grant that the expression '*sānṭaragrahaṇa*' means the perception *of that which is not got at*:—but in this case we find that this is exactly what is meant by the proposition that you are seeking to prove; and as such cannot be regarded as a reason in proof of that proposition. "Why so?" Simply because what is meant to be the reason or proof is already implied by the proposition sought to be proved; that is to say, your reasoning turns out to be—' The Eye cannot operate by *getting at the object*, because it apprehends things without *getting at them*', in

which it is clear that what is put forward as the reason does not differ from what it is meant to prove. If then, you accept the second of the two alternative meanings mentioned above and explain '*ṣānṭaragrahaṇa*' as 'perception along with the distance',—we ask, in that case, what is that 'distance' which is perceived, by the Eye, along with the object? Is it *ākāsha*? or mere negation? or some other substance? If it is *ākāsha*, then, it could never be an 'object of the Eye'; *ākāsha* is never perceived by means of the Eye; being, like Air and the rest, without colour. If the word 'anṭara' (distance) means some substance that has colour, then, as no coloured substance can be transparent, such an intervening substance would act as an obstacle to the perception of the other object; and hence there could be no perception of this object *along with that other coloured substance.* If lastly, the word '*anṭara*' means *negation* * then, it is a well-recognised fact that negation, independently by itself, can never be perceived by means of the Eye; if then, the negation that is meant is that which is perceived (not by itself, but) as pertaining to the coloured object seen by the Eye†,—then in that case the reason '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*' becomes *inconclusive* (incapable of proving that the Eye does not get at its object).

As pointed out above, some people, regarding themselves very wise, seek to explain the expression '*sānṭaragrahaṇa*' to mean the perception of a thing in the form 'this is remote from me.' But this explanation also cannot be

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* Whenever a *negation* is perceived, it is perceived only as related to something; and never independently by itself.

† If the negation perceived is as pertaining to the colour that is seen,—*i. e.* the negation is perceived along with what is seen—then, such a negation is found to be perceived in the case of Touch also; when *f. i.* we feel the cool touch of water, and along with it, perceive the negation of heat: Hence inasmuch as such *sānṭara* perception (*i. e.* perception of negation along with the perceived thing) is found in the case of Touch also, the organ of which does actually get at its object,—the reason *sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ* cannot conclusively prove that the Eye does *not* get at its object.—*Ṭāṭparya*

accepted; as the idea that 'the thing is remote from me' is due to other causes (and not to the sense-organ getting or not getting at its object); it is on account of entirely different causes that we perceive things as remote from ourselves; it is with reference to our body that we regard a thing as remote from us; a thing is regarded as near or remote to ourselves only with reference to our body; and this idea is not due the thing being got at or not got at by the sense-organs. In a case where the body and the sense-organ are both in touch with the object, we regard it as near; and when the object is related only to the organ, (and not in touch with the body), it is regarded as remote. Thus then, the perception of the thing as *remote* being due to other causes, such a perception cannot be accepted as a proof of the Eye not getting at its object.

(*b*) The second reason propounded above, in support of the view that the Eye does not get at its object is—*pṛiṭhuṭaragrahaṇāṭ* '—' *because it apprehends things larger than itself*'. This also is not right; as mere* connection with the thing is enough to bring about its perception (and it is not necessary for the *entire* thing to be in contact with the Eye); as a matter of fact, all our perceptions of things of varying dimensions, of the large as well as the small thing, proceed from mere connection (of the sense-organ).

Vār: Page 37.

(*c*) The third reason propounded above is '*ḍigḍēṣhavyapaḍēshāṭ*'—'*because there is mention of the particular di-*

* The *connection* meant here is that of the sense-organ with the object; *i. e.*, of the object with some parts of the organ, of the organ with parts of the object; of parts of the object with parts of the organ; this connection is possible only if the light emanating from the eye goes on expanding outwards, spreading wider and wider as it proceeds farther and farther; the passage of the text therefore shows that the author accepts this view of wider expansion. The light from the lamp, though originally centred round the wick, moves out of it in gradually expanding circles; and it is only thus that the light illumines objects of varying sizes;—so, in the case of the eye, the light, centred in it, moves out of the eye, and moves out in gradually expanding circles, and thereby renders perceptible things of varying sizes. —*Tāṭparya*

rection in which the thing is perceived.' This reason has already been refuted (*Text*, p. 36, *l*. 20, by pointing out that this mention is with reference to the body, and not to the sense-organ). As a matter of fact, we find that in cases where the sense-organ and the body of the perceiver are both in contact with the object perceived, there is neither a mention of the direction (as that 'the object is to the east of me'), nor any idea of the thing being near or remote (to the perceiver); when, however, the object is in contact with the sense-organ only (and is not in touch with the body), then alone we have such notions as those of direction, of proximity or remoteness;—all these notions being relative to the body and dependent upon the largeness or smallness of the number of conjunctions or connections of the sense-organ, which is in contact with the object, with points of space intervening between the object and the body. *

(*d*) The fourth reason given above is—'*because we see the branch of the tree (which is near us) at the same time that we see the (distant) moon*'. This also cannot be accepted; as the fact cited is not admitted: What sane-minded man is there who admits that the perception of the tree-branch is simultaneous with that of the moon? This idea of simultaneity is purely erroneous, due to our non-apprehension, of the difference in the time of the two perceptions; just as in the case of the piercing with a needle of the hundred petals of the lotus (where the piercing of all the petals is felt to be simultaneous, only because the difference in the time of the different petals being pierced is not apprehended by the observer). "How do you know that the idea of simultaneity is due to the non-apprehension of the difference in time, and not to real simultaneity?" What leads us to that conclusion is the inference based upon the impossibility of obstruction.

*When I see a cow I regard it as *near*, when the points of space between the cow and my body are few; and 'remote' when these points are many.

* That is to say, if the Eye were operative without getting at its object, there could be no power in walls or screens to obstruct the vision; and thus there would be an impossibility of obstruction ; as a matter of fact however, there is no perception of things hidden behind the wall and such other things; hence the conclusion is that the Eye can not operate without getting at its object. And further, if the Eye were to operate without getting at the object, we could not explain the well-recognised fact that we see things near us, and do not see those far away from us; † if it were true that the Eye apprehends its object without getting at it, then it could not be that it would apprehend things near it, and not those away from it; while that it is so is a well-recognised fact; this also leads to the conclusion that the Eye does not operate without getting at the object. In answer to the above the Opponent puts forward the following explanation :—"Because a thing becomes an object of perception (only when it is capable of being perceived, and not when it is not so capable) [this is the reason why the thing behind the wall is not perceived]." This is not right, we reply; nothing can become an object of perception without some sort of connection [there is nothing intrinsic in the thing which makes it capable of being perceived; this capability must consist in its having some relation with something. ‡ What the argument of the Opponent means is as follows :—"As a matter of fact, that thing which

* 'If it were not necessary for the Eye to go up to the object for apprehending it, what obstruction could the wall put to it? In case it has to get at its object, what moves forward is the light proceeding from the eye ; and the movement of light would naturally be obstructed by the wall and other opaque things ; and thus the light not getting at the object, there would be no perception of the thing in this case, —*Ṭāṭparya.*

†' The only explanation for this fact is that the Eye—or the light from the Eye—can go up to a certain distance, and not beyond it ; so that it falls upon the near object, which is seen, and not upon the remote object, which, therefore, is not seen.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

‡If there were any thing in the object itself which makes it perceptible, then, what is perceptible would always be perceptible ; which is absurd.

becomes an object of perception by the eyes is perceived, and that which does not become such an object is not perceived; and things hidden behind obstacles, or placed at a distance, do not become objects of perception by the eye; and it is for this reason that these things are not perceived, [and not because the eyes do not get at them]."

Var. p. 38.

Our answer to this is that the reasoning is not correct; as we do not admit that a thing can become an object of perception, without some sort of connection (with something else). Apart from such connection, what could this *becoming an object* be? Hence what you differ in from us is only in the matter of names, and not in reality: What we call 'connection' you call 'becoming an object'; and there is no real difference at all, as to facts.

The Opponent puts a further question:—"What is the proof for the Eye getting at its object?" The proof, we reply, lies in the fact of the Eye being a sense-organ; the reasoning being—'the Eye operates by getting at the object, because it is a sense-organ, like the Nose;—we have found that the Nose and other sense-organs operate by getting at objects,—and the Eye also is a sense-organ,—therefore the Eye must operate by getting at the object.' In case no sense-organ is admitted to be operative by getting at objects, we can make *all sense-organs* the 'subject' of our reasoning; and in that case our 'reason' would be 'because they are instruments'; the reasoning being put forward in the following form:—'We have found that the axe and such other instruments operate on their object only by getting at them,—and the Sense-organs are instruments,—therefore the sense-organs must be operative by getting at their object.'

*"In case, through extreme obstinacy, it be held that all things in the world are operative without getting at their ob-

* The view represented here is that it is through its intrinsic potency that the cause produces its effect, irrespective of its getting or not getting at the latter.

jects,—how then would you prove your case?" Well, this obstinate man should be met with the argument that even potent causes do not bring about their effects in the way that they should do, [if their effectiveness depends solely upon their own intrinsic potency, and is not aided by other auxiliary circumstances];—that is to say, if all these causes bring about their effects, by themselves, irrespective of getting at one another, without having any potency added to them (by extraneous circumstances),—then, how is it that effects are not produced in all places and at all times (as there is no time at which the cause may not be present somewhere or the other, and its mere presence should bring forth the effect)? This is what will have to be explained. Thus then, we conclude that there is no cause that is operative without getting at the object; and of this we have many instances in ordinary life,—*e.g.* the potter's stick, his wheel, and so forth.

Thus then it is established that Perception is the cognition 'produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object.'

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* A fresh question is raised.—"For what purpose is the word '*cognition*' introduced into the definition?" It

* On p. 41 of the *Vārṭika*, we find 'the cognition of pleasure' mentioned as' produced by sense-object contact' and in the present context 'Pleasure' is also spoken of as produced in the same manner;—the Bhāṣya on p. 16 includes '*Sukhādi*' under 'Perception.' What is the point then in excluding Pleasure from the definition of *Perception*? It is true that in the 'cognition of pleasure' being produced there enter some more factors than in ordinary perception; as the *Ṭāṭparya* remarks on p. 81, 1-6-8 and 27-28; but that cannot justify the exclusion of this cognition from 'Perception.' Taking the present passage with l. 15 on p. 41, we are led to believe that the *Varṭika* makes a distinction between 'Pleasure' aud 'Cognition of pleasure.' But what is 'pleasure' apart from our *feeling* of it? and *feeling* is only a form of 'cognition.' It may be that in some cases pleasure, even though present, is not *felt*; but that is the case with all cognitions. The *Ṭat.* on p. 81 speaks of Pleasure, as amenable to Mental Perception. So the attempt to exclude *pleasure* from 'Perception' can be justified only on the distinction between 'Pleasure' and 'Cognition of pleasure'. Pleasure is the object, and not Perception itself; hence just as colour being distinct from colour-perception, cannot be included in perception, so also pleasure being distinct from pleasure-cognition, must be excluded from Perception.

is introduced, we reply, for the purpose of excluding Pleasure and such other things ; Pleasure and Pain also are 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with objects'; hence for the exclusion of them it is necessary to add the word 'Cognition' [Pleasure and Pain not being *cognition*].

With regard to this Perception 'produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with objects,' the *Bhāṣya** has represented an objector as putting forward the objection that 'every perception is called after the name of its object (which makes every Perception *verbal*).' And it is with a view to reject this view that the *Sūṭra* adds (to the definition) the qualification '*avyapadēshya*', *not expressible by words*; the meaning of which is that *perception* is that cognition † *which follows, and varies with, the variations in the object*, and appears in a person who has not made use of, and does not yet know, the (denotative) relation that the object may bear to any word or words;—in fact even for the person who knows this latter relation of the object to its name, at the precise moment when the cognition appears, it appears in a form which is entirely free from any idea of the said relation [the idea of this relation coming to the mind only subsequently].

Some commentators explain that the qualification '*avyapadēshya*' is added with a view to exclude Inferential Cognition. ‡ This is not right. Why? Because the de-

*The words of this sentence seem to imply that the *Vārṭika* is quoting the *Bhāṣya*. But no such sentence is found in the *Bhāṣya* ; and the *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the present passage explains the purport of the *Bhāṣya* passage (pp. 12-13).

† This qualification is meant to show that the cognition in question is not *verbal*.

‡ How Inferential Cognition is excluded by the qualification is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*:–

When, from the contact of the sense-organ with objects we infer the motion of the senseorgan, the inferential cognition of this motion is also 'produced by sense-object contact'; as it is from this contact that the inferential cognition proceeds. And it is with a view to exclude such inferential cognitions from the *category* of 'perception that the qualification '*avyapadēshya*' has been added

finition already mentions the qualification 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object'; as a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognised object with the sense-organ; hence (even without the qualification '*avyapaḍēshya*') the definition could not apply to Inferential Cognition.

(c) Says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 14, l. 6) :—'*During the summer it often happens that the Sun's rays become mixed up with heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together flickering at a distance come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water*'. It is with a view to exclude such wrong apprehensions that the Sūṭra adds the qualification '*avyabhichāri*', *which is not erroneous.*

"What do you mean by a cognition being *Erroneous*?"

It means that it is the cognition of a thing as what it it not.

"What is it that is *erroneous*? Does the *error* lie in the *Object* or in the *Cognition*?"

*Some Naiyāyikas offer the following explanation :—The '*Error*' lies in the *object*: it is the object that appears as what it is not; and it is on account of this wrong appearance of the *object* that the *Cognition* is called 'erroneous."

This explanation however it not right. "Why?" Because the object all the while remains as what it actually is. In regard to the flickering rays of the sun, when there arises the cognition of water, there is no error in the object; it is not that the *rays* are *not rays*, nor that the *flickering* is *not flickering*; what the error lies in is the *Cognition*; as it is

'*Apaḍēsha*' is the statement of the reason or premise;—'*vyapaḍēsha* (*vi—apaḍēsha*) is the correct statement of the premise; '*vyapaḍēshya*' is that cognition which is obtained from the said *vyapaḍēsha* or statement of premiss; aud '*avyapaḍēshya*' is that cognition which does *not* follow from the statement of the premiss; thus then '*avyapaḍēshya*' is equivalent to 'not inferential.'

* '*Ekadēshimaṭam*'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

the *Cognition* which, instead of appearing as the 'cognition of the flickering rays,' appears as 'the cognition of water,'—*i.e.* the Cognition of a thing as something which it is not; there being no water there (and yet the Cognition is 'of water');—what happens in this case is that the Cognition * after having apprehended the rays with the Eye, falls into an Error, by reason of some defect in the perceiving organ; hence it is in the *Cognition*, and not in the *object*, that the 'error' lies.

(*d*) Says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 15, l. 1)—'*When the man observes from a distance and sees something rising from the earth, the Cognition that he has is in the doubtful form &c., &c., &c.*' It is for the purpose of excluding such *doubtful* cognitions that the *Sūṭra* adds the qualification '*vyavavasāyaṭmākam*,' '*which is well-defined.*'

An objection is raised—"The qualification is not necessary for the excluding of *doubtful* Cognitions; as doubtful Cognitions are not *produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ;* as a matter of fact, doubtful cognition is not produced by sense-object contact; it is a cognition due to Mind (and not to the sense-organs); specially as the word '*samshaya*' is synonymous with '*samshīṭi*, [*i. e.* the root '*shi*' with the prefix '*sam*', which signifies 'cogitation based upon some particular character'; and this 'cogitation' consists in the attributing of two mutually contradictory characters, recalled to the mind, to a single substratum: hence all that the Sense-organ does is to present to the mind that one *substratum*; and all the rest of the process of the

*The translation follows the interpretation of the Ṭaṭparya; which construes the passage as *indriyēṇa marīchīnālochya, indriyopaghāṭadoṣāṭ viparyēṭi'* and explains that the first *ālochya*, refers 'to the *nirvikalpaka* cognition, which is never 'erroneous.'; the error comes into only the subsequent *Savikalpaka* cognition.

It appears simpler however to construe the sentence to mean that it is by reason of apprehending the thing with a deranged organ that the Cognition falls into the Error &c.'

cogitation,—the recalling of the contradictory characters, and the attributing of these to the perceived substratum—is the work of the Mind; hence Doubtful Cognition must be regarded as a purely *mental* product.]"

This is not right, we reply. Because a doubt is caused by both: both are the cause of doubt,—the contact of the Soul with the Mind, as well as that of the Object with the Sense-organ; and what is meant to be excluded by the qualification '*vyavasāyātmakam*' in the present instance is that Doubt, consisting of non-ascertainment by the Mind, which is preceded by the non-ascertainment by means of the sense-object contact; as of this Doubt the sense-object contact is the cause; and the qualification is not meant to exclude that other kind of Doubt which proceeds merely from the contact of the Soul with the sense-organ. Thus then, we conclude that there is something to be excluded by the qualification, and hence it is quite right for the Sūṭra to add the qualification '*vyavasāyāṭmakam*.'

Another objection is raised against the definition:—"The definition 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object and so forth' does not apply to the (cognition of the) Soul or Pleasure &c., because the Mind (which is the instrument of these cognitions) is not a 'sense-organ'; and thus the proposed definition of Perception becomes too narrow. 'How is it that the Mind is not a sense-organ?' For the simple reason that it is not mentioned in the *Sūṭra* which enumerates the 'sense-organs'; as a matter of fact, we find that the Nose and the other 'sense-organs' are all mentioned in the *Sūṭra* (1-1-12), and the Mind is not mentioned among these; hence the conclusion is that the Mind is not a sense-organ. Nor is the Mind mentioned as a sense-organ in any other *Sūṭra*; hence there is no authority for regarding the Mind as a

Vār. P. 40.

sense-organ. Thus then, the Mind not being a sense-organ, Pleasure &c., (as brought about by the instrumentality of the mind) would not be amenable to Perception. As a matter of fact however, all these are amenable to Perception, and not to Inference; for the simple reason that there is no probans or inferential indicative available; and in the absence of the probans, there can be no cognition of a thing that is amenable to Inference. Nor is there any other means of cognition capable of providing the cognition of Pleasure, *etc.*; and they are not amenable to Inference; thus then there is no alternative left; it is absolutely necessary that the cognition of these should be included in 'Perception' [and yet under the proposed definition, this is found impossible]."

To the above we make the following reply; Who says that Pleasure and the rest are not amenable to Perception? "Well, that they are not so has been said by the philosopher who defines Perception as *produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.*" Certainly there is nothing wrong in the definition: the Mind *is* a sense-organ; and hence the cognition of Pleasure is a cognition *produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.* Then, as for the Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūṭra* enumerating the Sense-organs,—this is due to the Mind being different in character from the other Sense-organs. "What is this difference in character?" The difference lies in this that while the Mind operates upon all (perceptible) things, every one of the other organs operates upon only a limited number of of things; as a matter of fact, the Mind is effective on all objects,—while the others are not effective on all objects. That the Mind is effective on all objects is proved by the following reasonings:—(*a*) 'The Mind is effective on all objects—because it is the substratum of that contact which is the cause of remembrance,—like the Soul;—(*b*) because it is the substratum of that contact which brings about the cognition

of pleasure—like the Soul ;—(*o*) and because it supervises over all Sense-organs—like the Soul.

The *Bhāṣya* (p-16, ll. 5-6) itself has mentioned another point of difference between the Mind and the other sense-organs :—*viz.*, that the other sense-organs are all *material,* while the Mind is *immaterial.* But this is not right ; and such a statement is contrary to facts : in reality the Mind is neither material nor immaterial ; *materiality* and *immateriality* are properties belonging to products* ; [hence to say that the mind is *immaterial* would mean that it is the *product* of something other than *matter*] ; while as a Matter of fact the Mind is not a product at all ; and as such it cannot be either *material* or *immaterial.* Then again, the character of *materiality* cannot possibly belong to the Ear (which being *ākāsha* itself, cannot be regarded as a material *product*) ; consequently, if the non-mention of the Mind in the *Sūṭra* be explained as being due to the fact of its being different from the other sense-organs in that it is immaterial while those are material, – then, in that case, for that same reason the Ear also should not be mentioned in the *Sūṭrā* ; as the Ear also is neither material nor immaterial (product). " In the word '*bhaūṭika*', the affix has a reflexive force (so that the word means *matter itself,* and not *product of matter.*) [And the Ear, as *ākāsha,* is certainly *matter*]." This explanation is not right ; as in that case, the affix would become absolutely useless : what you mean is that the word '*bhauṭika*' is synonymous with '*bhūṭa*' ; but if it is so, then the affix (in the word '*bhaūṭika*') has absolutely no meaning ; no additional meaning being afforded by the affix (over and above what is signified by the word '*bhūṭa*' itself) ; and the addition of the affix therefore becomes totally meaningless and futile.

Var. P. 41.

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* That which is produced out of matter is 'material; that which is produced not out of matter, but out of something else ' is immaterial.

It has been urged by the Opponent (in the *Bhāṣya* that there is no mention of the Mind as an organ (of cognition). But this is not true; the Mind is actually mentioned as an organ (of cognition) in Sūṭra 1-1-15 which speaks of 'the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions as indicative of the presence of the Mind'; and from this it is clear that the Mind is an instrument or organ of cognition.

Another point of difference between Mind and the Sense-organs, mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* (p. 16, ll. 5-6) is that the Eye and the rest are organs 'only as endowed with certain specific qualities' (while the Mind is an organ without being endowed with any specific quality). But this also is not right; as if this were true, then also it would follow that there should be no mention of the Ear [which does not, through its own quality of sound, make perceptible Sound exterior to itself, as the other senses do: for instance, the Nose makes perceptible the Odour outside itself, through the odour inherent in itself; while the Sound that is apprehended by the Ear is actually that which is produced within the Ear itself].

For these reasons we conclude that the only point of difference between the Mind and the other sense-organs is that while the latter are effective on only certain particular objects, the Mind is effective on all objects. [And this affords the reason for Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūṭra* along with the other sense-organs.]

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 16, l. 9) supplies another reason for Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūṭra*—'*because the fact that the Mind is a sense-organ can be learnt from another philosophical system.*' As a matter of fact, we find the Mind mentioned as a sense-organ in the Sūṭra of another (*Vaishēṣika*) philosophical system; and as this mention has not been controverted in the *Nyāya-sūṭra*, it follows, from this non-controverting, that the fact is accepted.

*An objection is raised :—" This is not right; as in that case, the mention of the other Sense-organs would be futile; the other sense-organs also have been mentioned by the other philosophical systems; and hence these also should not be mentioned, if the mere absence of denial mean acceptance."

This objection is not well taken ;—the objector is ignorant of the ways of philosophical writers : The fact of the matter is that you are not conversant with the ways of philosophers : *it is a rule with all systems that those theories of other system which are not directly negatived are meant to be accepted as true.* (*Bhā*. P. 16, ll. 9-10). And then, unless a philosophical work lays down certain positive propositions, there can be no distinction, for that philosophy, of 'one's own theory' and 'another's theory;' that is to say, [by arguing that Gauṭama should not mention any sense-organs as all of them are found mentioned in other works] you would set aside entirely the statement of one's own philosophical views, simply on the ground that other people may have propounded them; but if this were so, then there could be no distinction of 'one's own theory' and 'another's theory '†.

For these reasons it follows that there is such a thing as the *Mind*, and that it is an organ (of perception). And thus it follows that the cognition of pleasure is 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ and object', and thus becomes included in the definition.

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*This refers to the objection urged by Diṅnāga. 'If the Mind is accepted as an organ because the Sūṭra has not controverted that statement, then the mention of the other organs is also futile.'

†Every theory is mentioned in some system or the other, being propounded in some philosophical work, or current among the common people. And what the view held by a certain person is cannot be known unless he expresses it by words; and it cannot be known if the man confines himself to denying the views he does not hold, and does not propound any positive views.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

A fresh question is raised as to whether the definition is to be taken piece-meal, or as one complete whole :—There is a doubt as to the definition of Perception that has been propounded : that is, are the qualifications to be taken as *individually* affording the necessary definition of Perception ? or are they to be taken as *collectively* affording that definition ? The ground for this doubt lies in the fact that we meet with both kinds of definitions ; in some the qualifications are meant to be taken collectively, while in others severally. For instance, in Sūṭra 1. 1. 10. we read—' Desire, Effort, Aversion, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the characteristics of the Self' ; wherein each factor constitutes by itself a definition of the Self ;—so also in Sūṭra 1-1-23, we have a definition of Doubt, wherein the qualifications are meant to be taken individually ; while Sūṭra 1-2-10 provides us with a definition of Casuistry as the subverting of another's declaration by means of suppositions,—in which the whole collectively forms the necessary definition ; so also in Sūtra 1-1-6, we have the definition of Analogy as ' that which accomplishes the desired end by means of similarity to something that is well-known', —where the whole forms one complete definition. And as what the present *Sūṭra* propounds is also a ' definition', there naturally arises the doubt as to whether it is to be taken collectively or in parts.

The answer to the above is that the words of the Sūṭra are to be taken collectively, as affording one complete definition of Perception ; for the simple reason that each of the qualifications serves to excluded Inferential Cognition, Pleasure, Verbal Cognition, Wrong Cognition and Doubtful Cognition. If every one of the five words of the *Sūṭra* were to constitute a distinct definition of Perception ; then, by turns, Inferential Cognition and the rest would come to be regarded as ' Perception ';* similarly if only any

Vāi. P. 42.

* For instance, if we took out the first word of the Sūṭra and accepted the rest of it as the definition of Perception, such a definition would apply to Inferential Cognition ; and so on.

two of the words constituted the definition of Perception, it would include all to which those two qualifications would apply; so also if the definition were made to consist of three words only, all to which these qualifications would apply would have to be regarded as Perception; and lastly, in case four words only were to form the definition, we would have to regard as Perception all in which those four qualifications would be present. Thus then, we have to reject the alternatives of accepting one or two or three or four words as constituting the definitions of Perception; and thus we set aside all the thirty contingencies (caused by the permutations and combinations of the four epithets), and take the entire *Sūṭra* (with its five epithets) as forming a single definition. If each epithet is taken as forming a complete definition, then we have *five* definitions provided by the Sūṭra; if the definition consist of any two epithets, we have *ten*; if it consist of any three epithets, we have *ten*; if it consist of four epithets, we have five, (these are the *thirty* contingencies rejected); and what we accept is the *thirty-first* alternative—in which all the five epithets are taken collectively as forming a single definition.

"How do you make out that the Sūṭra accepts the *thirty-first* alternative and rejects the other thirty?"

"It is a well recognised principle that the affirmation of one particular thing out of a number of things implies the denial of the rest, and the denial of a particular thing implies the affirmation of the rest. That is to say, whenever we have the affirmation of one particular alternative (out of a number of possible alternatives), it implies the denial of the rest; as it is in the case of the affirmation 'he sees with the right eye,' which implies the denial of seeing with the left eye; and when there is denial of a particular alternative, it implies the affirmation of the rest; *e. g.* the denial 'he does not see with the left eye' implies the affirmation of seeing with the other

eye. Thus then, in the case of the definition under consideration the acceptance of the one alternative (out of the possible 31) implies the rejection of the other 30.

Thus is the nature of Perception duly defined.

Some people [*e.g.*, Vasubanḍhu, the Bauḍḍha logician who wrote his *Ṭarkashāsṭra* about A. D. 480] have defined Perception as 'Cognition proceeding from that same object'; but this is not right. The definition has been explained as follows:—" When the cognition proceeds from that same object after which it is named, and from no other object, that cognition is called *Perception*; this definition serves to exclude the inferential and other forms of cognition, as all these do not proceed only from the object cognised, proceeding, as they do, from that and many other things." Our objections against this definition are the following:—In the first place, it is not necessary to have the words '*arṭha*,' 'object,' in the definition; if we said merely 'cognition proceeding *from that*,' it would mean '*from that object*.' "But the word *arṭha* is added with a view to emphasise it; that is to say, the addition of the word '*arṭha*' serves to lay stress upon the fact: so that the sense that would be got at by the phrase 'from that

Var. P. 43. *only*' is got at by the words 'from that *object*.'*"

This is not right, we reply. As the purposes of emphasis are already found to be served by the single word '*ṭaṭaḥ*,' 'from that;' just as in the case of the word '*abbhakṣaḥ*' ('feeding upon water'), the purpose of the emphasis that the man lives upon *water only*) is served by the word 'water' itself (and it is not necessary to add any other word for that purpose). †Thus then, the word '*arṭhāṭ*'

*The mere adjectival pronoun '*ṭaṭaḥ*' is meaningless unless some noun is added as qualified by it; hence also the addition of the word '*arṭhāṭ*' becomes necessary.—*Taṭparya*.

† In answer to what has been said above, Vasubanḍhu might reply that if we had only the word *ṭaṭaḥ*, from that', then, the definition would apply to the other forms of cognition also; as these also proceed from something; and this

being found to be superfluous, we have to reject also the view that the definition serves to exclude the inferential and other kinds of cognition.

It has been held (by the propounder of the definition under discussion) that it serves to exclude the Objective * Cognition. But we do not quite understand how the Objective Cognition becomes excluded by the definition. You will perhaps offer the following explanation :—"The cognition in reality proceeds from the qualities of colour and the rest, but is called after the jar, as 'the cognition *of the jar*'; and hence it does *not* proceed from that after which it is named; and thus becomes excluded by the definition." This however is not right; because as a matter of fact, the cognition that proceeds from colour and the rest is never called 'the cognition *of the jar*'; the cognition proceeding from colour is always named after the

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something, be it an object (as in the case of Perception) or a cognition (as in the case of Inferential Cogniton which proceeds from the Cognition of the probans), could be spoken of as 'that'; hence *all cognitions* could be spoken of as 'proceeding *from that*;' with a view to avoid this contingency, it is necessary to add the word 'arṭhāṭ.' In answer to this we have the text 'we have also to reject the view etc. etc.' 'From that' having been explained as 'from that after which it is named', the definition would not exclude the inferential cognition; as the latter also is named after its object 'the inferential Cognition of fire,' for instance. Nor would this be excluded by making 'arṭhāṭ' serve the purposes of emphasis; as such emphasis could exclude only that which is contradictory to, and incompatible with, what is mentioned; and certainly in inferential Cognition there is nothing incongruous, or contradictory, in its being named after its object, even though it may have other names also, as declared by the propounder of the definition (p. 42 l. 19). There is nothing in these other things, from which the inferential cognitions proceed, which could be contradictory to or incompatible with, the 'that object' after which the Cognition is named. Thus then, the phrase *ṭaṭaḥ arṭhāṭ*' cannot exclude these other causes of inferential Cognition; hence this latter Cognition fails to be excluded by the definition.

* When we see an object, what we see are only the atoms of *colour* or such other distinctive qualities, and not any single composite object. But this cognition of the atoms is followed by the cognition of the object as one composite whole—e.g. 'This is a jar'; as the Bauḍdha does not admit of composite wholes, he regards this latter objective cognition as wrong, and hence calls it by the name of '*samvṛṭṭi-jñāna*.

colour, and that proceeding from the jar is named after the jar; and hence there is no possibility of any such contingency arising (as you would exclude from the definition). Perhaps you are under the impression that the jar and such other objects are nothing apart from the qualities of Colour and the rest. But, in basing your theory upon this impression, you are building castles in the air. How the jar etc., are something apart from their qualities, we shall explain later on. As a matter of fact, every cognition proceeds from its own object; hence the introduction of the word '*ṭaṭaḥ*', 'from that', in the definition is absolutely futile. (As it does not serve to exclude any cognition at all).

'But certainly, the Wrong Cognition proceeds from an 'object which is not '*that*' (after which it is named). [and hence the phrase 'from that' would serve to exclude the Wrong Cognition]." Certainly not, we reply. It is not that the Wrong Cognition *proceeds from* an object which is not 'that,' * it only appears in a form which does not belong to the real object (in contact with the sense-organ). So it seems you have not yet been able to understand what a Wrong Cognition is!

Thus then we find that of the three words of the definition—'*ṭaṭaḥ aṭrhāṭ vijñānam*'—the first two are found to be futile; and what is left is the single word '*vijñānam*', 'cognition'; and this would be no definition at all (*of Perception*; which is a particular form of Cognition);—or if mere 'cognition' were the definition of Perception, then all cognitions would be *Perception*!

* When the shell is wrongly cognised as silver, this wrong cognition is not produced by what is *not-shell*; there is no doubt that the object whose contact gives rise to the cognition is the *shell* itself; what happens then is that the cognition is in the form of something (*silver*) which the actual object (*shell*) is not. Hence the wrong cognition, not *proceeding from* that which is not *not-that*, cannot be excluded from the definition.

* Even accepting the definition to mean what it is held to mean,—it is not possible for (*a*) the *apprehended object* (that from which the cognition proceeds, and which therefore is the *cause* of the cognition), and (b) the *apprehending cognition* (which is the *effect* of the former) to be present at one and the same time, [as the *cause* must always precede *its effect*]; so that the cognition, in this case, could not be perception.' "But the destruction or disappearance of the cause (Object) may be simultaneous with the appearance of the effect (Cognition) [so that even if the cause precedes the effect, the effect can appear at the moment of its disappearance]." This explanation cannot be accepted; because there is no instance available of such simultaneity; as a matter of fact, there is no instance of destruction and appearance being simultaneous. In any case there is no avoiding the absurdity that the object, which will have disappeared and hence become *past*, would under the definition, be cognised as *perceived* (in the *present*). "The objection applies equally forcibly to the original definition also [as in that also the object is a *cause* of the Cognition, and should therefore have gone before the Cognition]; and in this case also what instances of simultaneity (which is necessary) are available for you?" The objection does not apply to our original definition, we reply; as we have already answered this; and we have explained the simultaneity under *Sūṭra* 3, 2. 9.

Others (e. g. Diṅnāga) have offered another definition of *Perception*:—

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* As the cause and the effect cannot be present at the same time, 'antecedence' forming a necessary factor in the conception of the 'Cause'—the object (the cause) will have ceased to exist at the moment that the cognition will appear. So that the cognition *as present* ('the jar *is*') appearing with regard to the object that is *past*, would be clearly a *wrong* cognition; and hence the cognition would not be the *valid* Perception that is intended to be covered by the definition.

"Perception is that which is *free from determination*. 'What do you mean by *determination*?' It * means *connection with name and class*; the meaning of the definition thus being—that is *Perception* which is not spoken of by a name or specified (designated) by *class* and the rest†, which is in keeping with the form of the object‡, which is definite § and self-cognisable ||."

To these people the following questions should be put:—*Firstly* (as to the word expressing what is defined) what is it that is denoted by the word 'Perception'? If it is the perceptional *cognition* that is denoted by the word, then how can it be regarded as 'not spoken or by a name'?¶ (and yet this forms the first differentium in your definition). If, on the other hand, perceptional cognition is not denoted by the word 'Perception,' this word becomes meaningless (and yet your definition contains this word.), If then, it is held that what is denoted by the word 'Perception' is some sort of generic (unspecified) thing, then we ask—Is this generic thing something other than Perceptional cognition? or the same as Perceptional cognition? If the former, then Perceptional cognition remains undefined (and yet it is this very cognition that the definition is meant to define). And if the latter, then, in that case, how could you hold Perceptional cognition

* There are five Kalpanās or determinations to which cognitions are subject:—(1) name, 'the thing I see is Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa',—(2) the class—'it is a man I see',—(3) quality, 'he is dark',—(4) action, 'he is walking',—(5) connection with other things,' he is carrying a stick'. That cognition in which none of these determinations enters is Perception.

† Action, 'quality,' connection.

‡ This qualification precludes *wrong* cognitions.

§ This implies validity.

|| If it were not so, it would not be *cognition*; and it is because it is self-cognised that it is 'free from determinations.'

¶ The Ṭāṭparya says this would be contrary to the Bauḍḍha tenet that words express only unqualified cognitions.

to be one that is 'not spoken of by a name'? *Secondly* (as regards the definition itself), if the expression 'free from determination' is meant to denote the Perceptional cognition, then the definition involves a self-contradiction. [Perceptional cognition has been defined as that which cannot be spoken of by a name, and yet it is spoken by the name *free from determinations.*] And if Perceptional cognition is not denoted by the expression, 'free from determination,' then the expression itself becomes absolutely futile (as a definition of Perception). *Thirdly* (as regards the entire statement of the definition), the statement, 'Perception is that which is free from determinations,' is in the form of a sentence. Now, what is it that is denoted by the sentence? If it is Perception that is denoted by it, then there is the same self-contradiction. "How so?" Because Perception is actually denoted, *ex-hypothesi*, by the sentence 'it is free from determinations', and yet it is called 'undenotable,' 'not spoken of by a name';——and who else except the Bauḍḍha can make such a self-contradictory assertion? If, on the other hand, the sentence does not denote Perception, then the assertion, 'Perception is that which is free from determinations', becomes a meaningless jargon of words.

Then again, Perception being actually spoken of by such words as 'non-eternal' and the rest, it cannot be absolutely incapable of being spoken of by a name (or word). That is to say, we find the Bauḍḍha scriptures themselves speaking of Perception in the following words—'Perception is non-eternal,' 'Perception is free from pain, and also selfless; if then 'perception can be spoken of by such vords, how, can it be 'incapable of being spoken of by words'? If it cannot be spoken of by these words, this would mean that Perception is *not* non-eternal; and so, it will not have been (rightly) declared by Ṭaṭhāgaṭa

(Buḍḍha) that 'all that is *sanskṛiṭa* (amended or purified) is non-eternal?*

The Opponent offers the following explanation :—" What is meant by the expression ' free from determinations ' is that the 'specific individuality' † of the thing cannot be determined and spoken of."

In that case all things ‡ would become 'perception.' "How so?" Because no person, however well-instructed he may be (as a Bauḍḍha) can determine and speak of the 'specific individuality' of things ; for the simple reason that this would be opposed to all philosophic conception, (*specially* of the Bauḍḍha, according to whom the 'specific individuality' of things is undeterminable, something that cannot be definitely grasped and spoken of). As a matter of fact every object has two forms, general and specific ; and whenever any object is spoken of, it is only in its *general* form. Nor does this give rise to the absurdity of the object being not spoken of at all ;—because the object is not particularly spoken of in its specific form, it does not follow that it is not spoken of at all; for example, it is not that the Brāhmaṇa is not spoken of by the word 'Man' ; even though the word 'man' does not signify the specific features of the Brāhmaṇa—those that distinguish him from other men,—yet simply because the word does not signify the Brāhmaṇa *along with his specific characteristics*, it does not follow that the

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Brāhmaṇa is not spoken of by the word 'Man,' at all. In the same manner, Cognitions also have the two forms —general and specific ; and even though their specific form

*As perception is also included in 'all' and if it is not non-eternal, *all* cannot be not-eternal.

†This is a Bauḍḍha technicality: Every object has a distinctive form of its own but this is nothing positive, it is purely negative ; the 'specific individuality' of the Cow consists in the *negation of the not-cow* ; this is also called '*Apoha*'.

‡Diṅnāga has not put forward his definition in connection with 'Right Knowledge'—as Ḍharmakīrṭi has done ; hence the definition cannot be restricted to *Cognition* only. *Ṭāṭparya.*

can never be spoken of by means of words, the general form can always be so spoken of [Hence the explanation of the definition becomes absurd].

If, in order to escape from this absurdity, the definition of Perception be explained to mean 'that which is not spoken of *in its specific form*,'——then it would apply, not to Perception only, but to the entire Universe. [As no object is ever spoken of *in its specific form.*]

With a view to avoid these difficulties, the word '*kalpanāpodha*' (' free from determination') may be regarded as a conventional name for the specific form of 'Perception' (without having any literal meaning of its own). But even thus the contradiction does not cease; for as already pointed out above, the specific form of anything cannot be spoken of by means of any word; and yet, the specific form of Perception would be sought, in the definition, to be spoken of by means of the word '*kalpanāpodha.*' If (with a view to escape from this, it be held that) the word expresses nothing,—then what is the use of introducing the word at all in the definition—'*Kalpanāpodham praṭyakṣam*'? Not expressing anything at all, it is exactly like the dream of a dumb person.

Thus then, it is found that the more we examine the definition proposed by Diṅnāga, the more incapable it is found of bearing the scrutiny of reason.

Jaimini has proposed another Definition of Perception: "The cognition that is produced when there is contact of the man's sense-organs." Mīm-sū. 1-1-5. This definition also is not right; because the said contact is the cause of the production of Doubt (and Wrong Cognition) also; this has been pointed out by the commentators upon this *Sūṭra* of Jaimini (*e.g.* in the *Shabhara-Bhāṣya* and the *Shloka-vārṭika*).

This same argument also sets aside the definition of Perception as 'that cognition which appears when there is contact of the object with the sense-organs, and the mind is calm and clear*'.

Similarly the definition supplied by Vārṣagaṇya cannot be accepted. He defines Perception as 'the functioning of the Ear and other sense-organs.' This definition cannot be accepted as it introduces the names of all the five sense-organs; hence any cognition in which even one of the five organs is not in operation would not be a true Perception'!

The method of reasoning employed in the refutation of these definitions will serve to show that all those definitions that are similar to those already refuted, cannot be accepted as true definitions.

Thus ends the explanation of the Definition of Perception.

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* This also applies to Doubt and Wrong Cognitions.

Inferential Cognition.

Sūṭra 1-1-5.

* *After Perception comes Inferential Cognition,* † *which is led up to by Perception; it is of three kinds—(1)* ‡ *the Pūrvavaṭ,* (2) *the Shēṣavaṭ and* (3) *the Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa.* §

Bhāṣya.

[*Page 18, line, 1 to Page 20, line 6.*]

Page 18. The expression 'led up to by Perception' refers to the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, as also to the perception of the *probans* itself; and the *perception of the relation between the probans of the probandum* also implies the remembrance of the *probans*; and thus it is by means of remembrance and perception of the *probans* that the non-perceptible thing is *inferred*.‖

I. [The first explanation of the three kinds of Inference] —(A) the *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause¶; *e. g.*, when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. (B) The *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect; $ *e. g.*, when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is full and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain. (C) The *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* Inference [is that in which the inference is based upon a general observation]; *e. g.*, we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before only when it has moved; and from this fact of general observation we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot perceive it (because

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* This is how the *Ṭāṭparya* explains the word *atha*.

† The *Vārṭika* expands this into—'that which is preceded by other forms of valid cognition and by two perceptions'.

‡ These are technical names, of which the *Bhāṣya* supplies two different meanings. Hence the names are left here untranslated.

§ Another interpretation of the Sūṭra has been proposed by the *Vārṭika*. (See below).

‖ We *see* the fire and smoke together—this is one perception, that of the relation between fire and smoke;—after some time we see the *smoke*—this is the second perception;—on seeing the smoke we remember the relation that we had perceived; and this leads us to the inference of fire—the unperceived member of the relation.

¶ The cause is 'pūrva' or *prior* to the effect; hence that in which the inference is based upon the cognition of the cause, has been called *Pūrvavaṭ or a priori*.

$ The effect being '*Shēṣa* or *posterior*, to the Cause.

we see the sun in the evening in a place different from where we saw it in the morning).

II. [Another explanation of the three kinds of Inference]. Or, we may explain the three names in the following manner :—(A) The *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is that in which out of two things *as perceived on some former occasion*, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the perception of the other; *e. g.*, when fire is inferred from smoke.* (B) The word '*shēṣavaṭ*' means *remainder*; hence the *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied (and eliminated), and this elimination not applying to other likely properties, we have the cognition of those that *remain* (thus undenied); † *e. g.*, in regard to Sound we find that it is an entity and is transient; and as these two properties (*being an entity* and *being transient*) are found to be common to Substances, Qualities and Actions only, their presence in Sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of Generality, Individuality and Inherence (all of which three are *entities*, but *eternal*) ;—, then there arising a doubt as to Sound being either a Substance, or a Quality, or an Action, we reason (by a process of elimination) in the following manner :—(*a*) Sound cannot be a Substance, because it inheres in a single substance (*Ākāsha*) [while there is no Substance which inheres in only one substance, all substances being either not inherent in any substance,—*e. g.*, the atoms,—or inherent in more than one substance,—*e.g.*, the jar, which inheres in more than one atom] ;—(*b*) Sound is not an Action, because it is the originator of another sound [it thus gives rise to something that is of its own kind; and this is never the case with any Action, which always brings about effects that are entirely unlike itself;—*e.g.*, *Action*, in most cases, produces some kind of conjunction or disjunction] ;—and by this eliminative reasoning we come to the conclusion that Sound must be a *Quality* (this being the only member of the three that is not eliminated) ‡ (C) The *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* Inference is that in which, the relation between the *probans* and the

* The *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference would thus be *Inference by Prior Perception.*

† The *Shēṣavaṭ* inference would thus be *Inference by Elimination.*

‡ This example of *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is not accepted by the *Ṭāṭparya—Parishēṣa* is only another name for the purely *negative* inference; while the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is one of the affirmative-negative kind. The example suggested is the inference of the fact of Desire' &c., being dependent upon the Self.

probandum being imperceptible, the imperceptible *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; *e. g.*, when the *Self* is inferred from *Desire* ;—Desire is a Quality, and Qualities always inhere in Substances; and (from this similarity of Desire to other qualities we come to the conclusion that Desire must inhere in a Substance) this leads to the inference that that Substance in which Desire inheres is the Self.

It is true that the fact of there being three kinds of Inference is sufficiently indicated by the enunciation of the three kinds, and hence the additional word '*ṭriviḍham*,' 'it is of three kinds,' in the *Sūṭra* could well have been left out;—but this additional curtailment of the *Sūṭra* was not considered desirable by the author of the *Sūṭra*, as he thought that he had secured sufficient conciseness in expressing by means of the short *Sūṭra* the entire extent of the vast subject of Inference. This method of explanation—of being satisfied with one form of conciseness and not minding other possible forms—is often employed by the author of the *Sūṭra*; as we find in the case of his descriptions of the various kinds of '*Siḍḍhānṭa*', '*Chhala*', '*Shabḍa*' and so forth.

[The difference between Perception and Inference is that] Perception pertains to things present, while Inference pertains to things present as well as not present (*i. e.* past and future) "How so?" As a matter of fact, Inference is applicable to all the three points of time: by means of Inference we apprehend things past, present and future: for instance, we infer (a) that 'such and such a thing *will happen*',—(b) that 'such and such a thing is present',—and also (c) that 'such and such a thing existed.' The past and the future are 'not present', [hence we speak of Inference as pertaining to the *present* as well as to the *not-present*].

Vārṭika on Inference.

[*P.* 46, *line* 1, *to P.* 60, *line* 7.]

'*Aṭha ṭaṭpūrvakam ṭriviḍhamanumānam*'—says the *Sūṭra*. The word '*aṭha*' denotes *sequence*; and the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' is intended to be the definition of Inference; as it serves to distinguish Inference from what is like it (viz: the other forms of valid cognition) as well as what is unlike it (viz: invalid inference &c.).

The compound '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' is to be expounded as '*ṭāni—ṭē—ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*'. *When we take the factor '*ṭāni pūrvamyasya*', the 'ṭāni' in the plural, standing for all forms of valid cognition, it signifies that Inference is preceded by—*i. e.* is based upon and proceeds from—all forms of valid cognition (so that the inference proceeding from Inference becomes included). [Nor does this go against the declaration of the *Bhāṣya* that Inference proceeds from Perception as, whatever form of valid cognition may be the immediate antecedent of Inference.] Even so as a matter of fact, indirectly every Inference has ultimately to rely upon a Perception; and it is in view of this fact that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of Inference as 'preceded by Perception.' With a view to distinguish Inference from the other forms of valid cognition the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' has to be taken as implying a further qualification,—being expounded as '*ṭē pūrvē yasya*'; *i. e.* 'that which is preceded by *two perceptions*';—† so that *Anumāna* or *Inference*, as the *means* of inferential cognition, comes to be defined as 'that Perception which is preceded by two perceptions.'‡ "Which are these *two percep-*

* And not as '*ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*'; as this would mean 'that which is led up to, or preceded by, perception; and this would not apply to those Inferences that proceed from other inferences,; and it would become applicable to verbal cognitions, remembrances, doubts &c. also; as these are all 'preceded by perception.'

† The *Vārṭika* here makes, at the very outset, a distinction between Anumāna as a *form* of cognition, and Anumāna as a *means* of cognition. If this distinction is lost sight of, this and the following sentences of the *Vārṭika* become unintelligible. The Vārṭika refers all along to Anumāna as the *means* of inferential cognition.

‡ Though this is a *perception* in reference to its own object (smoke), it is the cause of the *inferential* cognition of another object (fire).

tions?" The perception of the relation (of concomitance) between the *probans* and the *probandum* is the *first*, and that of the *probans* is the *second*. What happens in the case of Inferences is as follows:—When the man, who is desirous of getting at inferential cognitions, perceives the *probans* a second time (*i. e.* after having had perceived it previously as concomitant with the *probandum*), this Perception arouses in his mind the impression left in his mind by the former perception, which leads him to remember (the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*); and after this remembrance, when he again perceives the *probans*, this last perception, led up to by the former two perceptions and the subsequent remembrance, becomes the '*Anumāna*', or *Means of Inferential Cognition*,—which is known by the name of '*Parāmarsha*' [a name that is given *to the perception of the probans as invariably concomitant with its probandum*].

"What is the meaning of the word 'Anumāna' (by which Perception can be called 'anumāna')?"

The word 'anumāna' means *anumīyatē anēna, that by which something is inferred*,—the affix having the force of the instrumental.

"What is the result that is brought about by its instrumentality?"

The result brought about is the cognition of the *probandum, fire* (for instance).

"How is it possible for the instrument (Perception), which pertains to one thing (the probans, *smoke*), to bring about the cognition of another thing (the probandum, *fire*)? How, for instance, can the instrument, pestle, which falls upon *paddy*, produce the thumping of the grains of *shyāmāka*"?

* This reasoning is not very sound; there is no such fixed rule as that the resultant action must bear upon the same object upon which the instrument operates; as we find that the cutting instrument operating upon the tree, produces the action (of falling) in the *parts* of the tree (and not in the tree itself); what is cut is the *tree*, while what falls (that on which the action of falling resulting from the *cutting* bears) is some part of the tree. In some cases it is true that the resulting action pertains to the same thing on which the instrument operates; for instance, the cooking pertains to the rice-grains, and the resultant action of *being cooked* (softened) also bears upon those same grains. In some cases again, the thing itself is the agent as well as the instrument, and the resulting action also bears upon the same; for instance, when we speak of the tree *as standing*; it is by itself that the tree stands. "What do you mean by the tree standing *by itself*?" What it means is that in the action of *standing* the tree does not employ any other instrument. In the same manner, in some

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cases the action bears upon an object entirely different from that upon which the Instrument operates. In some cases again it does happen that the action bears upon the same object as the Pramāṇa or Instrument of Cognition;—when, for instance, that same object is cognised (on which the Instrument operates). † "But, inasmuch as it is already cognised, what of it is there that could be further cognised (by means of the Instrument)?" What is meant by the object being further cognised is that it comes to be regarded as to be rejected or accepted or disregarded.

* This is the answer given by an *Ēkadēshin*. This view is refuted later on, *Text* p. 47, line 4.

†This happens when the resultant cognition itself is regarded as the '*pramāṇa*'; and thus what is led upto by this pramāṇa is the acceptance or rejection of the object cognised. In this case the Instrumental cognition and the resulting acceptance, etc., both bear upon the same object.

The above explanation given by the *Ēkaḍēshin* is not right; for as a matter of fact, we do not admit of any difference between the objects of the 'Instrument of Cognition' and that of the result led up to by that instrument. [And this leaves no ground for the raising of the objection, to which the *Ēkaḍēshin* has offered the above answer].

[Hitherto the *Vārṭika* has confined itself to that interpretation of the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*', in which '*ṭaṭ*' has been taken as standing for *ṭāni* (all forms of valid cognition) and *ṭ ē* (the two perceptions represented by the two premises); it now takes up the interpretation whereby '*ṭaṭ*' stands for *ṭāni*', as before, and '*ṭaṭ*' in the singular].

When we take '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' as '*ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*', 'that which is preceded by *one* perception',—then we have to disregard the distinction (that we have made above, between the *perception of the probans* on the one hand, and the *perception of the relation between the probans and the probandum on the other*); and then what happens is that the *Parāmarsha* of the *probans* (the recognition of its invariable concomitance with the *probandum*, which is *Anumāna*, the Means of Inferential Cognition) comes to represent and imply—(*a*) the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, (*b*) the subsequent perception of the *probans*, *and (*c*) the remembrance of the relation perceived before; as it is this that is really the '*ṭaṭpūrvaka*', 'preceded by perception of the *probans*.'†

"What is it that is inferentially cognised (inferred) by means of these (as implied by the *Parāmarsha*)?"

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* reads no *anusvāra* over *nṭara* in line 7; it takes the whole as one compound.

† The difference of this from the former interpretation lies in the fact that in this case there is only *one* perception of the *probans*; while in the former case there were *two*.

That which is over and above (what has been cognised by Perception) is what is cognised by Inference—[*i. e.* of the two members of the *Parāmarsha*, the *probans* and the *probandum*, the *probans* is *perceived*, and the *remaining member*, the *probandum*, is what is *inferred*].

"What is the force of the affix in the word '*Anumāna*,' 'Inference'?"

It may be taken as having either a *reflexive* or an *instrumental* signification [*i. e.* (*a*) the word 'Anumāna' may stand for '*anumiṭi*', or *inferential cognition* itself, in which case the *lyut* affix will have the sense of the reflexive ; (b) or it may stand for '*anumīyaṭē anēna*', *that by means of which the inferential cognition is got at,* in which case the affix has the force of the instrumental.] [The only difference would be that] in case the affix has the reflexive sense, the result of the *Anumāna* would be in the form of the rejection or acceptance of the object inferred ; while if it has the force of the instrumental, then the result lies in the cognition of the 'remaining factor' (*i. e.* the *probandum*).

*Now then there arises the question—What is '*anumāna*,' the *means* (the direct instrument) of Inferential Cognition? Is it *the remembrance of the relation between the probans and the probandum? or the perception of the probans?*

Several answers have been given to this question :—(*a*) Some people explain that it is *the remembrance of the relation between the probans and probandum* that constitutes the *Means* of Inferential Cognition ;—(*b*) while others would take this *remembrance* as the *means*, but only in so far as it is aided by the *perception* of the relation of the *probans* and the *probandum* and such other factors ;—(*c*) a third party holds the *liṅga-parāmarsha* (the recognition of the *probans* as invariably concomitant with the *probandum*) to be the *means* of inferential cognition ;—(*d*)

* What gives rise to the question is the fact that both, the remembrance and the perception, are *ṭaṭpūrvaka* and the *cause of inferential cognition.*

but in our opinion all these factors (mentioned by others) constitute the *Anumāna* ; as they are all equally necessary for Inferential Cognition ; and when we come to consider the relative importance of the factors mentioned, it seems only reasonable to regard the *liṅga-parāmarsha* as the most important.

"What is the *reason* that makes this view 'reasonable'?"

The reason lies in the recognition of immediate sequence : As a matter of fact, we find that the Inferential Cognition of the *probandum* follows *immediately* after the *liṅga-parāmarsha* ; and from this it naturally follows that this *parāmarsha* is what should be regarded as the *means*. The *remembrance* (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*), on the other hand, cannot be regarded as the most predominant factor. "Why?" Simply because the *remembrance* is not *immediately* followed by Inferential Cognition ;—for instance, when we infer the presence of fire from smoke, it is not right to say that the conclusion, embodying the cognition of the *probandum*,—'there is fire'—follows *immediately* after the observer's remembrance.—'where I perceived smoke I found fire'. Hence it is only right to hold that what brings about the required Inferential Cognition is the *liṅga-parāmarsha as aided by the said remembrance.*

It is only thus that the *Upanaya*, or 'Application of the Probans to the subjectin question,'(*e. g.* 'this mountain contains smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire) becomes a necessary factor in the inferential process ; that is to say, the *Upanaya* can be regarded as a necessary factor in the process only when the *liṅga-parāmarsha aided by the remembrance* (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*) is regarded as the *means* of Inferential Cognition ; and thus alone does the *Upanaya* come to be recognised as an essential part of the statement of the Inference.

Thus then it is established that *Anumāna* is '*ṭaṭpūrvaka*', as declared in the *Sūṭra.*

An *objection* is raised :—

"If *Anumāna* is defined as *that which is preceded by Perception,* then the definition becomes applicable to *Faculty* (*Saṁskāra*) and Demonstrated Truth (*Nirṇaya*) also (and therefore it becomes too wide) ; for certainly that Faculty which brings about remembrance, and which has been called '*Bhāvanā*' or' Impression' is certainly *preceded by Perception* ; and so also Demonstrated Truth (which, in the case of perceptional cognition , would be *preceded by Perception*) ; and thus by the definition proposed, both of these would come under 'Inference'."

The definition is not open to this objection, we reply. Because what is meant to be defined is a form of *Cognition* ; that every one of these definitions (of Pramāṇas) pertains to a form of Cognition is clear from the definition of Perception, wherein it is distinctly stated that Perception is '*a cognition* produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object'; and hence the definition cannot apply to *Impression* (as an Impression is not a *Cognition*). Then as regards Demonstrated Truth, it partakes of the nature of both : sometimes it is a *means of cognition,* and sometimes the *result* of cognition ; when it is in the form of the cognition of a thing—affording an idea of that thing—then it is only a result (led up to by a means of cognition ; and in this case, it is not a *Pramāṇa,* and as such, cannot be included in the definition of Inference) ; when however it leads to the further cognition of something else, it does become a Means of Cognition, a *Pramāṇa* [and in that case, there is nothing wrong in its being included in the definition]

Inference is of three kinds—says the *Sūṭra*. That is to say, (1) *The Universal Affirmative*, (2) *The Universal Negative* and (3) *The Universal Affirmative-Negative*. Of these the last, (3) the *Universal Affirmative-Negative* is that in which the Probans, while subsisting in the Subject and other objects akin to it (wherein the Probandum resides), subsists in those where the Probandum is known to reside ; *e. g.* the Inference, 'Sound is transient,—because while belonging to a generality and being possessed of specified individuality, it is perceived by the external organ of ordinary human beings like ourselves,—like the ordinary jar.' * (1) The *Universal Affirmative* is that in which the Probans subsists in the Subject and other objects akin to it, and (is of such a universal character that) there is, in regard to it, no object in which the Probandum is known to be absent ;—*e. g.*, †when the philosopher (the Bauḍḍha for instance), who holds all things to be transient, brings forward the reasoning —'Sound is transient,—because it is a product',—where there is no object in which the Probandum, *transient character*, does not exist. (2) The *Universal Negative* is that in which the Probans Subsists in the Subject,—in whose case there is nothing (apart from the Subject) in which the Probandum is known to be present,—and which does not subsist in any object where the Probandum is known to be absent ;—*e. g.*, ‡ 'the living body is not soul-less,—as if it were were soulless, it would be lifeless'.

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* In this, the character of Sound, on which the whole reasoning is based, is one that subsists in Sound, and things akin to it, like the Jar and other ordinary things ; and it is not present in any non-transient thing, in *Ākāsha*, for instance.

† An example of this inference, from the author's own stand-point, would be—'the specific individuality of things is something that can be spoken of because it is knowable, like the generality of things'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ In this case a 'sapakṣa'—'that where the probandum is known to be present'—is not possible ; as the probandum is ' negation of soullessness'; and this cannot be present anywhere else except the *living body*, which is already the Subject.

We may explain the 'three kinds' of Inference in another manner:—'*Inference is of three kinds—(1) the Pūrvavaṭ, (2) the 'Shēṣavaṭ* and (3) *the Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa'*—says the *Sūṭra.* (1) In the word '*pūrvavaṭ*', the word '*pūrva*' refers to the Probandum; hence the '*pūrvavaṭ*', 'having the pūrva', is that which (invariably) has the Probandum for its substrate. (2) In the word '*shēṣavaṭ*' the word '*shēṣa*' stands for the Probandum and other things akin to it; and *that which has these* (the Probandum as well as other things akin to it) for its constant substrate is the '*Shēṣavaṭ.*' Thus the difference between the *Pūrvavaṭ* and the *Shēṣavaṭ* lies in this that, while the former is invariably concomitant with the Probandum only, the latter is invariably concomitant also with other things akin to the Probandum. (3) The '*Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa*' is that which is not seen in common (*i. e.* which is found nowhere except in the Subject); and the particle 'cha' (at the end of the *Sūṭra*) qualifiying this last word '*Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭam*' signifies the fact that this inference should not be contrary either to the Scriptures or to any fact of ordinary perception. Of these, the first two kinds of Inference are distinguished by four characteristics, while the third is marked by five distinctive features.*

There is another explanation *of the* '*three kinds*' *of Inference, the Pūrvavaṭ, the Shēṣavaṭ and the Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa*,—proposed by the *Bhāṣya* (p. 18, l. 3); *the Pūrvavaṭ is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause,* says the *Bhāṣya.*

* The three kinds of Inference herein indicated are thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—The *Pūrvavaṭ* is that which is not sublated and which is not neutralised and which is concomitant with the probandum. These three features are common to all inferences,—which are classed under the following three heads:—(1) the *Shēṣavaṭ*, that which subsists in the probandum and things akin to it (this being the *fourth* feature of this kind of inference),—(2) the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa*, not seen anywhere else except in the Subject (this being the fourth feature in this second kind),—(3) the *Shēṣavaṭ-Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* which combines the features of the last two (and is thus possessed of two characters in addition to the aforesaid three common features)

An objection is raised against the *Bhāṣya*:—"What is meant by the assertion that *the effect is inferred from the cause?*

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(*a*) If it means that, on seeing the cause one cognises the presence of the effect,—then this is not true: No man in his senses is ever found to cognise the effect on seeing the cause; and thus the assertion becomes contrary to fact. (*b*) If it be meant that the inferential cognition is in the form—'*Where* the cause, *there* the effect is',—then this also is not true: because as a matter of fact the Cause and the Effect always occupy different points in space, inhering in different substrates; *e. g.* the yarns (the cause of cloth) inhere in the component fibres, while the cloth inheres in the yarns. Then again, by saying that 'the Effect is inferred from the perception of the Cause', you run counter to the very essence of Inference. 'What is this *essence of Inference?*' It consists in the fact that no reasoning ever operates in regard to either what is not known or what is fully known; and if the Effect were inferred from the perception of the Cause,— this inference (which is a process of reasoning) would operate upon what is not known [the effect being not known prior to the inference; and this would make the Inference invalid by reason of its *probans* being 'baseless', *āshrayāsiḍḍha*]. And thus there would be a contradiction or annulment of the whole fabric of Inference."

We cannot accept the force of the above reasoning; for the simple reason that we do not accept the assertions against which the reasoning is aimed. (*a*) In the first place, who says that 'the presence of the Effect is inferred from the perception of the Cause'? (b) Secondly, what person has ever asserted that 'the Effect is there where the Cause is'? What the Sūṭra actually means is that, what is inferred *is the Effect as the qualifying adjunct of the Cause*; and in this there is no 'running counter to the essence of Inference'.*

* As the Cause is already known; and what is inferred is only an adjunct of the Cause; and thus the Cause affords the necessary substratum for the Probans.

The same explanation applies to the case of the *Shēṣavat* Inferencealso: In the *Shēṣavat* inference also what is inferred is *the Cause as the adjunct of the Effect.*

"How can the word '*Shēṣa*' in the word *Shēṣavat*' mean Effect?"

The fact is that both Cause and Effect have been indicated as the instrument of inferential cognition;—and the instrumentality of the Cause has been already utilised in the *Pūrvavat* Inference;—hence of the two, the *Effect* is the only factor that *remains* behind as the one whose instrumentality has not yet been utilised;—and it is thus that the Effect comes to be spoken of as '*shēṣa*' ('what remains behind').

As an example of the inference of the effect from the cause, the *Bhāṣya* cites the case where that 'there will be rain' is inferred from the sight of the rising clouds. "In what form would this inference be stated?" In the following form—' These clouds will bring rain,—because they are rising, being, as they are, accompanied by deep rumbling, having many lines of cranes flying through them, flashing with lightning—just like other rain-clouds perceived in the past.'

The case of the rise of water in the stream (leading to the inference of the rain that has caused it) is an example of the *Shēṣavat* Inference. Against this an objection is raised :—"How can the rise of water, which is *in the stream,* bring about the inferential cognition of rain *in regions above the stream,*— the two being in totally different places?" The rise in the river is not the instrument leading to the inferential cognition of rain in regions above the river; what happens is that by means of the rise, which is a quality of the river, we infer the connection *of the river itself* with some place towards its source, where rain must have fallen; * the inference being stated in the following form :—' This river must be connected with some place towards its source, where rain has fallen,—because its flow

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*So that both pertain to the river itself.

is quick, pieces of wood are floating along by reason of the rise, and the river is full,—just like the river that is full when there is rain.'

* In stating the conclusion of this inference we might make use of any tense we like,—it being possible to speak of the rain as coming in the future, or as having been in the past (or as being present at the time).

† The third kind of Inference, the *Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa*, is that in which an object is cognised as qualified by a character which is an invariable concomitant of a well-known character of that object, the former character being independent of the notion of cause and effect; ‡ *e. g.* the presence of water is inferred from the presence of cranes. "In what manner do you get at the inferential cognition of water from the cranes?" In this case we take as the *pakṣa*, (the *Subject* of inference), the tree and other things along with

*At the time that we notice the rise in the river, the rain that caused it may have ceased, in which case the past tense would be used; the rain may be still going on, when the present tense would be right; or it may be possible for the rain to continue for sometime longer, when the use of the future tense would not be wrong. Therefore, so far as the example is concerned, it does not matter what tense is used; it is enough that the perception of the effect leads to the inference of the cause. The *Bhāṣya* has made use of the past tense; as there is always a certainty as to the rain having gone *before* the river rises; and the present and future would, at best, be only doubtful.

† The example of Sāmānyaṭoḍriṣṭa Inference given in the Bhāṣya is difficult to comprehend; hence, not satisfied by the explanation there given, the author of the *Vārṭika* supplies another explanation and cites another example. *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The same object as qualified by the well-known character becomes, in this case the instrument of inference; and qualified by the other character, it becomes the *object* of inference. The principal point of difference between this and the other two kinds of inference is that in this case, the relation of cause and effect does not enter at all. The expression '*Sāmānyaṭoḍriṣṭa*' is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*:—'*Sāmānyēna*'—*avinābhāvnā hēṭunā—lakṣiṭam*—'*ḍriṣṭam*'—*ḍharmirūpam*' *anumānam*. In the example, the place *known as with cranes* is the *means* of the inference of the *place as with water*.

the spot which is *well-known* as constantly inhabited by cranes and with regard to that spot we infer *the presence of water.**

† Some people take the *Bhāṣya* to mean that we have a case of *Sāmānyatoḍriṣta* Inference when we infer the movement of the Sun. But we do not understand this. In what manner is the movement inferred? If the inference is in the form 'the sun is mobile,'—the object inferred being the sun's movement,—then we ask: by what means is the movement cognised? There is no inferential indicative that has ever been perceived as concomitant with either the Sun or its motion (all cases of the concomitance of motion with change of position being noticed elsewhere than in the case of the Sun); and it is not possible to infer a thing that has not been found to be so concomitant; otherwise (if even non-concomitant things were to be inferred, then) anything could be inferred from anything (without any restriction). If it be urged that the *change of position* would form the requisite inferential indicative,—our answer is that this is not possible; as the change of the Sun's position is not actually perceived; no one ever sees with his eyes the Sun's going from one place to another; as the 'other place' to which the Sun goes must be either the *Ākāsha* or some *point in space*; and both of these—*Ākāsha* and *Space*—are imperceptible; and there is no other way of perceiving them; hence it is not right to assert that there is *the perception of Sun's going from one place to another*; specially as in all cases what is actually seen of the Sun is only the solar disc; and it is not right to draw an inference from the perception of a thing merely by itself. Even if the movement of the

* The reading '*balākāvattvēna*' appears to be a misprint; as the inference is of the place as *with water;* the presence of *cranes* being the means by which that inference is got at. '*Salilvattvena*' appears to be the correct reading.

† The *Vārtika* now takes up the example cited in the *Bhāṣya*; criticises its apparent meaning; and then, on the top of page 51, points out in what sense the assertion of the *Bhāṣya* may be accepted as right.

Sun were somehow capable of being perceived,—being, as it is, something that has the capacity of being perceived, —yet the Sun's reaching of another point in space could never be perceptible; as Space is something that is eternal and super-sensuous, and, as a matter of fact, the conjunction of two things (Sun and Point in Space)—one of which (the Sun) is perceptible and the other (Space) imperceptible ——cannot be perceived [and the Sun's getting from one point to another is nothing more than its conjunction with a point in space]. If what you mean is that from seeing the getting to another place by Devadatta (only when he moves) you infer the movement of the Sun—and this inference is the *Sāmānyatodriṣṭa*, then, an inference of this kind would be of the movement, of not the Sun only, but of *all* things; and why, in that case, should it not be inferred that you also are moving?

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The answer to the above objection against the *Bhāṣya* is that, as a matter of fact, we do not infer the movement of the Sun directly; what happens is that in the first place we infer the fact of the Sun getting at another point in space; and then from this latter fact, we infer the movement of the Sun; and there is nothing incongruous in this. The form of the inference is as follows:—'The Sun gets at another point in space,—because, while being a substance, and never conceived of as undergoing decrease or increase, and found towards the East, it is yet perceived and conceived of as being in front of the observer, when he turns round, without moving a single step *,—just as is found to be the case with genus and other things;—genus and other things are found to satisfy all the said conditions, and they, as such, are found to have got from one place to another;—similarly the

* The observer has seen the sun in the East; after some time, he turns round, without moving away from the original place, and he finds the sun in his front again,—*i. e.* towards the West. This proves that the sun has changed its position.

Sun satisfies all those conditions :—so that the Sun must be regarded as having got from one place to another.' This getting from one place to another having been thus inferred, from that we infer the movement of the Sun. The inference of the Sun's getting from one place to another may be stated in another form, as follows :—'The Sun must be regarded as getting from one place to another,—because when the observer has seen the Sun in one place, if he does not move his eyes from that point, he fails, after some time, to see the Sun, even when there appears nothing to obstruct the range of his vision,—just as is found to be in the case of Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa (when he gets from one place to another).'

Some people meet the aforesaid objection against the *Bhāṣya* by arguing that Space *is* perceptible; and in support of this, they put forward the following inference :—'Space is perceptible,—because it is pointed at and indicated by means of the finger—like the Moon.' But it is not right to argue thus; as Space is without colour; and being colourless, how could it be perceived by any external sense-organ?

"How then is it found to be indicated by means of the finger?" What is actually indicated as 'Space' by the finger is (not the Space but) trees and such other things connected with the points in Space ;—trees and other things are connected with definite points in space; and it is these that are figuratively spoken of and indicated as 'Space.' What really happens is this :—A certain point in space happening to be perceived along with the (rising) sun, the name 'East' comes to be applied to that point in space which is thus connected with the Sun; and then when any other thing, a tree for instance, is perceived along with the rising Sun, this other thing also comes to be spoken of as the 'East'; and when people indicate the 'East' with their finger, they do so with reference to the tree and such other things, to which the name is applied indirectly or figuratively.

Or, when the *Sutra* speaks of *Inference* as being 'of three kinds', what it refers to is the fact of the Inferential Indicative or Probans being—(*a*) well-known, (*b*) true, and (*c*) certain;—the 'well-known' Probans being that which is concomitant with the Subject; the 'true' that which subsists in other things of the same kind (*i. e.*, in which the Probandum is known to be present); and 'certain' that which is never found apart from things of the same kind.

Or, the mention of 'three kinds' may be taken as restricting the number of Inferences;—the sense being that all the various kinds of Inference are included under the three that are specified—*viz*; the '*Pūrvavat*', the '*Shēṣavat*' and the '*Sāmānyatodrista*'. "In what way can Inference be spoken of as being 'of various kinds'?" In the following manner, we reply:—(I) The Affirmative-Negative Inference is of two kinds—* (*a*) that of which the Probans is always present in things where the Probandum is known to be present, and that which is present as well as absent in such things;—(II) The Universal Affirmative Inference also is of the same two kinds;—(III) and the Universal Negative Inference is of one kind only; as in this case we cannot have any such thing in which the Probandum is known to be present;—then again, these *five* kinds of Inference come to be of *fifteen* kinds, according as each of them pertains to the past, the present or the future;—these fifteen again come to be sixty, according as they become addressed to the four kinds of persons (one who already accepts the conclusion, one who does not accept the conclusion, one who is doubtful on the point, and one who accepts the contrary of the conclusion);—of these again there are endless sub-divisions. Thus there being

Vār. page 52.

* (*a*) *E. g.* 'Sound is transient, because it is a product', where *the character of product is* one that is always present in all transient things. (*b*) 'Sound is transient because it is inseparable from our effort'—where of transient things, while some are inseparable from our effort, others are not so.

endless sub-divisions of Inference, all these become included in the 'three kinds'; hence it is with a view to this restriction that the *Sūṭra* speaks of the 'three kinds'.

The first kind of Inference has been called 'Pūrvavat'; with regard to this name a question is raised—"What is it that is *Pūrvavaṭ*? The cause or the effect? If the word '*Pūrvavaṭ*' means *that which has a pūrva* or *antecedent*, then it is the effect that must be the '*Pūrvavaṭ*'; and in that case it becomes a contradiction in terms to assert that the *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is the inference of the effect from the cause." We do hold that the word '*pūrvavaṭ*' means *that which has a pūrva or antecedent*; but we do not hold that it must be the *effect* that is so; we apply the name to the cognition; and the cognition is certainly 'that which has the antecedent', for its object; and thus what our meaning is is that from *the cognition of the antecedent*, *i. e.*, the cause, *follows the inference of the effect.* Similarly the name '*Shēṣavaṭ*' applies to *the cognition of that which comes after*, and so on.

Or (as the *Bhāṣya* points out on pp. 18-19) the affix in the word '*Pūrvavaṭ*' may be taken as '*vaṭi*', denoting similarity (and not as the possessive '*maṭup*')—; the meaning being that exactly as one has perceived the thing by means of Sense-perception, so also does he cognise the same thing by means of Inference; and thus by means of Inference the thing becomes cognised *as before, pūrvavaṭ*'.

Of the sentence '*yaṭhā ḍhūmnāgniḥ*' (*Bhāṣya*, p. 19, l. 2) several explanations have been given. The question that arises is—what is it that is cognised by means of the smoke? (*a*) Is it the fire? (*b*) Or the particular place where fire is? (*c*) Or the existence (of fire)? (*d*) * Or the particular place along with (containing) the fire? (*a*) It cannot be that the *fire* is cognised; as between fire and smoke, the relation of *ḍharma*

* (*d*) Is the position adopted by Diṅnāga after rejecting the former three views.

(quality) and *ḍharmin* (qualified) is not *possible*; as neither the fire is the quality of the smoke, nor the smoke of the fire; and further, inasmuch the fire is something already known (in the premises, as concomitant with smoke), it does not stand in need of being inferred, and hence cannot rightly be regarded as an 'object of inference'. The same reasoning discards the view that what is inferred is *existence* (*c*) and also that it is the particular *place* that is inferred (*b*),— both *existence* and *place* being already known (before the inference). (*d*) If then, it be held that it is *the place along with the fire* that is inferred,—this also cannot be right, because *smoke* is not a *quality* of that place. What we mean is that it will not be right to accept the view (held by Diṅnāga) that what is inferred by means of smoke is *the place as containing the fire.* "Why not?" Because *smoke* is not a quality of the *place containing fire*; and then again, as for the relation of *fire* to *any place*, such relation is not unknown (and as such, it cannot be an object of Inference). "The inference is in the form, '*this* place contains fire',—wherein what is inferred is a particular place as containing fire, and not mere place in general." This also is not right; as the actual place is never perceived, under your theory; the man who puts forward the aforesaid contention (*viz*. the Bauḍḍha writer, Diṅnāga) never actually sees the place; and hence if he asserts the conclusion in the form 'this place contains fire', he makes an empty meaningless assertion; * specially because mere smoke (unperceived)

* The view here controverted here is Diṇnāga's. See *Medieval Logic*, p. 87. The question arises as to the exact nature of the Probandum: Is it *any* place in general containing fire? Or that particular place which contains smoke? In the former ase the *smoke*, which is the probans would not be a necessary quality or concomitant of any and every place that may have the fire; and further, some place or other that contains fire must be already known; hence the Probandum could not be in this unspecified form: as regards the second alternative, the objectionable feature is that the actual place from where the smoke is issuing is not seen by the observer; as according to the Bauḍḍha what is *seen* is not any perceptible

cannot bring about the cognition of fire, and the Bauḍḍha philosopher can never perceive the smoke (which, like everything else, is imperceptible) ;—for these reasons any *particular place* cannot be regarded as the object of Inference. "But as a matter of fact the smoke does bring about the cognition of fire, by reason of its invariable concomitance with it." Well, what you mean is simply this that there is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, and on that account when one sees smoke he naturally apprehends the presence of fire ;—if this is what you mean, we cannot accept it as true ; as this assertion of yours will not bear the scrutiny of the several alternative interpretations of which it is capable : For instance, what do you mean by 'the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire' ? (*a*) Does it mean that the two are related to each other as cause and effect ? (*b*) Or that the two are related by the relation of 'inherence of the same object' ? (*c*) Or by mere relationship in general ? "We accept the first of these alternatives : the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire lies in the fact of the one being the cause of the other." This cannot be, we reply ; as they do not inhere in each other * : the smoke does not inhere in the fire, nor the fire in the smoke ; in fact each of them inheres in its own particular cause (which is neither fire nor smoke) ; thus the 'invariable' concomitance' cannot consist of the relation of cause and effect. (*b*) Nor can it consist of 'inherence of

gross substance,—mountain *e. g.*—but the mountain, like everything else, is only atoms, which are all imperceptible ; and for the same reason, the smoke also cannot, according to the Bauḍḍha, be perceived. So much for the Bauḍḍha possibilities ; but even for those who do admit of gross substances, when one sees the smoke moving in the sky, it is quite possible that he may not see the actual place from where it issues.

* If 'invariable concomitance' is the relation of cause and effect then it must be the relation between the effect and its material cause, in which it

the same object'. * Because (1) there is no single object produced by both fire and smoke [*i. e.* of which both, are the *material cause*' and which, as such, would inhere in both, and would form the basis of Smoke and Fire being related to each other by the relation of 'inherence of the same object']; specially as no object is ever produced out of two entirely heterogeneous material causes. (2) Nor are Smoke and Fire ever found to subsist in any single object, as each of them subsists in its own particular material cause, as we have already pointed out. [And thus this second form of 'inherence of the same object' is not possible between smoke and fire]. (*c*) All then that we find thus is that there is some sort of relationship (in general) between smoke and fire;—but even this cannot be rightly inferred. "Why so?" Well, if the inference (premiss) were put forward in the form—'there is some (permanent) relation between smoke and fire',—this would not be true; as no such (permanent) relationship is really known (at the time of the inference); in fact the smoke is actually perceived even in the absence of fire (as when one sees smoke issuing from the hill-side and he does not see the fire). "Certainly there would be some sort companionship (or concomitance), as there is in the case of Colour and Touch." That also is not possible; as the two are not always found together; we have often seen smoke without fire, as well as fire without smoke; and as thus the two are seen

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inheres i. e. subsists by *samavāyasambandha*; because there is no such concomitance of the effect with the non-material cause—the cloth being present also when the contact of the loom is not present; nor is there such concomitance of the effect with its Instrumental cause,—the cloth is not always accompanied by the Weaver. Thus the refutation emphasises the absence of the *relation by inherence, samavāyasambandha*, between smoke and fire.

* 'Inherence of the same object' may mean—(1) that some one object inheres in both; or (2) that both inhere in some one object. The first refutation meets (1)—the (2) being taken up a few lines below.

apart from each other, there can be no constant companionship between them. This same reasoning also serves to reject the inference in the form—'wherever there is smoke there is fire' [as this also postulates a form of companionship between smoke and fire]. Thus then, there being no other way in which this could be explained, the conclusion is that fire is *not* inferred by means of smoke. "But this would go directly against a fact accepted by all men : if there were no inference of fire by means of smoke, then a universally recognised fact would be contradicted." There is no such contradiction ; * as what really happens (in the case of the universally recognised inference of fire) is that by seeing certain peculiarities of smoke we infer the presence of *smoke as qualified* (*accompanied*) *by fire*. "In what way does fire become a qualification of smoke ?" Simply because the fire is subordinate to the smoke,—as what is inferred is 'this smoke *as accompanied by fire*'; and this is inferred by means of certain specific peculiarities of the smoke ; at the time of inference we perceive both—the smoke as well as its pecularities, in the shape of the continuity of its upward rising volume and so forth ; and what these peculiarities, as belonging to the smoke, lead us to infer is some such qualification of smoke as is not already known ; as it is a fact noticed in the case of all inferences, that all those peculiar qualifications of the object inferred that are already known serve as the means of

Vār. Page 54.

* 'In a case where we see the smoke rising close to us, we certainly infer the *place* as characterised by smoke, (and from that, the fire) as the popular belief is But in a case where a large mass of smoke is seen issuing from a place that is too far to be perceived, we do not take the trouble of finding out the means of cognising the *place* ; and what we infer, in this case, is the smoke itself which is seen *as accompanied by* fire ; and this inference is led up to by the peculiarities that we perceive in the smoke,—*e.g.* its rising upwards in a continuous line, and so forth.'—*Ṭāṭparya*

bringing about the cognition of that thing; *e.g.* in the case of Sound, its two peculiarities—that it is an *entity* and a *product*—are well-known; and what is not known is its further peculiarity of *non-eternality*; hence when we infer the Sound, we infer it as qualified by its (hitherto unknown) *non-eternality*.

(B.) Says the *Bhāṣya—The word 'Shēṣavaṭ' means 'remainder'* (p. 19, l. 2); —and later on it adds—'*Sound' is not an action because it is the originator of another Sound* (p. 19, l. 9);—and against this last assertion, the following objection is raised:—"The Probans, in this inference, is *too exclusive*, being absent both in the Probandum and its contrary; that is to say, the character of *being the originator of another Sound* is one that is not found either in *Action* or in what is *not-action* [Hence the said character cannot prove the fact of sound being *not-action*]."

This objection is not sound; as the *Bhāṣya* means something entirely different (from what has been objected to): What is meant by the phrase 'it is the originator of another sound' is that 'it is the orginator of a homogeneous thing'; and thus (this latter character being present in what is *not-action*) the inference is not open to the objection that has been urged.

[C] In regard to the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣta* Inference, the *Bhāṣya* (p. 19, l. 6) says—'The *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣta Inference is that in which the relation between the Probans and the Probandum being imperceptible &c. &c.*' Against this the following objection is raised:—"What is meant by the relation of the Probans and the Probandum being imperceptible? Does it mean that it is not perceived *at the time that the inference is drawn*? or that it is *never* perceived? If the former, then, inasmuch as in all inferences the said relation is

not *perceived* at the time of the inference, the qualification becomes useless [as it does not distinguish the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* from the other kinds of Inference]. If then, it means that the relation is *never* perceived, then in the first place how can any Inference proceed in such a case (where the relation has never been perceived)? And secondly, the assertion would be directly opposed to what the *Bhāṣya* (p. 3, l. 8) has asserted as to impossibility of Inference applying to such things as have been never perceived or to those that are already well known."

This objection cannot be maintained; because what is inferred is not *fire by itself* (which of course is perceptible), but *fire as the qualification* (or accompaniment, of smoke); and certainly the fire as such is not perceived (at the time) and has got to be inferred.

Thus then, the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* Inference is that which, from the perception of a certain property of an object, leads to the cognition of that object; *e. g.* when Desire, Aversion, &c., are inferred as belonging to the Self, Desire &c., are the 'object' (inferred), and the Self as qualifying them becomes the secondary factor; and in this the 'property' of Desire &c. that is perceived is *their character of belonging to the Self*; and the perception of this character leads to the inference of those 'objects' (Desire &c.) as belonging to (qualified, or accompanied, by) the Self; and the inference is in the following form:—'Desire &c. are dependent upon (belong to) something else,—because they are qualities—like Colour.' "All that this Inference leads us to cognise is the fact that Desire &c., belong to *something else*;—whence do you get at the conclusion that they belong to *the Self*?" We get at this latter conclusion by means of elimination: That is to say, first of all we know that Desire &c., cannot belong to Earth and other similar substances, because they can be perceived only by the Self (*i.e.* the person that draws the infer-

ence), and are not perceived by means of any external sense-organ; in the case of qualities belonging to Earth and other similar substances, we find that they can be perceived by the person that draws the inference as well as other persons; and that they are perceived by means of external organs of perception; Desire and the rest, on the other hand, are such as are perceived only by the cognising Self, and that also only by means of the internal organ, of perception; and this proves that these cannot belong to Earth, or Water or Fire or Air or Ākāsha.—Secondly, we also know that they cannot belong to Space, Time and Mind, because like these three substances themselves their qualities also are incapable of being perceived by the organs of perception.—Apart from these eight substances, there is no other substance except the Self;—and hence the only possible conclusion is that Desire and the rest must belong to the Self.

Vār. p. 55. '*Perception pertains to things present, while Inference pertains to things present as well as not-present*' —says the *Bhāṣya* [p. 20, ll. 3-2]. Against this the following objection is raised:—"Is this distinction based upon the difference of the qualifying adjuncts or that of the qualified objects? If the latter, then, the difficulty is that there can be no Inference with reference to *objects* that are *not-present*; for as it has already been explained, Inference never operates upon a thing which is not already * cognised in a general or vague manner,—and no such vague or general cognition is possible with regard (independently) to things that are *not-present*. If, on the other hand, you mean the distinction to the based upon the difference in the qualifying

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* Inference applies to things that are known in a vague form, but of which there is no well-defined cognition; and never with regard to things absolutely unknown.

adjuncts,—then we urge the following points:—There are three kinds of qualifying adjuncts—(*a*) those that are affirmed, (*b*) those that are denied, and (*c*) those that are self-sufficient (or self-contained); as an example of (*a*) there is 'odorousness' which is asserted of the Earth; of (*b*) the same 'odorousness' as denied of substances other than the Earth; and of (*c*) there is the relation of 'inherence' subsisting between things thus inherently related.

"A question is raised in regard to the relation of Inherence:—How can 'Inherence' be regarded as 'self-sufficient'? The answer is—because there is no further 'inherence' (by which the former 'Inherence' should subsist in the inherent things); as whenever one thing subsists in another, it does so through some relation; and as a matter of fact, for Inherence there is no further inherence that could be the relation (through which the former could subsist in the inherent things). —If there were such further Inherence of the former Inherence, there would be no end to the assumption of such Inherences; and if there were to be a limit somewhere to these assumptions, it would be best to have the limit at the very first Inherence (and make it, at the very outset, self-sufficient, independent of further functions and relations). 'This assertion that Inherence is self-sufficient—is it to be accepted on trust? or is there any reasoning in support of it?' Undoubtedly, there is reasoning; the reasoning being as follows—(1) Inherence is *not-dependent* (is self-sufficient), being as it is, denoted by a word expressive of the relation that subsists in the five categories *,—just like the Atom (which is regarded as self-sufficient, because it is spoken of as subsisting in the five categories) †;—or again

* Substance, Quality, Action, Generality and Specific Individuality.

† The translation follows the interpretation of the *Tātparya*, which says that the compound '*pañchapadā-ṭhavṛiṭṭi*' is to be taken as *Bahuvrihi*, when applying to the

(2) because while being present everywhere, it gives rise to the conception of things being 'here, in this',—just like the Self. 'If Inherence were dependent on something else (and not self-sufficient), what would happen?' In that case Products would have no substratum at all. 'How so?' If Inherence were 'dependent', it could be dependent on the Product, and as such could not exist before the Product came into existence; so that at the time that the Product comes into existence, it would be without a substratum until the Inherence comes into it (by virtue of which Inherence it would have the Cause for its substratum);—it is well-known that Inherence subsists in the Cause and its Product [and hence if it is to be dependent upon, contained in, these, it cannot exist before the Product appears]; and it is necessary to determine the relation (or form) in which it subsists in them; as we find that whenever one thing subsists in another, it does so in some particular form or relation. 'Being a kind of *approach* or *contact*, Inherence subsists in the same form as Conjunction'. This cannot be, we reply; as it involves a contradiction. When you assert that 'the contact, or conjunction subsists', do you mean this (*subsistence*) to be a property of the Contact (in which the contact subsists)? or of the Product? We would say that it is a property of the Product, and not of the Contact; and it is only in that case that there being other Products also to which that contact belongs (those endless products, namely, into which every product goes on momentarily changing) [the Inherence could belong to *all* these momentarily varying phases of the

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Atom, and as 'Genitive *Tatpuruṣa* when applying to the Inherence; and goes on to point out that it is in view of this flaw in the reasoning that the second reasoning is given.

It however appears possible to take the clause to mean—'because it is spoken of as subsisting in the five categories'—a fact that would be true alike with regard to the Atom and the Inherence.

Product.] *. On the other hand, if the *subsistence* were a property of the Contact, then this contact would stand in need of a further contact (in order to establish the relation of Inherence with the further phase of the Product); and so on and on, there would be an endless series of assumptions; for the Contact also will have some sort of *subsistence* (form of existence); and this, on your supposition, is a property of the Contact; and this endless assumption would be highly objectionable; specially as no one can justify it, in view of the fact that there is no authority or valid proof for it. † [Thus then, it is proved that the subsistence of Inherence cannot be of the nature of *contact.*] If then, you were to assert that Inherence subsists through another Inherence, you would contradict the tenets of the *Shāsṭra*; which declares that *the nature of Inherence is explained by its mere esse or presence* (which denies more than one Inherence). 'There is no proof for the assertion that a relation (Inherence *e. g.*) continues to exist even when the *relative* (the Product in which Inherence subsists as a relation) has ceased to exist [and this is what the aforesaid tenet of a single Inherence would imply]. It is not true that there is no proof for this; a when the relative ceases to exist, all that cease (so far as the Inherence is concerned) are the circumstances that rendered the Inherence cognisable, and not the Inherence itself; for the

Vār : P. 56.

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* In conjunction, the *prāpṭi*, contact, is temporary; so if the subsistence of Inherence were of the nature of Contact, there would have to be an endless series of contacts to explain the permanent relation of Causo—Effect and such other cases of Inherence. While if the subsistence belonged to the Product itself, then, the Inherence would continue as the *permanent* relation throughout the several change that the product undergoes every moment.

† *Anavasṭhā*, Endless Assumption, is regarded as valid or permissible *pramāṇika*, only when the first step in the series cannot be ascertained; in the case of Contact, however, we can always lay our hands on the first contact; hence *Anavasṭhā* in this case cannot be permissible.—*Tāṭparya.*

Inherence is not a product (and hence cannot cease to exist); —that Inherence is not a product is inferred from the fact of every product having a substratum*; if it were a product, it could be produced only along with the product (which is related by that Inherence); and in that case, (as pointed out above) this latter Product would, at the moment that it is produced, be without a substratum [as it can subsist in its substratum only through Inherence, which, on your supposition, is not yet produced]. 'The Inherence is certainly produced *before* the Product.' Even so you will have to explain to what the Inherence belongs (at the time that it is produced; the Product not yet being in existence). If then, the Inherence be held to be produced *after* the Product, the objection remains in force that the Product, at the time of its production, would be without a substratum. For these reasons it has to be admitted that Inherence is 'self-sufficient."†

The answer to the above objection (started above, P. 179) is that when Inference is spoken of as pertaining to *things not-present*, what is meant is that Inference which pertains to qualifying adjuncts that are denied, ‡ and not that which pertains to those that are *affirmed*, or to those that are *self-sufficient*§.

‖ "But we do find that *things not present* are sometimes actually affirmed;—e. g. when we make the affirmation '*ghato*

* The reasoning is thus formulated by the *Ṭāṭparya*—'The Product is related to its cause by a permanent relationship (a relationship which is not a product), because it has a substratum'.

† The objection started on p. 55, l. 1 (*Trans. p.* 179, *l.* 18) ends here; the final upshot of the objection is thus summed up in the *Ṭāṭparya*—'There being so many as three kinds of qualifying adjuncts, we do not know with reference to what Inference has been held to pertain to *things not-present*.'

‡ As only things not-present—i. e., past and future things—can be denied at the time (the present) when the Inference is formulated

§ The real classification of qualifying adjuncts is not exactly as the objector has put it.

In reality, in the first place, qualifying adjuncts are of two kinds—(a) affirmed and (b) denied; secondly those affirmed are of two kinds—(a) self-sufficient and (b) dependent.

‖ It is not true that only the *not-present* things are *denied*.

bhavaṭi' (' the Jar *is being produced'*), where '*bhavaṭi'* is synonymous with '*jāyaṭē'* [and that which *is being produced*, *i. e.* in course of production, is certainly *not present*]."

This is not true; as a thing that *is being produced* is not held to be (either *present* or *not present*); the word '*bhavaṭi'* (in the sentence '*ghato bhavaṭi.*') is synonymous with *viḍyaṭē* ' exists ', (and not with '*jāyaṭē'*, 'is being produced') [and when this 'existence' is affirmed with regard to the jar in course of construction, the 'jar' here stands for the several parts of the jar that have already been constructed, and which, being accomplished entities already, are sufficient for the purpose of the thing being recognised as 'jar' and being spoken of as '*bhavaṭi, viḍyaṭē.*']

Thus we have established the proposition '*ṭaṭpūrvakam anumānan*'.

Other philosophers have defined Inference '*Anumāna*' as *the perception of the thing which is invariably concomitant*,—this being held to be '*Anumāna*' (Instrument of inferential cognition) for one who knows the said concomitance. This definition is thus explained:—When one thing is never present apart from another, it is said to be 'invariably concomitant', '*nānṭarīyaka*', with it;—the thing that is so concomitant is called the '*nānṭarīyaka-arṭha*'; and the '*ḍarshana*' 'perception', of that thing is '*Anumāna*', for the man who knows it,—*i. e.* who knows that the thing perceived is 'invariably concomitant.'

This definition however, cannot be accepted; *firstly*, because the word '*arṭha*', 'thing', is superfluous; as what is 'invariably concomitant' can not but be a *thing*;—*secondly*, '*nānṭarīyakārṭha*', is a compound word; (A) now if this compound were treated as a Genitive *Ṭaṭpuruṣa*, being expounded as '*nanṭarīyakasya arṭhaḥ*', then, in the case of the Inference—

'sound is transient, because it is a product'—*the character of being a product* is the '*nānṭarīyaka*'; and the '*arṭha*' of this would be either (*a*) its *ḍharma*, property, or (*b*) its *prayojana*, purpose or aim; (*a*) if the *property* of 'the character of being a product' were the '*arṭha*' *of the* '*nānṭarīyaka*' (meant by the definition), then it would be possible to infer 'transient character' even from such properties as 'being an entity', 'being an object of cognition', 'being nameable' and so forth (which is absurd); *—(*b*) if, on the other hand, the *purpose* or *aim* of the 'character of being a product' were meant to be the '*arṭha*' of the '*nānṭarīyaka*', then the 'cognition of transient character' would become the *Probans* of the Inference [*Transient character* being the 'aim' or 'end' of 'being a product'.] (B) If then, the compound '*nānṭarīkakārṭha*' were treated as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound,—being expounded as 'that to which the *nānṭarīyakārṭha* belongs'—then also

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'the character of product' being the '*nānṭarīyaka*,' that to which this belongs would become the *Probans*;† and what is that to which *this character of being a product* belongs? (*a*) Does it belong to such things as the jar and the like? (*b*) or to Sound? (*c*) or to transient character.? (*a*) If it belongs to the Jar &c., then these become the means of Inferential Cognition; the inference being in the form—'Sound is transient, because it is a jar'! (*b*) If it belongs to Sound, then Sound becomes the means, and the form of the inference becomes—'Sound is transient because it is sound'! (*c*) If lastly, it belongs to *transient character*,—belonging

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* As the properties of 'being an entity' &c. are found in *Ākāsha* and such other *eternal* things also.

† That is, if we define '*Anumāna*'—which means, 'the source or means of inferential cognition'—as '*nānṭarīyakārṭhan ḍarshana*, the cognition of that to which the *nāntarīyaka* belongs would be such an Anumāna or *means of inferential cognition*; so that the cognition of transient character, *e. g.*, instead of being the *result*, would be the *means* of the inferential cognition! And other similarly absurd results would follow from the theory.

to it as its cause, or that which proves it—then also the form of the inference becomes—'Sound is transient, because it is transient!'—as 'the character of being a product' is the '*arṭha*' of the 'transient character;'—in no case could the former be a reason for the latter [and this is what it is intended to be in the inference 'Sound is transient, because it is a product.'] (c) If the compound '*nānṭarīyakārṭha*' be treated as *Karmaḍhāraya*,—being expounded as 'that arṭha *which is nānṭarīyaka*,'—in that case, the compound would be impossible; as the exact conditions of the *Karmadhāraya* compound—compound between the qualifying adjunct and the qualified object—are not present: that is to say, the co-ordination, or *coextensiveness*, necessary for the *Karmaḍhāraya* compound is possible only when there is some difference* between the two words (the one denoting the qualifying adjunct and the other the qualified object); as we find to be the case in the well-known compound '*nīloṭpalam*', 'blue-lotus', where we know that the word 'blue' signifies a colour that is present in many things (besides the lotus) and that the word 'lotus' applies to many lotuses (besides the blue one); and hence we have the co-ordination between the two (in the compound '*nīloṭpalam*');—in the case of the words '*nānṭarīyaka*' and '*arṭha*', on the other hand, we find that when we mention the word '*nānṭarīyaka*', there is no such discrepancy or difference as that the character of being *nānṭarīyaka* subsists in what is *arṭha* as also in what is *not-arṭha;* † and under the circumstances the mention of the word '*arṭha*' (in addition to '*nānṭarīyaka*') cannot but be regarded as futile and superfluous. "But we find the necessary co-ordination even in a case where only one of the two words (and not both) are incompatible; *e.g.* in the expression '*pṛiṭhivī ḍravyam*' (there is co-ordination between the 'Earth' and

* Otherwise—*i.e.* if the two are identical—both need not appear at all.

† As it is only an *arṭha* that can be *nānṭārīyaka*.

the 'Substance', even though it is only the word 'Substance' which applies to things other than Earth also; while the word 'Earth' does not denote things other than Substance)."*

In this case also, we reply, there is an incompatibility in both the words: when we take into consideration the diversity based upon the relation of subserviency (that subsists between the *class* as the qualifying adjunct, on the one hand, and the *individual*, as the qualified of the *class*, on the other),—that is to say, the word 'Substance' denotes the *individual* substance, as well as the *class* 'Substance'—the word 'Earth', while denoting the class 'substance' as forming its predominant qualifying adjunct, also denotes the individual earth as well as the class 'Earth' (which last cannot be identical with Substance) †; and thus there is a clear incompatibility between *both* words (the word 'Earth' also denoting something that is *not-substance*); which makes the proposition 'the Earth is a substance' possible. ‡The same conditions however do not hold regarding the co-ordination implied in the compound '*nānṭarīyakārṭha—ḍarshanam*'. "Why so?" Because people make use of words only for the purpose of making known things expressed by them; and as a matter of fact, we find that when the word '*nānṭarīyaka*' is mentioned, it provides the idea of the '*arṭha*' also (as it is only an *arṭha* that can be *nānṭarīyaka*); and hence it is no longer right and necessary to mention the word '*arṭha*.'

Lastly, the definition contains the phrase—'for one who knows the said concomitance'; and this is not right; being

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* So also in the case of '*nānṭārīyaka*' and '*arṭha*,' it is true that the word *nānṭarīyaka*' does not denote anything that is *not-arṭha*' but the word '*arṭha*' does denote things that are *not-nānṭarīyaka*.

† *Jāṭi* according to the Logician being something distinct from *Ḍravya*.

‡ Though '*arṭha*' is incompatible with '*nānṭarīyaka*'—all *arṭha* not being *nānṭarīyaka*; yet '*nānṭarīyaka*' is not incompatible with '*arṭha*; '*nānṭarīyaka*' does not signify anything that is *not-arṭha*; hence the case of '*nānṭarīyakārṭha* is not analogous with '*priṭhivī—ḍravam*.'

entirely redundant; as there can be no idea of anything being *nānṭarīyaka* unless the person (using the word) knows it to be so: *e. g.* people who live in the *Nārikēlaḍvīpa* (where there is no fire?), if they happen to see smoke, cannot have the idea of its being '*nānṭarīyaka*' (with fire); hence it is unecêssary to add the phrase '*ṭaḍviḍaḥ*,' 'for people who know the invariable concomitance.'

[Another definition is next taken up]

The above reasoning also serves to set aside another proposed definition: *viz*: 'The cognition of the *avinābhāviḍharma* is the *hēṭu* (means of inferential cognition).' "What do you mean by applying to this definition the same objections (that have been urged against an entirely different definition, this last definition not containing the word '*ṭaḍviḍaḥ*' of the former definition)?" What we mean is that, just as in the expression '*nānṭarīyakārṭhaḍarshana*', the word '*arṭha*' is superfluous, so in the other definition is the word '*ḍharma*'. Then again, the example of Inference that the propounders of this definition cite is—'there is smoke, because there is fire'; and we have more than once shown that such an inference is impossible.

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* Other philosophers declare as follows:—"*Anumāna*, Means of Inferential Cognition, is that which is present where the subject of Inference and its like are present, and which is absent where the Subject is non-existent". This cannot be accepted as a correct definition; as it applies to that also which subsists in only a part of the subject of inference;—*e. g.* 'atoms are transient, because they have odour, like the

* 'The author has already refuted the definition proposed by Diṅnāga [which of the above two definitions is Diṅnāga's is not made clear]; he now proceeds to criticise a statement made by Diṅnāga in support of his own definition'.——*Ṭāṭparya*.

jar.' * "The definition cannot apply to such inferences, because what the definition states as a necessary condition is that the *heṭu* should be present where the Subject is present [and certainly *odourousness* is not present wherever atoms are present]". This does not save your definition from the said undue application; what subsists in a part of an object is also its *ḍharma*,—just as what subsists in a portion of the *vipakṣa* (*i. e.* where the Probandum is known to be absent) is regarded as the *ḍharma* of *vipakṣa*; when a certain thing is found to subsist in a part of the *vipakṣa*, we do not hold that it does not subsist *in the vipakṣa*; in the same manner, where a thing is present in a portion of the *pakṣa* (Subject of Inference) we cannot deny that it subsists *in the Subject*;—and thus it behoves you to make an effort to exclude that which subsists in only a part of the Subject. "No special effort is needed for that purpose; the necessary preclusion of what subsists only in a part of the Subject is secured by the restriction or emphasis implied (in the words '*anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*, which means '*anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ ēva*']" [This is not right; as] the emphasised assertion '*anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ ēva*' can mean only two things: (*a*) 'it subsists *only* in the subject of inference,'—or (b) 'it *must* subsist in the subject of inference.' † (*a*) Of these, as regards the former restriction, what does it do? Does it preclude impossibility? [That is, does it mean that it is not impossible for the *hēṭu* to subsist in the Subject of inference] ? or does it only indicate the possibility (of the *hēṭu* subsisting in the Subject)? In either case there is no useful purpose served by the emphasis or restriction; the desired sense being got at even without the restriction; the idea that the *hēṭu*

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* *Odorousness* is present in *certain* atoms (those of the Earth) and is not present where those atoms are absent;—hence the inference should be accepted as valid, under the definition.

† (*a*) Means that it cannot subsist anywhere else; and (*b*) that wherever the Subject is present the other must be present.

subsists in the Subject of inference, and that it is not impossible for it to subsist therein, is implied in the simple statement (*ānumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*') without the restriction; and yet *that this hēṭu subsists in a part of the Subject* does not become excluded by the emphasis; which, thus, fails in the very purpose for which it was brought in. * Then again, [the restriction implied in '*anumēyē ēva sadbhāvaḥ*' would mean that the *hēṭu* subsists in the *anumēya only*, that is, in nothing else, not even in the *ṭaṭ-ṭulya*; and thus] there would be a contradiction of the latter half of the definition [which consists of two halves—(1) '*anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*, and 2) *ṭaṭ-ṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*.] (*b*) Then as regards the second of the two meanings of the restriction [*i. e.* if the meaning is that the *hēṭū must subsist in the Subject*], this would imply that there is *vyāpṭi* or *invariable concomitance* between the two; but that particular Subject (*e. g.* fire) which is cognised by means of the inference has no connection with the invariable concomitance (upon which the inference would be based); as that (fire) wherein the instrument of inference (or Probans, *e. g.* smoke) subsists (at the time of inference) is entirely different from that wherein the invariable concomitance (of smoke with fire) has been observed.

['*Anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*' having been disposed of, the author takes up the next factor of the definition, '*ṭaṭ-ṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*']—As a matter of fact where the Subject (fire) is observed, there is always a possibility of the presence of the Probans (smoke); and (on the occasion of the inference) what we do not know for certain is the possibility of the presence of the Probans; and so long as this uncertainty

* The *denial of absolute absence and disconnection* does not preclude ordinary or occasional or partial absence and disconnection; the mere assertion of the possiblity of existence also does not preclude the impossibility of existence;—thus on account of occasional or partial absence not being precluded, the emphasis fails to accomplish its purpose of excluding that invalid means of inferential cognition which subsists in only a part of the subject.——*Ṭāṭparya*.

continues, we feel that it may subsist (*a*) in the *Subject* (fire), (*b*) in that where the Subject is known to be present (the kitchen), and (*c*) in that where the Subject is known to be absent (the lake); thus then (apart from the Subject itself) there are two possible substrata where the Probans might subsist—viz: the *ṭaṭ-ṭulya* or *Sapakṣa* (where the Subject is known to be present) and the *Vipakṣa* (where it is known to be absent); such being the case, it may be right to preclude the possibility of the real Probans in the *Vipakṣa* by means of the clause '*nāsṭiṭā asaṭi*' 'where the subject is non-existent,' (the last clause in the definition);——but for what purpose should there be introduced the other clause '*ṭaṭ-ṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*'? It does not indicate anything that is not already indicated; all that is intended to be indicated is the mere possibility of the presence of the Probans in the *Sapakṣa* (and not its *invariable concomitance* with it) *; and this mere possibility is got at even though there is an uncertainty as to whether or not it is *invariably concomitant* [Hence the clause in question cannot be taken as indicating the invariable concomitance of the *Probans* with the *sapakṣa*]. "The clause '*ṭaṭṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*' is introduced for the purposes of emphasis". What is it that is meant to be emphasised by the clause? Does

Vār P. 59. it mean—(*a*) the Probans subsists *in the Sapakṣa only*?—(*b*) or that it *must* subsist in the *Sapakṣa*? (*a*) If what is meant by the emphasis is that it subsists in the *Sapakṣa only*;—then there is a clear contradiction between the first and second clauses of the definition: Just as one

* If this invariable concomitance with the *sapakṣa* were meant, then the definition would not apply to the case of the valid inference 'this is transient because it is preceded by effort'; as in this case the probans—*being preceded by effort*—is not invariably concomitant with all transient things; for instance the jar, which is transient, is not *always* preceded by effort; it is only when it is produced that it is so preceded.

cannot say 'feed *only Dēvadatta*, and also *Yajñadatta*', so the statement in question—'it should subsist *only in the Sapakṣa* and also in the Subject of inference'—cannot but be regarded as the raving of a maniac. (*b*) If then the meaning of the emphasis be that the Probans *must* subsist in the *Sapakṣa*,—then that which subsists in a part of the *Sapakṣa*, [*i. e.* not in all *Sapakṣas*, but only in a few] would cease to be a true Probans; *e. g.* the character of *being preceded by effort*, and the like, which subsists only in a few, and not in all, things belonging to the same class as the Subject of inference (all *transient things* in the case in question), would not be a true Probans.*

Lastly, the last clause of the definition——'*asaṭi nāsṭiṭā*,' 'it should not be present where the Subject is not existent'——has been introduced without due consideration. That which is non-existent, is by itself a non-entity at the time; and a non-entity could never be the substratum (of the Probans; and hence a denial of this impossible contingency of the *Non-existent* Subject being the subtratum of the Probans) is meaningless. "This clause also is introduced for the purpose of emphasis." What is the meaning of this emphasis? Does it mean—(*a*) that the Probans *never subsists*? or (*b*) that it does not subsist in the *non-existent Subject only*? (*a*) If the former, then the addition of the word '*asaṭi*', 'in the Non-existent Subject' becomes superfluous; as even without this word, the intended *Non-subsistence* would be got at; *i. e.* when a thing is spoken of as 'not subsisting' at all, it is implied that *it does not subsist in the Non-existent Subject also.* (*b*) If then, the meaning of the emphasis be that the Probans does not subsist *in the Non-existent Subject only*,——then the Probans in the inference 'this is a cow because it has horns' would be a true

* The sense demands a '*nā*' here; as the character in question, *is* regarded as a true probans.

Probans ; as horns are absent only in the non-existent Subject [*i. e.* the *vipakṣas* ; it is only animals other than the cow that are hornless], and they are not *entirely absent* in all *Vipakṣas* (as the buffalo, which is *not a cow*, has horns).

[Having criticised each of the three clauses of the definition separately, the author proceeds to criticise the definition as a whole.]

The upholder of the definition offers the following explanation of his definition :—— "The definition contains three qualifications; by the omission of any one, in turn, of these qualifications we would have three forms of the definition ; similarly by the omission of any two, in turn, of the qualifications, we would have other three forms of the definition ; and by retaining all the three we get the seventh form ; what then is meant to be done by the definition is to reject the first six forms,* and to accept the seventh form, with all the three qualifications." This explanation is not right, we reply ; as, *firstly*, the two kinds of § affirmative Probans are covered by only the first two clauses of the definition ; and *secondly* because the negative Probans is covered by only the first and third clauses [and yet both these are accepted as *true* Probans]. For instance, (1) for one who does not accept Sound to be eternal, the two reasons or Probans ——*because it is a product*, and *because it is preceded by effort*—serve as true *Probans*, and yet they fulfil only the condition indicated by the first two clauses of the definition— there being, in this case, no *vipakṣa* [and thereby the condition *nāstitā asati*' being impossible] ;—(2) in the case of the negative Probans, as there is no *sapakṣa or tattulya*', the qualification indicated by the second clause being im-

* The *Tatparya* explains the rejection of these ; but it notices only five forms,— the sixth, in which the first clause only remains, is not mentioned ; probably because it was too absurd to be noticed separately.

† 'Two kinds '—(1) that which is invariably concomitant with both *sādhya* and *sapakṣa* ; and (2) that which is *invariably* concomitant with the *sādhya* only ; its concomitance with the *sapakṣa* not being *invariable*.

possible, only two conditions—indicated by the first and the third—are fulfilled; and yet it is accepted as a true Probans; *e. g.* 'the living body is not soulless, as otherwise it would be without the life-breath'. Thus then, inasmuch as the definition fails to include the two kinds of Probans thus noted, it becomes 'defective ('too narrow').

The author next attacks the definition propounded by the *Sāṅkhyas*:—They have defined Inference as* '*sambandhāḍēkasmāṭ pratyakṣāchchhēṣasiḍḍhiranumānan*' [which means either—(a) 'where there is a relationship (between two things), from the one perception (of the Probans), the cognition that arises of the other (thing, the Subject) is Inference'; or (b) 'out of one perceptible relationship the cognition that arises of the Subject is Inference']. This definition also is to be rejected on the same gronnds as the one propounded by the *Bauḍḍhas*. Firstly, as a matter of fact, Inference does not proceed from a single perception (as the former of the two interpretations of the definition implies) [there is one perception of the Probans at the time of the inference; but before that many more perceptions are necessary for the recognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the Probandum]. If it is the second interpretation of the definition that is intended—the meaning being, 'from one perceptible relationship',—this also will not be right; as at the time that the observer draws his inference what he actually perceives is not the relationship (but only the Probans). "But the relationship has been perceived beforehand." Even so, you would have to regard as 'inference' the cognition that the man may have at a time when he does not actually perceive the Probans, only if he may have perceived the relationship beforehand (which is absurd. And these are the only two interpretations that

*This sentence is in the same metre as that of the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Ishvara Kriṣṇa. Where does this definition occur?

are possible of the proposed definition. Further, the case of the inference of touch (coolness or warmth) from colour (which inference is quite possible, also under the definition in question),—would be a direct contravention of the tenets of the *Sāṅkhya*; as a matter of fact, the *Sāṅkhya* can never (under his theory) have a perception of the relationship be ween colour and touch.* "There is certainly this relation between touch and colour (in the case cited) that both inhere in the same object."

Vār. Page 60.] But this also is not right, being incompatible with the tenets of the *Sāṅkhya* (who does not accept any such relation as *Inherence*), under whose theory, colour and touch do not subsist in the same object; it is not true, according to them, that the touch subsists in the same substance in which the colour subsists; as, by their philosophy, either touch or colour does not subsist in any object [all these qualities being only forms of Nature, Prakṛiṭi, they are one with this latter; hence they cannot be said to be contained in Prakṛiṭi either]. "There may be this relation (between Prakṛiṭi and its modifications) that they are themselves the substrates of each other." But even so,—even though there be the mutual relationship of being the container and the contained of each other—it would not be possible for touch to be contained in colour, or colour to be contained in touch [so that even the mutual relationship of the container and the contained could not be asserted in the case of touch and colour]. This also sets aside the view (held by the *Sāṅkhyas*) that there are *seven kinds* of relationship (between things; and some of these would be possible as between colour and touch); because as a matter of fact, from among these seven kinds of relationship—that of cause and effect and the like—there is not one that is found to hold between colour and touch.

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* There can be no relationship between any two things, under the theory that everything is undergoing modification every moment.

And yet the inference of touch from colour is a perfectly valid one; hence the definition (which does not apply to this inference) is clearly too narrow; and hence defective.

Thus has Inference been explained.

ANALOGY.

Analogy is next considered—

SŪTRA (6)—* *Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.*

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 21, l. 1 to P. 22, l. 3]

† That is, Analogy is that which makes known what is to be made known, through similarity to an object that is already well-known; *e. g.* the assertion 'as the cow so the *gavaya*' [*i. e.* the animal called 'gavaya' is like the cow].

"What is it that is accomplished by this *analogy*?" When a person finds similarity to the cow, he actually perceives the object that had been referred to in the *analogy*; and thence he comes to cognise the connection of that object with the name mentioned in that Analogy; so that it is this latter cognition that is the purpose accomplished by the Analogy. For instance, when the Analogy, in the form 'the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow', has been put forward,—and the man who has heard this happens, subsequently, to perceive, through the contact of his sense-organs, an object similar to the cow,—he realises that 'the word *gavaya* is the name of this object', and comes to cognise the connection of the particular name with the particular object. Similarly in the case of such analogies as 'the *muḍgaparṇī* is similar to the *muḍga*', 'the *māṣaparṇī* is similar to the *māṣa*'—being put forward, the observer, by means of these analogies, comes to know the con-

* The confused use of the word 'pramāṇa' continues. We have seen that *Pratyakṣa* has been defined as the *cognition* that is brought about by sense-contact &c.; and here we find *Upamāna* being defined as that which accomplishes the purpose of making known,—*i. e.* a *means* of cognition.

† There is some difference between the *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* on the other. As regards the object of analogical cognition and the exact *form* of that cognition, there is no difference; as according to both the object is the connection of the name with the object, the form of the

nection of the particular names with the particular objects, and thereby obtains the particular herb (*muḍgaparṇī* or *māṣaparṇi*) that he requires.

In the same manner we can explain other objects of Analogy met with in ordinary experience.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪ. 6.

[P. 60 L. 8 to P. 61, L. 3]

We proceed next to describe *Analogy*. The aphorism is to be interpreted as before, as providing a definition that differentiates Analogy from all homogeneous and heterogeneous things.

The compound '*prāsiḍḍhasāḍharmyāṭ*' in the Sūṭra means—either *that whose similarity is known*, or *that which has similarity to a known thing*; *—for instance, the *gavaya*

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cognition being 'this object is what is named *gavaya*'. There is however a marked difference of opinion as to the *means* of the cognition; that it is the similarity between the two objects that is the means, on this also all are agreed; but according to the *Bhāṣya*, it is this similarity as expressed in the assertion 'the gavaya is like the cow', -which assertion is remembered at the time that the man sees the animal ressembling the cow; while according to the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* it is the similarity that is actually *seen* when the animal is seen to ressemble the cow,—this perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity expressed in the assertion 'the gavaya is like the cow.' Says the *Parishuḍḍhi*. चाक्षुषस्यैव प्रत्यक्षस्य करणत्वमिति ।

The *Ṭāṭparya* interprets the *Bhāṣya* passage '*yaṭhā gauḥ ṭaṭhā gavayaḥ*' (ll. 1-2) to mean that the similarity should be one that is already known by means of such assertions. But we find (in l. 4) the *Bhāṣya* calling this assertion itself '*Upamāna*.'

There is no doubt that the view of the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* is more logical. The latter rightly remarks that for the cognition that 'this animal is what is called *gavaya*' 'it is necessary that the observer should know the assertion 'the gavaya is similar to the cow', and also that he should preceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. If the analogical cognition had for its means only this remembered similarity, then its validity would be as doubtful as that of Remembrance itself.

* This is different from the interpretation given by the *Bhāṣya*. The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks—'The *Vārṭika* proposes to take the compound as a *Bahuvrīhi*; but it does not reject the Bhāṣya's interpretation of it as *an Instrumental Ṭāṭpuruṣa*'. The *Pārishuḍḍhi* adds that the similarity must also be well-known; so that there should be

[whose similarity to the cow is known, or which is similar to the well-known cow] ; and this analogy accomplishes the purpose through that thing (which is similar);—*i.e.* accomplishes (brings about) the cognition of the connection of the name ; and *Analogy* is that which, through such a thing, accomplishes —*i. e.* makes known—what is to be accomplished or made known—*i. e.* the connection of the thing with its name.

" What does this mean ? " It means simply this, that the knowledge of similarity, as aided by the remembrance brought about by the impression left by a trustworthy assertion, is what is called ' Analogy. ' That is to say, when the observer happens to have heard the assertion that ' the gavaya is like the cow',—and thus the similarity between the cow and the *gavaya* being well known to him,—and, on some future occaions, he sees the *gavaya* and perceives its similarity to the cow, —he comes to have the cognition 'this is gavaya '; a cognition in which be cognises the connection of the animal with the name '*gavaya*' [and this last cognition has been brought about by the perception of similarity as aided by the remembrance of that same similarity which is brought about by the impression left on the mind by the assertion that 'the gavaya is like the cow.']

[The Bauḍḍha * brings forward the following objection against *Analogy*, as an Instrument of Cognition]—" Analogy does not differ from Perception and Word. "How so?" When the observer actually sees the cow and the *gavaya*, it is by Perception that he cognises that *the one is similar to the other* ;—when too he hears the assertion that 'the *gavaya* is like the cow', the cognition that he has (of the similarity) proceeds from his hearing of the *words* (so that the cognition is purely verbal). Of the

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Karmaḍharaya compound also; but (it adds) both the *Ṭāṭpuruṣa* and the *Kamaḍhāraya* are implied in the two *Bahuvrihis* that the *Vārṭika* has put forward—*(a)* 'that whose *similarity is known* implies that the similarity should be known ; and *(2)* 'that which is similar *to a known thing*' implies what is meant by the *Ṭāṭpuruṣa*.

* In Chapter IV. (of his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*) Diṅnāga rejects Upamāna as a separate instrument of cognition ; he includes it under *Perception*.

many properties of the cow, a few are found to be present in the *gavaya*; while others are absent; if it were not so (and if all the properties were present in the *gavaya*), then there could be no such assertion as 'the gavaya is *like* the cow'; all that the observer cognises is that the *gavaya* bears much resemblance to the cow. Thus it is found that Analogy does not differ from Perception and Word."

The theory of the Bauḍḍha comes to this, that the same cognition apprehends the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* and also the presence of the *gavaya* (as similar to the cow): and this shows a rare insight into the nature of Pramāṇas! [Apart from this however] What the *Sūṭra* means is that what follows from the cognition of the similarity of the *gavaya* to the cow is the cognition of the connection of that animal with the name [and it is thus this latter cognition, and not the cognition of similarity, that is brought about by means of Analogy]*. Thus it is found that it is without understanding the meaning of the *Sūṭra* that the Bauḍḍha has urged a frivolous objection.

Word.

BHAṢYA.

[*Page* 22, *l.* 5 *to l.* 9.]

We now proceed to describe *Word* [as an Instrument of Right Cognition]—

SŪṬRA (7). *The assertion*† *of a reliable person is 'Word'.*

That person is called '*āpṭa*', 'reliable', who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is moved by

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* 'Thus Analogy must be regarded as different from Perception and Word,—because the cognition that it brings about is of an entirely different character from the cognition brought by the latter two',—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† 'The word Upaḍésha, standing for words uttered for the benefit of others, here applies to the Sentence as well as to what is expressed by the sentence. When the sentence is regarded as the 'means' of the cognition, the result brought about by it is the knowledge of what is expressed by it; and when this latter is the 'means' the 'result' consists in the idea of acquiring or discarding the thing spoken of. *Ṭāṭparya*.

a desire to make known (to others) the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it. The word '*āpṭa*' is explained as denoting one who acts or proceeds, through '*āpṭi*', *i. e.* through the direct right knowledge of things. This definition applies to sages, * as well as to *Āryaṣ* and *Mcēlhchhas* †; the activities of all these people are carried on through such 'Words.'

Thus we find that it is by means of the aforesaid four Instruments of Cognition,—and not by any other means—that the activities of Gods, Men and Animals are carried on.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 7.

[P. 61, line 4 to P. 63, line 20.]

We proceed next to describe Word (as the fourth Instrument of Cognition]. What the Sūṭra means is that the 'Word' that is the *Instrument of right cognition* is that which consists in the assertion of *reliable persons*, and not in *mere assertion* (which would include the assertion of unreliable persons also, which does not always lead to *right* cognition).

* 'One who has direct intuitive knowledge of things is a Sage. The name Ārya stands for the people of the Central Land (bounded by the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Vindhya and the Himālaya). And the residents of the rest of the world are called Mlēchchha's !

† 'There are cases where the word of the worst man is true and reliable. For instance, after a robber has taken away all that a traveller possessed, if he is asked to point out the way to a certain place, what he indicates does turn out to be the right path. The word of such people is reliable only when they have no motive for giving incorrect information. Hence for being an 'āpṭa', for purposes of the validity of his assertions, it is not necessary that he should be completely free from all defects, as has been asserted by some philosophers'.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

On this the *Parishuddhi* observes as follows :—There two kinds of persons—ommiscient and not-ommiscient ; of these, the unreliabity of the former is set aside by the very proof that establishes his existence ; as the persen who is proved to be ommiscient is also proved to be free from all defects of ignorance, love, hatred and the like. As for the not-omniscient person, his assertions only can bear testimony to his being reliable, by reason of his being possessed of—(a) due knowledge of the thing spoken of, (b) desire to convey true information, (c) efficient faculty of right articulation &c. ; and one can be sure of this only after having repeatedly found the man to be possessed of these qualities.

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 22, ll. 5-6) says—*That person is called 'reliable' who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things,..................The word 'apta' is explained as denoting one who acts through 'āpti', i. e. through the direct and right knowledge of things.* Against this the following objection is raised (by * the *Mīmāmsaka*) :——"No *Assertion* is possible in regard to such things as Heaven, Apūrva, † Deity and the like; as all these are beyond the senses; that is to say, if by the 'āpṭi' of the thing (by reason of which the man is called '*āpta*' 'reliable') is meant the *direct valid knowledge* of things, then,—inasmuch as no one ever perceives, or has the direct knowledge of, Heaven, Apūrva, Deity and other such imperceptible things,—there could be no activity of speech (assertion) bearing upon these things. Consequently it would be well to explain the compound '*āptopadēshaḥ*' as '*āptaḥ upadēshaḥ*', 'reliable assertion', ‡ and not as '*āptasya upadēshaḥ*' 'the assertion of a reliable person."

This objection does not affect our position; for we do not mean to say that Heaven &c., are *perceived* by us; what we mean is that those persons to whom they *are* perceptible (the Sages for instance),—the *assertion* of these persons would constitute the *Word* (as the valid means of cognising those things) §. "But what is your reason for believing that

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* Who denies an author for the Veda; hence if Word were defined as 'the assertion of a reliable person', the Veda would be excluded.

† This is the name given to a certain invisible agency or force set going by every act that man does; this force being the immediate cause of the results, accruing to the man, from that act.

‡ 'The Veda, being without an author, is inherently free from all those defects that vitiate the reliability of assertions; hence with regard to all things, visible and invisible alike, it is *reliable*. As regards the words of persons of the world, these are *reliable* when they have the sanction of the other means of knowledge'.—*Tāṭparya*.

§ And as the Vedas are (according to us) the work of God;—and God can perceive Heaven &c.,—it is only natural that his 'assertion', in the form of the Vedas, should be the 'word' that provides the means of knowing these things

Heaven &c., are perceptible to some persons?" * We explain our reasons as follows:—† Heaven, &c., are perceptible to some persons,—because they are possessed of certain definite generic and specific characters:—for instance, (a) because Heaven &c. are '*Āshrita*', *i. e.* subsist in a certain substratum,—as a matter of fact, whatever is so subsistent must be perceptible to some one;——(b) because they are for the sake of others,—whatever is for the sake of others must be perceptible to some one;——(c) because they are things, and are capable of being spoken of,—whatever is a thing and is spoken of, must be perceptible to some one; as we find in the case of the jar and such other things;—and (d) because they are not eternal,—whatever is non-eternal must be perceptible to some one. "But as a matter of fact, *Apūrva* is not known to be non-eternal." This is not right; for in that case, there would be no possibility of death; that is to say, if Merit and Demerit (which constitute *Apūrva*) be eternal, to the destruction of what will man's death be due? If they are non-eternal, what happens is that the Merit and Demerit, that have begun to bear fruit, are destroyed by reason of their fruits having been experienced,—and there being left no more of such residuum of past deeds as has begun to bear fruit,—the Mind (Soul) of the man falls off from the body, and moves into another; and in this manner

* Our reason against such belief being—'The perception of the sages cannot pertain to Heaven and the rest,—because it is perception,—like our own perceptions.'

† In every reasoning that much alone of the Subject can be put forward as the 'Subject,' as much of it is known to contain the Probans. Hence, when the Mīmāmsaka puts forward the reasoning 'The perception of the sages, &c.' wherein 'the perception of the sage' is put forward as the 'Subject', it follows that he accepts such perception as a reality. And when it is admitted, it must be admitted exactly as it is known to exist; so that there can be no reason for denying that they do pertain to Heaven &c. If, on the other hand, the said 'perception of sages' is not admitted, then the reasoning becomes open to the fallacy of the 'Unknown Subject' So much for the untenability of the reasoning against the perceptibility of Heaven &c., by the sages. As for positive proofs for such perceptibility, we have many such; some of which are mentioned.

death and birth go on. For these reasons Merit and Dermerit (Apūrva) cannot be eternal.

Then again, if *Apūrva* be regarded as eternal, (a) is it one only, common to all persons ? (b) and (c) or is it, different for each person, * [(b) one for each person, or (c) many for each person] ?

(A) If it were one only, common to all persons, then the good (resulting from it) would also be common to all persons ! As there is nothing else that could determine which resulting good should go to what individual person ; and thus (the good deed done by one person bringing the desired good to all) people would abandon the performing of meritorious deeds. " Even though Apūrva be eternal (and one only), as there would be many and diverse manifesting agencies, there would be neither of the two incongruities pointed out;—that is to say, even if the *Apūrva* be eternal and one only, common to all persons, neither the resulting good would belong to all persons, nor would there be a cessation of meritorious deeds. ' How so ? ' For the simple reason that the manifesting agencies are many and diverse ; that is to say, the result proceeds (not from the *Apūrva* but) from that which manifests that eternal *Apūrva* ; and it is for this manifesting of the eternal *Apūrva* that deeds have to be done; so that there is no possibility of the cessation of meritorious deeds; for it is a well-recognised fact that that which is manifested by a certain person brings its results to that person only [and thus when the *Apūrva* is manifested by the act of a particular person, the good resulting from it will belong to that person only]." This last statement that you make by no means represents a well-recognised fact; for instance, it is not a fact that the Jar that is manifested

Vār. P. 62.

* There are three possible alternatives implied in this, says the *Tātparya* :—(1) There is a single Apūrva common to all persons ; (2) there are many Apūrvas one only for each person ; (3) there are many *Apūrvas* for each person.

(rendered perceptible) by Ḍēvadaṭṭa is not seen by Yajña-ḍaṭṭa. Further, what do you mean by the 'manifestation' of the eternal *Apūrva*? Does it mean that it is *perceived*? or that it becomes capable of bringing about its results? or that its covering is removed? If you mean that it becomes perceived, then this is not a fact; as no ordinary person ever perceives the *Apūrva*,* which is beyond the reach of the senses. If secondly, you mean that the *Apūrva*, by being manifested, becomes capable of bringing about its results, then we ask—is this *capability of bringing about its result* the Apūrva itself? or is it a property belonging to the *Apūrva*? If it is the *Apūrva* itself, then in that case [as the *Apūrva* is eternal, and the said *capability* is nothing other than the *Apūrva*] there is nothing done by the man to the *Apūrva* [so that one man's *Apūrva* should bring results to all men]. If, on the other hand, the said *capability* is a property belonging to the *Apūrva*, then, what proof have you for the belief that the *Apūrva* is something entirely different from that *capability*? The view held is that the *Apūrva* is that from which the result follows. If, lastly, by the 'manifestation' of the *Apūrva* you mean that its covering is removed,—then you have to explain what this 'covering' of the *Apūrva* is; as a matter of fact however, we cannot conceive of the possiblity or impossibility of any covering for things that are beyond the senses.

(B) The above reasonings also serve to set aside the view that *Apūrva* is eternal and [one] for each person. "How?" For in this case also the incongruities pointed out in the previous case—*viz.* the cessation of meritorious deeds by men &c.—are present; and so also the incapability of manifesting agencies (for the *Apūrva*); and further, there would be no possibility of any activity for the purpose of adding to the *Apūrva* that has been once produced; as [this

* And as regards the Sage, he can perceive even an *unmanifested* Apūrva.

'addition' consists in the increasing of the component factors, and] no change of composition is possible in the case of an eternal thing (as the *Apūrva* is held to be). "The diversity in the composition would be due to the diversity in the manifesting agencies."* This is not right; as no such diversity is ever found in any single thing. All that you mean is that though the *Apūrva* is one only, yet it can appear as diverse, through the diversity of its manifesting agency, and this diversity would cause the said 'increase' and 'decrease'. But this, we say, is not possible; for the simple reason that no such diversity is ever found to appear in any single thing; that is to say, we have never found any single thing being affected by any diversity of its manifesting agency, whereby any such 'increase' or 'decrease' could be possible. "But, as a matter of fact, we have found such diversity (and increase and decrease) in the size of the face as reflected in diverse reflecting media, like the bright sword (the large mirror, the small mirror,) and so forth." No such diversity has ever been found, we reply. "Then what is it that is found (in the case cited by us)?" (In the case you have cited) the idea of diversity (that people have) is a wrong one; the face only *appears as if it were* diverse, and it does not actually become diverse; and this for the simple reason that one and the same thing can never have more than one form; there is no single thing that ever takes diverse forms. For these reasons, you must give up either the notion of the Apūrva being one only, or that of its being the cause of increase and decrease.

Vār. Page 63.

(C) "We shall then regard *Apūrva* as eternal, and many and belonging to each person separately." If you take up the position that there are many eternal *Apūrvas* be-

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* One and the same thing may be larger and smaller in accordance with the size of its manifesting agency; for instance the same face appears large in a large mirror, and small in a small mirror.

longing to each person,—even then the incongruity does not cease; that is to say, even this last theory is not free from the incongruities that, there would be no possibility of death, and that there would be a cessation of meritorious deeds. "But what produces the result is the *manifestation* (of the *Apūrva*)." What do you mean by this? Do you mean that the *Apūrva* produces the result at the time that there is its manifestation? or that the result is produced after the action (producing the *Apūrva*) has ceased? As a matter of fact, it is never found to be the case that the *Apūrva* produces its result at the time that it is manifested; for instance, the attainment of heaven does not follow immediately after the *Ashvamēḍha* sacrifice [and the manifestation of the *Apūrva* must be at the same time as the action of sacrifice; as the action is the manifesting agent of the *Apūrva*, and in all cases the manifestation is found to be at the same time as the manifesting agency; *e. g.* the manifesting of the jar by the lamp is synchronous with the appearance of the lamp]. If then it be held that the result is produced after the action (of sacrifice, for instance) has ceased to exist,—then it comes to this that what manifests the *Apūrva* is the action that is non-existent, and yet it is as aided by this action that the *Apūrva* produces the result—a truly wonderful view of things! And [if a non-existent action were to manifest an *Apūrva*, then] there would be no *Apūrva* that would be not manifested at any time [as at any particular time we have any number of actions non-existent]; —so that all *Apūrvas* would produce their results at all times! If, with a keen desire to support your view of the case, you hold every action also to be eternal [so that the action would not be non-existent at the time of the result],—even then you do not escape from the incongruities pointed out above; —*i. e.* the cessation of all meritorious deeds, and so forth [one meritorious action having been performed, as this would, *ex hypothesi*, continue to exist for all time, and to manifest its *Apūrva* and

bring about its results, there would be no need for the performance of any other act].

Thus then we find that in whatever manner the eternality of *Apūrva* is held, it fails to bear examination.

[Not admitting *Word* as a distinct Instrument of Cognition, the Bauḍḍha * philosopher raises the following objection] —" What is the meaning of ' assertion of a reliable person ' ? Does it mean that the person making the assertion is truthful ? or that the fact asserted is true (really as it is averred to be) ? If it means the former, then that idea (of the truthfulness of the speaker, and of the consequent truth of his assertion) is got at by Inference. † If, on the other hand, it means that the fact asserted is true,— then this also can be known by Perception ; for it is only when we actually *perceive* the state of things to be as it is asserted to be, that we conclude that the fact is really as it has been averred to be."

This objection cannot be maintained ; as it is based upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of the *Sūṭra*. The Sūṭra '*Āpṭopaḍēshaḥ shabḍaḥ*' does not mean what it has been taken to mean [*i. e.* it does not mean that ' the word, aided by the reliability of the speaker, makes the object known ', in which case alone would it be regarded as *inferential* ; nor that ' the truth of the fact averred is known by actually coming by the thing spoken of ', in which case alone could it be regarded as *perception*] ; ‡ what it does

* Diṅnāga in Chap. V of his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*—vide Satish. Ch. Viyasbhusana', Mediaeval Logic' from which it appears that the objection as found in the *Vārṭika* is a quotation from Diṅnāga's work.

† That a certain person is truthful can be learnt only from inference ; and when we have come to the conclusion that he is a truthful man, from that we infer that what he says must be true.

‡ It is only after the Word has brought about the cognition of the fact expressed by it, that its reliability is inferred from the fact being actually found to be as averred by the Word. But because the reliability of the Word is inferred, it does not follow that the effect—the cognition-produced by the Word should also be inferred. Nor again is the relation between the Word and its meaning always that of invariable con-

mean is that, in regard to things connected with the senses, as well as those not connected with them, we have a cognition which we speak of in terms of the *word*—*i. e.* of which we speak of in the form 'I have the cognition of such and such a thing *by means of words*;'—and it is the cognition, thus expressed, that forms the result of the 'Word' (as the instrument of cognition). Thus it is found that the objection urged by Diṅnāga is wholly irrelevant.

SŪṬRA (8).

The said Word is of two kinds—the Dṛiṣṭārṭha, that of which the thing spoken of is perceived, and the Adṛiṣṭārṭha, that of which the thing is not perceived.

BHĀṢYA.

(Page 23, ll. 1—4.]

That 'Word' of which the thing spoken of is perceived in this world is called 'Dṛiṣṭārṭha'; while that of which the thing spoken of is only believed to exist in the other world is 'Adṛiṣṭāriṭha'.* These are the two divisions under which are included all the assertions of sages and ordinary men. "For what purpose does the Sūṭra mention these two divisions?" This mention is made so that the other party (either a pupil or a disputant) may not think that what is a *valid instrument of cognition* is only that *assertion of the reliable person* which speaks of things that

mitance, whereby every verbal cognition would be always inferential. What happens in the case of verbal cognition is that the words used are such whose conventional meanings, being well known, are recalled to the mind whenever they are heard; and the meanings of the individual words thus recalled, come to be connected together by reason of their proximity, capability and mutual need,——and thus related together, they give rise to the comprehension of the connected meaning of the Sentence as a whole. And this process is entirely different from the process of Inference.

* (1) That which speaks of things directly perceived by the Speaker, and (2) That which speaks of things only known to him indirectly, by means of Inference for instance.

are directly perceived, as it is only such things that can be duly ascertained. This idea had to be guarded against, as such assertions also as speak of things not seen are *valid Instruments of cognition,*; as such things also can be duly ascertained by means of Inference*.

Here ends the section of the *Bhāṣya* dealing with the Instruments of Cognition.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA (8).

[Page 63, l. 21 to page 64, l. 6.]

The declaration (in the Sūṭra) that '*Word is of two kinds*' is meant to restrict the application of the name; the sense being that, though a 'reliable assertion' may be of many kinds, yet, in the present context, it is meant to be restricted to such assertions only as speak of things that are amenable to Perception and Inference. † Or, the two kinds of Word may be said to be due to the difference in the character of the speakers; as words are found to have both 'ḍriṣṭārṭha' and 'aḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers; those who speak of things

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* If only Words speaking of visible things were reliable, then the Veda would become excluded. Hence it is added that words speaking of invisible things also are reliable. Such invisible things as Heaven and the like can be known by means of Words whose validity can be ascertained only by means of an Inference based upon the fact of their being the Word of 'a reliable person', —i. e. God. And it is for this reason that these things are said to be inferred. This precludes the validity of mere Hearsay, or of the word of persons whose veracity cannot be correctly inferred; *e. g.* that of Buḍḍha and others. And it does not mean that the things spoken of in this case are those that cannot be cognised by means of Perception. As Heaven &c., are actually perceived by the sages. When the ordinary man speaks of Heaven &c., his words are 'aḍṛīṭārṭha' in a double sense—the thing is one cognisable only by means of words whose validity can be only inferred, and the man speaks of things that he has not seen, but knows by means of words whose reliability he knows from Inference. It is on the basis of this double sense of '*aḍṛiṣṭārṭha*' that we find the *Vārṭika* offering a second interpretation of the words '*ḍṛiṣṭārṭha*' and '*aḍṛiṣṭārṭha*'—*Ṭaṭparya*.

† 'The former explanation is in accordance with the *Bhāṣya*; the *Vārṭika* next adds another interpretation'—*Tāṭparya*.

they have seen are 'ḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers, and those who speak of things (not seen, but) known by them by means of Inference are 'aḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers.

The definition provided by the *Sūṭra* thus *applies to sages as well as to Āryas and Mlēchchhas* (*Bhāṣya*, p. 22, line 7-8). This common definition has been provided, and no distinction has been made, for this reason that the activities of all these men are carried on through 'reliable assertions.'

Thus we find that the four described above are the Instruments of Cognition, by means of which *the activities of gods, men and animals are caried on* (Bhāṣya, p. 22 l. 8-9).

Thus ends the section of the *Vārṭika* dealing with the Instruments of Cognition.

Lecture (3).

The Pramēyas.

The Objects of Cognition.

[*Sūṭras* 9—22.]

Bhāṣya.

[P. 23, l. 5 to P. 24, l. 4.]

The *Sūṭrā* now proceeds to explain what is to be known by means of the above-described Instruments of Cognition.

Sūṭra (9).

Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Release really * *constitute the Objects of Cognition'.*

Of these—(1) the Soul is the perceiver (of all that brings about pain and pleasure),—the experiencer (of all pains and pleasures)—the knower of all (pains, pleasures and

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* According to the *Parishuḍḍhi* there are two readings of the *Sūṭra*—one with 'ṭu', and the other without it. We shall see later on (P. 216) how this particle is essential.

their causes)—who gets at all things.* (2) The Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences. (3) The Sense-organs are the instruments of the experiences. (4) The Things are the objects to be enjoyed and experienced. (5) Apprehension consists of the experience itself. (6) † The Mind is that internal organ which is capable of bringing about the apprehension of all things,—which the Sense-organs (being limited in their scope) cannot do. (7) Activity is the cause of the propagation of the body, the sense-organs, the things and the sensing of pleasure and pain; (8) So also are the Defects. (9) Rebirth—the body that belongs to the Soul in one life is not the first that the Soul has had; nor is it the last; in fact there can be no 'first' in the previous bodies that the Soul has had [as we cannot trace any beginning of the worldly process]; and as for its subsequent bodies, there can be an end to these only when Release is attained;—and it is this that constitutes *Rebirth*. (10) Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain along with the causes leading to these. (11) *Pain*—by the special mention of 'pain' (and the omission of 'pleasure') it is not meant that there is no pleasure at all,—which is what is actually felt as agreeable [just as much as Pain is felt as disagreeable]; what is meant is to lay stress upon the teaching that it is desirable that one should practise the thoughtful contemplation of the fact that Pleasure also is only a form of Pain,—being as it is, along with its causes, found to always end in pain, to be never also entirely free from pain, and to be inseparable from various difficulties; as when one is thoughtful and contemplates upon the said fact, he becomes disgusted;—this disgust makes him free from all attachment, and brings Dispassion;—and having become dispassionate, he attains Release. (12) Release consists in the cessation of the series of births and deaths, and the consequent disappearance of all pain.

* If the Soul did not get at all things, it could not know 'all things'.

'The point in which the *Soul* differs from the other objects is that it is only as the experiencer of pleasures and pains that the Soul is something to be got rid of (*hēya* in its own positive form; it is never *hēya*, it is always *upādēya*, to be acquired and treasured; while all the rest—except Release—are always only fit to be got rid of; and *Release* is always to be acquired and treasured.'

† There is much uncertainty on the exact nature of *manas*. The later Logicians regard it as an '*indriya*'; while the *Bhāṣya* is not clear on this point. We shall deal with this subject later on, under Manas'.

Though apart from these enumerated, there are many other 'objects of cognition' also—such as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence,—yet it would be impossible to enumerate all such objects severally; so what the Sūṭra has done is to make specific mention of only those 'objects' whose right knowledge brings Release, and wrong knowledge leads to Birth and Rebirth [and it does not mean that these are the only objects that can be cognised.]

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 64, l. 7 to P. 66, l. 10.]

The 'Object of Cognition' is next described—

*[The *Bhāṣya* puts the question—*What is to be known by means of the above described Instruments of Cognition*,—with a view to specify the 'objects of cognition', which have been only hinted at, in a general way, in the definition of the Pramāṇas; and the sense of the *Sūṭra* is that the 'objects of cognition' enumerated are precisely those whose true knowledge brings Release and whose wrong knowledge brings Birth and Rebirth. The compound in the *Sūṭrā* is *Ḍvanḍva*, of which every component is of equal importance.

An objection is raised—"What is the meaning of the *Sūṭra*? Does it mean that the Soul and the rest here mentioned are the only 'objects of cognition'? or that these are 'objects of cognition' only? If the former, then the statement becomes too narrow, as it omits to mention many objects of cognition; such, for instance, as Space, Time, Community, Individuality and Inherence.] If, on the other hand, the meaning is that they are 'objects of cognition' only, then there is a contradiction between this *Sūṭra*, and *Sūṭra* 2-1-16, where the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the Soul &c. as both 'instruments of cognition' and 'objects of cognition';

*The whole text of lines 10—17 is defective, there being no less than five lacunae. We give within square brackets, the purport of these eight lines, so far as it can be gleaned from the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

and in support of this dual character it cites the instance of the weighing balance, in which when weighed, the gold becomes the *object* weighed; while when some other thing is weighed, and gold is used only as the medinm of measurement, it is the *instrument*; and thus the same gold comes to be spoken of as '*pramēya*' as well as '*pramāṇa*'. And further, such a statement by the *Sūṭra* would be contrary to facts of ordinary experience; in which it is found that one and the same thing is related to actions in more ways than one; for instance, in the case of the tree, we find it spoken of as the *agent* in the sentence 'the tree stands' [as an *objective* in 'I see the tree', as an *instrument* in 'he sees the moon by means of the tree,' and so on]; and just as in this case we find the names of several verbal-relations applied to the tree, on the basis of the presence, in it, of all the several characters,—so, in the same manner, the same thing (Soul for instance) could be '*pramēya*' as well as '*pramāṇa*' [so that it is not right to say that Soul and the rest are *pramēyas*' only]."

The above reasoning is not right; as it is based upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that the 'object of cognition', consisting of the Soul and the rest, when duly known and differentiated tends to bring about the Release of the person; and it does not mean that there are no other 'objects of cognition'. Nor would there be any incongruity if the *Sūṭra* were taken to mean that Soul &c. are 'objects of cognition' only. "What do you mean *?" What we mean is that the *Sūṭra* states that for the man seeking Release, Soul and the rest must be the 'objects of cognition' only; *i.e.*, these must be *known* by him; and it is not meant to enjoin the knowability of these [*i.e.* the *Sūṭra* does not lay down that Soul &c. must be

* "The incongruity—in the shape of the contradiction of Sū. 2. 1. 16 is quite patent in this case—how then can you say that there is no incongruity in this view?"

known by all men *]; nor is it meant to deny the knowability of other things. All that is done by the *Sūṭra* is to reiterate † the truth that by one who seeks for Release, *these must be known;*—*i. e.* for him they must be '*objects* of cognition' only. Thus we find that the *Sūṭra is* meant to do both [to state that Soul &c. are the only 'objects of cognition', and also that Soul &c. are 'objects of cognition' only]; and neither of these statements is open to the objections that have been urged.

Even granting the contention of the Opponent against the *Sūṭra,* we offer the following explanation :—

Space and the other objects also are included in the Sūṭra, by the force of implication. "What is the *implication*?" It is this :—There are twenty forms of *Activity* (the *seventh* object mentioned in the *Sūṭra*); and these are affected,—*i.e.* found to be qualified and borne upon by—Space and Time; all which therefore are implied ‡ in the mention of 'Activity;' as for Community, Individuality and Inherence, these are only qualifications of the several Objects mentioned in the *Sūṭra*; that is, Soul and the other objects are already mentioned in the *Sūṭra,* and Community, Individuality and Inherence are only relations serving to differentiate the said objects from one another; and as such are included in the *Sūṭra* as the qualifications of those directly mentioned.

* 'But only by the pupil who is seeking for Release.'

† The use of the word 'reiterate' shows that the fact is vouched for by other pramāṇas also.

‡ The reading of the printed texts is defective; as it stands, the sense is that Space &c. are *not* included; which would be absurd; as from what follows, and from what the *Tāṭparya* says, it is clear that Space and Time &c. *are* meant to be included. Hence the proper reading should be सर्वेष्वप्रवृत्त्यर्थेषु विद्यन्ते इति ग्रहणम्

Space affects activity, when the Veda lays down a sacrifice as to be performed on a plot of ground sloping eastwards; Time affects it when it lays down the Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice to be performed on the Purṇamāsī day.

* As a matter of fact however, the *Sūṭra* does not mean either to indicate all 'objects of cognition', or to indicate those that are 'objects of cognitions' only. If the author of the *Sūṭra* had simply meant to indicate the 'objects of cognition', he would thereby only prove his own inaptitude, by mentioning what has already been mentioned (as implied by the account given of the Instruments of Cognition); and further by mentioning again what has already been mentioned in the very first *Sūṭra* (and what is again already implied in the account subsequently given of the Pramāṇas) the author's statement (in the present *Sūṭra*) would partake of the character of the incoherent ravings of a maniac. It is with a view to all this that the author of the Sūṭra has inserted the qualifying particle 'ṭu'; the meaning of the *Sūṭra* thus is that 'though there are other *objects of cognition* also, yet those that are mentioned (Soul &c.) are those *objects of cognition* whose true knowledge brings the highest good; this is what is implied by the particle '*ṭu*'.

An objection is raised:—"How is it that Pleasure is not mentioned? Is it because there is no such thing as Pleasure? Or because it is already included in something else? It cannot be the former; as Pleasure is a thing that is known to every living Soul; inasmuch as Pleasure is found to be experienced by every living Soul, it cannot be said that there is no such thing as Pleasure. For the same reason [*i. e.* because Pleasure is actually known as something entirely different from Soul and the rest] Pleasure cannot be held to be included in any of the things mentioned in the *Sūṭra*."

Pleasure has been omitted with a view to indicate the absence of attachment. "How so?" The man who is seeking after Release should look upon everything as 'Pain;'

* The above explanation has been given by the author only to show his ingenuity; the real explanation is the one already given above; which he reiterates.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

and it is for the purpose of laying stress upon the propriety of regarding everything as 'Pain' that the *Sūṭra* has omitted to mention 'Pleasure' separately. As a matter of fact, when a man regards everything as 'Pain', he acquires that Dispassion which consists of the *absence of attachment to* (or indifference for) the entire three worlds; and when the 'absence of attachment' is practised, his longing for all the three worlds ceases; the 'longing' for a certain thing consists in the desire for its return; and naturally no such desire is possible, when the man regards all things as 'pain'; for certainly no one desires Pain;—all longing having thus ceased, the man does not have recourse to those (activities) that tend to bring back the objects desired; as he does not have recourse to these activities; no further Merit or Demerit accrues to him; those that have already accrued to him in the past become exhausted through his experiences, and thus ultimately Merit and Demerit, which form the sole cause of birth and rebirth, entirely disappear from the man; and thereupon he becomes 'released'; that is, he is not born again. It is with a view to indicate all this that the *Sūṭra* has omitted to mention 'Pleasure'.

Soul—The first Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 24, l. 5 to p. 25, l. 9.]

* As a matter of fact, it is found that the Soul is not apprehended by Perception; the question then arises as to whether it is known only by means of 'reliable assertion'. The answer is that it is not so; as Soul is cognised by means of Inference also.

* 'That there is such a thing as Soul is known, in a general way, from Reliable Assertion (of the Veda, for instance), and this knowledge is ratified by Inference'—*Ṭaṭparya*. 'By being *ratified* is meant that the vague general cognition is specified'—says the *Parishuḍḍhi*. That is, the existence of particular souls in particular bodies becomes recognised.

In connection with the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, the objection is raised as to why the perception of the Soul is denied, when as a matter of fact, the Soul is

SŪṬRA (10).

Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul.

[A] The Soul having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of things, whenever, in the future, he happens to see a thing of that same kind, he wishes to acquire that thing; and this wish to acquire is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things; as it arises from his remembrance of a previous perception; it is thus that Desire becomes an indicative (a sign or proof) of the Soul. * No such desire would be possible [if there were not one and the same agent to cognise and to recognise the thing, and] if there were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining to its own distinct object; for the recognition of one cognition by another cognition would be as possible as the recognition by one body of the experiences of another body†.

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always an object of *mental perception*, being always perceived as 'I', a conception that appears along with every cognition. The answer to this is that it is true that we have the notion of 'I'; but this might be (and actually is) taken as referring to the body; and as such it could not afford a sufficient proof for the existence of the Soul apart from the body; so long as it is not strengthened and ratified by other means of cognition, Inference &c. This is the answer from the stand-point of one who does not regard the Soul as purely perceptible; the answer from the standpoint of one who regards Soul as perceptible is that the passage refers to the Soul of others, one's own Soul being always *perceptible*.—[as held by some Logicians, called by Jayanța Bhatta, '*svayūțhyāḥ*']——*Parishuddhi*.

* 'Having found a certain kind of thing to give pleasure, the man formulates the judgment 'this kind of thing gives pleasure', this is the major premiss; when he ees that kind of thing again, he has the idea 'this is that kind of thing'; this forms the minor premiss; from these two premisses he comes to the conclusion 'this will give pleasure'; and then *desires* to acquire that thing. Thus this *Desire* proves that the agent who has this desire must be the same who has the three cognitions represented by the two premisses and the resultant conclusion)—there being a common agent for all the four; if the agent were not the same there could be no such recollection or fusion of the several cognitions involved; and it is this common agent—who is the the seer of the thing, the experiencer of pleasure, the rememberer of the thing being the source of pleasure, and the desirer of the thing,—who is the *Soul*'—*Tātparya*.

† 'This anticipates the following argument :—' If in the absence of a *Soul*, the recollection and fusion of cognitions were possible under the hypothesis of every cognition setting up, and forming a factor in, a series of cognitions; then every cognition would recall and fuse into every other cognition of the same series. *Tātparya*.

The phrase '*dēhāntaravat*' is explained by the *Bhāṣya* itself later on—p. 25 lls. 4—6.

[B] Similarly it is only when one and the same agent perceives several things, that, on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have *Aversion* to the thing that has been the cause of pain to him.

[C] When a certain kind of thing has been found to be the cause of pleasure, on subsequently seeing a thing of that kind, the man makes an attempt to obtain that thing; and this *Effort* would not be possible if there were not *one* agent perceiving a number of things and recollecting his past perceptions; specially no such Effort would be possible if there were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining to its own distinct object; for the Effort of one cognition on the basis of the experience of another cognition would be as impossible as the Effort of one body on the basis of the experiences of another body. This explanation also applies to the *Effort* that is put forth for the getting rid of what has been found to be a cause of pain.

[D and E] It is only by reason of his remembrance of his previous experience of pleasure and pain that when the man gets by the thing that had caused him pleasure he is pleased, and when he gets by what had caused him pain he feels unhappy; and thus it is that he experiences *Pleasure* and *Pain*. And in this also the reason is the same as before [that is to say, the said pleasure and pain is possible only when the person getting by the thing and remembering the previous experiences is the same who had had those experiences; and this proves the Soul as the experiencer of Pleasure and Pain in the past, their rememberer and their experiencer in the present].

[F] When a man is desirous of knowing or understanding (the real character of a certain thing), at first he ponders over it in the form—'what may this be?'; and pondering thus he comes to know it in the form—'this is so and so'. This *Knowing* of the thing is by the same agent as the previous *desire to know* and the consequent *pondering*;—so that this *Knowledge* becomes an indicative of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the 'Soul'. And here also the reason is the same as before.

Now we proceed to explain the phrase '*ḍēhānṭaravaṭ*' 'as in the case of another body', [that we have used twice before, p. 24, l. 11 and l. 14]:—The philosopher who does not admit the Soul readily admits that the diverse, Cognitions,

each pertaining to a distinct object, when appearing in different bodies, are never recognised [and never fuse together, the cognitions of one body not being recognised by another body]; and for the same reason the diverse cognitions, appearing in the same body also, could not be recollected; the two cases being for the said philosopher exactly alike, [so far as the absence of the common agent is concerned; there being no such agent in either case]. Thus then, with regard to a single agent we find that he recognises only what he has perceived, and not what he has not perceived * [or what has been perceived by another]; similarly with regard to diverse agents also, we find that one agent does not recognise what has been perceived by another; neither of the these two well-known facts can be adequately explained by the philosopher who does not admit a *Soul*.

Thus it is proved that there is such a thing as *Soul*.

Vārṭika on Sūṭra 10.

[Page 66, line 11 to P. 71, l. 4]

Sūṭrā 10 is put forward—(*a*) with a view to differentiate the Soul from what is homogeneous to it (*i. e.* other *Pramēyas*, Body, Sense-organs &c.) as also from what is heterogeneous to it (*i. e.* the *Pramāṇas*) ;—(*b*) † also with a view to ratify (or specify) by means of Inference what is already known by means of Word (of the Scriptures) : *i. e.* with a view to strengthen the knowledge of [or to specify the cognition of] the Soul that has been known in a general way by means of Reliable Word ;—(*c*) and lastly also with a view to show an instance of the commixture of several Instruments of Cognition: We have said above (in the *Vārṭika*, Text, pp. 31-32) that in many cases several Instruments of Cognition commingle ; and the case of the Soul is one of those cases [where we find the commixture of Word and Inference].

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* The text reads नान्यदृष्टस्य नादृष्टस्येति ; and the foot-note remarks that नादृष्टस्येति is not found in three of the four manuscripts. But from the contex it is clear is that what is necessary is the clause नादृष्टस्येति, and it is the other clause नान्यदृष्टस्य, which is superfluous, in view of the next sentence ; where the perception and remembrance by different agents is spoken of.

† The particle 'cha' here means 'and'—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 24, l. 8)—*The Soul having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of thing, whenever, in the future, it happens to see a thing &c. &c.* The sense of this is that what proves the existence of the Soul is the * 'recollecting' or 'blending' of Desire and the rest (the cognitions and recognitions leading up to it).

"In regard to this", says the Opponent, "we have to consider the following dificulty : [In every case of Inference the indicative proves the conclusion only when it is itself perceived] how, then, can Desire and the rest prove the Soul, when they are themselves not perceived ? †"

[They prove the existence of the Soul] because they pertain to the same object as the Recognition ; that is to say, because Desire and the rest have the same object as the Recognition, they prove that all the cognitions appearing in the Recognition have a common agent ; it is a well-known fact that no 'recognition' of cognitions is possible, (*a*) when these cognitions have different agents, or (*b*) when their objects are not the same, or (*c*) when they are brought about by different instruments. For instance—(*b*) in no case do we find a 'recognition' of the cognitions of colour, of taste, of odour, and of touch : as there is never any such recognition as 'this *touch* that I feel is the *colour* that I had seen' ;———(*c*) nor again is there any such recognition as 'that by means of which I see' colour now is that by means of which I had felt its touch ;—(*a*) nor lastly is there recognition by Yajñadaṭṭa of what had been seen by Ḍēvadaṭṭa : there is never any such recollection as 'this that I, Yajñadaṭṭa see, is the same

*The *Parishuḍḍhi* explains the word '*praṭisanḍhāna*' as the blending or fusion of (1) the previous cognition of the thing, (2) the remembrance of the pleasure, caused by it, (3) the subsequent cognition of the thing, (4) and the consequent Desire —into a single conception comprehending all the four ideas as belonging to one and the same agent.

† Desire, Aversion, and Effort are not perceptible.

thing that Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa had seen.' And what is the reason for all this? The simple reason lies in the fact that each cognition has a distinct object of its own. Thus then, for one who denies a Soul, every cognition must be *distinct, with a distinct object of its own; and no 'recognition' or 'recollection' would be ever possible. Hence the conclusion is that there is a single agent who *recognises*; and this is the *Soul*.

You will perhaps offer the following explanation:—" The fusion or recognition of the several cognitions (in a series) will be due to the fact of the preceeding cognition being the cause of the following cognition. That is to say, the 'recollection' or 'fusion' of the several cognitions is due, not to the fact of all of them having a common agent, but to the fact that, in any series of cognitions (to which every cognition gives rise), every individual cognition is the cause of the cognition that follows; as a matter of fact, every cognition is followed by another cognition, this latter proceeding from a certain potency in the preceeding cognition,—and is itself endowed with all the potency (that belonged to the previous cognitions); and thus even though the cognitions are diverse and many, there is a 'fusion' by reason of the relation of cause and effect subsisting among them; just as there is in the case of the seed: in the case of seeds, we find that the small grain of paddy is followed by the sprout; and the sprout, by reason of its having followed from the paddy-seed, is endowed with the potency of the paddy; and from this sprout by the aid of the several elemental substances, is produced only another grain of paddy, not a grain of barley: and the only reason for this lies in the fact that what has gone before is a paddy-grain, and not barley; [so that there is a *recognition* of the grain of paddy];—in the same manner, in the case in question also, there is a 'fusion' or 'recogni-

* The 'na' in the text is evidently wrong; as this sentence is meant to be explanatory of the preceding sentence; while with the 'na' it would be a direct contradiction of it.

tion' of several cognitions only when they appear in the same 'series of cognitions',—so that there is a causal relation among them, every one of them being the effect of that which precedes it; and there is no such 'fusion' when the cognitions belong to a different 'series'; as in this latter case, there is no necessary sequence (and consequent causal relation) among the cognitions. Thus the 'fusion' is due to the presence of causal relation, and not to the presence of a common agent; for the simple reason that we do not know of any instance where there is 'recognition' due to the presence of a common agent [while of 'recognition' due to causal relation we have an instance in the case of the Seed]; and thus the 'Recognition' (that has been urged as the reason for the existence of the Soul) having been found otherwise explicable, it cannot prove the existence of the Soul *."

† The above reasoning is not sound, we reply. As it does not remove the diversity: That is to say, when you declare that the 'recognition' is due to the causal relation, you do not set aside the diversity among the cognitions; and this for the simple reason that causal relation itself subsists on (*i. e.* presupposes) diversity; it is upon diversity that every causal relation depends;—and in cases where both parties admit diversity (among the things concerned) no 'recognition' is found possible. Why not?—you will ask. Well, in a case where the cogniser is not the same as the rememberer (in which case the diversity

Vār Page 68.

* The import of this objection is thus explained by the *Ṭaṭparya*—Between the cognitions of Dēvadaṭṭa on the one hand, and those of Yajñadaṭṭa on the other, we find two differences: they have different agents, and they are not the cause of each other. We also find that there is no 'recognition' of the one as the other. The question then arises—Is this absence of 'recognition' due to the first difference, or to the second; and as there is nothing to determine the exact answer to this question the inference drawn (as it is by the *Bhāṣya*) from 'recognition' can not be conclusive as to the difference or non-difference of the agents.

† The *Ṭaṭparya* remarks that the Siḍḍhanṭi purposely keeps his real explanation hidden from the Opponent. The real explanation is clearly given in the *Vārṭika*, Text, p. 68, l. 11.

of agents is admitted by both parties), no remembrance is possible; and when there is no remembrance, there can be no 'recognition.' [Hence so long as the causal relation does not do away with diversity, it cannot form a basis for 'recognition'].

" What we mean" the Bauḍḍha explains, "is that no 'recognition' is possible; and we do not say that 'recognition' is found where there is causal relation, all that we say is that where there is no causual relation, no recognition is found; and the reason that we have put forward for this absence of recognition is the fact that there is no necessary sequence (in cases where there is no causal relation). Thus your complaint against our reasoning is absolutely futile and meaningless".

This explanation is not right; as it does not really meet the question at issue. In explaining your position in the way you have done you do not meet the real point at issue: I have said 'where there is diversity', *recognition* is not found; and you say * 'when there is diversity, on account of the absence of causal relation, *recognition* is not found'; and your statement in this form is of such doubtful import that it does not at all set at rest the question at issue. " Well the same is the case with yourself: when you simply assert, that 'recognition is not found when there is diversity,' you do not meet the point in dispute." This answer of yours is no answer at all; when you say that my statement is similar to yours, you admit that your own statement *does not* meet the point in dispute.

" Not so", says the Opponent; " as what I have put forward is not meant to be a reason; that is to say, I do not mean that 'there is Recognition *because there is causal relation*'; all that I mean is that the Recognition, that you have

* The 'na' in the text is wrong: the opponent *does* say above 'कार्यकारणभावे न दृश्य

put forward, can be explained otherwise (than on the basis of what you seek to deduce from it); and hence it cannot serve as a valid reason for deducing what you seek to deduce from it; and tnus all that I mean is to point out the fallacy involved in your reasoning; and I do not mean to put forward another reasoning in the form that 'there is *recognition because there is causal relation*', or that 'there is no *recognition because* there is no causal relation']."

* Even so your argument is not tenable. For you have failed to grasp the import of the reason (Recognition) put forward by us (in support of our conclusion). Evidently the true import of our reasoning has not been comprehended by you; you have been misled by the generalised form in which our reason has been asserted; that is why you find, with it the fault that it is explicable otherwise (than on the basis of our conclusion). The 'Recognition' that we have put forward as our Reason is a *qualified* Recognition (and not mere Recognition in general); what we mean is that particular kind of Recognition which apprehends a certain thing as the common object of the previous cognition, of the present cognition and of the remembrance.† And no such remembrance or Recognition would be possible under your theory [where nothing is admitted except the 'series' of cognitions, and where everything having a momentary existence, any form of 'Recognition' is an impossibility.‡] "Why so?" Simply because—§(a) there

* The real answer of the Logician to the Bauḍḍha objection begins here.

† The Recognition is in this form—'that source of pleasure in the shape of garlands, sandal paste and the like, which I remember, is the same that I am perceiving now'. The Recognition appearing in this qualified form differs materially from that Recognition which depends upon causal relation; as in this latter kind of Recognition there is no remembrance.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ 'The proving of the momentary character of things means the disproving of all Recognition' says the *Parlihuḍḍhi*.

§ There is no recognition in any of the following forms—(a) 'I am touching this thing with the same organ of touch by which organ of vision I had seen it'; (b) 'This that I am seeing as the jar is the same as the cloth that I had seen'; or (c) 'I recognise this which had been perceived by my friend.'

is no recognition by one sense-organ of what has been previously apprehended by another;—(b) because there is no recognition in one form of what has been apprehended in another form;—and (c) because there is no recognition by one person of what has been previously apprehended by another person. [And under the Bauḍḍha's theory of momentary existence, each cognition being distinct, no form of Remembrance would be possible]. And yet in the case cited by us, Remembrance does take place; which proves that Recognition is possible only under that theory under which there is Remembrance [and not under that under which there is merely causal relation.]*

The Opponent makes the following rejoinder:—"You urge against us the *impossibility of Remembrance*; but as a matter of fact, it is not true that no Remembrance is possible under our theory. How so? Well, because on the basis of causal relation itself there is remembrance of a thing in that same 'series of bodily sensations' in which the previous apprehension of the thing had appeared; so that that 'series of bodily sensations' in which the apprehension and the remembrance appear is the *Rememberer* as well as the *Apprehender* [and there is no necessity for the postulating of a *Soul* apart from the body and the sensations]."

What you say is not possible, we reply; firstly because all cognitions are transient; and as a rule it is only something lasting for some time that can be impressed upon by an impressing agency†;—and secondly because of the absence of

* In the case of the cloth and the yarns composing it, where causal relation is distinctly comprehended, there is no Recognition; there is no such idea as that 'this cloth is the same as the yarns'.

'The conclusion thus is that for the proving of the existence of the common agent in the form of the Soul, we have a flawless Reason in the shape of the Recognition of an object as the same that was seen, is seen and is remembered.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The Opponent having failed to grasp the import of the former explanations, the Author proceeds to convince him of the existence of the Soul by means of another set of reasonings: 'Every cognition is momentary; when it disappears it disappears

connection: as a matter of fact, it is only when there is some connection between the two that one is impressed by the other;* while (under your theory) the cog-

Var. Page 69.

nitions (all appearing at different points of time and disappearing as soon as appearing) can have no connection with any impresser [so that, there being no impression, no Remembrance is possible].

† "The *impression* consists only in the production or appearance of a sensation endowed with a certain potency; that is to say, as a matter of fact, from a particular consciousness, which is produced along with a previous sensation, there follows another sensation, which is endowed with the potency of its predecessor; and the appearance, with this potency of this latter sensation, in the Consciousness, is what is called 'impression' [and this is quite possible under the theory of 'momentary cognition.']."

We have already answered this by pointing out that no such thing is possible; because Cognitions are transient, and because (as such) they can have no connection with any

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entirely, leaving an impression of itself behind; and it is through the agency of this impression that the subsequent remembrance appears; it is absolutely essential for this process that the rememberer should continue to exist from the time of the cognition up to the time of the remembrance. According to the Bauḍḍha however no such lasting entity is possible; as he admits of nothing else except a series of momentary cognitions'.—*Tāṭparya.*

* The reading should be '*sambaḍḍham*', not '*asambaḍḍham*'; as the sense apparently is that as a rule the impresser is always connected with the impressed.

† The Bauḍḍha view is thus explained in the *Tāṭparya*:—

The 'previous sensation' is that cognition which sets up the 'series of cognitions'; this is of six kinds—five related to the five organs of sensation, and the sixth the cognition of attributes. From the previous sensation there follows, coeval with it, that particular Consciousness or 'stream of cognitions', which is known as 'ālayavijñāna', or 'Basic Consciousness'; from this comes the next sensation which is endorsed with the *potency of remembrance*, in the form of the 'I-idea.' Though this is nothing apart from the sensation itself, yet it is regarded as 'potency' only figuratively, for the purpose of explaining the phenomenon of [re]membrance.

impression. Then again, * that 'particular consciousness', which you hold to be coeval with the previous cognition, cannot afford any help either to the sensation appearing at any present moment, or to any that appears at some future time; because (according to you) the cognition that appear at the present moment appears in an immaculate form, and also disappears exactly in the same form in which it appears [so that it cannot be affected by the 'particular consciousness']; and as for any future cognition, no 'particular consciousness' could be regarded as having any connection with what is yet to come; and it cannot affect, or impress, that which is not connected with it. Thus we come to the conclusion that your assertion—that 'Remembrance proceeds on the basis of causal relation'—shows that you have not been taught the real meaning of *Impression*.

There is yet another reason why no Remembrance is possible under your theory [that there is no Soul, and every phenomenon depends upon causal relation among Cognitions] :—As a matter of fact, every *bhāva*, (lit. *becoming*, *i. e. condition* or *quality*), stands in need of a *bhaviṭṛi*, the *becomer*; *i. e.* the thing to whom the condition or quality belongs; every *becoming* must require a *becomer*, because it is of the nature of an *action*,—like the action of *being produced*. In accordance with this inference, Remembrance, being of the nature of a *becoming*, must require a *becomer*; and in the case of Remembrance this *becomer* may be ither in the form of an objective (the object remembered), or in the form of an agent (the person remembering); that the *becomer* of an action has these two characters is shown by the fact that in the *action* of the 'cooking † of rice' the *becomer* is the rice, which is the

* This anticipates the following argument of the Bauḍḍha—"Even though the two cognitions are transient, yet, when they appear at the same point of time, there is some connection between them; and through this connection one cognition would be impressed by the other, and thereby bring about it remembrance."

† According to the *Ṭāṭparya*, the reading is '*pākaḥ*', not '*pāchakaḥ*'; and the also demands '*pākaḥ*.'

object cooked [as the condition *of being cooked* belongs to the rice, and not to the *cooker*]; while in the case of the action of '*walking*' *by Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa*, the *becomer* is Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa, who is the agent [as the condition of *walking* belongs to the man who walks]. Now so far as the action of Remembrance is concerned, the *becomer* cannot be of the nature of the objective, as there is remembrance of absent things also; if the *becomer* of Remembrance were its *object*, then at the time that one remembers an object that does not exist at the time, the Remembrance would be entirely baseless (its *becomer* being non-existent); it could certainly have the *agent* for its substratum; but this would be possible only under our theory, and never under yours; for the simple reason that you do not admit of any such thing as 'agent' (the 'stream of cognition' being all that you admit); as a matter of fact, you do not admit an 'agent' for the action of Remembrance; so that under your theory (when one remembers an absent thing) the Remembrance must be baseless. And if you admit this position [that Remembrance *is* baseless], then you are met by the following (inferential) reasoning: * 'Remembrance can never be baseless,—as no effect is ever found to be baseless; as a matter of fact we find that every effect—such for instance, as Colour—subsists in a substratum; and Remembrance is an effect;—hence Remembrance must have a substratum [and it can never be baseless]'.

"The names *becoming* and *becomer* may be applied to Effect and Cause respectively; *i. e.* the 'Effect-moment' (the moment at which the Effect appears) is the *becoming*, and the 'Cause-moment' the *becomer*. What then is the necessity of postulating a *becomer* (in the shape of the *Soul*) apar from these?"

This cannot be right; because of the difference in time; as a matter of fact, the Cause and the Effect

* This is the answer given by the Author on the basis of the momentary character of things; *i. e.* from the standpoint of the Bauḍḍha himself. The answer from his own standpoint he gives below, line 20 *et seq.*

exist at different points of time; so that neither of the two could ever be the substratum or container of the other; as in the case of the bowl and the jejube fruit, [we find that the bowl is the substratum of the fruit, only when the two are present at the same time, and when the bowl has a certain degree of continuity of existence, whereby it acts as an obstacle to the action of gravity which tends to the downward fall of the fruit, and thereby becomes its 'substratum'].

The Opponent may state his case as follows :—*" *Becoming* is nothing more than *being produced*, and the *Becomer* is *that which is produced*; that is to say, because Remembrance is something that is *produced*, its production would be its 'becoming'; and the Remembrance itself would be the 'becomer' [and as such not require a further 'becomer' in the shape of the *Soul*]".

Vār. P. 70.

This also cannot be; because it involves a self-contradiction, and implies a contingency which you do not admit. If you hold the *production* to be something different from the *Remembrance*, then you fall into self-contradiction; for you will have to point out the distinctive features of such 'production' [and this pointing out will land you in self-contradiction]; as you do not accept the *production* to be anything distinct from the *thing produced*. That is to say, if you hold the *production* to be different from *the thing produced*, it becomes necessary for you to describe the distinctive features of *Production*; and when you describe these features, you go against your philosophy. You will perhaps ask—why so? Well, the 'production' of a thing could be explained only, either as 'the connection of the thing with the existence

* Remembrance is not a *becoming*, a quality; in fact it is itself a *becomer*, a thing; and the *being produced* of Remembrance is its 'becoming'; so that being itself a *becomer*, Remembrance does not stand in need of another *becomer* in the shape of the *Soul*. The postulating of a *becomer* for what is itself a *becomer* would lead to a vicious regress.

of its cause,' or as 'the existence of the thing as qualified by the connection of its cause'; and both these are contingencies not * accepted by your philosophy [as both involve the more than momentary existence of the Cause and the Effect]; and this is the 'self-contradiction'. (mentioned by us).

If then, [with a view to escape from this self-contradiction] it be held that the *Production* is not different from the *Remembrance*,†——then, which (of the two) would subsist in which? In fact, in this case, your assertion—'the *production* is the *becoming* and the Remembrance is *that which is produced* (the becomer)'—becomes absolutely meaningless.‡ Such an assertion can have some sense only in case *production* is the 'becoming' or 'property' of Remembrance [and not when both are identical].§ And when Remembrance itself is a 'becoming,' it must have a 'becomer'; for the simple reason that every 'becoming' must have a 'becomer', as we have already pointed out.

Thus it is found that under the Bauḍḍha theory, there can be no Remembrance; and when there is no Remembrance, there can be no Recognition;—but Recognition is a fact;—hence the inevitable conclusion|| is that that which is the

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*The reading demanded by the sense is 'तन्मते नाभ्युपगतम्'

† The reading demanded by the sense, and countenanced by the *Ṭāṭparya* should be—'अथ स्मृतिरुत्पत्तिरित्युत्पत्तिः किंस्मृ

‡ As Remembrance and Production being *ex hypothesi* identical, how can one subsist in the other?

§ The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—Even so the assertion, 'Remembrance is the *becomer* and Production is the *becoming*', could have some sense; that is all. It could not, however, save the opponent from the necessity of admitting the permanent Soul; as even though the *production* is the 'becoming' of the Remembrance, yet it does not follow that Remembrance, in its own turn, can never be a 'becoming'; specially as every effect can be a 'becoming'; and Remembrance is certainly an effect. Nor does this mean an *infinite regress*; as the series ends in the *Soul*, which is a permanent entity, and not an *effect*. Thus of Remembrance, as a 'becoming', the eternal Soul is the 'becomer'.

||The Sūṭra thus comes to be interpreted as containing an 'Inference per negation' which may be thus formulated:—Remembrance has a common agent with the past and the present cognitions,—because it is actually *recognised* as having the same object with these two,—that which has not the same agent, is never thus

agent of this Recognition is something quite distinct (from Cognitions and Series of Cognitions), and this is the single entity of the *Soul*.

*We may also explain the Sūṭra as containing a 'positive Inference', or 'Inference per affirmation':—Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa's cognition of colour, taste and touch must have one as well as many causes,†—because they are all *recognised*, as 'by me,' along with the remembrance of the same objects;—exactly as it is found in the case of the single glance of the dancing girl, on looking at which several cognitions appear simultaneously in the minds of several experienced persons knowing [through their study of Bharaṭa's *Nāṭyashāsṭra*] the signification [of every gesticulation]. That is to say, in the case cited, as the *cause* is one only,—in the shape of the *glance*; thus even though the cognitions are several and by several persons, yet they are all *recognised* as having been brought about by a common cause; in the same manner, in the case under consideration, as the cause, in the shape of the agent, Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa, is one only, his cognitions (of colour, taste and touch), even though several, will be *recognised* as by a common cause;—and this common cause is the *Soul*.

II.

[Having proved the existence of the *Soul* on the basis of the *Recognition* that is involved in Desire, Aversion &c., the *Vārṭika* proceeds to prove the same on the basis of the idea that, Desire and the rest being *qualities*, must have a *substance* in which they would subsist].

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recognised,—*e g*. the Remembrance by Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa is never recognised as having the same object as the Yajñaḍaṭṭa's cognitions,—the Remembrance in question however is *not* not-recognised,—hence it must have a common agent with the cognitions.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* The 'negative inference' proving the existence of the Soul has been shown in the preceding note; in accordance with the Bhāṣya. The Vārṭika next proceeds to show the 'Inference per affirmation,' in support of the same conclusion,—as deducible from the Sūṭra.

† In the present context it is the presence of *one* common cause—the common *agent*—that is wanted to be proved; but in order to make the judgment perfectly correct, the author has added the 'many causes' also; these many causes consisting of the several distinct *objects* cognised.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Some people have explained the *Sūṭra*—'Desire......are indicatives of the Soul'—in a different manner. Desire and the rest are all *qualities*; and it is a well-known fact that qualities subsist in something different from themselves. That Desire and the rest are *qualities* is proved by an 'Inference per residue', as follows :—(*a*) Desire &c., being non-eternal, can be neither Community, nor Individuality, nor Inherence (all which are eternal) ;—(*b*) nor can they be Substance, or Action, as they, like Sound, inhere in an all-pervading * substance [and Substance cannot inhere in Substance, and Actions do not *always* inhere in all-pervading substances] ; and so on there are many similar reasonings that could be deduced, which go to make up the 'Inference per residue' [that proves that Desire &c. cannot be any thing else but *Qualities*]. All this goes to prove that Desire and the rest must subsist in something distinct from themselves, because they are non-eternal, and because they are effects, like Colour and other qualities. Then, inasmuch as it is a well-known fact that the qualities that belong to the Body continue as long as the Body remains in existence,—and as Desire and the rest are not found to so continue,—they can not be regarded as qualities belonging to the Body. And being precluded from belonging to the Body,

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* The reasoning is put here in a condensed form ; it contains the sense of several reasonings (as mentioned towards the end of this passage). The full import of this reasoning has been thus explained by the *Tāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi* :—

Because Desire &c. are non-eternal, they must inhere in a substance ;—where a mere 'substance' is sufficient to form the substratum of Desire &c., there can be no justification for asserting that their substratum should be such as is made up of several component parts ;—hence we conclude that the substance in which Desire &c. inhere is one that is not made up of component parts ;—such impartite substances are of two kinds : some are all-pervading, while others are atomic ;—Desire &c. could never inhere in an atomic substance, because they are non-eternal, and they are perceived by us ; while no qualities of the atom can ever be perceptible to us ordinary human beings ;...hence the conclusion is that they inhere in an all-pervading substance. Why they cannot inhere in the non-pervading or limited substances, Earth, Water &c. is shown in the next Note.

they must subsist in the Soul. * Thus the existence of the Soul is proved by an 'Inference per residue.'

Body—the Second Pramēya.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 25, l. 10 P. to 26, l. 2].

† The receptacle of the Soul's experiences is—

The Body, which is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects.‡ (Sūṭra 11).

(A) "How is the Body the *vehicle of actions*?" With regard to things that the Soul desires to obtain or to discard, there arises in the Soul the desire to obtain, or to discard it respectively; urged by this desire, the Soul puts forth exertion embodying the operation of the means for obtaining or discarding it; and that wherein this exertion appears is the *Body*.

(B) "How is the Body the *vehicle of sense-organs*?" That thing alone can be regarded as the *vehicle of the sense-organs* by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefited, and by whose injury they are injured,—and being according to this benefit or injury, they act upon their objects good and bad;——and such a thing is the *Body*.

"How is the Body the *vehicle of objects*?" That is to be regarded as the *vehicle of objects* in which receptacle

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* The other items in this 'Argument per residue' are thus supplied by the *Ṭāṭparya*.—'Desire &c. cannot be the qualities of the five elementary Substances, Earth, Water &c.; as, if they were so, they would be common to all men: the desire of one man would be the desire of all men; just as the odour of the earth is perceived by all men;——they cannot be the qualities of the Mind; as the Mind is found to be the instrument that produces them;—nor could they belong to Time and Space, as, if they belonged to these, then also, they would be common to all men. Hence the only substance to which Desire &c. can belong is the Soul.

[For further discussion on the Soul the reader is referred to Sūṭra 3-1-28].

† As the Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences of pleasure and pain, it lies at the root of the series of births and rebirths; hence its treatment comes next after the Soul.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

‡ According to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika*, this Sūṭra contains three definitions of the Body—(1) it is the vehicle of the Soul's actions; (2) it is the vehicle of the Soul's sense-organs;—(3) it is the vehicle of the Soul's objects. Some philosophers have taken the Sūṭra as providing a single definition—'it is the vehicle of actions &c. &c.". This is rejected by the *Vārṭika.*

there appear the feelings *of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense-organs with those objects ;—and such a receptacle is the *Body*.

VARṬIKA.

[P. 71, l. 6 to P. 72, l. 12.]

"*The Body is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects*—says the *Sūṭra*. Now what is *Action* †?

By 'action' in the present connection is meant only a motion, an activity, *for the purpose of obtaining what is beneficial and discarding what is injurious.* That is to say, when one comes across something that has been the source of pleasure (in the past), he is moved by a desire for obtaining that thing ; and the movement that follows from this desire is what is meant by 'action' (in the Sūṭra) ; similarly when one comes across something that has been the source of pain, there is an activity in the shape of a movement towards the discarding of that thing ; and this movement constitutes what is meant by 'Action'.

*The word प्रतिसंवेदनं in the pointed text appears in the wrong place. The 'Pandit' edition places it after सुखदुःखयोः ; This gives a better sense and has been adopted in the translation. In the other reading it is not possible to find a reasonable construction for सुखदुःखयोः

†The Opponent puts this question, in view of the following difficulty:—The definition of Body as *the vehicle of action* is both too wide and too narrow ; the tree also is a vehicle of some action, while it is not a *body* ; similarly the frog embedded in stone has *body*, which is devoid of all action.

The answer is that the word 'action' does not stand here for any and every action ; but only for that action which is excited by a desire for the obtaining and discarding of the beneficial and the injurious thing respectively. So that the definition cannot apply to the action of trees, which have no desires. As regards the body of the frog embedded in stone, though it has no action at that time, yet it has the capability of such action ; as no sooner does the frog come out on the stone being broken, its body acts in the same way as all other bodies do. Our bodies also are not always *acting* ; all that the Sūṭra can mean is that the Body is capable of action ; *i.e.* when such conscious action appears it does so only in a body.

The *Parishuddhi* defines *chêṣṭā* as that activity which is brought about by the contact of the Soul that is moved by exertion.

"How can the Body be the *vehicle of sense-organs*—when as as a matter of fact, sense-organs either subsist in their own cause, or do not subsist in anything at all? That is to say, those sense-organs that are products subsist in their own cause; while those that are not products do not subsist in anything. For instance, the organs of smell, of taste, of vision and of touch are products, while the organs of hearing and Mind are not products; and not one of these organs—beginning from the organ of smell down to the Mind—subsists in the Body. Under the circumstances, it is not right to assert that *the Body is the vehicle of sense-organs*."*

What we mean by the Body being the *vehicle of sense-organs* is that the sense-organs follow the changes of the Body. We do not mean that the Sense-organs subsist in the Body in the sense that the Body is the *container* and the sense-organs the *contained*; all that we mean is that they subsist in the Body in the sense that they are affected by the benefit and injury of the Body; that is to say, the Sense-organs are benefited by the benefitting, and injured by the injury, of the Body;—this is all that is meant by the Body being the *vehicle of the sense-organs*. Thus the objection urged by the Opponent has no force.

This same explanation applies to the assertion that the Body is the *vehicle of objects*. How so? For the following reason:—What is meant is not that the 'objects'—smell and the rest—subsist in the Body (in the sense that the Body is the container of smell &c.); what is meant is that the 'purpose' or 'function' of smell &c.—which consists in their being the cause of the experiences of pleasure and pain—is not accomplished except when the Body is there; and it is in this sense that smell &c. are said to have the Body for their vehicle; just as the villagers are said to have the proprietor

*The *Tātparya* adds that if by 'subsistence' it be meant mere conjunction, and no inherence then the jar also would be a body; as the jar is often in contact with sense-organs.

of the village for their '*āshraya*' [which means that they are the cause of bringing pleasure and pain only when the proprietor is there to experience them; and it does not mean that they are *contained* in the proprietor].

"As a matter of fact we find the *Sūṭra* using the general terms 'action' ('Sense-organ' and 'object'); how then can they be interpreted in the restricted sense that you have given them [of 'action' *for the obtaining of the beneficial and the discarding of the injurious*, and so forth]?"

Our answer to this is that general terms are found to have their signification restricted by their *force*; this 'force' consisting in the peculiarity of the context and so forth. For instance, when the assertion is made 'feed the Brāhmaṇas' [where the general term '*Brāhmaṇas*' is used, which signifies *all* Brāhmaṇas]—as it is absolutely impossible for *all* Brāhmaṇas to be fed, the word is taken to mean a *particular* Brāhmaṇa, who happens to be in closer proximity (than other Brāhmaṇas) to the speaker, and who, on that account, is more nearly related to the context. In the same manner the words 'action' and the rest also, though used in their general forms, become restricted in their significations by the force of the attendant circumstances [which make the wider signification impossible]. The 'force' that thus alters the denotation of words is twofold—(1) popular usage bearing on the subject spoken of, and (2) certain inconsistencies, or incongruities. And in the case in question we find that in popular usage, the word 'action' is never used in the sense of *action in general*; whenever it is used, it is used always in the sense of some *particular* action; *e.g.* all such words as '*spanḍaṭē*', '*sarpaṭi*', '*ḍhāvaṭi*' and the like,—though denoting activity *in general*—are always used in the sense of some *particular* form of activity; exactly the same is the case with the word '*chēṣṭā*' used in the *Sūṭra*. Even if we accept*

* 'The particular '*api*' denotes—*even if we grant it*'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

the word '*chēṣṭā*' to be denotative of action in *general*, we shall have to regard it as denoting a *particular* action, in view of certain incongruities (arising from the word being taken in its general sense); and by reason of those incongruities, * it will not be right to take it in the sense of action in general; [the incongruity in the present instance consisting in the fact that] the vehicle of any and every action could not be entitled to the name 'Body;'—and that, it is only when we take the word '*chēṣṭā*' in the restricted sense, that we can avoid the absurdity of the definition of Body (as *the vehicle of action*) applying to the jar and such other things [everyone of which is the 'vehicle' of some sort of action in general].

† The explanation that we have provided serves to set aside the view that the definition applies to the jar and such other things,—if made to consist (severally) of the first word [or of the second word, or of the third word]. Further, those who admit the force of the contention that the definition (consisting of each of the words taken severally) becomes applicable to the jar &c., propose to take all the three expressions (*vehicle of action—vehicle of sense-organs—vehicle of objects*) as collectively forming a single definition of Body;—but even so they cannot prevent the definition from applying to atoms [which being the constituent cause of sense-organs and objects, and being the vehicle of many actions, are the 'vehicles' of all these].

* The *Tātparya* reads an additional 'न क्रियामात्रं after चेष्टे'

† Having given the sense of the Sūṭra from the standpoint of the *Bhāṣya* and of himself, the Author takes up the interpretation suggested by certain writers that the Sūṭra does not contain *three* definitions (as held by the Bhāṣya); but it constitutes a single definition. This view is thus explained:—(1) If the first word alone —'vehicle of action'—be taken as the definition of 'Body', it applies to the jar, which is the vehicle of some action;—(2) if the second word—'vehicle of sense-organs'—is taken as the definition of Body, the word 'vehicle' meaning that which is in contact, the jar would be a Body, as it is in contact with Sense-organs;—(3) lastly, if the third word—'vehicle of objects'—be taken as the definition, it will apply to the jar; as the jar is the vehicle of many such objects as colour and the like.

All this is set aside by the explanation that we have given as to how the jar &c. are excluded from the definition.

As for our own view of the definition, we have already shown how it does not apply to any thing except the Body.

The Sense-organs—Third Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 26, L. 8 to P. 26, L. 10].

* The instruments that bring about the experience (of pleasure and pain) are—

The Olfactory, the Gestatory, the Visual, the Cutaneous and the Auditory Organs, proceeding from material substances. (Sūṭra 12.)

That by whose instrumentality one smells things is the Olfactory Organ; so called because it apprehends odour. That by whose instrumentality one tastes things is the Gestatory Organ; so called because it apprehends taste. That by whose instrumentality one sees things is the Visual Organ; so called because it apprehends colour. That which is located in the skin is the Cutaneous Organ; so called indirectly because of its location. † That by whose instrumentality one hears things is the Auditory Organ; so called because it apprehends sound. Thus from the force of the literal signification of the names, we learn that the sense-organs are to be defined as the apprehenders of their respective objects.

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* 'The sense-organs being the *presenters* [as they serve to bring before the Soul through the body, definite objects, which become the source of pleasure and pain—*Parishuḍḍhi*], they differ, in this respect, from the objects that are *presented;* and as such they have to be defined before the Objects. As the Sūṭra only provides the definitions of the particular organs,—and as these particular definitions are not intelligible until we have the definition of 'Sense-organ' in general, the Bhāṣya in this introductory clause, supplies this general definition. The general definition should have been stated in the form that the sense-organs are the instruments by which direct cognitions are brought about; but it is with a view to excite disgust against the organs (along with every thing else), that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of them as the 'instruments of the experience of pleasure and pain.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The other organs are named after what is apprehended by them; the Cutaneous Organ apprehends the *touch* of things; hence the name 'Cutaneous Organ' applies to it, not directly in the se..se in which the names of the other organs apply, but only indirectly, in the sense that the skin is the locus of that organ.

**Proceeding from material substances*—adds the Sūṭra. The meaning of this is that it is because the organs proceed from diverse sources (in the shape of the material substances) that they are restricted to particular objects; this would not be possible if they all proceeded from a single source [in the shape of the 'self-consciousness' of the Sāṅkhyas]; and it is only when each of them is restricted to a particular object that it can be defined as the apprehender of its object.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 72, L. 14 to P. 74, L. 4].

This *Sūṭra* also is be interpreted in such a way as to show how the Sense-organs are to differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; as such is the sense of all Sūṭras that are put forward as definitions.

An objection is raised:—

"The Sūṭra merely mentions the Sense-organs by name; and as such having the form of simple *Enunciation*, it cannot † be taken as a *Definition*. *Enunciation* has been defined (by the *Bhāṣya* p. 9 l. 10) as the mention of things by mere names; and this is exactly what the present Sūṭra does; hence it cannot be accepted as a *Definition*."

This is not right; as the Sense-organs are of the nature of instruments, and hence their definition must rest upon the apprehension of their objects.‡ That is to say, being

* As a matter of fact, odour, which is the specific quality of Earth, is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ only; taste, the specific quality of Water, is apprehended only by the Gestatory Organ: and so forth. This is so because the Olfactory Organ proceeds from—is built of—Earth, and the Gestatory Organ of Water. If both proceeded from a single source, as held by the Sānkhya, then we could not account for the aforesaid facts.

† There is a '**न**' wanting in the text. The meaning intended must be as translated above.

‡ The sense-organs being imperceptible, they can only be inferred from the perception of things; which perception is not possible without the instrumentality of a sense-organ; and hence a sense-organ can be defined only as the instrument by which its particular object is apprehended and its perception brought about. Thus the the word '*Ghrāṇa*' (Olfactory) in the Sūṭra is to be taken in its literal sense—*Jighrati anēna*, that by the instrumentality of which odour is apprehended; and this is a perfect definition ot the Olf.ctory Organ. Similarly with the other Sense-organs.

of the nature of instruments, and as such being themselves beyond the senses (and hence imperceptible), they can be described and defined only through the apprehension of their objects; so that the Sense-organs should be defined as the instruments of the apprehension of their respective objects; as it is this apprehending that forms their distinctive feature [and what the definition does is to point out the distinctive feature of the thing defined].

The word '*bhūṭēbhyaḥ*', 'proceeding from material substances', has been added with a view to show that the Sense-organs have, each of them, the Earth, Water &c., for their respective causes; and this is mentioned in order to show that they are restricted in their scope.

"What is the meaning of this *restriction*?"

What is meant is that each Sense-organ is the instrument by whose instrumentality the apprehension of the specific quality of a particular material substance is brought about; as a matter of fact, no Sense-organ apprehends the qualities of all material substances; in fact every Sense-organ proceeds from a particular material substance, and apprehends the distinctive* quality of that substance alone;—*i. e.* that quality which distinguishes that substance from all other substances. This is the *restriction* that is meant to be expressed by the word '*bhūṭēbhyaḥ*'. No such restriction would be possible if all the Sense-organs proceeded from a single cause; that is to say, if all the Sense-organs proceeded from a single cause, then, inasmuch as every effect follows the trend of its cause, all the organs would be of a uniform nature; so that, there could be no restriction or sharp line of demarcation in the scope of the organ; in fact either all the organs

* As a matter of fact what the Olfactory Organ apprehends is only odour, which is the distinctive specific quality of Earth. From this fact we infer, as follows, the fact of that Organ being of the Earth—'The Olfactory Organ is of the Earth, because from among the specific qualities of material substances, it apprehends odour only, which is the specific quality of the Earth.'

would apprehend all objects, or a single organ would apprehend all objects.

"But, in the case of colour and such other things, we find that, even though proceeding from a single cause, the effects differ in their nature. That is to say, in the case of the various shades of colour, produced in the jar, by the baking, there are distinct differences, even though they all proceed from a single cause. 'What is the one cause of these shade of colour etc?' That single cause is the contact of fire."

This is not right, we reply; as it shows that our position has not been understood. We do not hold that the various shades of colour proceed from a single fire-contact. What we hold is that they proceed from the fire-contact as aided by a certain peculiarity in the preceding shade of colour. That is to say, when a certain object is baked on fire, what happens is that each succeeding shade of colour is brought about by the fire-contact as helped by a peculiarity in the preceding shade of colour. * It is only thus that it is possible for varying grades of baking to appear in the same atom. From all this it follows that the several shades of colour &c., do not proceed from one cause. In fact we have never found any effect produced by a single cause; every effect is produced by three causes,—the 'constituent' cause, the 'non-constituent' cause and the 'efficient' cause. "But we find a single action (of moving f. i.) to be the cause of two such things as conjunction (with one point in space) and disjunction (from another point)." This reasoning is not sound; as the fact put forward is not admitted by us; you

* This 'peculiarity' of the preceding colour consists in its destruction. The succeeding colour is produced only when the preceding colour is destroyed; and until it is destroyed, no new colour is produced, even though the fire-contact continues there. This shows that the several shades of colour do not proceed from a single cause, in the shape of the fire-contact; in fact each colour has a distinct cause consisting of the fire-contact as qualified by the destruction of the particular colour that precedes it.

mean to say that a single action is the cause of both conjunction and disjunction; but we do not accept this as true; we do not admit that any action, independently by itself, is the cause of both conjunction and disjunction. "If then, it is only as aided by something else that action produces conjunction and disjunction, then the definition of 'action' falls to the ground: Action has been defined as that which, independently by itself, is the cause of conjunction and disjunction; and this definition fails; and the failure of the definition of Action leads to the failure (and rejection) of Action itself; * and this means that conjunction and disjunction are not preceded (and caused) by Action." This argument does not vitiate our position; when we say that 'action, independently by itself, is the cause of conjunction and disjunction,' we do not mean that it does not stand in need of the aid of anything else; all that is meant by its being 'independent' is that it does not stand in need of any such other positive cause as appears and functions subsequently (to the action) [as a matter of fact, in the bringing about of a new conjunction, it does stand in need of the *absence* or *cessation of the previous conjunction*; so that while independent of positive causes, it is not independent of a negative cause]. That is to say, in the case of Substances we find that one substance produces another only when aided by the subsequently appearing conjunction of other homogeneous substances; but such is not the case with Action,—which does not require the aid of a subsequently appearing Action; but being an Action, it brings about conjunction and disjunction [through the aid of other negative circumstances, such as the cessation of the previous conjunction and so forth]. Thus the definition of Action does not fail; nor are conjunction and disjunction brought about by a single cause.

* 'The failure of the definition implies the failure of the thing defined'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

The Material Substances.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 26, L. 10 to L. 12.]

What are the causes from which the Sense-organs proceed?

* *The Material Substances are Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ākāsha* (Sūṭra 13.)

Here we find the Material Substances mentioned by their respective names with the view that when they are thus clearly mentioned, it will be easy to point out which Sense-organ is the product of which substance.

[The *Vārṭika* does not deal with this Sūṭra separately.]

Arṭha—Things or Objects (the fourth Pramēya).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 26, L. 13 to P. 27, L. 2.]

Of the endless objects, the following are those 'objects' [which, when pondered upon as things apprehended by the sense-organs, lead to that dispassion which helps the attainment of Release; and which, when not rightly discerned, become the cause of endless births and rebirths]——

Sūṭra (14)

† *Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, which are the qualities of Earth [Water, Fire, Air and Ākāsha], are the Objects of the aforesaid [sense-organs].*

The qualities mentioned, belonging to Earth and the other elementary substances, are the 'objects' of the sense-organs respectively; in accordance with the actual functioning or operating of the sense-organs.

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* The *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* do not take any note of this Sūṭra; but the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* has this as an independent Sūṭra. The *Bhāṣya* also speaks of this as containing the *upadēsha* of the *bhūṭas*; and this word could have been used only with reference to the word of the *Sūṭrakāra*.

† The translation here follows the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* however do not agree with the view that Odour and the other four qualities alone are 'perceptible'. Hence they interpret the *Sūṭra* and the *Bhāṣya* differently. The first difference lies in the following explanation suggested by the *Ṭāṭparya*—'*Ṭadarṭhāḥ*', the last word in the *Sūṭra*, means that which is sought

Vārṭika on Sūṭra 14.

[P. 74, l. 7 to P. 82, l. 2.]

The compound word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' (in the Sūṭra) is capable of several explanations. "How ?" Well, in the first place, it can be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa* compound; the meaning in this case being 'the qualities of Earth &c.' ;—secondly it can be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound ; the meaning being 'Earth &c. *and* Qualities';—lastly it can be taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound ; the meaning being 'those things of which the Earth and the rest are Qualities'. Thus the compound being capable of being explained in several ways, there naturally arises a doubt as to what is the real meaning of the word.

And [our opinion is that] the real explanation is to take the word as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound. (A) The word cannot rightly be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa* compound; as, if that were the meaning, then, the Earth and the rest would cease to be 'objects of Sense-perception'. That is to say, if you explain the word as meaning 'the qualities of

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after—i.e. acted upon,—by the sense-organs ; so that this word embodies the definition of the fourth 'object of cognition', '*arṭha*' ; and the rest of the *Sūṭra* is not a definition ; it only supplies certain details of information ; though not in a precise manner, as it is meant for a friendly listener, and not for a critical opponent.

The reason why the *Ṭāṭparya* had recourse to this explanation of the definition of *Arṭha* lay in the fact that according to the view of the *Vārṭika*, the *Sūṭra* could not be taken as supplying an accurate enumeration of the 'objects' of perception ; so the precise definition had to be found somewhere in the *Sūṭra* ; and this was found in the word '*ṭaḍarṭhāḥ*.'

The word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' is taken, as we shall see, by the *Vārṭika* to mean *pṛiṭhivyāḍayaḥ*—i.e. '*priṭhivī*', '*jala*' and '*agni*'—and *guṇāḥ* ; *ganḍha*, &c., being included in '*guṇāḥ*' ; their separate mention is regarded as another information supplied in a friendly spirit, with a view to indicate what is precisely apprehended by each sense-organ.

The great weakness in this explanation of the Sūṭra is that *Pṛiṭhivyāḍi* has to be taken as standing for only three out of five bhūṭas ;while the guṇas of the other two are as perceptible as those of the other three. It is not easy to see why the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* fought shy of the *Bhāṣya's* explanation ; the only reason appears to be that this explanation precludes the 'perceptibility' of the other qualities of '*Pṛiṭhivyāḍi*'—viz : number, separateness &c.

Earth and the rest', then [the *Qualities* would be the principal factor of the compound, and] the *Earth and the rest* would be merely subordinate qualifications of the afore-mentioned Qualities, Odour, Taste &c.; and [being thus subordinated, the Earth &c. could have no syntactical connection with the predicate of the sentence; so that] Earth, Water &c. could not be regarded as 'objects of Sense-perception. And further, the qualification itself would be entirely superfluous; the first word itself of the Sūtra mentions by name Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound; and it is at once understood that these are 'the qualities of Earth &c.'; so that the further mention of these, 'Earth and the rest' (in the next word of the Sūṭra) becomes entirely superfluous. As a matter of fact, among Odour, Taste &c. there is no such division as that some of them are the 'qualities of Earth &c.' and some are the qualities of other entirely different things; and only in case there were such a division, would the specification of qualities '*of Earth and the rest*' have served some useful purpose. For these reasons we conclude that the word can not be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa*. (B) Nor again will it be right to take the word as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; for this reason that we do not know of any such *things* 'of which Earth and the rest are qualities'; when taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, the word can only mean 'those things of which the Earth and the rest are qualities'; now what are those *things* of which the Earth and the rest really *are* qualities? In fact, it is impossible to prove that Earth and the rest are *qualities* at all. And the *Bahuvrīhi* compound cannot be explained in any other way (to provide another meaning). Then again, except in certain specified cases, the *Bahuvrīhi* compound must denote something which is co-extensive with the denotation of the component words.*

*'And further, the thought that 'Earth and the rest are qualities of something' is not conducive to that disgust for things which is the purpose of the Shāsṭra.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

For instance, in the case of the compound '*chiṭraguḥ*', 'the man who possesses cows of variegated colour', we find that the compound (as denoting the man possessing the qualification mentioned) is possible only when it is already known that the man possesses cows, and also that the cows are of variegated colour; in the case in question, however, we do not know of any thing possessing the qualities mentioned; nor do we know that the Earth &c. are *Qualities*.

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"Because they appear (in the compound) as *qualification*, Earth and the rest could certainly be regarded as *Qualities*." Certainly not; for by this assumption everything would be *Quality* only: as there is nothing which cannot be the *qualification* or the *qualified* of something else; so that, by your reasoning every thing would be a *Quality*! For these reasons the word cannot be taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound. Thus both of these compounds being precluded, the word must be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound. That is to say, we have shown the impossibility of the word being taken as either a *Ṭaṭpuruṣa* or a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; no fourth compound is possible; and the only compound left is the third one, *Ḍvanḍva*; hence we conclude that the word "*pṛiṭhviyāḍiguṇāḥ*' must taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound.

The Opponent raises an objection:—

"It is not right to take the word as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound; as there is neither any authority (*Shāsṭra*), nor any reason, in support of this view. If the word is to be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound, it is necessary for you to point out your authority and reasons in support of the view that Earth and the rest *are* 'objects of sense-perception'."

Your objection is not effective, we reply. As both are available: we have both authority and reasons in support of the view that Earth and the rest are 'objects of Sense-perception': As for 'authority', we have the Sūṭra—'Because of the apprehension of a single thing by means of the

organs of vision and touch' (3-1-1).* And this same *Sūṭra* also shows the 'reason' as follows: As a matter of fact, we recognise the organs of both vision and touch as apprehending the same thing; as we have such a notion as 'I am *touching* the thing that I had *seen*'; and this fact supplies the 'reason' as regards sight and touch (bearing upon Earth); and the Sūṭra quoted (which mentions this fact) supplies the 'authority'; and requisite 'authority' is also afforded by the fact that our (Nyāya) Shāsṭra declares that 'community' is perceptible by the senses [and 'community' belongs to Earth &c. also, and not only to Odour and the other qualities).

Thus it is proved that the word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' should be taken as a Ḍvanḍva compound, signifying 'Earth &c. *and* Qualities.'

When the Sūṭra speaks of *pṛiṭhivyāḍi*,' 'Earth and the rest', what are meant are Earth, Water and Fire, which are perceptible by the *external* organs of perception; and by the word '*guṇāḥ* †' are meant (1) all that inheres in substances—*viz.* Number, Dimension, Separateness, Cognition, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Viscidity, Velocity, Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality ‡,—as also (2) *Ṣamavāya*, Inherence, which does not inhere in substances; and is yet

* The Sūṭra quoted represents both 'authority,' and 'reason'. It is only a material substance, an earthy substance for instance, that can be both seen and touched; so that the Sūṭra indicates the fact that material substances,—i. e. Earth, Water &c.—are amenable to perception by sight and touch: and it is not that it is only the qualities of the earthy substance that are perceived; as any single quality—out of the five mentioned in the Sūṭra, Odour, Taste &c.—is never perceived by sight and touch both.

† The word 'guṇa' here does not stand for only the qualities proper; it stands for the much wider conception of property, everything that qualifies a thing. So that Inherence also, which does not inhere in Substance, becomes included; and Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality, though not qualities, are included as these also inhere in substances.

‡ The word 'vishēṣa' here is not used in the technical sense of *ultimate differentiam*; as this latter is beyond the reach of the senses. It is used in the ordinary sense of distinctive individuality'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

'guṇa'; inasmuch as it (along with Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality) is a-*ḍharmā*, property of things.

An objection is raised—" As according to what you say, Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound are all included under 'Guṇas', they should not be mentioned separately; and the Sūṭra should be in the form '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāsṭaḍarṭhāḥ*' thus the *Sūṭra* would be much shorter; and yet the same end would be served."

It will not be right to shorten the *Sūṭra* in the way suggested. As the specific mention of the qualities of Odour Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound is for the purpose of showing the specific restricted action of the sense-organs: What is meant is that, as regards the qualities of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, the action of each Sense-organ is specifically restricted [Odour being apprehended by the Olfactory Organ only, and so forth]; while as regards other things, the action of the Sense-organs is not so restricted; for instance, Earth, Water and Fire are each apprehended by two sense-organs; as also the Guṇas (from Number down to Distinctive Individuality in those enumerated above); *Saṭṭā* (Being) and the genus '*guṇaṭva* are apprehended by all the sense-organs; so also are Inherence and Negation.

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The Opponent [the *Bauḍḍha*, who does not admit of a *Substance* as distinct from an aggregate of qualities], objecting to the statement that 'a single thing is apprehended by the organs of vision and touch' [Sūṭra 3-1-1, put forward by the Logician above as the 'authority' for regarding Earth &c. as objects of Sense-perception], says:—" What is apprehended by the organ of Touch is only Touch, and what is apprehended by the organ of vision is only Colour [and no substance possessing the qualities of Touch or Colour]." Now to this Opponent we put the question—How do you know that Colour and Touch are apprehended by the Organs

of Vision and Touch respectively? "We know this", the Opponent will say, "for the simple reason that we actually find that the cognition brought about by means of the organ of vision is qualified by Colour, (i. e. in the form of cognition of Colour) and that brought about by the organ of Touch is qualified by Touch (i. e. in the form of cognition of touch).' In that case, we reply, your denial of the Substance (as the ubstratum of qualities) becomes baseless; as in regard to the jar and such other substance also, we have such cognitions as are qualified by that substance; that is, as a matter of fact, whenever a man perceives the jar by means of his Visual and Cutaneous Organs, the object that he cognises is the jar; and his cognition is qualified by the *jar*, is *of the jar* [just as the cognition of colour is qualified by colour]. Thus your denial (of the Substance) is not well-considered.

"The cognition *of the jar* proceeds only from the *qualities* appearing in that shape; when you say that by means of the Visual and Cutaneous organs the man cognises *the jar*, you say what is not true; because as a matter of fact what is cognised is only the qualities, Colour and the rest, which happen to be in a particular shape; and it is these *qualities* that the man actually perceives *in that shape*; and it is by reason of this that he has the cognition 'of the jar'; and there is no such substance as the 'jar', as distinct from Colour and the other qualities." *

This is not right, we reply; as, in the first place, you apparently do not understand the meaning of the word '*ākāra*', 'shape' [when you assert that 'Colour and the other qualities appear *in the shape* of the jar']. What is meant by a thing having a certain *shape is* that it ressembles something different from itself [so that the said assertion

* The Bauddha view is thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—' The atoms of colour and the other qualities appear in diverse shapes; and when these qualities are found to be characterised by the action of water-fetching, they are called 'jar'; while when they are found characterised only by the action of imparting colour to what had no colour, they are called 'Colour'; and so on.

presupposes two distinct entities, the jar and the quality]; for instance, when we speak of the man having *the shape of the pillar*. we mean that the man has the shape of a thing, the pillar, which is *not man*; so that what the word ' shape ' means in this connection is the *ressemblance of the pillar to the man*; and this ' ressemblance ' is possible only when the man and the pillar are both well-known (distinct) entities. For you, however (who do not admit of the jar as a distinct entity), there is no basis for the conception of *the shape of the jar* belonging to Colour and the other qualities,—the conception that finds expression in your assertion that ' Colour and the other qualities appear in the shape of the jar and such other substances.' Thus then, the assertion that ' Colour &c. appear in the shape of the jar ', coming from you, cannot be taken seriously. *Secondly*, as a matter of fact, there can be no such cognition as the ' cognition *of the jar* ', if all that existed were only the qualities of Colour and the rest. For one who admits of nothing except the qualities of Colour and the rest, all things are equal [all being, for him a mere aggregate of qualities]; and hence for him there would be no possibility of any such cognitions as of the 'cow,' the ' horse ' and the ' jar '— cognitions that are constantly found to appear in course of our experience; * as for him there is not available any such peculiarity in the qualities of Colour &c. (appearing in different substances) as would distinguish one cognition from another. " The difference in the cognitions is due to the difference in the configuration (or an arrangement, of the atoms of Colour and other qualities); that is to say, Colour and the other qualities appear in different substances in different configurations; and the difference in these configurations forms the basis of the difference in the cognitions of the several

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*The reading of this sentence is defective; the meaning, which is clear, requires some such reading as [illegible] गौरश्वो घट इति वा न [illegible]

substances." This explanation is not tenable; for if the 'configuration' is something different from Colour and the other qualities, then there is a mere difference of names; and [if the 'configuration' is nothing different from Colour &c., then] the explanation offered becomes entirely futile. That is to say, if the 'configuration' is something different from Colour &c., then there is mere difference of names [what we call a 'substance' different from, and containing the qualities, you call 'Configuration'']; if on the other hand, the 'Configuration' is not different from Colour &c., then your explanation, that 'the distinct cognitions of the jar &c. appear in accordance with the difference in the configuration of the qualities', becomes entirely futile [as in this case the 'configuration of the qualities' has no meaning] *

"The cognitions *of the jar* and such other substances are *wrong* cognitions. That is to say, we hold that the cognitions that people have *of substances*, such as the jar, are not *right* cognitions; they are *wrong* cognitions, brought about by the force of a beginningless tendency towards (material) fancy." †

This is not right; as all *wrong* cognitions have the ressemblance of *right* cognitions; whenever a wrong cognition appears in the world, it always bears the semblance of *right* cognition [so that when there is a *wrong* cognition of the jar, it implies the presence of a *right* cognition of the jar also]; but for you (who do not admit the existence of any such thing as the *jar*) there can be no basis for any cognitions of the jar and such other substances; *all* of which cognitions

*The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds a few more objections: If the configuration is the same as Colour &c. then 'the configuration of Colour' would mean only the 'atoms of colour' and so on; and under the circumstances, how could you account for the perception of certain aggregates by means of two or more sense-organs?

† The word 'shabḍa' here stands for *vikalpa*,—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

That the cognitions are wrong has to be admitted, as no satisfactory explanation is possible as to whether the substance jar for instance, is one or more than one—*Ṭāṭparya*.

are regarded by you as wrong [so that there is no right cognition to which these wrong cognitions bear the semblance]; and these wrong cognitions can never appear without some such basis. From all this the conclusion follows that the cognitions in question are *not wrong*. Further, that the cognitions (*of the jar* and such other substances) are *wrong* can be proved only *after* it has been proved that the jar and such other substances are not something distinct from the qualities of Colour &c. And there is no proof in support of this latter view.

"It is not true that there is no proof in support of the view [that the jar is not something distinct from its qualities]. What proves the said view is the fact that there is no cognition of that (jar) while that (the quality) is not cognised. As a matter of fact, it is only when one thing is not-different from another that the cognition of the former is found to be impossible while the latter is not cognised; as we find in the case of Soup, and in that of a Row. [The Soup is not cognised until its constituent elements of meat and water have been cognised; and similarly the Row is not cognised until the objects constituting the row have been cognised; so that the Soup is nothing different from the meat and water, and the Row is nothing different from the objects constituting it]; and on the other hand, we have found that when one thing is different from another, one is cognised while the other is not cognised; for instance Time * is cognised while Colour &c. are not cognised."

The above reasoning is not right. (A) Firstly, because the premiss upon which the reasoning is based is not quite true. According to you† the object *jar* is made up of Earth,

*The text reads बाल; But the Bauḍḍha will not admit the independent existence of बाल or Hair apart from its Colour &c. It has therefore been presumed that बाल is a misreading for काल.

† The Opponent's theory is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya* :—The entire world consists of three *ḍhāṭus*—the *Rūpaḍhāṭu*, the *Arūpaḍhāṭu* and the *Kāmaḍhāṭu*. In connection with the last of these, every atom consists of eight constituents—Colour

(Water, Air, and Fire, Colour, Taste, Touch, Odour and Sound); so that when we perceive the jar, we should see Water &c. also (and not only the Earth); as a matter of fact, however, Water and the rest, being distinct substances, are not perceived; so that your premiss ['whenever it is found that while one thing is perceived, the other is not perceived, he things should be regarded as different'] cannot be true [as, we have the perception of Earth while Water is not perceived; and yet, according to you, Earth and Water are not distinct substances]. This difficulty may be sought to be avoided by saying that the constitution of the Atom described in the Bauḍḍha scriptures refers to the ordinary things of the world, and not to the four Elementary Substances [Earth, Water, Air and Fire]. But even so the view that Colour and the rest are identical with the Earth &c. will go against the assertion of the Bauḍḍha that '[every atom consists of] Colour and the four Elementary substances' [where Colour is mentioned as something distinct from Earth Water, Air and Fire.] You might argue that you do not regard Earth &c. to be anything different from Colour and other qualities. But, in that case your expression 'Colour and the four Elementary Substances' becomes equivalent to 'colour and colour'; and this expression (meaning that the Atom consists of *colour &c. only*) would be a direct contradiction of your scriptures, which declare that 'in the *Kāma-ḍhāṭu* section of the Universe, the Atom is constituted by *eight* things.' If you add the explanation that the name 'Colour &c.' is applied to the *aggregate of the Earth*
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&c. [and the notion of 'eight' declared in the scriptures is purely fictitious or imaginary; so that your view

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Taste, Odour, Touch, Sound, Earth, Water, Fire and Air. Thus every atom represents an aggregate of all these eight; so that neither of these eight has any distinct existence apart from the rest.

The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the view that Earth, Water, &c. are not distinct substances is a direct contradiction of the theory that 'every atom is made up of *eight* things.'

involves no contradiction];—then our reply will be that even with this explanation it will not follow that Earth &c. are only Colour. "How so?" Because your theory would mean that *Colour* is a composite of Earth &c., and *Earth &c.* are the composite of Colour &c.; so that both sets being *composites*, there are no *components* (in your philosophy); and as a matter of fact, in the absence of *components* there can be no *composites*; as every *composite* is found to be dependent upon its *components*.* Thus there is no escape for you from 'self-contradiction.'

(B) † *Secondly*, the reasoning that you have put forward —'Earth &c. are not different from Colour &c., *because there is no cognition of that while that is not-cognised*'——is open to another objection:—If we follow the real signification of the word 'that', in your statement, we find that it becomes absolutely incoherent. That is to say, when we take into consideration the meaning of the word 'ṭaṭ' (that occurs in your assertion), the meaning of your statement comes to be that 'there is no cognition *of that* when there is cognition *of that* same'; and this is certainly most incoherent. Then again, [the meaning that you intend to express by your statement is that 'the Earth is not different from Colour &c., because there is no cognition of Earth when Colour &c. are not cognised'; but this also is open to the following objection:] In your sentence—'the Earth is not different from Colour &c.'—if you intend 'colour &c.' to be the qualification of, and subordinate to, the 'Earth', then [as the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*,' 'that,' always refers to the principal factor] in the sentence, 'because there is no cognition of *that* when

* Even the bringing in of the '*samvṛiṭi*' or 'Fiction' will not help you; as the function of fiction lies in the hiding of the real forms of other things; and as in the case in question there are no components or composites, there is nothing that could be *hidden*,—*Ṭāṭparya* and *Parishuḍḍhi*.

† Having urged 'Self-contradiction' against the Opponent's reasoning, the Author next proceeds to show that the words in which the reasoning has been set forth make it absolutely incoherent and absurd.

that is not cognised,' the word 'that' in both places would refer to the *Earth* (which, *ex hypothesi*, is the principal factor, having Colour &c. subordinate to it); so that the meaning of your reason would come to be—'because there is no cognition of the Earth when the Earth is not cognised'; the reason for this lying in the fact that the word 'that' cannot refer to 'Colour &c.,' which are the qualifications of, and subordinate to, 'Earth'. This same argument will also apply to your view if you regard the 'Earth' as the qualification of, and subordinate to, 'Colour &c.;' as in this case also the meaning of your reason would be—'because there is no cognition of Colour &c. when Colour &c. are not cognised': as the word 'that' in both places would refer to the principal factor (which, in this case, would be Colour &c.). Similarly if you put forward your conclusion in the form—'The Earth is only Colour &c.,' or 'Colour &c. only are the Earth',—as this would mean that *Earth is only Colour &c.* or that *Colour* &c. *alone are the Earth*, your reasoning would be open to the same objections as before [*i. e.* as *ex hypothesi*, the *Earth* would be identical with *Colour* &c. the meaning of your reason would be 'because there is no cognition of the Earth when the Earth is not cognised', or 'because there is no cognition of Colour &c. when Colour &c. are not cognised'].

(C) *Thirdly*, your reasoning is open to the further objection that in whatever form you put forward your conclusion (asserting the non-difference of *Earth*, '*pṛiṭhivī*', from Colour &c., '*rūpāḍayaḥ*'), it always involves the incongruity that there can be no compatibility or co-ordination between the two words (subject and predicate) of your conclusion, because of the difference in their number; the word '*pṛiṭhivī*' is singular and '*rūpāḍayaḥ*' is plural; and difference in number always implies difference in the things denoted; as we find in the case of the two words '*nakṣaṭrāṇi*', 'stars', and '*shashī*', 'moon'; so that, inasmuch as we have the two

words '*pṛiṭhivī,*' 'Earth', and '*rūpāḍayaḥ*', 'Colour and the rest,' having different numbers, there must be some difference between the things denoted [*i.e.* between the *Earth* and *Colour* &c.]. "But we often find words denoting the same thing taking different numbers; as for instance, when we speak of the 'four life-stages', '*chaṭvāraḥ āshramāḥ,*' (plural) as '*chāṭurāshramyam*' (singular)." This is not right; as we do not admit of different numbers being used in connection with words denoting the same thing; as regards the word '*chāṭurāshramyam*' cited by you, what is denoted by this word is the fact that all the four life-stages are conducive to the performance of certain common duties (such as truthfulness and the like) [and as this *fact* is one only, it is only right that the word should take the singular number; and then again, the word, thus explained, does not denote the same thing as the word '*āshramāḥ*']. Other instances of the use of different numbers used in connection with words denoting the same thing that may be cited are—(a) the '*ṣad guṇāḥ*' (plural), constitute the *ṣādguṇyam*' (singular); and (b) the '*vishēṣāḥ*' (plural) constitute the '*vaishēṣikam*' (singular);—but both of these are amenable to the same explanation as above [the singular form in (a) '*ṣādguṇyam*' denotes, not the *six guṇas* or *methods of success*, but the fact of the six methods serving the common purpose of accomplishing success for the king; and the singular form in '*vaishēṣikam*' denotes, not the *many vishēṣas*, or *specific individualities*, but the fact of these individualities serving the common purpose of differentiating a thing from all other things].

(D) *Fourthly*, your reason—'because there is no cognition of the Earth when Colour &c. are not cognised,'—is not a true one. "In what way is it *not true*?" Well, as a matter of fact, we do cognise a substance, even when its Colour &c. are not cognised; for instance, when a piece of rock-crystal is placed near a black object, we do-not perceive

the colour of the crystal, which is *white*; and yet we do perceive the crystal itself [so that it is not true that there is no cognition of a thing when its Colour &c. are not cognised].

(E) *Fifthly*, in support of your reasoning you have cited the instances of the Soup and the Row; and this is not right; for apparently you do not understand what the 'soup' or the 'row' is. When a number of different substances (flesh, water &c.) are cooked together, they become mixed up with certain other substances brought into existence during the process of cooking; and at a certain time during this process there is a mixture of all the various ingredients; and to this mixture is given the name of 'Soup'; so that the *Soup* is not the same as its ingredients; it is something different from them; hence the case of *Soup* is not a right one to be cited as an instance where, on account of the non-difference of two things, the perception of one implies the perception of the other. This explanation disposes of the case of all such things as '*pāka*', '*kāñchika*' &c.* [which are the names of dishes made up of several ingredients]. Similarly, when a number of like and unlike things stand together towards one direction, in such a way that they are in contact with one another,—their limit or end being either definitely ascertained or not so ascertained,—we have a notion of *plurality* with regard to these things so placed; and it is this plurality of number to which the name 'Row' is given [and being a 'number', it is distinct from the things to which the number belongs]. So also when a number of elephants, horses, and chariots stand together, in different directions, in contact with one another,—their exact extent being, or not being, exactly determined,—the

* 'Pāka' is a name given to such preparations, chiefly medicinal, as consist of many substances cooked together; e. g. *Ḍhāṭripāka*. '*Kāñchika*' is a medicinal preparation where many medicinal substances are cooked along with very old gruel. We have not been able to ascertain what the 'vivēka' or 'virēka' is; but from what is said on p. 81, l. 8, it seems that this is a name for a preparation consisting of the mixture of equal quantities of Earth, Fire and Water—'Avakṣāra' is the name given to the mixture of the ash of several substances.

plurality of *number* subsisting in these is called 'army' Similarly when a number of a particular class of persons congregate together in definite bands, according to the diverse degrees of renunciation, the plurality of number subsisting in them comes to be called 'sect' or 'congregation.' Similarly with all collective names; such as 'heap', 'forest', 'herd,' 'Brahmāṇa-band' and the like. The name 'Circle' is given to that plurality of number which subsists in a number of things placed in diverse directions, in such a way that the central space enclosed by them is vacant. Thus we find that the case of 'Row' (or any similar collective name) does not afford the required instance of 'non-difference'.

[Having failed to convince the Logician of his own view that Substance is nothing different from an aggregate of qualities, the Opponent demands proof for the view of the Logician] –" What is the proof for difference (between the qualities and the substance to which they belong)?"

This proof, we reply, we have in the fact that when we perceive an object, we speak of this perception in terms of all that are perceived along with it; for instance, when the sandal is perceived, we speak of this perception as 'the colour of this is white', 'its taste is bitter', its odour is strong', 'its touch is cool'; and as a matter of fact, we know that whenever we speak of the perception of one thing in terms of the perception of another thing, the two things are different; as for instance, when we speak of the *vessel* as 'of the Brāhmaṇa;' and we never speak of the perception of the sandal in such terms as 'this white colour that I perceive belongs to the qualities of Taste, Odour and Touch, which (though not perceived) are inferred.' [And such should be the expression if the Sandal were nothing apart from its qualities]. "Your reasoning is not valid; as it is based on a premiss, the truth of which is vitiated by the case of such things as 'army', 'forest' and the like; in the case of these things we make use of such expressions as 'the elephant of the army', 'the

tree of the forest', where the things are not different [e.g. the Elephant is not something different from the Army, nor is the Tree different from the Forsst; so that mere verbal expression, such as 'the odour of the Sandal', cannot justify the conclusion that the Sandal is something different from odour and other qualities]." This is not true, we reply; it is not true that the *army* and the *forest* are identical with the *elephant* and the *tree* respectively; we have already explained * how the *army* and the *forest* are entirely different from the elephants and the trees composing them respectively.

[The Opponent takes up the case of the *Row*, which the Logician has analysed into a phase of Number, and hence different from the things composing the *Row*.]——"There is no such thing as Number; how then can we accept the view that (in the form of the *Row*) it is something different from the things to which it belongs?"

Vār. P. 80.

This is not right; as one who denies the existence of Number cannot account for either the affirmation of *oneness* (of Number, and that to which the number belongs, or of qualities and the substance to which the qualities belong), or the denial of diversity (between them) [as both *oneness* and *diversity* are only *numbers*]; and yet the said notions of *oneness* and *diversity* cannot be altogether denied (by the Bauḍḍha Opponent, who actually makes the said affirmation and denial); and when you cannot deny the existence of the said notions, inasmuch as these are *qualified* notions, they would not be possible, if their very basis, in the shape of the Number, were altogether denied. "Why so?" Because of the following reasonings:—(a) 'The notion of *one* or *many* (with regard to the jar) must have a basis different from the basis of the notion of the *jar* itself,—because it is a notion different in character from the notion of the jar,—

* On this same page; as also under Sūṭras 2, 1. 33 to 36, where it is proved that the *composite* is different from its *components*.

like the notion of *blue*;—and thus that which forms the basis of the notion of *one* or *many* is *Number*.'—(b) Then again, the qualified notion of *number* being different from the notion of that to which the number belongs,—differing, from it, as it does, in regard to its object, its cause and the notion itself, —it must require for its appearance, an entirely different basis; as a matter of fact, we find that whenever one notion differs from another, in regard to its object, its cause and the notion itself, it always requires a different basis; as for instance, in regard to such things as the cloth, the skin and the blanket, we have those same notions only of which the cloth the skin and the blanket respectively, in their unqualified form, are the basis; while in connection with those same things, the notion that we have of the colour *blue* is found to proceed from a basis entirely different from those things (the cloth &c.); in the same manner in connection with the jar, * the notions of 'one', 'two' &c. that we have are found to have their object and cause different (from those of the notion of the *jar* itself); and from this it follows that they must proceed from a different basis; and this basis is what is called 'Number'. [This same reasoning applies to the case of all the qualities, Colour and the rest].

[The Opponent brings forward another objection]—"We have such phrases as 'extensive army', and 'the forest in flowers',—where the *army* and the *forest* are spoken of as *extensive* and *in flowers*; so that either the *army* or the *forest* cannot be mere 'Number' (as the *Siḍḍhānṭi* has tried to prove above, p. 79, ll. 6—7). If the *army* or the *forest* were mere *number*,† we could not have such expressions as 'extensive army' or the 'forest in flowers'; as *extensiveness* cannot belong to Number, nor can Number have *flowers*."

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* The reading should be घटादिविषयनिमित्तव्यतिरेकभावः तत्र एकादिप्रत्ययाः। as read by the Chaukhambha Series edition.

† A च is wanting in the text. It is found in the Chaukhambha Series edition.

This does not affect our position, we reply. For what is the meaning of the expression 'the extensive army'? *The same elephant &c. that constitute the army, having their precise number undetermined, and having other constituents (elephants, horses &c.) added to them, come to be spoken of as 'the extensive army'; so that what is called 'extensive' is only the plurality of *number*, arising from an † increase in the constituents of the army, which are spoken of as 'extensive.' Then as regards the expression 'the
Vār. P. 81. forest in flowers,' it is only the plurality of *number*, which inheres in the same substratum as the flowers; this substratum being the blossoming trees [and this co-substrateness forms the basis of the figurative application of the epithet 'in flowers' to the *Number*]; just as we have in such expressions as 'the bitter sugar'; though it is the *taste* that is 'sweet' [and the reason for the applying of the epithet 'bitter' to the sugar, and to the taste, is due to the fact that both *taste* and *bitterness* inhere in the same sugar.]

Similarly Number and other qualities must be regarded as different from the substance to which they belong, because they have different names. "The reason given is not sound, as we find many names of things that are mere nonentities; for instance, 'pit', and 'hole' [which are the names of mere void, which is a non-entity]." This argument is not right; as evidently you do not know (what a *pit* is). The *pit* is only the *ākāsha* as limited by a particular configuration of composite particles qualified by colour and other qualities,

* 'The word सत्त्व, etymologically meaning that which exists, here stands for number; and सत्त्वानि is that to which the number belongs—*i. e.* elephants, horses and chariots. And when the army, originally consisting of elephants, has some more elephants added to it, it is said to have become *extensive*. This shows that extensiveness is nothing more than *number* in an undefined form; and it is varying; on account of the possibility of further additions to, and subtractions from, the army.'—*Tātparya*.

† 'प्रचय', not 'अवयव', nor 'अवयव:भेदक' as read by the Chaukhambha Series edition, is the correct reading. The sense demands it and the *Tātparya* supports it

—a configuration of which the central portion is empty. The same is the case with the *hole* also. [And thus being *Ākāsha*, neither the pit nor the hole can be regarded as a void or non-entity].

The Opponent raises a further objection:—"It is not right to regard a thing as different simply because we find it having a different name; (a) because as a matter of fact, we find different names applied to one and the same thing; for instance, we have such expressions as 'the post of *khaḍira* wood' [where, though the post is not different from the wood, yet they are spoken of by different names];—(b) secondly because we find a different name applied to a number of disjointed things;—as when we speak of a 'line of houses' [where the *line* is nothing different from the houses]; and also a different name applied to a number of heterogeneous things—as when we speak of the *virēka* consisting of the 'triune* combination of Earth, Water and Fire'. [all this proves that we are not justified in deducing any conclusion from mere names or expressions."

None of the above reasonings is convincing: (a) It has been urged that with regard to one and the same thing we find different names used. This is not right; as in the case cited by you what the word '*khaḍira*' denotes is a certain substance characterised by a particular class-character; the word 'post' also denotes a certain figure; and a 'figure' is only that particular form of conjunction which is called '*prachaya*', 'aggregate' or 'conglomeration'; and it is certainly something different† (from the *khaḍira*). The same reasoning applies to all similar expressions— such as 'the coil of the serpent', 'the body of the image', 'the ring of gold',

* The text here is hopelessly corrupt. Neither the *Ṭāṭparya* nor the *Parishuḍḍhi* helps us to trace the correct reading. The Chaukhambha Series edition reads 'virēkaḥ' for '*vivēkaḥ*'; '*vyūhaḥ*' is the word that gives some sense; and has been adopted in the translation. It may be that '*virēka*' is the name of a certain preparation consisting of the mixture of equal quantities of Earth Fire and Water.

† The Khaḍira wood and the post, both being material substances, could not inhere in any one part of the post.

'the body of the grinding stone,' and so forth,— in every one of which the two words denote different things. (b) The case of the expression 'the line of houses' is analogous to that of the word 'row', which we have explained above. (c) As regards the third case, where different names are applied to a number of things as forming a 'combination,' called 'virēka' it is clear that 'combination' is only a form of conjunction (which always implies difference among the members in conjunction).*

[A fresh objection is raised against the view that the Substance is something different from the qualities belonging to it]—" As a matter of fact, we have no cognition of any sub stance apart from the aggregate of its qualities". It seems you have the following reasoning in your mind—" If the substance were something different from the qualities, then it would be perceived apart from these qualities;—as a matter of fact however, it is never so perceived;—hence the conclusion is that there is no such thing as Substance (apart from qualities). " But this reasoning is not valid: In-as much as the non-perception can be due to two causes; and your premiss [' That which is not perceived does not exist '] is not true. With regard to every case of non-perception, there is a doubt as to whether there is no perception of a thing because it does not exist, (e. g. of the hare's horns), or because the means of perception are absent (e. g. of the roots of a tree buried under the ground). If then, the meaning of your premiss be that 'there is non-perception of the substance because it does not exist', then as this premiss would include the conclusion (that 'the substance does not exist'), it would not be a right premiss [as the conclusion being by its very nature open to doubt, the premiss that includes that conclusion also becomes of doubtful validity]. If then, the meaning of your

* The reading of this sentence is corrupt and curiously enough, the reading of the corresponding passage of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is also corrupt. We are unable to guess the correct reading and neither the *Tātparya* nor the *Parishuḍḍhi* affords in clue as to the reading. As in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, so here also, we have adopted the reading '*vivēkaḥ*', though perhaps '*vyūhaḥ*' may be a better reading.

premiss be that the non-perception of the substance is due to the absence of the means of its perception,—then also it cannot be accepted as leading to the desired conclusion; for it is not right to deny the difference (of the substance from the qualities) merely on the ground * that there are no means available for cognising that difference. [As it is only on the strength of the absence of such means of cognising a thing as would be possible in the case, that you could rightly conclude the absence of that thing. If, lastly, you assert that you do base your conclusion on the absence of such *possible* means of cognising the substance as apart from qualities, then] Your reasoning also becomes open to all the objections that we have shown against the former reasoning of yours, that 'the substance is not different from qualities, because there is no cognition of it when the qualities are not cognised.' (P. 77, L. 13).

Thus we find that the more we examine the arguments put forward in support of the theory of *non-difference* (of Substance from Qualities), the more do we find them supporting the theory of *difference*; as it is found that while all proofs tend towards one—the view of difference.—all of them tend against the other—the view of *non-difference*.

Vār. P. 82.

Thus it is established that the word of the *Sūṭra*, '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' should be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound.

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*The reading of the printed text is defective. The *Ṭāṭparya* reads न प्रमाणाभाव-मात्रान्न्याय्यो व्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधः ।

—,,—

Buḍḍhi—Apprehension. The fifth Parmēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 27, L. 3 to P. 27, L. 8.]

* Some people (the Sāṅkhyas) have held the view that *Jñāna*, 'Cognition,' is the function of *Buḍḍhi*, 'Intellection,' which latter is a non-intelligent or unconscious instrument; while *Upalabḍhi*, 'Apprehension,' is the function of the intelligent (Soul), which latter is not-active. And our Author makes the following declaration, with a view, it would seem,† to set aside this view.

Sūṭra (15).

'INTELLECTION', 'APPREHENSION,' AND 'COGNITION' ARE SYNONYMOUS TERMS ‡ (SŪṬRA 15).

It is not possible for Cognition to belong to the unconscious instrument Buḍḍhi; as if it were, then Buḍḍhi could be a conscious entity; while there is a single conscious

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* The Sāṅkhya theory is thus explained in the *Ṭaṭparya*:—Buḍḍhi is a product of the three guṇas, which are unconscious entities. Hence Buḍḍhi also is unconscious. Through the medium of the Sense-organs, the Buḍḍhi becomes modified into the form of the object. The faculty of consciousness on the other hand is unmodifiable, and is even conscious. When Buḍḍhi comes into close proximity to this conscious entity, it reflects within itself this consciousness; and thereby appears as itself conscious; and becoming modified into the form of the object, it cognises it; hence the modification of the Buḍḍhi into the form of the thing cognised completes the 'cognition' of that thing. While the connection of the conscious entity, through reflection, with the Buḍḍhi in the shape of the object cognised, constitutes a function of the conscious Sou', and is called the 'apprehension' of the object by the Soul. Just as the moon though without light of own, reflects the light of the Sun, and with this reflected light illumines objects, in the same manner Buḍḍhi, though itself unconscious, reflects the consciousness of the Soul and thereby cognises objects and makes them apprehended.

† "*It would seem*" -This qualifying clause is added with a view to indicate that this refutation is not the main purpose of the Sūṭra. The Sūṭra is for the purpose of providing a definition of Buḍḍhi; and the way in which the definition is put forward serves also the purpose of setting aside the Sāṅkhya view.

‡ Thus the definition of Buḍḍhi comes to be this—'That thing which is denoted by these synonymous words is Buḍḍhi.'

entity, apart from the aggregate of the body, and the sense-organs*.

Though the sentence composing the Sūtra is for the purpose of providing the definition of one of the *objects of cognition*, yet it is taken as implying the other fact (the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory) by the force of the argument (implied in the mention of the synonyms). †

Vārṭika on Sūṭra 15.

[Page 82, Line 3 to Line 22].

The Sūṭra briefly indicates something else (*viz*: the the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory) while putting forward the definition of Buḍḍhi, the turn of whose treatment has arrived ‡.

Intellection is that thing which is denoted by these synonymous words—'Intellection,' 'Apprehension,' 'Cognition.' "How can mere synonymous words constitute the definition of a thing § ?" They can do so for the simple reason that they serve to differentiate the thing defined. The only purpose served by definitions is to differentiate things from one another; and as a matter of fact we find that no other thing

* This refutation is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* :—Buḍḍhi cannot reflect the conscious Soul, in the way that the moon reflects the light of the Sun. As consciousness being non-modifiable, there can be no reflection of it. Hence it would be necessary to attribute consciousness to the Buḍḍhi itself. So that every cognition will have two conscious agents. (See *Vārṭika* below).

† Thus explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

‡ The Soul and other things that have been already defined are causes of Buḍḍhi; so that after the definition of the causes, it is the turn of the definition of the Effect—says the *Ṭaṭparya*.

§ The sense of the objection is that mere words depend upon connection only; so that any word might, by convention, be applied to anything; so that no mere word can be a proper definition. The reply is that there are two kinds of words—Some have their denotation fixed by individual convention; as when the father gives a certain name to his child; while there are others whose denotation is fixed by a convention that is universally binding; as in the case of the word 'cow' denoting the cow. And there is nothing incongruous in regarding words of this latter class as proper differentiators of things—*Ṭāṭparya*.

(save Būḍḍhi) is denoted by the synonyms mentioned ; so that being peculiar to the thing defined, they serve as its definition.

The *Bhaṣya* says [Page 27, Line 8.]—*The sentence of the Sūṭra is taken as implying the other fact* (*the refutation of the Ṣāṅkhya theory*) *by the force of the argument.*

The meaning of this is that the function of Buḍḍhi as (postulated by Sāṅkhya) is set aside by means of the mention of the synonymous words. These people have held that Cognition is the function of Buḍḍhi, and Apprehension is a function of the Soul ; and with a view to reject this view the Sūtra declares that all these words—*Buḍḍhi* (Intellection), '*Jñāna* (Cognition) and *Upalabḍhi* ' (Apprehension) are synonymous ; so that Cognition being the same as *Buḍḍhi*, cannot be regarded as a function of it, something different from itself.

" But what is the *argument* that implies all this ?"

It is this :—When one asserts that 'the Soul *apprehends*' and 'Intellection *cognises*,' he admits that both Soul and Intellection are conscious entities. And if both were conscious entities, then there would be * no possibility of any inference of cognition having a single agent, which is deduced from the fact of every cognition belonging to only one individual. That is to say, if Intellection were a conscious entity, and the Soul also were a conscious entity, then the Soul could never apprehend things touched by the Intellection; for the simple reason that the apprehensions of one conscious entity are never cognised by another conscious entity; as a matter of fact, however we find that the Soul does apprehend things touched by Buḍḍhi; hence the conclusion is that there is a single

* The translation follows the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭparya* ; but this makes the presence of 'न' necessary in the text. The text as it stands may be translated thus :—'The view that both are conscious entities would be met by the following reasoning based upon the fact of every cognition belonging to only one agent.'

conscious entity [and this is the same whose consciousness is admitted by all parties]. If (for the purpose of explaining the fact of a single cognitive agent) it be assumed that [there are functions of both, Soul and Buḍḍhi, and] the function of the Cognitive Soul is non-different from that of Buḍḍhi [*i.e.*, either that the function of both is one and the same, or, that though their functions are different, they cannot be distinguished],—then it becomes incumbent upon you to point out the exact nature of the Soul (as distinguished from Buḍḍhi).' "Well, Buḍḍhi determines things, and the Soul apprehends them; that is to say, the Soul is conscious of things in accordance with such time and place in connection with which Buḍḍhi determines them." But 'determines' and 'apprehends' are synonymous terms; and it is not proper to regard those things as different which are spoken of by means of synonymous terms; as we find in the case of the words '*ḍhvani*' and '*nāḍa*.' If it were not so [*i.e.*, if things spoken of by means of synonymous words were different], then in the case of the words '*ḍhvani*' and '*nāḍa*' also the things denoted by them would be diverse! It may be held that "while the Soul apprehends things, Buḍḍhi makes them known or apprehended." True; in that case the Soul of man cognises things by means of Buḍḍhi, and it is not Buḍḍhi that cognises things; when you say that Buḍḍhi makes known things, this Buḍḍhi becomes only an *instrument* of cognition.*

Manas,—Mind. The Sixth Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 27, Line 9 to Page 28, Line 6.]

Remembrance, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Doubt, Intuition, Dream, Imagination, as also the Perception of Pleasure and the rest,—all these are indicative of the existence of the Mind; and in addition to all these, we have the following also—

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* So that *Buḍḍhi* would be the same as *Manas*—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

SŪṬRA (16).—THE NON-APPEARANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS COGNITIONS IS INDICATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF MIND. (2).

Inasmuch as Remembrance and the rest (enumerated above) are not brought about by the instrumentality of the (external) * sense-organs, they must be due to some other organ. As a matter of fact, we find that even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respectively perceptive sense-organs, the Olfactory organ and the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is some other cause, by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear,—this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them, and being non-pervasive (limited) in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the Mind, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 16.

[Page 83, Line 1, to Page 85, Line 4.]

Vārṭika, Page 83.

†The *Bhāṣya* (page 27, *l.* 9), says—*Remembrance, Inference, etc.*; this means that Remembrance and the rest are indicative of the presence of the Mind. "Are these the only indicatives?" No. "What then?" This also that follows (in the Sūṭra):—*i.e.* '*The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions.*' As a matter of fact, we find that at times, even though the contact of several sense-organs and their objects is present, yet the cognitions of all these objects do not appear simultaneously; and from this it follows that there is some other organ capable of being in contact with the sense-organs and helping them, and non-pervasive in its dimension, the presence and absence

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* This qualification is added by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† From here the translation has the advantage of the Chaukhambha Sanskrit series edition; but the page references continue in accordance with the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition.

of whose contact determine the appearance and non-appearance of cognitions. "How does this conclusion follow?" For the simple reason that the non-appearance of the effect (cognition) can only be due to some deficiency in the cause (the sense-contact; and this deficiency consists in the absence of mind-contact). This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*.

"How can Remembrance and the rest which subsist in something else (the Soul), be indicative of the existence of the Mind?"

We do not mean that Remembrance and the rest are indicative of the Mind, *because they subsist in it*; * what we mean is that they are due to some other instrument, because they are actions, and yet they are not the actions of odour-cognition and the rest. That is to say, in our experience we have found that an action other than Odour-cognition is due to an instrument other than the Odour-organ; and so forth; as for instance, the action of the chariot; and Remembrance and the rest are actions; so these must be due to the operation of instruments other than those of odour-cognition and the rest. Or, the reasoning may be put as follows:—Pleasure and the rest must be due to the operation of an organ other than the Visual and the rest, because while being different from odour (colour) and such other objects (operated upon by the Visual and other organs), they are objects of cognition, —just like chariots and such other objects (operated upon by agencies other than those of the ordinary sense-organs). As a matter of fact, we find that the chariot &c., are operated upon by such instruments as the axe and

* That is to say, Remembrance etc., are actions, and yet they are not brought about by the instrumentality of the Visual and other organs;—therefore they must be due to the instrumentality of some other organ. Because they are the specific qualities of the Soul; and all such qualities of the Soul must be due to the instrumentality of organs; as we find in the case of all perceptional cognitions. So that the appearance of Remembrance must be due to the operation of an *organ*, and not to any such agency as that of Impressions and the like. And to this organ we give the name 'Mind.'

the like, which are other than the Visual and other sense-organs; and pleasure, etc., also are objects (like the chariot); hence these also must be operated upon by instruments other than the visual and other organs.

An objection is raised :—

"The *non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions* is a property belonging to *cognitions*; how then can it be indicative of the *Mind*? Even when a property is not related to a thing, if it were regarded as indicative of it, then everything would be indicative of everything; and we could in that case have such reasonings as—'the Soul exists because the crow is black.' Such reasonings however are impossible; so that a property that is not related to a thing can never be regarded as its indicative."

To this objection some people make the following reply :—Even though a property be not related to a thing, it can be indicative of it. For instance, when we see a fresh earthenware cup, even though this *seeing of the cup*, does not subsist in the potter, yet it rightly indicates his existence. Similarly also the * sight of the revolving potter's wheel [which also indicates the presence of the potter].

This explanation however is not right. What is indicated by the fact (of seeing of the fresh cup) is, not the presence of the potter, but only the spot, the point in space, as qualified by the presence of the potter; and certainly *the presence of the cup* also is a qualification of that same spot. Similarly when the spot is found qualified by the revolving wheel, it proves the fact of that same spot being qualified also by the presence of the potter. Thus we find that in no case is there an Inference of a thing from a character not related to it.

Vārṭika, Page 84.

* Both editions read '*chakramaḍarshanam*', which gives no sense. '*Chakra-ḍarshanam*' gives better sense.

"In that case *the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions* not being related to the *Mind*, how can it be indicative of this latter?"

* The said *non-appearance* is not absolutely unrelated to the Mind, when we take the *appearance af simultaneous cognitions* as the Subject, or Minor Term, of our inference "How so?" The apprehensions of Colour, etc., must be regarded as standing in need of other instruments, because they are never found to appear simultaneously; for instance, in the case of a man well-versed in several handicrafts, we find that even though several instruments, in the shape of the axe and the rest, are before him at one and the same time, yet, they do not bring about, at the same time, any large number of objects, in the shape of the chariot and the like; and this because all those instruments stand in need of the operation of his hands: in the same manner, inasmuch as the Eye and the other organs also are never found to bring about simultaneous cognitions, it is concluded that these also stand in need of the operation of some other instrument. Or again, we may meet tho objection by putting forward an inference in which the *sense-organs* are the 'Subject' or Minor Term. "How?" In the following form:—'The Eye and the other organs, in all their operations, stand in need of another instrument, because they are never found to operate simultaneously; just like the axe and other instruments.

A fresh objection is raised:—"If then, the Eye and the other organs are incapable of apprehending their several

* The only inference relevant to the present context, of which *the appearance of simultaneous cognitions* could be the subject, may be thus stated:—'*The appearance of simultaneous cognitions* is not possible because the perception of colours, etc., stands in need of an instrument other than the Eye, etc.'; and then we can construe the next sentence as proving the fact of the perceptions standing in need of other instruments; the reasoning contained in this latter sentence having the *apprehensions* for its 'Subject,' and not *the appearance of simultaneous cognitions.*

objects simultaneously, because they stand in need of another instrument,—then, why should there be no simultaneous cognition in the case of such objects as are *all* perceptible by the same sense-organ? Certainly the contact of the mind is not absent in the *one* organ! It will perhaps be urged that the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions in this case will be due to the diversity of the objects related (to the organ). But then, how would you account for it in a case where several objects are actually related to the organ at one and the same time? In the case of such several objects as the blue colour, and the like, where these objects come into contact with the organ one after the other, the diversity of the objects may account for the non-appearance of their simultaneons cognition. But in a case where several objects are actually in contact with the organ, how would the said non-appearance be accounted for? For example, [when you see the white cow walking, and the white colour, the animal's body and the motion are all in contact with the eye at one and the same time] why cannot we have the cognition 'the white cow is walking' [where the three cognitions of the three objects would be simultaneous]?"

To the above some people make the following reply:—The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is due to the diversity in the *desire for cognition* (in the mind of the cogniser). The sense of this explanation offered by some people is that, even though a certain object may be related (to the perceiving organ), yet it is not cognised, if there is no desire (on the part of the cognitive agent) to cognise it. [So that when a number of things are not cognised at one and the same time, it is due to the fact that the desire for cognising all of them is not present at one and the same time].

This explanation is not right: as this would lead to the rejection of Mind; if the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions were due only to the diversity in the desire for the

several cognitions, then, Mind should be rejected altogether. [If, in the case of one set of cognitions, the non-appearance be held to be due to the diversity in the desire for cognitions, then] in other cases also there would be no bar prohibiting the postulating of the same diversity in the desire for cognitions ; so that there being no use for the Mind, it should be rejected.* But there are cases where even though the desire for cognising many things is present, simultaneous cognitions do not appear ; and for this some other explanation than diversity of desire for cognising should be found. Hence the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions must be regarded as due to some other cause (than the diversity of desire for cognising). "What is that cause ?" The cause lies in the very nature of instruments. That is to say, it is in the very nature of Instruments that they never act unless they are operated upon (by an intelligent agent) ; and in the same manner it is also in their very nature that even though related (to objects), they do not have more than one action at a time ; that is to say, even though it may be related to several objects, an instrument can never have more than one action at a time ; and †even though the Soul may be the supervisor or operator of the instrument, yet, inasmuch as the fact of the Soul being related to more than one organ at one and the same time cannot be denied, some other cause (than the supervision of the Soul) should be found for the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions. And this cause is no other than the Mind. Thus is the existence of Mind established.

Vārṭika, Page 85.

* As Apparent Inconsistency of the non-simultaneous cognitions is the only basis for the postulating of Mind ; so that when another explanation, in the shape of diversity in the desire for cognitions, is found for the non-simultaneous cognitions, the inconsistency ceases ; hence there remains no basis for the assuming of Mind.

† 'The supervision of the Soul cannot account for the non-simultaneity of cognitions ; as when several causes are present, the Soul does bring about several effects. For instance, one and the same boy accompanies his teacher, carries his water-pot, and repeats his lessons—all at one and the same time '—*Tātparya*.

Pravṛiṭṭi, Activity—Seventh Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 28, Line 7 to Page 28, Line 11.]

After Mind comes the turn* of Activity; and ACTIVITY CONSISTS IN THE OPERATING OF SPEECH, OF MIND AND OF BODY. (SŪṬRA 17.)

By the word '*buḍḍhi*' in the Sūṭra the Mind is meant,—the word being taken in the sense of *that by means of which things are cognised* (*buḍḍhyaṭē anayā*)†.

‡ The various 'operatings' by the body, by Speech and by the Mind are virtuous and sinful; and are of ten kinds. And this we have already explained above under Sūṭra 2.

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 85, Line 5 to Page 85, Line 13.]

Activity consists of the operating of Speech, of Mind, and of Body—says the Sūṭra—*i.e.*, of operations *by* Speech, *by* Mind and *by* Body.

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* As Activity belongs to the Mind (see Sūṭra), Activity has to be defined after Mind has been described.

† The word '*buḍḍhi*', when explained as '*buḍḍhyaṭē iti*,' that which is apprehended, denotes cognition; and when explained as '*buḍḍhyat anayā*', it denotes the instrument of cognition, Mind.

‡ Says the *Ṭāṭparya*:—Operations are of two kinds—some give rise to cognitions; others give rise to action. For instance, the operation of Speech becomes the cause of virtue or sin according to the nature of the cognition that it produces (in the mind of the person spoken to). So that 'Speech' must be taken here to stand for *all* those operations that bring about cognitions; and thus the operations of the Eye and other organs, which consists in the perceiving of agreeable or disagreeable things, become included. Operations leading to Action are of two kinds—*that having the Body for its cause, and that caused by the Mind.*

These two expressions are explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi* to mean—'that of which the body is the *object*' and 'that of which the Mind is the *object*'. For instance, the operation or effort involved in the actions of giving, stealing and the like, have all got the Body for their object; as it is the Body that is active; similarly, sympathy, jealousy and the like are operations having the Mind for their object; as it is the Mind that is active. This explanation of the two expressions—'*Kayanimiṭṭā*' and '*Manonimiṭṭā*'—are necessitated by the fact that otherwise all operations could be called both *Kayanimiṭṭā* and *Manonimiṭṭā*; as there is not a single action of man in which *both* Mind and Body are not the cause.

This Activity is both virtuous and sinful; and is of *ten* kinds. *Virtuous* activity consists in—(1) giving shelter, (2) serving and (3) giving—these by the Body;—(4) telling the truth, (5) telling what is salutary, (6) saying what is agreeable, and (7) reading—these by Speech;—and (8) mercy, (9) aspiration, and (10) faith—these by the Mind. The contraries of these ten constitute the *sinful activity.*

*An objection is raised:—"All Activity being momentary,—it is impossible that it should be the cause of birth (as has been held). That is to say, in view of the fact that every operation exists for a moment only, it is not right to regard it as the cause of birth; and the fact of Activity not being the cause of Birth goes against what has been declared in Sūṭra 2 above (where it has been stated that Birth is due to Activity)."

The answer to the above objection is that there is nothing in the present Sūṭra which goes against what has been declared in Sūṭra 2; as in Sūṭra 2, the word 'Activity', '*Pravṛiṭṭi*', stands for the *results* of Activity; *Virtue and Vice* (Ḍhārma and Aḍharma) are the direct results of all Activity; and it is these that have been spoken of by the word 'Activity, in Sūṭra 2; and the justification for this figurative use of the word lies in the fact that *Activity* is the cause of Virtue and Vice; and such usage is common; for instance, we have such assertions as 'food is the *life* of living beings' [where *food*, which is the *cause*, the *means* of living, is spoken of as *life* itself.]

Ḍoṣa—Defect.—The Eighth Pramēya.

Sūṭra (18).

(SŪṬRA 18).—DEFECTS HAVE URGING OR INCITING FOR THEIR DISTINGUISHING FEATURE.

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* 'Birth occurs in the next life; hence it cannot be due to the activity of the present life; as all such activity vanishes in a moment, and cannot be present when the effect—next birth—appears.'

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 28, L. 13 to P. 29, L. 4.]

*'Inciting' means *causing activity*. Attachment and the rest incite, or cause the activity of, man towards virtuous or sinful deeds; and whenever there is ignorance, there are attachment and aversion.†

Objection—"Everyone knows what these *Defects* are; why are they described by means of a definition?"

As a matter of fact, persons qualified by attachment, aversion and ignorance (which are the inciters to activity) are distinguished (or characterised) by their action: the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain; similarly the man who has aversion, or one who has ignorance. [And it was necessary to bring out this fact of Attachment &c. being the cause of activity, in order to produce disgust against them; which fact could not have been brought out by the mere mention of Attachment and the other *Defects*; for] when the words 'attachment,' 'aversion' and 'ignorance' are used by themselves, not much is expressed by them.‡

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*The action of the *inciter* can be understood only after that of the *incited* has been understood; hence after the definition of Activity comes the turn of its excitant, Defects.—*Tātparya.*

†Both Attachment and Aversion arise from ignorance; and urge the man to activity; so that 'inciting' is a peculiarity of Attachment and Aversion; and this peculiarity subsists in the same substrate as the ignorance.—*Tātparya.*

In explaining this, the *Parishuḍḍhi* draws a distinction between *pravarṭaka* that which incites) and *pravarṭanā*, (the action of inciting). What incites men to activity are ignorance and the consequent Attachment and Aversion towards the object on which the activity turns; and the *inciting* is towards this activity, which is the means leading to that object, and with regard to which also there are ignorance and consequent Attachment and Aversion.

‡The *Tātparya* explains—All that the words express are the mere forms of the defects; and they give no idea of their being excitants of activity; and until this fact is brought out, there would be no disgust against Defects; as there is nothing wrong in Attachment or Aversion *per se*; it is only when they give rise to activity bringing pleasure and pain, that they come to be recognised as something to be shunned.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 85, L. 15 *to* 86, L. 2].

Defects have inciting for their distinguishing feature—says the Sūtra. The question is asked—"'What is this *inciting*?" The answer is that *inciting* is that by reason of which man is forced, helplessly, to act; when a man acts, he is incited by the *defects*, Attachment and the rest; and thus this inciting being the cause of activity, is called '*pravarṭanā*', *the means of activity* (*pravarṭayaṭi iti.*); just as we have the words '*kāraṇā*' (which means the *means of doing*), *hāraṇā* (the means of taking away) and the like. 'But how is this inciting known?"* The fact that there is *inciting* (done by the Defects) is known by each person directly by Perception so far as his own activity is concerned; and in the case of the activity of other persons, the fact is known by Inference; just as the fact of the Soul being the object of the notion of 'I' (self-consciousness) is known by each man directly by Perception; and this self-consciousness is not got at either by means of Inference or by means of Word. "Why is it not known by Inference?" For the simple reason that there is no *probans* available (whereby the inferential cognition could be obtained). "And why cannot it be got at by means of Word (Trustworthy Assertion)?" Because it involves a conception that cannot be obtained by any teaching or instruction.† From all this it follows that like Colour &c., the Soul of each man is perceptible to himself, while the Soul in another man's body is inferred from his activity and cessation from activity.

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*What is known is the *defect*, and not the fact of the defect being the excitant to activity'—*Tāṭparya*.

†That my activity has been due to a certain attachment or aversion in myself can be known by myself alone; and cannot be taught to me.

Prēṭyabhāva, Rebirth.—The Ninth Prameya.

Sūṭra (19).

*REBIRTH CONSISTS IN BEING BORN AGAIN.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 29, L. 6 to, p. 29, L. 11.]

Having died, when [the Soul] is born again in an animate body, this *being born again* constitutes the *Rebirth* of that [Soul], which is born,—*i.e.*, becomes connected with the body, the sense-organs, the mind, apprehension, and experience; and *being born again* consists in repeated connection with the body etc.;—the word 'repeated' denotes *recurrence*.† The literal meaning of the word '*Prēṭyabhāva*' may be thus explained:—When the Soul, subsisting in a particular animate body, abandons the body etc., previously occupied, then it *dies* (*praiṭi*); and when it takes possession in another body, of another body and sense-organs etc., it is *born* (*bhavaṭi*); so that '*prēṭyabhāva*' is *birth* (*bhāva*) after *having died* (*prēṭya*). The recurrence of this process of birth and death should be regarded as without beginning, and ending only with Final Release.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 19.

[Page 86, Line 4 to *Line* 17.]

Rebirth consists in being born again—says the *Sūṭra*; that is to say, Rebirth is transference into another body after the abandoning of the previously occupied body etc. The mention of the word 'repeated' (in the *Bhāṣya*) is with a view to indicate the beginninglessness of metempsychosis; the meaning being that birth and death recur again and again; which shows that metempsychosis is without beginning.

"What is this *Metempsychosis*?"

Metempsychosis consists in the unceasing process of effective causal activity among Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Cognition (mentioned in Sūṭra 2). And this process is without beginning; as there is no restriction as to

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*The *Ṭāṭparya* omits to mention the ground for the treatment of Rebirth after Defect. The *Parishuḍḍhi* says—Rebirth is the acquisition of the Body etc., down to Defects, after the abandonment of the same; so that it is only natural that Rebirth should be dealt with after these.

†'Recurrence' of connections with body etc., implies also the abandoning of these.—*Parishuḍḍhi*.

any particular order of sequence among the said 'Pain' and the rest. For instance, if it were held that Pain comes first, then this could not be right; as there is no Pain without Birth;—If Birth were held to come first, this also would not be right; as there can be no Birth without Merit and Demerit;—if Merit and Demerit be held to come first, this also would not be right; as these are not possible without Attachment and Aversion;—lastly, if it be held that Attachment and Aversion come first, this also will not be right; as Attachment and Aversion never appear without Ignorance.

"Then, Ignorance may be taken as the beginning of the series." This also will not be right; as there is no Ignorance without Body and the rest.

This causal activity among Pain and the rest, down to Ignorance, being unceasing, constitutes 'Metempsychosis', '*samsāra*',—also called (in the scriptures) '*Ājarañjarībhāva*.'

"This Birth and Death (*samsāra*),—does it belong to the Soul or to the Mind?" If by '*samsāra*' you mean *the action* (of entering and moving off from the Bodies), then it belongs to the Mind; as it is the Mind that actually *moves*, '*samsarați*'; on the other hand, if by '*samsāra*' you mean *experiencing* (of pleasure and pain) [as it really is], then it belongs to the Soul; as it is the Soul that experiences pleasure and pain.

Fruition, Phala.—Tenth Pramēya.

Sūṭra 20.

* FRUITION IS A THING PRODUCED BY ACTIVITY AND DEFECT.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 29, L. 18 to P. 30, L. 2].

Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain. And as

* Fruition is the direct result of man's *activity* alone; but the Sūṭra adds *Defects* also with a view to show—(1) that defects are the cause of Activity and (2) that Pleasure and Pain (which constitute Fruition) are the result of Defects also. It is only when the soil of the Soul is irrigated with the water of Defect that the seeds of Merit and Demerit produce the fruits of Pleasure and Pain'—*Tāṭparya*.

pleasure and pain appear only when the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and Apprehension are present, what are meant to be included under the name 'Fruition' are pleasure and pain along with Body and the rest; so that all these (Pleasure and Pain along with Body &c.) constitute the Fruition, which is *a thing produced by Activity and Defect.* Each time this Fruition is received by man, it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again received; and there is no end * or absolute cessation of these receivings and relinquishings; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on.

This same (Body and the rest) [constitute *Pain*, defined in the next Sūṭra].

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 86, L. 19 to P. 87, L. 3.]

Everything that is produced, *e.g.*, the Body and the rest, is a 'fruit' or 'fruition'; as every one of such things is brought about by the agency of Merit and Demerit. If we regard the primary or principal fruit alone as constituting *Fruition*, then the experiencing of pleasure and pain is the only *Fruition*; as this is what it ultimately leads to. But inasmuch as the experiencing of pleasure and pain is the final result of Merit and Demerit,—and there is no possibility of this experiencing without the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest,—with a view to this fact, it has been held that Merit and Demerit bring about the experience of pleasure and pain only after having brought about the Body &c.; so that the word 'fruiion' is applied, primarily, to the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and secondarily to the Body (and the rest).

Vār. P. 87

The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that the author of the Sūṭra will himself describe in Adh. VI how Defects help Activity in the bringing about of Fruition.

On the word '*Arṭhaḥ*', 'thing,' in the Sūṭra, the *Tāṭparya* remarks—'The word is put in for including all kinds of Fruition, primary as well as secondary; the primary fruition consisting in Pleasure and Pain, and the secondary in the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest—says the *Parishuḍḍhi.*

* '*Niṣṭhā*' is mere end; and as there is some sort of an *end* to Pleasure and Pain &c. at each Dissolution, the *Bhāṣya* corrects itself and adds the word '*Paryavasānam*' *absolute* (*pari*) *cessation* (*avasāna*).—*Tāṭparya.*

Pain, Duḥkha.—Eleventh Pramēya.

Sūṭra (21).

PAIN IS THAT WHICH IS CONNECTED WITH ANNOYANCE.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 30, L. 4 to L. 7.]

By 'Annoyance *' here is meant *suffering, injury*. Every thing, (*i. e.* Body &c. and also Pleasure and Pain), being intermingled with *i. e.* invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from—pain, is inseparable from Pain; and as such is regarded as *Pain* itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with Pain, when one wishes to get rid of Pain, he finds that birth (or life) itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life); and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he is released.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 87, L. 5 to Line 22.]

This same—*i. e.* the Body &c.—being connected with annoyance, is called 'Pain'. Primarily, it is pain alone that can be called '*Duḥkha*'. The word '*lakṣaṇa*' (in the Sūṭra) means *connection*. All these—Body and the rest—are connected with pain: The body is the cause of pain; so that in this case the 'connection' consists in the *causal relation*;—the Sense-organs, the Objects and Apprehension are the instruments of pain; so that in the case of these, the 'connection' consists in *instrumentality*;—Pleasure never exists apart from Pain; so that in this case the 'connection' consists in *invariable concomitance*. Primarily, however, Pain itself alone can be regarded as *Pain* [everything else being so regarded only on account of being connected with Pain].

Some people have held that everything is Pain, primarily by itself. But this is not right; as this is against

* 'Annoyance' here stands for the *feeling* of annoyance; so that it refers primarily to Pain; but secondarily to the Body and the rest also;—all of which are necessary factors in tne feeling of pain.—*Tāṭparya.*

well-known facts of perception: Pleasure is something that is distinctly perceived; so that its existence cannot be entirely ignored. "But Pleasure is only a form of Pain. That is to say, Pleasure is only a particular phase of Pain; and it is nothing independently by itself." This also is not right; as the negative particle is not added to what is only a particular phase of a thing; in no case do we find the negative particle added to what is only a particular form of a thing; for instance, a particular Brāhmaṇa is never called a 'non-Brāhmaṇa'; similarly if Pleasure were only a particular form of Pain, it could not be spoken of as 'not Pain' (as it is actually called). Then again, if there were no Pleasure, Ḍharma or Merit would be entirely useless. "Why so?" Because Merit has been regarded as the means of Pleasure; so that if there is no Pleasure, there is no use for Merit. Nor will it be right to regard the mere *negation of Pain* as the result of Merit; as in that case Merit will come to have a negative result; that is to say, the result of Merit will become a merely negative entity; and [this would not be right; as] in ordinary experience we find a two-fold activity among men: One man acts with a view to obtain something desirable (when the result aimed at is positive), while another acts with a view to *avoid* an undesirable thing (where the result aimed at is negative); and if there were nothing *desirable* (*i.e.*, affording pleasure), then this two-fold activity would not be possible [every action being, in that case, undertaken for the purpose of *avoiding* that which is undesirable, *i. e.*, pain]. Then again (if there were no Pleasure) there could be no such advice as that 'Pleasure should be looked upon as Pain'; as there could, in that case, be no counter-entity (of Pain, in the shape of Pleasure, which could be looked upon *as Pain*). Lastly, (if there were no Pleasure) there could be no attachment; as no one is ever attached to Pain. For all these reasons we conclude that all things cannot be regarded as 'Pain' in

themselves; and the fact is that all things are regarded as 'Pain' because of the teaching that they should be so regarded [and in reality Pain is not the only entity].

Apavarga—Final Release—Twelfth Pramēya.

Sūṭra (22).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 30, Line 8.]

When there is an end, an absolute cessation [of the series of receivings and relinguishings of Fruition], this is what constitutes Final Release, (which is thus defined) :—

ABSOLUTE FREEDOM FROM THE AFORESAID (PAIN &C.) IS FINAL RELEASE (SŪ. 22).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 30, Line 10 *to* Page 34, Line 2.]

Release is absolute freedom from that—from the aforesaid Pain, *i.e.*, from birth.* "How is this ?" When there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken, and the non-resumption of another,—this condition, which is without end (or limit) is known as 'Final Release' by those who know what Final Release is. This condition of immortality, free from fear,† imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called 'Brahma.'

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* The word '*ṭaṭ*' in the Sūṭra stands, not only for Pain proper, but also for all such products as the Body, the Sense-organs &c. to everyone of which the name 'Pain' is applied in its secondary sense.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The 'fear' meant here is the fear of being born into the world ; the epithet 'unchanging' is added with a view to deny the view that Brahma evolves itself into diverse names and forms ; the phrase 'condition of immortality' is meant to exclude the Bauḍḍha theory that Release consists in the absolute cessation of the mind, resembling the extinguishing of the lamp.—*Ṭāṭparya.* The *Pariṣhuḍḍhi* adds——Evolution is of two kinds - (1) the material object itself ceases and another bject takes place, which idea of evolution is favoured by the *Bauḍḍha* ; and (2) the object remaining intact, there is a change of its qualities ; this form of Evolution being held by the *Sāṅkhya.* Neither of these two is possible in the case of Brahma ; as in either case it would be transient.

Some people hold the view that "in Final Release what is manifested is the eternal pleasure of the Soul, just like its vastness; and when that happiness is manifested, the Soul is absolutely free, and becomes happy." *

Bhāṣya, Page 31.

This position is untenable; as there is no proof for what is here asserted; that is to say, there is neither Perception, nor Inference, nor Word of Scripture to prove that 'like its vastness, the eternal pleasure of the Soul is manifested in Final Release.'

Then again, the above view of the *Vedāntin* meaning that (in Final Release) there is manifestation—*i.e.*, feeling or experience—of the eternal (pleasure),—it behoves him to point out the cause of this 'manifestation.' In other words, when it is asserted that there is experienced a feeling or knowledge of eternal (pleasure), it is necessary to explain what is the cause of this manifestation—*i.e.*, the cause whereby it is produced. (*a*) If it be held that the manifestation, or experiencing or feeling, of pleasure is eternal, like the pleasure itself [so that there can be no production of it by any cause, which, therefore, need not be pointed out],—then there would be no difference between the Soul released and the Soul still in the meshes of birth and rebirth. That is to say, just as the released Soul is endowed with the eternal pleasure and its eternal experience, so also would be the Soul that is still involved in birth and rebirth; as both these Souls are eternal [and would therefore be equally endowed with the pleasure, which also is eternal, and as such cannot be absent at any time, even before Final Release]. And if this be admitted, then people would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity (of Final Release) with the result of of Merit and Demerit. In other words, we would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity of the eternal feeling of eternal pleasure with that pleasure and pain which, brought about by Merit and Demerit in the substrates (viz., the souls) wherein they are produced, are experienced by turns! And there would never be any substrate (soul) where either pleasure or its experience would be absent; both of these

* We have the text '*vijñānam ānandam brahma*,' where all the three appear as synonymous; so that Brahma is of the nature of happiness; and as Brahma is eternal, the happiness also must be eternal. Hence in the phrase 'happiness of the Soul,' the preposition 'of' has the sense of apposition. —*Tātparya.*

being *ex-hypothesi*, eternal! (*b*) If, on the other hand, it be held that the feeling of pleasure is not eternal, then it becomes necessary to point out its cause; *i.e.*, if it be held that the manifestation in Final Release, of the eternal pleasure, is not eternal,—then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that manifestation proceeds. As regards the Mind-Soul contact it can be such a cause only when aided by other causes; *i.e.*, if it be held that the Mind-Soul contact is the cause of the said manifestation of pleasure, then it would be necessary to point out some other cause which aids the said contact (in bringing about that manifestation of pleasure).* If Merit be held to be that auxiliary cause then the cause of this has to be pointed out; *i.e.*, if Merit be held to be that other accessory cause, then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that Merit proceeds [which, through the Mind-Soul contact, brings about the manifestation of eternal pleasure].

Bhāṣya, Page 32.

The merit that is produced by Yogic contemplation, being a product, must have an end; so that if the product of this ephemeral Merit (in the shape of the said manifestation) were held to be eternal, this would involve an incongruity (the continuance of the product in the absence of the cause); consequently it is necessary to regard the said manifestation also as coming to an end on the cessation of the Merit. That is to say, if the Merit brought about by Yogic contemplation be the cause of the Merit that brings about the manifestation of pleasure, then, inasmuch as the continuance of the product after the cessation of the cause would involve an incongruity, it would be necessary to admit that, when the Merit ceases,—as it must cease, being itself a product,—there must follow the entire cessation of the feeling of pleasure. And when the *feeling* of pleasure is absent, the *pleasure* itself is as good as non-existent. In other words, if there is a cessation of the feeling of pleasure, on account of the disappearance of Merit, then it can not be true that *eternal* pleasure is felt; as there is nothing to determine whether the feeling is absent, because the pleasure itself is absent, or that the feeling is absent even though the pleasure is present. [Nor will it be right, with a view to escape from these difficulties, to hold that the Merit is eternal, as] there is nothing to prove that the Merit is imperishable; for the simple reason that it is something that

* Alone by itself, the Mind-Soul contact can bring about nothing.

is produced. That is to say, there can be no arguments to prove that the Merit produced by Yogic contemplation does not perish; on the other hand, there is a clear argument to the contrary—viz., 'a thing that is produced is non-eternal [and Merit being *produced*, must be ephemeral].' In case there were a person whose feeling of pleasure never ceased, he alone would be justified in arguing that the cause of that feeling (Merit) is eternal. But if Merit were eternal, there would be no difference between the man that has been *released* and one who is still in the meshes of birth and re-birth,—as we have already pointed out above (page 31, line 6). What we mean is that, just as in the case of the released man, the pleasure as well as the cause of the feeling of that pleasure are both eternal,—and there is no cessation of the feeling itself, for the simple reason that the Merit, which causes the feeling, is eternal,—so in the case of the worldly man also [as his Merit also would be eternal, its effects, in the shape of the feeling of pleasure, would also be eternal]. And this would mean that Final Release is co-existent with the feelings of pleasure and pain brought about by Merit and Demerit*. It might be argued that (in the case of the worldly man) the presence of the Body, and the Sense-organs is the cause of obstruction (of pleasure-experience); but this cannot be right; as the Body etc. are for the very purpose of experience; and there is no reason to prove the contrary. In other words, our Opponent might put forward the explanation that in the case of the man who is still in the meshes of worldliness, the presence of the Body etc., obstructs the operation of the cause that leads to the feeling of eternal pleasure; so that there is a clear difference between the worldly man and the released man (in whose case, the Body etc., having fallen off, there is no obstruction). This however is not right; as the only purpose for which the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest exist is to bring about experiences; so that it is not possible that they should obstruct or hinder the experiencing (of eternal pleasure), specially as there is nothing to prove that there is any sort of experience for the Soul deprived of the Body and the rest.

[On p. 31, l. 2, the Author has said that there is no proof in support of the view that final Release consists

* As it is such feelings that abound in worldly existence; and both worldly Existence and Release have been shown to be co-eternal.

in pleasure. In order to meet this, the Vēḍānṭin puts forward proofs in support of his view] (1) "The activity of of man is always for the purpose of obtaining what is desired".——If this be urged as a proof in support of the Vēḍānṭa view, then we deny this; as activity is (also) for the purpose of removing the undesirable. That is to say, the Vēḍānṭin might put forward thefollowing argument.—*"The instructions in regard to Final Release, as also the activity of men desiring Final Release, are both for the purpose of obtaining what is desirable; and neither of the two can be absolutely useless." But this reasoning will not be right; as the instruction relating to Final Release as well as the activity of men desiring Final Release, may both be also for the sake of avoiding or removing what is undesirable. That the said activity is for the purpose of removing something undesirable (and not always for obtainting what is desirable) is also proved by the fact that there is nothing that is absolutely desirable, and not mixed up with an undesirable element; so that what is *desirable* also becomes *undesirable*; and thus when one is active towards the removing of something undesirable, he comes to remove or renounce also what is desirable; as removing by discrimination is not possible, *i. e.* it is not possible to remove the one without also removing the other.

Bhāṣya, Page 33.

2. As regards the renouncing of what is desirable, this applies with equal force to the case of the Body etc. That is to say, the Vēḍānṭin might put forth the following argument—"We see, as a matter of fact, that people renounce the ordinary transitory pleasure and seek for the more lasting pleasure (which proves the presence of a pleasure that is ever-lasting; and this is Final Release)." But on the analogy of this argument, you might also argue that, because in ordinary life people are found to renounce their ephemeral Body, Sense-organs and the rest, this indicates the presence of an eternal set of Body etc., for the released man; and in this manner you will have really established the singularity or aloofness and self-sufficiency of the released man! † If it

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* The real sense of this argument it thus explained by the *Tāṭparya*—"The scriptures urge men to activity towards the obtaining of Final Release; and in ordinary experience we find that it is only when a man desires something that he acts towards its accomplishment; and as pleasure is the only thing desirable it follows that Final Release must consist in pleasure.'

† In seeking to prove that the man becomes free. isolated, you come to prove that it is eternally beset with the entire set of Body, sense-organs and all the rest of it

be urged that this would be against all proof, that would apply with equal force to both parties. In other words, it might be urged that the eternality of Body etc, being contrary to all evidence, it would not be right to assume such body etc. for the released man. But this could be said with equal force with regard to Pleasure also: that the eternality of Pleasure being contrary to all evidence, it is not right to assume such pleasure for the released Soul.

(3) Inasmuch as the absolute cessation of metempsychic pain could be spoken of as 'Pleasure,' there would be no incongruity (in the view that Pleasure consists in the cessation of Pain), even though there be scriptural texts describing Release as 'Pleasure.' That is to say, even though there be certain scripture-texts to the effect that 'absolute pleasure belongs to the released man,'—yet, such texts could very well be taken as using the word 'pleasure' in the sense of 'absolute cessation of pain;' in fact in ordinary parlance, we often find the word 'pleasure' used to denote the cessation or absence of pain. [So that the view that Final Release consists in the cessation of pain is quite in keeping with the said texts].

(4) Further, * until there is a renunciation of the desire for eternal pleasure, there can be no attaining of Final Release; for the simple reason that all desire or attachment has been held to be a *bondage*. That is to say, if it be held that in Final Release eternal pleasure is manifested, then, in accordance with this view, whenever a man would put forth activity for the attaining of Final Release, he would do so only under the influence of a desire for the eternal pleasure; and being so influenced, he could never attain Final Release; nor would be deserve the attainment of Final Release; as desire of all kinds has been held to be a bondage; and it is not possible that a man should be *released* while he is under *bondage*!

† On the other hand, when a man is free from desire for pleasure, there is no longer any feeling of aversion or

* The reading '*syaprahāṇā*' gives no sense; the 'Pandit' edition, as also all the manuscripts consulted, read '*syāprahāṇā*.'

† This is added in anticipation of the following objection:—"If Final Release consists of the removal of pain, then man's activity towards it could be due only to aversion to pain; and aversion is as much a bondage as desire." The sense of the reply is that there is real aversion only so long as there is no desire for something,—the aversion being against that which obstructs the fulfilment of the desire.

undesirability (with regard to anything). In other words, when the man's desire for eternal pleasure has disappeared, the desire for eternal pleasure being not there to obstruct (his path towards Final Release), [and the activity towards Release thus emanating from one who has renounced desire],—whether the man does, or does not, really obtain eternal pleasure, in either case, there is no doubt as to his attaining Final Release.*

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 88, Line 2 *to* Page 91, Line 5.]

Absolute freedom from the aforesaid is Final Release—says the *Sūṭra*. This means that Final Release consists in † absolute separation from pain, consisting in Body, the Sense-organs, &c.

Some philosophers ‡ have held that Final Release consists in the absolute manifestation of pleasure; they declare that Final Release is only the consummate manifestation or feeling of pleasure. But it cannot be so; as there is no proof; there is no evidence to show that the released Soul experiences eternal pleasure. "It is not right to say that there is no evidence; as there is restriction; § that is to say, the congregation, in the Soul, of pleasure brought about by several causes, is not possible unless there is a restrictive or determining agency (restricting a particular pleasure to a particular Soul); this (fact of congregation) proves that there

* Being free from all desire, when the man betakes himself to activity towards the attaining of Release, he does not care whether the eternal pleasure comes to him or not. As in any case, the activity being of a man who is purified of all desire, there can be no uncertainty as to his attaining Final Release.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† This epithet is necessary with a view to exclude the separation from Body &c., that occurs at the time of universal dissolution,—this separation not being absolute; the Soul being again saddled with these during the next creation.

‡ The Vedānṭins who follow Chiṭsukhāchāryā hold with him, that the Release, that forms the highest end of man, consists in 'unlimited bliss.'

§ The reasoning here put forward is thus explained in the *Parishuḍḍhi* :—Eternal pleasure must be accepted as subsisting in the Soul—because there subsist in it pleasures which are of the same generic kind as the eternal pleasure.

is, in the Soul, an eternal pleasure, being determined or restricted by which the said pleasure brought about by several causes comes to inhere in that particular Soul." This however is not right; firstly, because this reasoning would apply, with equal force, to all those qualities of the Soul that are brought about by several causes; so that like eternal pleasure, eternal pain also, as well as eternal desire and the rest, will have to be assumed for the Soul;—secondly [in case eternal pain is not assumed] the reasoning becomes inconclusive [as pain subsists in the Soul, and yet it is not eternal, so that the basic premiss itself of the reasoning becomes false];—lastly, the precise signification of the word 'manifestation' has not yet been pointed out: in the assertion 'eternal pleasure is manifested', what is the precise signification of 'manifestation'? If* 'manifestation' means cognition or feeling, then it is not possible to determine whether this cognition (of pleasure) is eternal or non-eternal.

If it be held that the cognition (of pleasure) is *not* eternal, then it becomes necessary to point out the cause (whereby the cognition is produced). If Mind-Soul contact be held to be the cause, then it should be pointed out what is the accessory cause of that contact. That is, if you hold that the Mind--Soul contact is the cause of the Cognition, then you should point out its accessory cause; because, as a matter of fact, we find that whenever such products as substances,

* 'Pleasure is only a *quality*, not the very constituent, of the Soul; and as such the pleasure must be something distinct from the Soul. Similarly, cognition also is a quality of the Soul; and it is not possible for the Soul, which is without beginning or end, to be identical with cognition, which has both beginning and end; nor can the Soul be regarded as of the nature of cognition itself; as in every act of cognition, all the three factors of cognition, cogniser and cognised object are apprehended as distinct from one another; and even though the factors of cognition and cognised vary with each particular cognition, the cogniser remains the common factor in all; all which goes to show that the *cogniser*, *i.e.*, the Soul, cannot be the same as the *cognition*. Then again, we have proved in the section on 'Perception' that Pleasure is *not* of the nature of *cognition*; and we shall prove in Aḍhyāya IV that there is nothing that can be self-illumined or self-manifested—*Ṭāṭparya*.

qualities or actions are brought about by contact, this contact never operates independently by itself. It might be urged that the Mind-Soul contact is dependent upon, and is helped by, Pleasure; but this will not be right; as this would be incompatible with the idea of 'Kaivalya' or Final Release. That is to say, if you hold that the Mind-Soul contact becomes the cause of cognition when it is aided by the eternal pleasure subsisting in the Soul,—this will not be right; as this would go against all idea of Final Release. *For, just as this Mind-Soul contact of yours brings about the cognition of pleasure, with the help of its object alone (*i.e.*, of this pleasure), independently of all other agencies,—so, in the same manner, a similar contact could bring about the cognitions of such objects as Colour and the rest, †with the help of these objects alone, (independently of all such other agencies as the Sense-organs and the rest); and this would do away with Final Release altogether; and the Soul would be beset with all sorts of difficulties; as cognitions could be constantly crowding upon it (if they came independently of auxilliary agencies) [With a view to escape from these difficulties] it might be held that ‡the Mind-Soul contact brings about the cognition of (eternal)

Vārṭika Page 89.

* As a matter of fact, in ordinary worldly experience the Mind-Soul contact brings about the cognition of pleasure, with the help of the agency of Merit; if in Final Release, the contact bring about the pleasure independently of Merit, then in the cognition of colour etc., also the auxillary agency of the sense-organs would not be necessary!—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The Chaukhambha edition reads '*Viṣayānanapēkṣamāṇaḥ*'; but from what has gone before, as also from the explanation supplied by the *Ṭāṭparya*, it is clear that the sense demands the reading with a single '*na*'.

‡ "We do not", says the Vēḍānṭin, "mean that the contact depends upon the object alone; what we mean is that it requires exactly the same aid that it does during ordinary worldly existence; *i.e.*, during Final Release also it is aided by Merit; but with this difference that the Merit that brings about the cognition of eternal pleasure is that which is born of Yogic contemplation; while the cognitions of ordinary ephemeral pleasures are bought by ordinary merit."—*Ṭāṭparya.*

pleasure, when aided by the merit born of Yogic contemplation. But this also will not be right; as in that case the cognition of pleasure (*i.e.*, Final Release) would cease on the cessation of the said merit. That is to say, after the Merit born of Yogic contemplation will have become exhausted, what would be there to aid the contact, —this has to be pointed out It will not be right to assert that the merit born of Yogic contemplation is never exhausted; as all that is produced is bound to be transient (perishable). As a matter of fact, everything that has the character of a product is found to be transient; so that if it be held that the merit born of Yogic contemplation is eternal,—our answer would be that to say that it is *born* of Yogic contemplation and is yet eternal would be a contradiction in terms.

If, on the other hand, the cognition (of eternal pleasure) be held to be eternal, —this also will not be right. For the eternality of cognition (of pleasure) stands on the same footing as the eternality of pleasure itself; inasmuch as for the former also there is no proof, and there arises the same incongruity of there being no difference between the released man and the man who is still in the meshes of worldliness; and further (if the cognition of pleasure were eternal) there would be no experiencing of pleasure and pain by turns— (as is actually found to be the case); —then again, if a man were to experience pleasure eternally, then, there would be absolutely no use in making any efforts to obtain Final Release; as no one ever wishes to get rid of, or be *released* from, pleasurable experience (and such experience is eternal, *ex hypothesi*); and [if the effort put forth were held to be for the purpose of obtaining *release* from *pain*], as it would not be possible to differentiate pain from pleasure (as the latter would be eternal), and to regulate his renunciation accordingly, when a man would renounce pain, he would

renounce pleasure*; and further as the man would never experience any pain (his experiencing of pleasure being eternal), for getting rid of what experience would be put forth his effort (for Release)? "As there would be the †obstruction caused by the Body and the rest [which has to be got rid of], the said objection does not hold good; that is to say, the objection, that the man would *for ever* be experiencing everlasting pleasure, does not hold; as the Body and the rest are there to obstruct the experiencing of the everlasting pleasure." This is not right, we reply. For without the Body, the sense-organs etc., no experience is possible; so that [for the experiencing of the everlasting pleasure] an everlasting set of Body etc. will have to be postulated! That is to say, just as for the *released* man you postulate an everlasting pleasure, so you will have to postulate for him an everlasting set of Body and the rest. And a nice release indeed would this be for him! "The eternality of the Body, etc., would be contrary to well-ascertained facts of ordinary perception; and as such no such eternality could be reasonably postulated." This does not help you, we reply; for in the case of Pleasure also, the eternality of any such pleasure as belongs to us (mortal men) would be contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception; so that no such eternality could be reasonably postulated.

There is no proof [in support of the assertion that in Final Release there is manifestation of eternal pleasure]—says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 31, l. 2);—against this the following objection

* 'Under our theory, pleasure becomes an object to be got rid of, as it is accompanied by pain. But if pleasure is eternal, it cannot be accompanied by pain; so that it could never be an object to be got rid of'—*Ṭāṭparya*; and if an ordinary worldly pleasure is not got rid of, there is no Final Release.

† From what follows, '*praṭibanḍha*' appears to be the proper reading in place of '*prabanḍha*'

is raised :—*" What the *Bhāṣya* says is not true ; as all activity is for the purpose of acquiring something desirable. As a matter of fact, we find that in this world whenever a man acts, he does so for the purpose of acquiring something desired by him ; and people who desire to be *released* are found to act ; this action also must be for the obtaining of something desired by them, and such an activity could be useful only if there were such a thing as *eternal pleasure* to be obtained. [And this is a sure proof for the existence of eternal pleasure]."

Vār. P. 90.

† This is not right ; as activity is of two kinds : In ordinary experience we find that there are two kinds of activity : One is for the obtaining of something desirable, and another for the getting rid of something undesirable ; so that it is doubtful whether renunciate mendicancy (which according to the Vēḍānṭin, is a means to Final Release) is for the obtaining of something desirable, or for the getting rid of something undesirable [and so long as this is doubtful, the mere activity of man cannot prove that *Release* consists in *pleasure*, and not in mere *freedom from pain.*]

" But we learn this from the Scriptures : We learn from the Scriptures that for the released Soul there is eternal pleasure ; we are distinctly told that the released Soul becomes happy." This Scripture also has to be carefully pondered over : Does it assert the connection (of the Soul) with eternal pleasure, or the final and absolute separation from pain ? As a matter of fact, in ordinary experience we find people, who have got rid of fever and other diseases, saying—' we are well

* The Scriptures urge man to activity towards the undertaking of measures for the obtaining of Final Release,—a man undertakes an activity only when he wishes to obtain something he desires ;—pleasure is certainly a desired thing ; —this proves that Release consists in pleasure.—*Tāṭparya.*

† The reasoning adduced by the Opponent is by no means conclusive ; as it is one-sided : all that it proves is that Release *may* consist of *pleasure* ; it is equally possible that it *may* consist in mere *cessation of pain.*—*Tāṭparya.*

and and happy.' * Further, if the contemplative renunciate were urged to activity towards the attaining of Final Release by a desire for pleasure, under the impression that the pleasure is eternal,—then it would be impossible for him to obtain that release at all. "Why so?" † For the simple reason that all desire and attachment have been declared to be bonds; desire is a source of *bondage* [so that one who has desire can never be *free*] "Even if the man were urged to activity towards the attaining of Release by aversion,—*i.e.*, with a view to get rid of pain,—even so he could not obtain the Release; as Aversion also is a bond; as both attachment and Aversion are sources of bondage." ‡ It is not so we reply; because of

* This further reasoning is put forward to meet the following argument of the Opponent:—"In all our verbal construction we accept the secondary or figurative meaning only if the Direct or Primary meaning is found incompatible. In the text 'the released Soul is happy', we find no incongruity in the word 'happy' signifying *pleasure*; so that there is no justification for taking it in the secondary sense of *freedom from pain*". Finding this reasoning to be sound, the Author puts forward another argument against the idea of Release consisting in pleasure.

† 'Merit and demerit are real, and not the products of mere illusion; and these can be set aside only by a man who has got rid of all desire. So long as a man is beset with desires, he has to set himself to obtaining the things desired and discarding them after they have been enjoyed; and this process going on without ceasing, the man has no chance for release; the desire is a *bondage*; so that the man seeking for Release should avoid all activity due to desire. Otherwise, even though the desire be only for the lasting pleasure attainable in Release, yet when it has once obtained a footing, the devil of desire will eventually make the man dance attendance on all the several objects of ordinary enjoyment; and would throw him off further from Final Release. For this reason no man should allow any footing to desire in any form. In view of this, in all the scriptural texts that speak of Final Release as 'eternal bliss,' we cannot take the word 'bliss' in the direct sense, of *pleasure*; it must mean *absence from pain*.'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ "So that the Nyāya view of Release being *freedom from pain* is open to the same objections as the Veḍānṭa view that it consists in *pleasure*." The sense of the reply to this, given in the next sentence, is as follows—The *obtaining of pleasure* is detrimental to Final Release on account of its being inextricably mixed up with desire and attachment, which are the direct opposite of that *Vairāgya*, *Freedom from Passion*, which is essential for the man seeking release; the *Discarding of*

its being not detrimental: the discarding of pain is by no means detrimental; as a matter of fact, the man (seeking to get rid of pain) is not moved by aversion; and as he is not moved by aversion, he obtains the freedom from pain, which is not detrimental (to Final Release).

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*[The Author next takes up the conception of 'Final Release' propounded by the *Bauddhas*].

Other philosophers have held that it is the Mind that is *released*; as Desire and the rest (which are the source of bondage) have power over the Mind only; as a matter of fact, it is the Mind which, under the influence of desire &c., comes to be produced under various conditions and in diverse substrata; and so far as the Soul is concerned, Desire and the rest have no influence over it.

This view of Final Release however is not right; as if this were true, then Final Release would be accomplished without any effort; that is to say, those people who hold that Final Release consists in either the non-production or the destruction of the Mind,—for them Final Release would be accomplished without any effort. "Why so?" For the

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pain, on the other hand, is not necessarily mixed up with aversion: a man suffering from pain is not necessarily angry; and anger is the baneful factor in aversion; so that in this latter case there is nothing that is detrimental to the obtaining of Final Release.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* This is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*:—It is only that which is beset with worldliness that can be *released*; Desire, Aversion &c. are the sources of worldliness; these cannot subsist in the Soul, which is eternal; nor can they beset the Soul with worldliness; as that which is eternal can never have its charactor modified in any way: there can be no addition to, or subtraction from, its essence. To this effect we have the following saying:—"Rain and heat have no effect upon the ākāsha; they effect only the skin; if then the Soul is like the skin, then it is transient; if, on the other hand, it is like ākāsha, then it cannot be effected by any pleasure or pain." The Mind, however, is a product, and as such, capable of being beset with worldliness, by desire and the rest; so that it is the Mind which, on being freed from desire &c., becomes *released*.

simple reason that the birth or production of a thing is only for being destroyed (under the theory that everything lasts only for one moment); so that the destruction of that which is born or produced would come about without any effort. "But Final Release consists (not in the destruction of the Mind, but) in the non-production of the series (of momentary minds)."* This also cannot be accepted; as such non-production is not possible; it is not possible to bring about the non-production of the Series; as the Series consists only in the unceasing flow of causes and effects [and this can never come to an end; as so long as the cause is a *cause*, it cannot but bring about its effect]†. "What is brought about is the non-production of what has not yet been produced." But the non-production of what is not produced is already present; so that what is it that is brought about? Thus then, we find that under no circumstances is it possible for Final Release to belong to the Mind.

Vārṭika, Page 91.

"To whom then does Final Release belong?" It belongs to one who is released. "Who is it that is released?" It is the Soul? "What is *Final Release*?" It consists in separation or freedom from Pain and the rest.

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* The series of Minds, wherein each individual is the cause of that which follows it, is usually without beginning or end; but it can come to an end only in the case of a man all whose weaknesses of ignorance and tendencies of past acts have been destroyed by the direct realisation of the Self; and this *destruction* consists in the fact that there is no production of a Mind-unit in the never-ending series; so that the series comes to an end; and this is 'Final Release.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† 'There can be no non-production of that which has been produced; nor can the series be brought to an end; as in the case of no series is it possible to have the *last moment*. For does this *last moment* produce something or not? If it does, then there is no cessation in the line of cause and effect. If it does not, then being unproductive and thus having no effective action, it is as good as non-existent (as according to the Bauḍḍha, *existence* consists only in effective activity); and when that moment is non-existent, the moment preceding it, which is said to be its cause, is not effective; so that also is a non-entity; so on and on carrying the same process backwards, the entire series becomes a non-entity. Under the circumstances, whose cessation would constitute Final Release?'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

LECTURE (4).

The Preliminaries of Reasoning.

[*Sutras* 23 -25.]

DOUBT.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 34, L. 3.]

**Doubt* having been the next in order to appear in the Mention of Categories (in Sū. 1), it is now— after the definition of its predecessor, 'Objects of Cognition'— time to put forward its definition. This definition is now put forward—

Sūtra (23).

DOUBT IS THAT WAVERING JUDGMENT IN WHICH THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF ANY ONE OBJECT IS WANTING, AND WHICH ARISES EITHER—(A) FROM THE COGNITION OF THE CHARACTERS COMMON TO THE OBJECTS CONCERNED, OR (B) FROM THE COGNITION OF CHARACTERS THAT SERVE TO DISTINGUISH AN OBJECT FROM DIVERSE OBJECTS, OR (C) FROM THE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY OPINIONS;—AND THE APPEARING OF SUCH WAVERING JUDGMENTS IS DUE TO THE UNCERTAINTY ATTACHING TO PERCEPTIONS AND NON-PERCEPTIONS.† (Sū. 23).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 34, L. 6 to Page 35, L. 15.]

(A) ‡*Doubt is the wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises from the cognition of characters common to the*

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*The *Parishuddhi* attempts a rational explanation of the order of sequence : All knowledge depending on Pramāṇas, and Pramēyas being the objects sought to be known, these two have been first mentioned. Reasoning in all its details is what is to be explained next; and among all these details Doubt comes first, as until there is Doubt there is no occasion for any reasoning.

†The interpretation of the Sū. by the *Bhāṣya* is different from that of the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*. According to the former the Sūtra puts forward five kinds of Doubt; according to the latter it lays down only three. The translation follows the latter interpretation.

‡According to the *Bhāṣya*, there are five kinds of Doubt described in the Sūtra The first kind of Doubt arises from the cognition of common characters.

objects concerned. For example, when a man perceives the qualities of length and breadth, which are common to man and post, and is desirous of detecting the previously perceived characters that would distinguish the one from the other, there arises in his mind the idea of 'whether it is this or that', and he cannot ascertain whether it is the one or the other; it is this uncertain cognition that constitutes *Doubt*;—and what raises the Doubt is the 'want',* appearing in the form 'I can perceive only such characters as are common to the two things, and do not perceive the distinctive features of either'; it is for this reason that Doubt is called '*that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting*'.

† (B) *Doubt arises from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects*. This is to be thus explained :The word '*anēka*', 'diverse', denotes all those things that are homogeneous and heterogeneous to the thing in question; and Doubt arises from the cognition of characters that distinguish the thing from, or exclude,‡ those 'diverse' objects; as a matter of fact, the specific character of a thing is found to serve both purposes—things are distinguished by them from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things; *e. g.* the presence of Odour distinguishes the Earth from Water and the rest (which being *substances* are homogeneous to Earth), as also from Qualities and Actions (which being not *substances* are heterogeneous to Earth). [As an example of Doubt arising from the cognition of the specific character of a thing, we have the following]—Sound is found to be endowed with such a specific property, in the form of *being produced by disjunction*; and the cognition of this character gives rise to the Doubt as to whether Sound is a Substance, a Quality or an Action. Inasmuch as the specific characters of things are found to serve both purposes (of distinguishing from homogeneous as well as

*The *Tātparya* remarks that the mere presence of this 'want' is not enough; what is meant by the word 'want', '*Apēkṣā*', is the remembrance of the distinctive characters of the things, along with the non-perception of those characters. This is supported by the last sentence of the *Bhāṣya* (p. 35, L. 15).

†This is the second kind of Doubt.

‡The phrase '*tasya anēkasya dharmaḥ*' is explained by the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* in two ways :—(1) *anēkam, tasmāt vishēṣako dharmaḥ*; the words *tasmāt vishēṣakaḥ* being supplied; (2) *tasya anēkasya dharmaḥ, vyāvartakatāyā*. Both interpretations have been combined in the translation.

heterogeneous things), there naturally arises a Doubt as to whether—(a) being an entity, Sound is a *substance* distinguished by the said specific character from Qualities and Actions, or (b) being an entity, it is a Quality distinguished by that character, or (c) being an entity, it is an Action distinguished by that character*. And in this case 'the *want* of cognition of the specific property' is in the form of the idea, 'I do not perceive any such character as would definitely indicate any one of the three (Substance, Quality and Action)'.

†(C) Doubt arises *from the presence of contradictory opinions.* Contradictory notions entertained with regard to one and the same thing constitute 'contradictory opinions'; 'contradiction consisting in mutual enmity, *i. e*, incompatibility. For instance, one system of philosophy asserts that 'the Soul exists', while another declares that 'there is no such thing as Soul', and when no proof one way or the other is available, there is an uncertainty as to the truth; and this constitutes *Doubt.*

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* This explanation has been added with a view to the objection that it is only the remembrance of common properties that gives rise to Doubt, and not that of specific or exclusive properties. The sense of the explanation is that, (1) in the case of the Earth, we know that it is an entity, and on perceiving that it has Odour, we naturally are uncertain as to its being either a Substance or a Quality or an Action; all of which are *entities*, like the Earth; and the presence of Odour distinguishes it equally from all the three. (2) Similarly in the case of Sound; it is an *entity*, like Substance, Quality and Action; so when we find that the presence of the character of being produced by disjunction distinguishes it equally from all entities—just as much from other Qualities, as from Substances and Actions—there arises the Doubt as to its being a Substance, a Quality or an Action.

This is the *Bhāṣya's* answer. The answer of the *Vārṭika* is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—It is true that the character of being produced by disjunction has never been found in Substances, &c., but the absence of that character is found equally in all—in Substances, in Qualities, in Actions; so that when Sound is found to possess this character, as also the character of being an entity,—the latter being common to Substances, Qualities, and Actions—there arises the Doubt—'Being distinguished from Substances and Actions by the character of being produced by disjunction, is Sound a Quality? Or being distinguished from Qualities and Actions, it is a Substance? Or being distinguished from Qualities and Substances, it is an Action? Thus in this case the specific character brings to mind the other things only by negation, *i. e.*, by reason of its *absence* being common to all

†*This is the third kind of Doubt.*

*(D) Doubt also arises from *uncertainty attaching to perceptions.* As a matter of fact, there is perception of really-existing water, as in the tank and such other reservoirs; there is perception also of non-existent water, in the rays of the Sun (appearing in the mirage); so that when in any particular case there is perception of water, and yet there is no proof available which would determine the real character of what is perceived, there arises a Doubt as to whether the water perceived is really existent or non-existent.

†(E) Doubt also arises from *uncertainty attaching to non-perceptions.* As a matter of fact we find that even really existing things are not perceived; *e. g.* we do not perceive the water within the roots and branches of trees; and there is non-perception also of what is non-existent; *e. g.* of what is not produced at all, or what has been destroyed; so that whenever there is non-perception of a thing, there arises the Doubt as to whether what is not perceived really exists, or it does not exist at all. In this case also the 'want of cognition of the specific character' is as before.

‡In the first two kinds of Doubt, the 'common properties' and the 'properties distinguishing an object from diverse objects' are such as subsist in the object cognised; while in the fourth kind, the 'perception' and 'non-perception' subsist in the cognising person; and it is only by reason of this difference or peculiarity that these have been mentioned separately.

The definition common to all forms of Doubt comes to be this:—'Doubt is a wavering judgment which arises from the apprehension of things possessed of common properties,§ proceeding from the cognition of common properties, and depending upon the remembrance of specific properties.'

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*This is the fourth kind of Doubt, according to the *Bhāṣya*.

†This is the fifth kind of Doubt, according to the *Bhāṣya*.

‡The *Bhāṣya* regards the 'uncertainty attaching to Perception' and the 'uncertainty attaching to non-perceptions' as distinct and independent causes of Doubt; and so proceeds to show here that the Doubts aroused by these uncertainties cannot be included in those aroused by the cognition of 'common characters' or of 'characters distinguishing the object from diverse objects.' This view is controverted by the *Vārṭika* (Page 99, Line 21, *et. seq.*)—*Ṭāṭparya*.

The *Vārṭika* takes the first *samānadharma* as a Bahuvrīhi compound.

Vārṭika.

[P. 91, L. 6 to P. 105, L. 7.]

After the treatment of the Objects of Cognition comes the turn of *Doubt.* What is meant by the words of the *Bhāṣya*, '*sṭhānavaṭo lakṣaṇam*' is that the Sūṭra now proceeds to provide the definition of *Doubt*, whose turn comes after the *Objects of Cognition.*

What the *Sūṭra* means is that there are three kinds of Doubt—arising, (1) from the cognition of '*samānaḍharma*'; (2) from the cognition of '*anēkaḍharma*' and (3) from '*vipraṭipaṭṭi*'; the other words of the *Sūṭra* being taken as qualifying adjuncts. The meaning of the definition is that that cognition, which does not apprehend with certitude the character of this or that particular object, and which arises from the three aforesaid causes,—the cognition of 'samānadharma' and the rest,—is called 'Doubt.'

* "The assertion that the cognition does not apprehend with certitude involves a contradiction in terms; it forms the very-nature of a cognition that it apprehends things with certitude; so that if a cognition does not apprehend an object with certitude, it loses its character of 'cognition.'"

This is not right; as the cognition makes known itself; what is apprehended is the form of the cognition itself; and it does not apprehend the form of the object; and thus, inasmuch as the Doubt (even though not apprehending its object) is itself apprehended, *praṭīyaṭē*, it is rightly called '*praṭyaya*', 'Cognition' [the word '*praṭyaya*' literally meaning *praṭīyaṭē yaḥ saḥ*].†

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* We perceive in this an echo of the well-known declaration of Shabara—*vipraṭiṣiḍḍhamiḍamuchyatē bravīṭi viṭaṭhañchēṭi*;

† This answer is given by the *Varṭika* on the admission that the word 'praṭyaya' stands for *certain cognition*; so that even though there is no such cognition of the *object* of Doubt, there is such cognition of the Doubt itself. As a matter of fact however the word 'praṭyaya' is only a synonym for 'jñāna,' simply *cognition*, not necessarily *cognition with certitude*; and as this generic character of 'cognition' belongs to Doubtful Cognition also, there is nothing wrong in its being called '*praṭyaya*.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

[A.] In the compound '*samānaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*', 'the word '*samāna*' means *common*, the meaning of the compound being 'from the cognition of the *common* character.' "What is it that is *common*? Is it a *quality* or a *genus*?* If it is a *quality* that cannot be 'common.' Why so? Because the shape (of *uprightness* as belonging to the Man and the Post) subsists in a single substance; as a matter of fact, *shape* (which is a typical quality) subsists in a single object; how then can it be *common* to a number of objects? Nor will it be right to regard the genus as the common factor; as such a genus would not subsist in the substance; for instance the genus of 'uprightness' subsists, not in the upright *substance*, but in the

Vār. P. 92. quality, the particular shape; and the genus of 'uprightness' subsisting in the *shape* cannot give rise to *doubt* in regard to the *substance*. Specially as quality (the upright shape) is known with certitude (before the doubt arises as to the nature of the thing); so that, that wherein the genus subsists is already known with certitude." This objection is not well taken; as the word '*sāḍhāraṇa*', 'common,' is explained differently (from what has been made as the basis of the objection). We do not mean that it is either the quality or the genus that is 'common'; what is meant by 'common' is *similarity*; the idea (in the case of Doubt) being in the form—'the two things, man and post, that I have previously seen, possessed the property of uprightness,—and the property that I am perceiving now is one that is *similar* to that uprightness.'

† By the '*upapaṭṭi*' of that 'common character' is meant its *cognition*; so that the clause '*samānasya ḍharmasya*

* In the case of the man and the post, *uprightness* is one of the 'common' characters; is this uprightness a quality or a genus? If it is a quality, it cannot be common to two things. If it is a genus, then the genus 'uprightness' will subsist in the *quality* of uprightness, and not in the upright *object*, man or post.

† This anticipates the objection that the word '*upapaṭṭi*' denotes mere *existence*, and there is nothing to show that the sūṭra means the *cognition* of common property.

upapaṭṭēḥ' is equivalent to *'sadṛishasya ḍharmasya upalabdhēḥ,'* 'from the cognition of the common character.' "Why does not the *sūṭra* simply use the word '*samānaḍharmopalabdhēḥ*' [if it really means what it is said it does mean]?" (a) Inasmuch as the sense that would be got at by the use of this word is implied even without its use, it would be superfluous to reiterate what is already implied. "By what is the sense implied?" By the term '*vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*' 'in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting.' "How is it implied by this term?" What is meant by the 'apēkṣā' or 'want' of the 'specific character' is its '*ākāṅkṣā*', 'a desire for it;' and this desire or want is possible only if the 'specific character' *is not-cognised*; so that what the Sūṭra means by saying that there is 'want' of the specific character, is that the *specific* character is *not cognised*, and this clearly implies that the *common* character *is* cognised; for if it were meant that the person perceives neither the *specific* nor the *common* character, then it would be absolutely useless to add the phrase 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character.' And on the strength of this we conclude that the fact that the common character *is cognised* is implied. (b) Or, we may regard the word '*upapaṭṭi*' as synonymous with *upalabḍhi*; the word '*upapaṭṭi*' denoting capability of being *amenable to the Instruments of Right Cognition*; and this is the same as *being cognised*; as a thing whose existence is not cognised is as good as non-existent [so that when the word '*upapaṭṭi*' denotes *existence*, it implies its *cognition*]. "But what similarity would there be between the existent and the

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There are three answers to this objection; the second is given in the text, line 14 and the third in the line 18. The three answers are thus summed up in the *Parishuḍḍhi*—'The purport of the first answer is that what is meant as *cognition* is implied by the word *vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*; the second answer means that word '*upapaṭṭi*' itself has several meanings; and one of these is *cognition*; the sense of the third answer is that even though the word '*upapaṭṭi*' directly denotes mere *existence*, yet it indirectly indicates *cognition* also.

non-existent [Which similarity you speak of by saying that it would be '*as good as* non-existent'] ?" The similarity would consist in both not being the object of the Instruments of right cognition; the non-existent thing by itself is never an object of an instrument of right cognition so that the *non-existent* thing also fulfills the condition of being *not cognised*. [Hence 'existence' may be regarded as synonymous with 'being cognised.'] (c) Or the word '*upapaṭṭi*' denoting the *object* of cognition, may be taken as implying the *cognition* itself; so that the phrase 'the *upapaṭṭi* of the common character' may be taken as implying the *cognition* of that character; and this method of interpretation is quite in keeping with the methods employed in common usage; for instance' men make such statements as 'fire is inferred from smoke,' where the word 'perception' is not mentioned; and yet on the strength of what is actually meant by the assertion, people accept the presence of the word 'perception,' and the sentence to mean 'having *seen* smoke one infers fire.'

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[Some Logicians make the following observations in regard to the *Sūṭra*]—"It is necessary to add the word '*avyavachchhēḍahēṭoḥ*,' to the definition. That is to say, the word '*samānaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*' that we find in the *Sūṭra* should have added to it the word '*avyavachchhēḍahēṭoḥ*', —the sense of the definition being that 'Doubt is that wavering judgment which arises from the cognition of that common character *which does not serve the purpose of preclusion*'. This addition is essential, as the mere 'cognition of common character' cannot be a source of Doubt; if it were, then the cognition of the character of *being a product* would also give rise to Doubt (as to the transitory character of Sound); as it is a *character common* to all transitory things; as a matter of fact, however it does gives rise, not to Doubt (but to *certainty*, in the shape of the

conception 'sound is transitory because it is a product'); and this for the simple reason that it does *serve the purpose of precluding* (the absence of transitory character from Sound)."*

This position is not tenable, we reply. For it is clear that the true significance of the epithet '*samāna*', 'common', has not been grasped. As a matter of fact it is not possible for one and the same character to be 'common' and 'serve the purpose of preclusion or differentiation'; as that character is said to 'serve the purpose of preclusion or differentiation' which, while subsisting in all things meant to be homogeneous with the thing in question, does not subsist in anything heterogeneous to it; and certainly this is not what is meant by a 'common' character; that character is called 'common' which, while subsisting in all things meant to be homogeneous with the thing in question, does also subsist in things heterogeneous to it. For these reasons it is not necessary to add the qualification 'which does not serve the purpose of preclusion.'

†The meaning of the *Sūṭra* is that the 'common character', as described above, when perceived, becomes a source of Doubt. "Does the common character alone, by itself,

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*The author puts forward here an exception taken to the definition by an Ekaḍēshin.—

His view is as follows—There are many common characters that also serve the purpose of preclusion; *e. g.*, *being a product* is common to all transitory things; subsisting in Sound as also in the jar and all such things; and yet the cognition of this character of *being a product* is not found to give rise to a *Doubt* with regard to eternality; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the said character does serve the purpose of precluding the absence of transitory character from Sound. Hence it is necessary to add that the common character, whose cognition leads to Doubt, is one which does not serve the purpose of preclusion. Otherwise the cognition of arising from the premiss 'Sound is a product' would fall within the definition of 'Doubt'.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† In the case of the man and the post, the perception of hands, face, &c., and the non-perception of crevices, &c., would give rise to the certainty that it is a man; on the other hand, the perception of the crevices and the non-perception of hands, &c. would bring about the certainty of negation, that it is not a man. So by the phrase 'on account of the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions,' what is meant is the absence of any means of cognition which could afford either the

give rise to the Doubt?' No; it does so, not by itself alone, but through '*the uncertainty that attaches to perceptions and non-perceptions.*' That is to say, Doubt is aroused, because perceptions and non-perceptions are not certain. "Is this enough to give rise to Doubt?" By no means, we reply; Doubt arises only—(1) when there is a want or absence of the cognition of the specific character of any one thing, (2) when there is cognition of a common character, and (3) when there is no certainty in perception or non-perception in regard either to the thing being this or that particular thing, or to its being not that thing; so that the 'want of cognition of the specific character of any one thing' is an essential element in the cause of Doubt. "Does the cause of Doubt consist in all the aforesaid three factors collectively, or in each of them severally?" Our reply is that it consists in all the three taken collectively. For [in case each of the three were regarded as a cause of Doubt] (a) if 'the cognition of common character' alone were the cause of Doubt, then in a case where one does perceive the specific character of one of the two objects, as 'the cognition of common character' would be there, there should arise Doubt in his mind* [whereas as a matter of fact when there is perception of the specific character of any one object, there is no Doubt];—(b) similarly, if merely the 'uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions' were the sole cause of Doubt, then, inasmuch as there may be cases where there is no perception of any common character, and yet there is 'uncertainty attaching to perception and non-perception', Doubt might arise in such cases also†;—(c)

positive cognition, or its contrary, the negative cognition. And the phrase 'want of cognition of the specific character' indicates that and there is remembrance of such a character.—*Tātparya.*

* This absurdity becomes precluded if the 'want of cognition of the specific character' of any one object, is made a necessary factor in the cause of Doubt.

† This absurdity is precluded by having as a necessary condition, 'the cognition of common character.' Instances of such a contingency would be with regard-

lastly, if 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object' were the sole condition for Doubt, then, even in a case where the man does not perceive any 'common character', as there may be remembrance of the specific character of an object,* (and no cognition of that character, as this cognition would be wanting) Doubt should be possible.† Similarly, [in case only any two of the three conditions mentioned were regarded as the cause of the Doubt] (*a*) if we accept the definition to consist of only the two clauses—' arising from the cognition of common characters' and ' on account of the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions,'—[that will not be a correct definition as], no Doubt arises in the mind of a man who is either moving along in a boat, or on a conveyance, or is swinging in a swing‡;—(*b*) similarly, if, the definition consisted of only the two clauses,—' on account of the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions' and ' wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object',—then, Doubt would be possible in regard to things not perceived at all §;—(*c*) lastly, if, the definition consisted of only

to such non-entities as the 'seventh flavour' or 'the tenth substance'—the Doubt being in the form 'this thing that' I perceive, is this the seventh flavour or the tenth substance?'.—*Ṭāṭparya and Parishuḍḍhi.*

* And there is no perception of that character; so that there is want of cognition of it.

† This absurdity is precluded by making the cognition of common character a necessary condition.

‡ When a man is moving in a boat or in a litter, or is swinging on a swing, he perceives a certain thing with height and thickness.—thus there being a cognition of a character common to several things,—and there is no certainty as to the thing being this or that particular thing,—until there comes to the mind of the man some idea of the specific character of either a *tree* or an *elephant*. Whereas if the first two conditions alone were essential, Doubt should arise in this case also. It does not arise however; and the reason lies in the absence of the third condition—*Ṭāṭparya.*

§ As in this case both the said conditions would be present; what is absent is the cognition of common characters; and it is on account of this absence that no Doubt does arise.

the two clauses,—'arising from the cognition of common characters' and 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object,'—then, as a matter of fact, we find that in a case, when there is 'cognition of common characters,' and there is also the 'want of cognition of the specific character of any one object,' yet, if there is a *certainty* attaching to the perception or non-perception of the thing concerned, there does not arise any Doubt at all; * for instance, an observer perceives a thing, as endowed with certain generic and specific characters, and there arises a certainty in his mind, as to what he is perceiving and what he is not perceiving;—that same observer having moved off to a certain distance from the thing, the specific characters, which subsist in fewer things, cease to be perceived by him, on account of the remoteness caused by his motion, and what he perceives is only that common or generic character, which subsists in a large number of things,—(notwithstanding this however) the certainty in his mind is still there, as to what he is perceiving, and what he is not perceiving, and there is also present in his mind, the idea of the specific character of the particular thing;—and yet with all this, there does not arise any Doubt [which, under the proposed definition, should arise]. Thus then, having rejected the views that the

* Going to the garden, the man perceives an object, with leaves and blossoms with birds singing on the branches, and so forth; he knows with certainty, that he is perceiving the *tree*, and he is not perceiving the elephant;— he moves off to a distance, from where he fails to perceive the branches and flowers, &c., which belong specially to the *tree*, and perceives only the height and thickness, which are properties common to the tree and the elephant; but the certainty in his mind is still there, as to the thing being a tree, and not an elephant; and he has in his mind the idea of the presence of branches and flowers, &c., so that there is 'cognition of common characters'; there is also a 'want of cognition of the specific characters of the thing'; and, thus both the conditions of the proposed definition being present, there should arise a Doubt as to the object being a tree or an elephant. As a matter of fact however, no Doubt can arise, as long as the man is certain as to its being a *tree* and not an *elephant*; so that absence of this certainty should be an essential factor in the defini ion of Doubt.—*Tātparya*.

definition consists of any one or any two clauses only (of the Sūṭra), we conclude that all the three clauses collectively constitute the correct definition of Doubt. We have rejected each of the three single-clause definitions proposed to consist of either—(a) the clause 'arising from the cognition of common characters', or (b) the clause 'from the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions', or (c) the clause 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object'; and we have also rejected each of the three two-clause definitions proposed to consist of either —(a) the two clauses, 'arising from the cognition of common characters , and 'from the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions', or (b) the two clauses, 'arising from the cognition of common characters' and 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object', or (c) the two clauses, 'from the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions' and 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object';— all these rejections are obtained by accepting the definition to consist in all the three clauses collectively. And it is for this reason that the author of the Sūṭra has defined Doubt as '*the wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises from the cognition of common characters; . . . being due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions*';— from which it is clear that the whole of this forms a single definition.

The *Sūṭra* uses the word '*vimarṣaḥ*', 'wavering judgment'; and this means *judgment* pertaining to several (mutually contradictory or incompatible) things. That such is the meaning is proved by the fact that Doubt touches—*i. e.* apprehends—both the things (with regard to which the Doubt arises).

The word '*samshayaḥ*' has the sense of the abstract noun, being equivalent to '*samshīṭiḥ*', 'the character of

being asleep'; or it may be taken as having the sense of the instrumental, the meaning being 'that *by which* the Soul is made to sleep',—*i. e.* by the force of which the Soul appears as if it were asleep. "What is the import of the simile ('the Soul is as if it were asleep')?" The similarity lies in the non-ascertainment of the real character of things*.

The above explanation of the first kind of Doubt also explains the other two kinds of Doubt referred to by the words (b) *anēkaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*', '*arising from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects*', and (c) '*vipraṭipaṭṭēḥ*', '*from the presence of contradictory opinions.*' "What do you mean by this application of one explanation to several cases?" What we mean is that just as in the case of the first word ('*samānaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*'), we took the definition of Doubt to consist in the three words ('*samānaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*', *upalabḍhyanupalabḍhyavyavasthāṭaḥ* and *vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*'), and rejected the view that the definition consists of either each one of the three terms or of any two of the three terms—so also in the case of the two terms that appear (in the Sūṭra) after the first word [each of the two terms should be taken as a distinct definition, along with the words '*upalabḍhyanupalabḍhyavyavasṭhāṭaḥ* and *vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*'].

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[B] '*Anēkaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ samshayaḥ*', '*Doubt* (of the second kind) *arises from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects*',—says the *Sūṭra*. [On this, the *Bhāṣya*, p. 34, L. 10,—"*The word 'diverse' denotes all those things that are homogeneous and heterogeneous to the thing in question; and Doubt arises from the cognition of characters that distinguish the thing from, or exclude, those diverse objects.*' With a view to grasp the

*The man in Doubt is as uncertain as to the real character of the thing before him as the man who is asleep.

meaning of this passage, the Author puts forward and criticises the explanation proposed by some *Ēkaḍēshins*].—Some people have proposed the following interpretation:—" The compound '*anēkaḍharma*' should be taken as '*anēkasya ḍharmaḥ*', 'the character of diverse objects', and also as '*anēkaḥ-ḍharmaḥ*', 'diverse characters'. For instance, the character of *being produced by conjunction* is '*anēkasya ḍharmaḥ*', as it is a character belonging to such diverse things as Substance, Quality and Action; and as '*anēkah ḍharmaḥ*', 'diverse characters', we have such characters as *being produced by conjunction, being without qualities, and being without action*; and both these kinds of characters subsist in Sound; so that from the cognition of such characters (as subsisting in Sound there arises Doubt (as to Sound being a Substance, a Quality, or an Action)."

This interpretation is not right; as the Doubt arising in this manner would be included under that which has been defined as 'arising from the cognition of common characters'. That is to say, the one character that subsists in diverse things, as well as the diverse characters that subsist in any one thing, are both included under the 'common characters' mentioned in the clause 'from the cognition of common characters'; so that the Doubt arising from the cognition of such characters would be included under this first clause *; and no special purpose would be served by the mention of the second word '*anēkāḍharmopapaṭṭēh.*'

*Sound is *produced by conjunction* ; and being *produced by conjunction* it subsists in all transient substances, as also in such qualities as Colour and the rest ; so the this quality, which has been cited as an example of '*anēkasya ḍharmaḥ*', is only '*samānaḍharmaḥ*', a character common to several things. Of the 'diverse qualities' '*anēkaḥ ḍharmaḥ*' mentioned, *being produced by conjunction* subsists in Substances Qualities and Actions ; *being without qualities* subsists in Qualities and Actions; *being without action* also subsists in Qualities and Actions ; so those also are 'common characters'; and it is only because these are *common* to a number of things—*i. e.* they are *samānaḍharma*—that they give rise to Doubt. And this Doubt falls under the first category, 'that which arises from the cognition of common characters.'—*Tāṭparya.*

"What then is the true meaning of the expression '*anēkaḍharmaḥ*'.

(1) * The true meaning is *the specific character*, the character peculiar to, belonging exclusively to, the thing concerned. "How can the compound word '*anēkaḍharmaḥ*' denote the *specific character*?" For the simple reason that the *specific character* serves the purpose of differentiating the thing from homogeneous and heterogeneous things. The word '*anēka*', 'diverse', stands for the homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is from these that the said character differentiates the thing;—the compound '*anēkaḍharmaḥ*' being interpreted either as '*anēkasmāṭ vishēṣaḥ*', 'differentiating from diverse things', or (as the *Bhāṣya* interprets it) '*ṭasya anēkasya ḍharmaḥ*', (the character which belongs, by serving to exclude them, to each of the diverse things.')

(2) †Or, '*anēkaḍharmaḥ*' may be explained as 'that character which is the cause or basis of the notion of oneness and diversity of the thing'; that is to say, that from which arises the notion 'this is the same, that is different'; of the notion of 'this is the same,' the basis consists in *non-difference*; while that of the notion of diversity, the basis consists in *difference*,—*i. e.*, that character which distinguishes one thing from another. As an example of such '*anēkaḍharma*' we have the character of *being produced by disjunction*, as subsisting in Sound [the said character being the basis of the notion of *one-ness* or *sameness*, with the said Sound, which we have with regard to all Sounds produced by disjunction; and being also the basis of the notion of diversity or difference from the said Sound which we have with regard to Sounds other than

*This answer is in accordance with the *Bhāṣya*. Another explanation is given below. *Text*, line 13.

† '*Anēkam*'-*ēkañcha anēkañcha*; and the character which forms the basis of these two,—*i. e.* of the thing being different from one and non-different from another thing—is called '*anēkaḍharma*'.

those produced by disjunction.] And this *character of being produced by disjunction* as subsisting in Sound,—which is already distinguished from Community, Individuality and Inference by reason of such characters as being endowed with the community of 'being' and so forth (which can never belong to Community, Individuality and Inherence)—gives rise to the Doubt as to that Sound being a Substance, a Quality or an Action; as neither of these latter—Substance, Quality or Action—is ever found to be *produced by disjunction*; so that the character of *being produced by disjunction*, not being found anywhere except in Sound,—and as such serving to distinguish or exclude Sound from everything else (in the shape of Substance &c.)—gives rise to the said Doubt.*

"But disjunction itself is something produced by dis junction [one disjunction being produced by another], and disjunction is a Quality [so that, the character of *being produced by disjunction*, when found to subsist in Sound, should be the basis of the well-ascertained cognition that 'Sound is a *Quality*', and *not* to the Doubt as to whether it is a Substance, a Quality, or an Action]" True; but the said character (of being produced by disjunction) gives rise to Doubt only in the mind of the man who does not admit of disjunction

*Sound is possessed of the community of 'being'; according to the Logician no community can subsist in Community, Individuality or Inherence. So that by the presence of the community of 'being' Sound is distinguished from Community Individuality and Inherence. Substance, Quality and Action are possessed of the community of 'being', in common with Sound; but Sound has the character of *being produced by disjunction*, which is not found in Substance, Quality and Action. So that the said character not being present in any of these three, the absence of it is common to all; so that there arises the Doubt in the following form—'Sound, which is non-different from Substance, &c., because possessed of the character of Being,—is it a Substance, being distinguished from Quality and Action by the character of being produced by disjunction, which is not present in these two? or is it a Quality, being distinguished as before from Substance and Action? Or is it an Action, being distinguished as before from Substance and Quality? Here the said character brings to mind Substance, &c., not because it subsists in them, but because it is *absent* from them; and hence it is regarded as a *specific character* of Sound.

being produced by disjunction;* while in the mind of one who admits of such disjunction, it does give rise to the certain cognition;—the reasoning in his mind being that 'Sound is a Quality, because it is produced by disjunction, like the disjunction that is produced by disjunction'. And in order to meet this latter case (of the man who admits of disjunction) we say that what forms the basis of the said Doubt in regard to Sound is its character of having *disjunction produced by disjunction* for its immaterial cause; as certainly this last character subsists in Sound

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only; as it is Sound alone that is produced by disjunction; so that what is meant by the assertion that 'the character of being produced by disjunction is the cause of Doubt' is that Doubt is produced by the character of *being produced by such disjunction as is produced by disjunction*; and certainly this character never subsists apart from Sound; so that serving to exclude Sound from all other things, it becames a source of Doubt, with reference to things that are homogeneous to Sound, as well as those that are heterogeneous to it; as a specific character is actually found to serve both purposes (*i.e.* of distinguishing a thing from homogeneous as well as from heterogeneous things). †

* As a matter of fact it is only the Vaishēṣika that admits of disjunction being produced by disjunction.

† When a piece of bamboo is cleft open with force there is a cracking sound produced; and it is produced by the disjunction or separation between the two pieces of the bamboo; and also by the disjunction of the fibres from the ākāsha enclosed between them, the former disjunction being the efficient, and the latter the non-material cause. So that the Sound has for its non-material cause the disjunction of the fibres from the enclosed ākāsha; and this disjunction is itself produced by the disjunction between the two fibres themselves.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* is not satisfied with all this. "Notwithstanding all that the *Vārtika* says, there is, as a matter of fact, no flaw in the reasoning where the character of being produced by disjunction is made the basis for regarding Sound as a Quality; no Substance or Action is ever found to be produced by Disjunction. For if the Disjunction subsists in things that do not form the constituent factors of the

(3) [Another interpretation of the expression *anēkadharmaḥ*' is suggested]—Inasmuch as the '*samānadharma*' 'common character', has already been mentioned (as a cause of Doubt), the word '*anēkadharma*' must be taken to mean its contrary, the *asāmāna*, or *specific*, *ḍharma* or *character*. Or, out of the two well-known causes of Doubt,—*i. e.* out of 'common character' and 'specific character',—the first is already mentioned by the first term of in the *Sūṭrā*, '*samānaḍharmaḥ*'; so that what remains to be mentioned is the second cause, the '*asamānaḍharmaḥ*'; hence it must be this that is mentioned by means of the term '*anēkaḍharma.*' "Why then does the *Sūṭra* not use the expression *samānāsamā naḍharmahapaṭṭeḥ* ?"

It would not be right, to use such an expression ;—(1) because in that case, we could not get at the sense of *the character being excluded from diverse objects* [*anēkasmāḍ vyāvriṭṭaḥ ḍharmaḥ*, which can be got at only if we have the expression *anēkaḍharma*];—(2) the use of the expression in the sūṭra may be said to be due to a desire for simplicity or brevity: the Sūṭra has used the expression '*samānānēkaḍharma*' instead of '*samānāsamānaḍharma*', as it contains one letter less than this latter. "Well, if the expression '*anēkadharma*' means only *asāḍhāraṇa dharma*, *specific character*,—and if it is this specific character of a thing that is the cause of Doubt with regard to it,—then Doubt should arise from such a reasoning as this: 'the living body is not without soul, as if it were so, it would be without breathing &c.,' [as the character of *being endowed with breathing* &c., is one that

Substance, then it is not a cause at all of that Substance; and if it does subsist in the constituent particles of the Substance, then it only serves to destroy the conjunction or cohesion among these particles; and thereby forms the cause of the *destruction* of the Substance. Of Action also Disjunction can never be the cause. So that the character of being produced by Disjunction can belong to Quality only. And so the said character cannot in any case give rise to the said Doubt And yet the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* have made an attempt to find an explanation simply with a view to justify the Bhāṣya in the selection of its example."

is peculiar to, belongs specifically to, *the living body only.*] [and yet this is a reasoning the Logician has employed to prove *with certainty* the presence of Soul in the body.]"*

This objection does not affect our position at all; for in the case of the 'common character' also, because a certain 'common character' gives rise to Doubt it does not follow that Doubt would arise even when that 'common character' is one that is common to *all things*; for† there is no failure in the universality of the character which is common to all things;—similarly in the case of the character which is not present in things (other than the one in question), even though the character may be 'peculiar' to that thing, what determines whether it will bring about Doubt or certainty is the failure or otherwise (of the universality of the absence of the character in other things); so that when there is failure of this, the character becomes a source of Doubt, and when there is no failure in this, the character brings about a well-ascertained Cognition.‡

"Well, if in the case of both (the *common character* and the specific *character*) the fact of their being the source of Doubt rests upon their failure (of the universality of their presence and absence respectively) then both would be included in the single word '*samānadharmopapattēḥ*';§ so that being included in the first, the second source of Doubt should not have been mentioned apart by itself." It is

* This objection is based on the notion that what makes the specific character the cause of Doubt is the fact of its exclusion from a number of things.—*Tātparya.*

† From what follows the correct reading appears to be '*Anvayāvyabhichārāt.*'

‡ The Chaukhambha series edition reads this sentence thus—

व्यतिरेकिणोऽपि वस्तुसाधारणत्वे विपर्ययवत्स्वरूपसत्त्वाव्यभिचाराद् हेतुभाव इति । तस्मात् नैकवृत्तित्वमनेकवृत्तित्वं संशयकारणत्वमनिर्णयहेतुत्वे वा हेतुः किन्तर्हि साधारणासाधारणत्वे सति व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारौ संशयनिर्णयहेतू ।

But the reading of the *Bibliotheca Indica* Edition gives better sense.

§ The 'fallibility' or 'failure' of the Probans of a reasoning consists in its subsisting in both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*; in which case it is 'common'; so that if 'fallibility' is the sole basis of Doubt, all sources of Doubt should be included under 'that which arises from the cognition of common characters."

true that there is no other cause of Doubt save 'failure'; but there is this difference between the two forms of Doubt mentioned in the Sūṭra, that, though in both cases there is failure,' yet in one case there is *failure* of what is *affirmed*; while in the other case there is *failure* of what is *denied*, that is to say, the expression 'arising from the perception of common characters' indicates the 'failure' of what is *affirmed*; while the mention of the specific character of *being produced by disjunction* indicates the 'failure' of what is denied; and it is on the basis of this difference that the two have been mentioned separately.*

(4) [Having put forward his own view, the Author of the *Vārṭika* puts forward another interpretation, with a view to showing its incongruity]—Some people have explained the word '*anēkadharmopapaṭṭeḥ*' in the following manner:—"The negative particle signifies preclusion; so that the word '*anēkadharma* means *the presence of two such characters as are not fallible or deficient*; that is, '*anēka*' is that *which is other than 'one'*; so that the word '*anēkadharmaḥ*' must signify the presence of two such infallible characters as are mutually contradictory; a reasoning where this condition is present has been called '*praṭiṭarka*', 'counter-reasoning'; and this is a source of doubt; e. g. the two characters of *being audible* and *being a product* as subsisting in Sound (give rise to the doubt as to Sound being eternal or non-eternal).†"

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* It is true that in both cases, there is 'common factor;' but in the first case, what is common is the *presence* of the character in question, while in the second case it is the *absence* of the character that is common.

† In regard to Sound we have the two reasonings—'Sound is eternal because it is audible, like the genus *shabḍaṭva*'; and 'Sound is non-eternal becaus it is a product.' Here 'being audible' is just as infallible in proving eternality as 'being a product' is in proving non-eternality; they are mutually contradictory, as leading to contradictory conclusions; so they are the source of the Doubt as to whether Sound is eternal or non-eternal.

This interpretation is not right; as what is here put forward is impossible; as a matter of fact, it is *not* possible for any two really *infallible* characters, which are mutually contradictory, to subsist in any one thing; for the simple reason that any *one* thing cannot have *two* forms; and if two mutually contradictory characters were really *infallible* (true), then the single thing (to which they belong) would come to have two forms; such however is never found to be the case; so it must be admitted that both the characters are not *infallible* or true. Further, the counter-reasoning that has been put forward (as affording the analogy for the subsisting of contradictory characters in a single thing) is not quite right. For, in the first place, if the man putting forward the counter-reasoning were to say 'this counter-reasoning of mine is just as valid and infallible as the previous reasoning',—then this would be scarcely right; as under the law that 'things are named according as they are generally known', when he calls the previous reasoning a 'reasoning', that reasoning becomes known and recognised as a *true* reasoning beforehand (i. e. before the counter-reasoning); so that there can be no proper occasion for the putting forward of the counter-reasoning, being, as it is, annulled and precluded by the fact of the recognition of its contradictory (by means of the previous reasoning);—secondly, if the counter-reasoner were to accompany his reasoning with the remark 'the previous reasoning is as impossible and invalid as the counter-reasoning that I have put forward',—even so the inconclusiveness and invalidity of the counter-reasoning becomes admitted by the man himself. And further, the very fact that it is possible for the two characters put forward as 'mutually contradictory' (e. g., the characters of *being audible* and *being a product*) to co-exist in the same thing shows that they are not really contradictory. For what does 'contradictory' mean? (a) Does it mean that the two characters cannot co-exist? b) or that they indicate con-

tradictory facts? (c) or does it consist in the specific forms (of the characters)? (a) If it means the impossibility of co-existence, then there is no such 'contradiction' in the case in question; as the two characters are actually found to co-exist *ex-hypothesi*. (b) If 'contradiction' is held to consist in the indicating of contradictory facts, this also will not be right; for (we have already pointed out) that it is not possible for anything to have two forms; if the two characters were really indicative of contradictory facts, then a single thing would have two forms (which is impossible). (c) Lastly, if it is the specific forms of the characters that constitute 'contradiction', then there is no annulment of anything at all; for the character of *being a product* is not the same (has not the same specific form) as that of *being audible*—nor is *being audible* the same as *being a product* [so that, when it is only the specific form of each character that constitutes 'contradiction', there could be real 'contradiction' only if both had the same specific forms]. And thus in this case no Doubt would arise at all.* [The interpretation has been found impossible, as there is no real 'contradiction' in the case but]—Even granting (for the sake of argument) that there is 'contradiction',—if by reason of the presence of the two contradictory characters of *being audible* and *being a product*, a doubt really arises in regard to Sound (being eternal or non-eternal),—as this Doubt will have arisen from the cognition † of the particular characters (of Sound, i. e. *being audible* and *being a product*), by the cognition of what would that Doubt be removed? As when the particular characters of a thing have been already cognised, there can be no 'want' or desire to find out its character;—as it is only when the mere generic form of a thing has been cognised that there arises a desire

* As the Doubt is produced only by reason of the two characters subsisting in the same thing, Sound, and indicating contradictory facts with regard to it, the mere fact of the two characters being different does not give rise to Doubt.

† The Chaukhambha Series edition reads '*vishēṣādarshanāt*' but the reading '*vishēṣadarshanāt*' gives better sense and is adopted by the *Tātparya*.

to find out its particular characters. The Opponent answers—"The Doubt in this case, which has arisen from the conflict of two *Inferences*, will be removed by *Perception*." This is not right; as the matter in question is not amenable to Perception; whether Sound is eternal or not-eternal can never be known by means of Sense-perception. "Well, the Doubt could be removed by means of Word." This also is not possible; as it is the exact nature of Word itself that is under consideration; whether Sound is eternal or not-eternal is a question that has been raised with special reference to Word; [so that no Word could rightly settle that question]. Thus then, it is found that the matter is not amenable to either Perception or Word; and on account of the two contradictory Inferences that have been put forward, it is clear that the Doubt cannot be removed by Inference; so that the Doubt becomes one that cannot be removed at all. "Let it be one that cannot be removed' what harm does it do?" Why? It certainly does this harm that no such Inference could bring about a definite cognition with regard to other things also; *e. g.*, no definite cognition would be afforded by such a reasoning as 'apprehension is non-eternal because it is a product'; for though the character of *being a product* has been found in Sound, yet it is still doubtful whether Sound is eternal or non-eternal; so that that character of *being a product*, which has been found in Sound, would, in the case of other things also, be a source of *Doubt* (and not of a definite well-ascertained cognition of non-eternality); and the result of this would be that no Inference could prove non-eternality [as every reasoning put forward in support of non-eternality is based upon what is only a form of *being a product*]; and thus your argument strikes at the root of all Inference; * and certainly an argument

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* The inference of non-eternality from the character of *being a product* is quite valid; and yet if it brings about only *Doubt*, and no *certain* cognition, then the same would be the case with all valid Inferences!

that annuls all Inference should never be put forward by one who is well-versed in the science of reasoning!

In answer to the above the Bauḍḍha retorts—"As there is nothing eternal for us, the reasoning does not annul anything for us; for one who holds some things to be eternal, the reasoning put forward presents the undesirable contingency of the concomitance of contradictions (eternality and non-eternality); for us however nothing is eternal [so that the reasoning does not give rise to any such undesirable contingency]." This is not right; you apparently do not understand what is meant by 'annulment'; you have not studied' the subject of 'annulment' at all. When you assert that there is nothing 'eternal' for you, you simply urge an objection to the particular argument of your Opponent (which is in reference to *eternality* or *non-eternality*); as for the undesirable contingency of the concomitance of contradictions, in your own philosophy also there is ample room for such contingencies for instance, your philosophy admits of such contradictory inferences as—(1) 'Idea *obstructs the production of anything at the point of space occupied by itself, because it is an entity, like Colour,' and (2) 'Idea does not obstruct the production of other things at the point of space occupied by itself, because it has no colour, like cognition'; and here as we find the combination of two mutually contradictory and true characters, it cannot be definitely ascertained whether idea is an obstructor or it is not so. Thus then we conclude that it is not right to assert that 'there is doubt with regard to Sound being eternal or non-eternal, because of the co-existence in it of two mutually contradictory characters.

Then again [if the perception of such characters were really a source of Doubt], in view of the fact that the two characters (of *being audible* and *being a product*) are constantly present in Sound, it would be impossible to make any such

* '*Sapraṭigham*' means '*Svaḍēshē paroṭpaṭṭipraṭibanḍhakaṭvam*,' and according to the *Sauṭrānṭikas* Colour is corporeal and as such *Saparṭigha*—*Ṭāṭparya*.

assertion as has been put forward. * That is to say, as a matter of fact, Sound is never entirely found to be without the said two characters; it is always endowed with them; it is always a *product* and always *audible*; so that no such assertion could be made as that 'Sound is eternal,' or that 'Sound is non-eternal,' [and this would be absurd]. Similarly, as regards the case of the Man and the Post, even if the observer were to perceive the characters of the Man and the Post, no such definite assertion would be possible as that 'it is a man', or that 'it is a post' [and this would be absurd]. "Well, no such assertion will be possible—what then?" What you say is contrary to facts: as a matter of fact, you do make the assertion that 'Sound is eternal', and I also make the assertion that 'Sound is non-eternal'; so that how can it be said that no such assertions are made?

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Thus then we find that the more we examine the interpretation of the Sūṭra whereby the combination of two contradictory properties is made a cause of Doubt, the more do we find it contrary to reason. So we desist from further criticism of that interpretation.

With a view to avoid the above difficulties, if it be urged that what is meant to be the cause of the said Doubt in regard to Sound are the two characters, of *being a product* and *being audible, taken together* (and not each individually),—then, in that case, the case of the two taken together leading to the said doubt does not in any way differ from that of the character of *being produced by Disjunction* giving rise to the same Doubt: just as the character of *being produced by Disjunction* gives rise to the Doubt with regard to Sound, because it is a character peculiar to Sound and does not subsist in any other thing, in the same manner the

* *Shabḍaḥ anitya eva iṭi, shabḍaḥ niṭya eva iti vā abhilāpaḥ na sambhavaṭi*—*Ṭāṭparya.*

two characters, of *being a product* and *being audible*, when *taken together*, constitute, in their combined form, a character that is peculiar to Sound, and which does not subsist in anything else, and as such gives rise to the Doubt.* And thus this also is only an instance of Doubt being caused by a 'specific character', and not of one due to another kind of character; so that this case of Doubt is already included in the one cited by us [under the Doubt caused by the cognition of *specific character*; and hence there was no need of dealing with it separately, and of propounding a different interpretation of the Sūṭra for the sake of this Doubt].

Thus then we conclude that the expression '*anēkaḍharmaḥ*' should not be interpreted as *ēkasmāṭ anyaḥ ḍharmaḥ*, the *character other than the one* [but as *anēkasmāṭ vishēṣakaḥ ḍharmaḥ*, as explained by us above, *Text*, p. 95, L. 11].

A fresh question is started—"When an observer notices such two characters (*as audibility* and *being a product*) in a single thing (Sound), what is he to understand with regard to that thing? What idea can he form of it?" What he should do is to ponder over and ascertain the comparative strength of the two characters; that is, as a matter of fact both of the characters (on account of their being mutually contradictory as leading to contradictory conclusions) cannot be the means of affording any correct cognition; so that the observer has to make an effort to astertain the comparative merits of the two, as to which one of the two is actually a means of bringing about a right cognition, and which one is not so; and (in the particular case of Sound) when such an effort is made it is found that what is actually capable of leading to a correct cognition is that character which is one of those that go to indicate the *non-eternality* of Sound. "How do you know that?"

*Nothing except Sound is both a *product* and *audible*.

For the simple reason that the *eternality* of Sound is opposed to well-ascertained proofs, as we shall show later on.

From all this, we conclude that the second form of Doubt mentioned in the Sūṭra is that *which arises from the cognition of 'anēkaḍharma,' i. e. of the specific character of a thing.*

[C] The third kind of *Doubt arises from vipraṭipaṭṭi,*—says the *Sūṭra*. The word '*vipraṭipaṭṭi*' signifies *contradictory opinions, i. e.,* statements* that contradict one another. So that the third kind of Doubt is that which arises when one finds,—(a) that there are contradictory statements with regard to the thing in question,—(b) that there is no certainty attaching to its perception and non-perception;—and (c) when there is a remembrance of the specific character of the thing.

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 35, L. 13-14) says:—[*In the first two kinds of Doubt*] *the 'common properties' and the 'properties distinguishing the thing from diverse objects' are such as subsist in the object cognised, while* [*in the fourth kind*] *the 'perception and non-perception' subsist in the cogniser.* As against this, we have already stated above [*Text*, P. 93, Ll. 12-13 *et seq.*] that the 'perception' and 'non-perception' cannot independently by themselves, give rise to Doubt.† Then again, we do not quite understand the assertion that 'the common properties and the properties distinguishing the thing from diverse objects subsist in the object cognised.' For is it the *property*

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*It is not enough that different opinions are entertained with regard to the thing; as it is possible that there may be many opinions; but they may not be known to the observer. So what is necessary is that there should be a *statement* of the opinions, so that the man may become apprised of them.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

†It has been shown that the 'uncertainty attaching to perception and non-perception' can give rise to Doubt only when accompanying the cognition of 'common characters' &c.

that gives rise to the Doubt? Or the *cognition* (of the property)? It has been again and again shown that the *property* cannot give rise to the Doubt; what gives rise to the Doubt is the *cognition* of 'the common properties, and of the properties that distinguish the thing from diverse objects'; and certainly this *cognition* subsists in the *cogniser*; so that there is no difference (between the first two causes of Doubt, and the 'uncertainty attaching to the perceptions and non-perceptions'). The reason why the 'common properties' and the 'properties that distinguish the thing from other objects', have been mentioned separately, we have already explained above;—namely, that there is this difference between the two sets of properties, that while the former are affirmed of the thing in question as also of the other things, the latter are only denied of the other things. And when we speak of Doubt, arising from *difference of opinion*, this difference of opinions subsists in the persons making the statements of the opinions, and the Doubt arises in the mind of the person who hears these contradictory statements; and this Doubt is in the form —'which of these persons has the right knowledge, and which only the wrong one.' And it is for this reason, that the three causes of Doubt have been mentioned separately.

* An objection is raised:—

"All that is mentioned in the *Sutra* is 'common character'; Every one of the three factors—'the cognition of common characters,' 'the cognition of the specific character' and the 'cognition of contradictory opinions'—is implied in the expression 'common character'. Thus then, the mention of the latter two factors—'specific character' and 'contradictory opinions'—being futile, there is no use mentioning them. Hence the Sūṭra should appear in the form—'*samānadhar-*

*'Specific character' also can be spoken of as 'common', inasmuch as 'being specific' is a character that can be said to be 'common' to all specific characters. Similarly, 'being contradictory' is 'common' to all contradictory opinions, So that both of them are included under 'common character' —*Tāṭarya*.

mopapaṭṭēḥ vishesāpēkṣaḥ samshayaḥ ', ' Doubt is the wavering judgment arising from the cognition of common character, in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting."

This is not right; it is clear that the objector does not know the meaning of the Sūṭra. The objection has been brought forward, without understanding the meaning of the Sūṭra. We have already explained in what way there is a difference between the three factors of ' common character', ' specific character ' and ' contradictory opinions.'*

Some people (among whom is the author of the *Bhāṣya* itself) take the words, of the Sūṭra to mean that there are *five* kinds of Doubt; they construe the Sūṭra as —' Doubt is that wavering judgment, in which the cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises from the cognition of common characters '; and so on also with each of the remaining terms. But this interpretation is not right; as the expression 'on account of the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions' should qualify each of of the preceding expressions; the meaning of the Sūṭra being—' Doubt is the wavering judgment which is wanting in the cognition of the specific character of any one object, which arises, when there is cognition of common characters of things and when there is uncertainty attaching to what is perceived and what is not perceived '; similarly, ' which arises from the cognition of specific character, &c., and ' which arises from contradictory opinions, &c., &c., [in every one of these the ' uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions' being a necessity] ; so that ' the uncertainty attaching to per-

*We do not deny that everyone of these may be regarded as 'common' in some way. They may all be similar, so far; but what we lay stress upon, and what is more pertinent to the subject under consideration, is the fact that each of these three has its own distinctive feature; *i. e.* the 'common character' is present in both; the 'specific character' is not present in any thing at all except one thing; and the 'contradictory opinions' are expressed by two opposite parties.

ceptions and non-perceptions' cannot be regarded as a distinct cause of Doubt, and this is what the *Bhāṣya* has done]. Then again, it will not be right to hold that 'Doubt arises from the fact of all Perceptions and Non-perceptions being of two kinds (*i. e.*, right and wrong)' *; for this would be against ordinary experience: one who holds that 'Doubt arises, because Perceptions and Non-perceptions are of two kinds' contradicts facts of ordinary experience. "How so?" For the simple reason, that if Doubt arose in that way, there could be doubt in regard to everything that a man would perceive. "Why?" Well, because in every case what is perceived is of two kinds (real or unreal); so that, if Doubt were to arise, because Perception is of two kinds, how could this Doubt be removed? "The Doubt would be removed by the subsequent perception of particular features."

Vār. P. 101.

But with regard to these particular features also, so long as any such feature would be perceived, every one of these perceptions being, *ex hypothesi*, of two kinds, there would always arise a Doubt in the form—'these particular features that I perceive, are they real or unreal?'; so that there would be no end to any Doubt at all.

The same arguments may be urged against the view that Doubt arises from the fact of non-perceptions being of two kinds. Further (if Doubt were to arise in this manner) there would be no possibility of a man being free from fear and suspicion; for instance, when on entering a room, even though he may not † see a serpent there [inasmuch as this non-perception is of two kinds, right and wrong], there would be the doubt in the form—'Does the house contain a serpent or not'?—And this Doubt also could never be removed; so that there would

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*This is what is meant by 'the uncertainty attaching to Perceptions and Non-perceptions'.

† The sense demands a 'na' here. Without the न also the passage gives the the same sense; but the 'na' makes it clearer.

be no freedom from fear and suspicion with regard to any place at all. Further, those who take the Sūṭra to mean that there are five kinds of Doubt should explain whether this proposed difference is due to a difference in the causes giving rise to Doubt, or to a difference in the nature of the Doubts themselves. If the difference be held to be due to difference in the causes, then there would be not only *five*, but many kinds of Doubt [as the causes of Doubt are endless, each Doubt having a distinct cause, and the number of Doubts being endless]. If, on the other hand, the 'difference be said to be due to difference in the nature of the Doubts, then there is no difference in the *nature* of the Doubt, every *Doubt* as such is of one and the same nature, which consists in its being *Samshīṭi, doubting*. All this goes to prove that the Sūṭra does not mean that Doubt is of *five* kinds.

An objection is raised against the Sūṭra :—"As a matter of fact, Doubt pertains to the *object* ; and as such it cannot arise from the perception of common *properties*. When the Sūṭra asserts that 'Doubt arises from the cognition of common properties,' it does not make a right assertion; because Doubt arises with regard to the *object* possessing the properties (and not with regard to the properties themselves); it is not right to say that Doubt arises in regard to the *object*, when what is cognised is the common-*property*, for the simple reason that the object possessing the property is entirely different from the property; certainly Doubt does not arise with regard to the *horse* when what is perceived is the *cow*. Then again, there being no perception of the *object* at the time (when the property is perceived), if the Doubt be said to arise with regard to it, this would be a direct contradiction of the declaration of the *Bhāṣya*, (P. 3, L. 8,) to the effect that 'there can be no Doubt with regard to what is *not perceived* or with regard to what is definitely cognised."

The answer given to the above objection by some people is that, inasmuch as the *property* perceived belongs to the particular object, it is only natural that it should give rise to Doubt with regard to that object. What this answer means is that the perception of the common property gives rise to Doubt with regard to the object to which the property belongs, for the simple reason that the property belongs to that particular object; and the perception of the cow cannot give rise to Doubt with regard to the horse, because the cow is not a property belonging to the horse.

This answer is not satisfactory; as the difference between the *property* and the *object* still remains; the fact that the property belongs to the object does not do away with the difference between the two. If the relation of *Property and Object* were accepted as determining Doubt, then this would be contrary to what has been said under Sūṭra 10, above (See *Text*, p. 67, l. 8, &c. &c). "How so!" That Sūṭra having been taken to mean that, inasmuch as there is a fusion or congregation of Desire, Aversion, &c., these come to indicate the presence of Soul (wherein they all congregate),—the Opponent comes forward with the assertion that the said fusion is due to the causal relation; and is met with the argument that the causal relation does not do away with the difference (among Desire and the rest). This is what has been done by us there; while here when you assert that Doubt is due to the fact that the Property belongs to the Object, what you mean must be that what determines the Doubt is the difference as qualified by the particular relationship between the property perceived and the object to which it belongs; and if this were right then the Opponent (who has been met on p. 67) could also retort, with equal reasonableness, that the causal relation would be the determining factor (in the said 'fusion' of Desire, &c.). For these reasons

Vār. P. 102.

we conclude that it is not right to explain the Sūtra to mean that Doubt arises from the fact of the Property belonging to that object.

"Well then, what explanation have you to give of the assertion in the Sūṭra that Doubt arises with regard to the Object when what is perceived is the Property, and not that Object."

The right explanation is as follows:—The compound '*samānadharma*' is to be taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, and as such denoting the *object*; when the compound is taken as *Bahuvrīhi*, it denotes the *object*. "How so? '*Samānadharma*' is *that which has the samāna ḍharma, samānaḥ-ḍharmaḥ yasya*—, *i. e.* the *object possessed of the common character*; and the *upapaṭṭi* or cognition of this is '*samānadharmopapaṭṭi*'; so that the expression '*samānadharmopapaṭṭēḥ*' means that [Doubt arises] *from the cognition of the object possessed of common properties.*

The Sūṭra says—*Doubt is that wavering judgment which is vishēṣāpēkṣa.* Here the word '*vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*' stands for '*vishēṣasmṛiṭy apēkṣaḥ*', which means that there should be a remembrance of the specific character (in addition to the non-perception of such character).

"What specific character is the object of this 'remembrance'? Is the remembrance of the specific character of that object with regard to which there is Doubt? or is it some other specific character? That is to say, does the observer remember the specific character of that object in which he perceives only common characters, and with regard to which he has the Doubt? or does he remember the specific character of something else? If you mean the former, then what you say is not right; as the specific characters of that thing have never been perceived; as a matter of fact, one can remember the specific characters of that thing whose such characters have been

previously perceived; as in this case the characters would be those already cognised (and as such capable of being remembered); but when the thing is one whose specific characters have not been previously apprehended, and with regard to which Doubt arises by reason of only its common characters being apprehended,—how can there be any remembrance of the specific characters? As no such specific characters of it have been previously cognised."

The above objection is futile; as the phrase 'remembrance of specific characters' is used in a general sense; the word '*vishesāpēkṣaḥ*' is used in its vague general sense; and it does not* signify anything definite as to the remembrance pertaining to the specific characters of that object or to those of something else; [it is both; for instance] when the specific characters to be remembered are those that belong to a thing previously known, then the 'remembrance of specific characters' pertains to the previously cognised characters; while when the Doubt arises with regard to a thing not previously cognised [but ressembling some other thing that is so cognised], the desired remembrance pertains to the specific characters of the other thing that has been previously cognised,—this remembrance being due to similarity (of the two things).†

Vār. P. 103.

Thus it is established that there are only *three* kinds of Doubt.

The definition of Doubt provided by the *Sūtra* includes all those definitions propounded by other philosophers,

* The sense demands a 'na' here; the sense being that it cannot be definitely said whether it is one way or the other; as sometimes it is one and sometimes the other.

† When the Doubt pertains to a thing already known, its characters also are known; so that their remembrance is not impossible. When however the Doubt pertains to a thing never known before, but ressembling something known,—in this case also the specific characters of the known thing are recalled to the mind through similarity.

which are not incompatible with it. *E. g.* the definition given by *Kaṇāḍa* (*Vaishēṣika-sūṭrā*, 2. 2. 17) that Doubt arises when there is '*sāmānyaprațyakṣa*', '*vishēṣāprațyakṣa*' and '*vishēṣasmriți*',-the meaning of these words is as follows :—(1) *sāmānyaprațyakṣa* means *the perception of an object possessed of* '*sāmānya*' *or common characters*; and it does not mean 'the perception *of common characters*';—(2) *vishēṣāprațyakṣa* means that the specific characters of the thing are not definitely recognised;—(3) the word *vishēṣasmriți* means exactly what it means in our *Sūṭrā*. "But in what way does the *Vaishēṣika-suṭra* quoted include the 'specific character' (which the Nyāya-Sūṭra mentions as one of the causes of Doubt)?" The 'specific character' is also included in the Sūṭra, as this also is 'fallible' or 'inconclusive' in determining the character of a thing; the 'common character' is regarded as a source of Doubt because it is inconclusive in determining the exact character of a thing; and as the 'specific character' also is equally inconclusive, this also is implied (by the mention of the 'common character'). "If that is so (*i. e.* if the 'specific character' is implied in the 'common character'), then the next word in the *Nyāya-Sūṭra*—'*anēkadharmopapaṭṭēḥ*'—shorld not be there, being superfluous." The two have been mentioned separately,* not by way of enumerating the several distinct causes of Doubt, but because of the fact that while one (*i. e.* the *common character*) becomes a source of doubt by its *presence* in several things, the other (*i. e.* the *specific character*) gives rise to Doubt by its *absence*. Some people have urged the following objection against the *Vaishēṣika-Sūṭra* :— "The using of the two words *vishēṣāprațyakṣāț* and *vishēṣasmriṭēḥ* forms a needless repetition : the mere statement that 'Doubt arises from the perception of common characters and the *remembrance* of specific charactors' would imply that there is '*non-percep-*

*The sense demands a 'na' here.

tion of the specific character'; for when there is *perception* of the specific characters there is no *remembrance* of them." This reasoning is not right; it shows that the objector does not understand the meaning of the *Sūṭra*: The Sūṭra does *not* mean that there is *non-perception* of the specific character; what is meant by *visheṣāpraṭyakṣa* (non-perception of the specific characters) is that no specific characters are definitely recognised as subsisting in any one particular object. Thus then there is no fault of 'repetition', or 'redundancy' in the *Sūṭra*.

Other people (the Bauḍḍhas) explain the nature of Doubt in a different manner:—" Doubt, "according to them, " is that wavering judgment which arises from the perception of similarities by one who is desirous of apprehending the specific character of the thing." * It behoves these people to explain what it is with regard to which there is Doubt, when the similarity is already duly ascertained. " It is the thing possessed of the characters that forms the object of the Doubt;—this has been already explained." It is true this has been so explained; but the explanation is not right.

Vār. P. 104.

"Why is the explanation not right?" If the Bauḍḍha admits an object (apart from its properties) then he falls into a self-contradiction.† And further, if the *object* and its *property* be held to be totally different from one another, then, in the case cited, what is seen and definitely ascertained is the *property*, and the *object* is absolutely unknown; and under the circumstances [no *doubt* could arise with regard to the *object*, as] no Doubt can arise with regard to that which is totally different from what is perceived. If (in order to escape from this difficulty) you adopt our method and show that the word

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*The import of this criticism is not easily intelligible—says the *Ṭāṭparya*; the Author explains it on the next page.

†According to the Bauḍḍha there is no *substance* apart from the properties of colour &c.

'*sāḍharmya*', 'similarity' (in your definition) signifies the *Thing* [so that what is seen and definitely ascertained is the other same thing with regard to which the Doubt arises],—then our reply is that this would be scarcely right; the word *sāḍharmya*, 'similarity', denotes *the character of being similar*; and this being an *abstract* noun, it must signify a *character* or *property*, and not an *object*; so that the perception of one (*i. e.* the *Property*) cannot give rise to *Doubt* with regard to another (*i. e. Object*). If on the other hand, the Bauḍḍha does not admit the difference between the Object and its Properties, in that case also, inasmuch as the Property is definitely known, *ex-hypothesi*,—with regard to what would the Doubt arise? [as the two being non-different, the definite cognition of the Property would mean that the Object is also definitely known,]. Further, if the observer does not cognise the *Object*, whose 'specific character' would he 'desire to know' (as stated in your definition)? Certainly no 'specific characters' can belong to 'Similarity' (which is what it cognises). It could not be held that the 'specific characters' desired to be known belong to that *Object* which has the 'similarity' that is perceived;—as no such *Object* is cognised at all, as we have already said above. As a matter of fact, when you make the assertion that—'inasmuch the specific characters cannot belong to the *Similarity*, they must belong to the object having that similarity'—you admit the difference among the 'similarity', the 'specific characters' and 'the object having the similarity'; nor does this assertion serve any useful purpose for you; as 'the specific characters' of the object possessing similarity will not be the same as 'the specific characters of the similarity' [so that the 'desire to know' these latter would still be an impossibility]. Further, [your definition is deficient, as] even when there is 'perception of similarity', and also the 'desire to know the specific characters', no Doubt can arise, if there is certainty

with regard to perception and non-perception (what is perceived and what is not perceived); so that it is necessary to add to your definition, the word '*upalabḍhyanupalabḍhyavyavasṭhāṭaḥ*,' 'there being no certainty attaching to perceptions and non-percepions,' as also the word '*anēkaḍharmaḍarṣhanāṭ*,' 'from the perception of specific characters'

The Opponent starts a fresh discussion:—

"The definition of Doubt as propounded by the *Sūṭra* consists of the sentence beginning with the word, '*samānānēkaḍharmopapaṭṭēḥ*. With regard to this, we proceed to consider the question as to whether this sentence is meant to be an enumeration of the causes of Doubt, or a description of the nature of Doubt. If it is intended to be an enumeration of the causes of Doubt, then the statement is extremely meagre, when the causes mentioned are only those few that begin with the 'perception of common characters;' for there are many other causes apart from these; and all these others should also be enumerated; *e. g.* the contact between the Mind and the Soul, which is one of the causes of all Doubts arising in regard to internal things (such as calmness of mind, dispassion*, and so forth); and with regard to external things, such causes are necessary as the contact between the Mind and the Soul, and also the contact between the object and the sense-organ concerned. If, on the other hand, the *Suṭrā* be taken as a description of the exact nature of Doubt, then in that case, it is absolutely useless to mention any causes at all; it should suffice to say that 'Doubt consists in *doubting* (or wavering)', '*Samshīṭiḥ samṣhayaḥ*."

Our answer to the above is that the *Sūṭra* is intended to contain an enumeration of the causes of Doubt. "But we have already pointed out that there are many other causes besides those mentioned which should have been mentioned."

*When there is a doubt, as to one's own self being free from passions, it is necessary that there should be contact between his Mind and his Soul.

Not so, we reply; what the *Sūtra* is intended to enumerate is not *all* the causes of Doubt, but only those that pertain specifically to Doubt only; so that there need be no mention of such causes as the 'contact between the object and the sense-organ' and so forth, which pertain in common to Sense-perception also.

Var. P. 105.

Or, we may also take the *Sutra* as meant to be a description of the exact nature of Doubt; the sense being that the nature of Doubt consists in this that it arises from the 'cognition of common characters &c.'

The *Doubt* as above described is dealt with in this Treatise, as it forms an integral factor in all investigations "But like Doubt, Wrong Cognition also is a factor in all investigations; so that this latter also should have been mentioned in (Sūtra 1), as one of the categories." It is true that Wrong Cognition is a category; but it does not form an essential factor in all investigations; that is why it has not been mentioned. "How can it be said not to be an essential factor in investigations?" As a matter of fact, the man who is in *Doubt* on a certain point makes an effort to obtain more definite knowledge of it [and it is this *effort* that constitutes investigation]; not so the man who entertains an absolutely *wrong notion* in regard to that point; and for this reason Wrong Cognition cannot be regarded as a part of the *Science of Reasoning*; that is why it has not been mentioned among the categories.

Prayojana-Motive.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 35, L. 16 to P. 36, L. 3].

As before, the definition proceeds in accordance with the order in which the several categories have been mentioned in the opening Sūṭra.

Sūṭra (24).

THAT OBJECT, AIMING AT WHICH ONE ACTS, IS CALLED 'MOTIVE'.

An object is capable of being either acquired or rejected; and when a person determines or fixes upon an object as to be either acquired or got rid of, he has recourse to the means of acquiring or getting rid of it; and that object is called the 'motive', simply because it forms the cause of that activity of the agent.

An object is said to be 'aimed at' when there is a *determination* on the part of the agent with regard to it in the form, either that 'I shall acquire it', or that 'I shall get rid of it'; as it is only when an object is thus *determined* that it comes to be 'aimed at.'

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA (24).

[P. 105, L. 8 to P. 106, L. 5].

That object aiming at which one acts is called 'Motive'—says the Sūṭrā. In the phrase 'aiming at which', *being aimed at* consists in being *determined.* "Determining of what?" Of the causes of pleasure and pain: when one comes to know and determine that 'this object is a cause of pleasure', he makes an effort to acquire the pleasure (afforded by that object); similarly when he comes to know that 'this object is a cause of pain', he makes an effort to get rid of the pain (caused by that object).* As a matter of fact, people are moved to activity for the *obtaining of pleasure* and *discarding of pain*; so that these two, the obtaining of pleasure and discarding of pain, constitute the 'motive.' By this definition of 'motive' all things become included; and it is only when

* It is only when an object is regarded as the cause of either pleasure or pain that is gives rise to any activity on the part of the agent.

the Sūṭra is thus interpreted (and *Motive* thus defined) that we can explain the activity of the man who is engaged in finding fault with the view of his opponent, and is yet unable to indicate the exact fault.*

An objection is raised :—"You explain *Prayojana*, 'Motive,' as *prayujyaṭē anēna*, that by which one is moved to *activity*; this is a well-known ordinary fact; and it does not help Reasoning in any way : so that it is not right to treat it as an integral part of Reasoning (as you have done)."

Our answer to the above objection is that as regards the statement that what is here explained is a *well-known ordinary fact*, it is only a very superior reasoner (like our Opponent) that can make the assertion that it is only the category of *Motive* as here explained that is *well-known*, and not the categories of *Pramāṇa* and the rest.† Then again, what is the meaning of *being a well-known ordinary fact*? If it means that it is right and valid, in due accordance with the means of right cognition, then the dictum laid down would mean that one should not speak of what is valid and right and supported by the means of right cognition ; and this would be a highly objectionable dictum indeed! If by *being well-known* is meant something different from *being right and valid*, then we fail to understand how *Motive* can be called 'well known' [as it is something quite right and valid and supported by the means of right cognition]. Lastly, it has been urged that Motive is not an

Vār : P. 106.

* And this man has recourse to the *Wrangling* form of discussion ; as at the time this is what brings him pleasure. The reading of the text is somewhat defective ; though it is the same in both editions. All that the *Ṭāṭparya* says is—*viṭaṇḍāyāṁ api prayojanam ukṭam praṭhamasūṭre ; ċhoḍyamānasya pravarṭyam ānasya iṭyarṭhaḥ*. The sentence as it stands is incomplete ; if we have the word '*sambhavaṭi*' at the end of the sentence, after '*vyavahāraḥ*', it gives some sense. This reading has been adopted in the translation.

†The sense is that *Pramāṇa* &c. are just as well-known as *Motive*; so that if Motive should not be treated of on the ground of being *well-known*, *Pramāṇa* &c. also should, for the same reason, not be dealt with.

integral part of Reasoning. This objection also is not well taken; because as a matter of fact, any mere purposeless Doubt never acts as an incentive to Reasoning; while a clear Motive or Purpose always forms the basis of Reasoning and investigation,—all investigation being based upon Motive.*

Ḍṛṣṭanṭa—Example.

Sūṭra (25).

THAT IS 'EXAMPLE' WITH REGARD TO WHICH BOTH PARTIES—THE ORDINARY MAN AND THE TRAINED INVESTIGATOR—ENTERTAIN SIMILAR IDEAS—Sū. (25).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 36, L. 6 to L. 10.]

Those men are called '*laukika*', 'ordinary,' who are not above the capacities of an average man; *i.e.* those who are not possessed of any particular superiority of intelligence, either inherently or through hard study;—and the opposite of these are '*pārikṣaka*', 'trained investigators'; so called because they are capable of carrying on the investigation of things by means of reasonings and proofs. And that object forms an 'Example' which is understood and known by the ordinary man just as it is by the trained investigator †. The purposes served by the 'Example' are:—(1) the contrary opinions are overthrown by being shown to be contradictory to, incompatible with, the Example;—(2) one's own opinions are established by being shown to be compatible with, supported by, the Example;

* This passage is somewhat obscure. The *Parishuḍḍhi* says—'The sense of this passage is a follows: Though Motive, being what is accomplished by the Reasoning, cannot be regarded as its integral part, yet there can be no doubt that the statement of the Motive forms such a part; for the simple reason that without such statement no Reasoning can proceed; though itself without a purpose, Motive is what gives rise to Reasoning, which is fruitful and accomplishes a distinct purpose; just as though Heaven does not accomplish any purpose, and as such does not form an integral part of the sacrifice; yet it is what leads to the performance of the sacrifice, and as such it may be regarded as its very basis': This interpretation is somewhat forced. The *Parishuḍḍhi* has supplied another interpretation which is clearer, and has therefore been adopted in the translation.

†By the 'ordinary man' in the present context, is meant the person to whom things are explained, and by the 'trained investigator' the person who is explaining.

and (8) the Example is utilised as the corrоborrative Instance or Illustration, which is one of the essential factors of the inferential process.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA (25).

[P. 106, L. 8 TO L 20].

Laukikaparīkṣakāṇām &c.—says the *Sūṭrā.* The true definition of *Example* is that it is *that object with regard to which similar ideas are entertained*; as it is only such a definition that can include such well-known Examples as those of *Ākāsha* and the like. If we insisted on defining the Example as that *with regard to which ordinary men and trained investigators entertain similar ideas*, then, such *extraordinary* things as Ākāsha and the rest, with regard to which the 'ordinary man' has no ideas at all, could never serve as an *Example.* When the *Sūtrā* mentions the 'ordinary man' and the 'trained investigator', it is only by way of an illustration, and no stress is intended to be laid upon the similar ideas being entertained by both these two classes of men.

An objection is raised against the utility of Examples:—"Does the Example serve the purpose of indicating similarity? Or that of proving what is not proved? If it is meant to serve the purpose of indicating similarity, then it does not differ from Analogy. If, on the other hand, it is meant to serve the purpose of proving what is not proved, then it does not differ from the Corroborative Instance. If Example is the same as Analogy, then it falls within the category of '*Pramāṇa*'; and if it is the same as Corroborative Instance, then it is only one of the factors of inferential reasoning. So that Example is nothing apart by itself."

This objection is truly unanswerable, we think! "Why so?" For the simple reason that the objector does not understand any one of the three things that he talks of: The man who argues as above shows that he does not know what is 'Example' or 'Corroborative Instance'

or 'Analogy'. We have already explained (under Analogy) that 'Analogy' does not afford any notion of similarity. As regards the 'Example', it does serve the purpose of affording the notion of similarity*. As to whether or not the Example serves the purpose of proving what is not proved, our reply is that it does not serve that purpose. Lastly, the exact nature of the 'Corroborative Instance' we shall explain later on, under the section dealing with that subject.

Lecture V.

The Basis of Reasoning.

Siḍḍhānṭa—Doctrine.

Bhāṣya on Sūṭrā 26.

[P. 36, L. 11 to L. 13 to P. 37, L. 4].

We now proceed to define Doctrine, *Siḍḍhānṭa*. The word '*Siḍḍhānṭa*' is made up of the two words '*siḍḍha*' and '*anṭa*'; of these the word '*siḍḍha*' denotes all those things with regaad to which people have the idea that 'this is so and so,' 'this thing has such and such a character;' and the word '*anṭa*' denotes the conviction or opinion that people have with regard to the particular character of those things†. This *Siḍḍhānṭa* is thus defined :—

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*The similarity between the 'Example' and the thing sought to be elucidated by its means consists in both being concomitant with that which proves the conclusion, *e.g.*, the similarity of the ki chen (Example) and the hill lies only in this that both contain *smoke* ; and the comprehension of this similarity is all that is meant to be accomplished by the citing of the Example.

†The word '*siḍḍha*' literally means *accomplished*, hence *anything* that has come into existence ; and it is only with regard to such a thing that any opinion can be held as to its exact nature ; the word '*anṭa*' means *end* ; by which, in the present context, is meant that *final* and well-determined conviction which people have with regard to the exact nature of any particular thing.

In regard to these lines of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Ṭāṭparya* has remarked that 'the author of the *Bhāṣya*, without mentioning the Sūṭrā containing the general definition of *Siḍḍhānṭa*, has given an explanation of its import'. This has been taken by some writers to mean that there was some other *Sūṭrā* now lost to us, which contained the said general definition. As a matter of fact however, *Sūṭrā* 26, itself supplies,—specially according to the explanation of the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*—

SŪṬRA 26.

DOCTRINE IS A THEORY OR CONVICTION IN REGARD TO THE EXACT NATURE OF A THING DEALT WITH BY PHILOSOPHY.*

Bhāṣya on Sūṭrā 27.

[P. 37, L. 1 to L. 4.]

By *ṭanṭrāsamsṭhiṭiḥ* in the Sūṭrā (27) is meant the conviction resting upon the direct assertions of philosophy; the word '*ṭanṭra*', 'philosophy', standing for the teachings in connection with things connected with one another; [this includes the first two kinds of theory mentioned in Sūtra 27]—'*aḍhikaraṇasamsṭhiṭiḥ*' is the conviction resting on implication, and not on direct assertion;—and '*abhyupagamasamsṭhiṭiḥ*' is the hypothetical acceptance of an opinion not duly ascertained, [and not directly stated in philosophy] —such acceptance being for the purpose of examining the detailed particulars of the theory.

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the general definition of *Siḍḍhānṭa*; so that all that the *Ṭāṭparya* means is that the explanation of the general definition by the *Bhāṣya*, instead of following the Sūṭrā, precedes it.

*The *Vārṭika* has taken the two Sūṭrās 26 and 27 together so the translation of the *Vārṭika* appears after Sū. 27. The translation of the *Sūṭra* is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Vārṭika* and *Ṭāṭparya*; which explain the compound '*ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇābhyupagamasamsṭhiṭiḥ*' by taking '*ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇa*' as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound—'*ṭanṭram aḍhikaraṇam yeṣām*'; and this, with the rest of the word, as a genitive *Ṭaṭpuruṣa*. The exact position of the *Bhāṣya* appears to be doubtful. If we take the *Bhāṣya*, p. 37, lines 1—4 as explanatory of Sūṭrā 26, then, it is clear that it takes '*ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇābhyupagama*' as a *Dvanḍva*; and thereby connects each of these severally with the word '*samsṭhiṭiḥ*'. According to the *Bhāṣya* then, the translation of the *Sūṭra* 26 would run thus— *Doctrine is conviction resting upon philosophy, on implication and on hypothesis*'. We have given preference to the *Vārṭika* interpretation; because by the *Bhāṣya* the Sūṭrā is made to contain an enumeration of the different kinds of *Siḍḍhānṭa*; while by the *Vārṭika* interpretation this *Sūṭrā* supplies a general definition; and the several kinds are enumerated in the next Sūṭra 27. It is this interpretation by the *Bhāṣya* which affords occasion to the objector in the *Vārṭika* to put the question as to the Sūṭra being a general definition or an enumeration. According to the *Ṭāṭparya* however the *Bhāṣya*, p. 37, ll. 1 to 4 is explanatory, not of Sūṭra 26, but of Sūṭra 27. Just as the sense of Sūṭra 26, which contains the general definition of Doctrine, is given by the *Bhāṣya* before the Sūṭra, so of Sūṭra 27 also the sense is explained before the Sūṭra. As this interpretation reconciles the *Bhāṣya* with the *Vārṭika*, we adopt it; and therefore take the lines of the Bhāṣya p. 37, Ll. 1 to 4 as explanatory of Sūṭra 27.

Doctrine thus is of four kinds, on account of diversity among the several philosophies,— as described in this *Sūṭrā*. And each of these four kinds is quite distinct.

DOCTRINE IS OF FOUR DISTINCT KINDS:—(1) DOCTRINE COMMON TO ALL PHILOSOPHIES, (2) DOCTRINE PECULIAR TO ONE PHILOSOPHY, (3) DOCTRINE RESTING ON IMPLICATION, AND (4) HYPOTHETICAL DOCTRINE.—(SŪṬRA 27).

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRAS 26 AND 27.

[P. 107, L. 3 to P. 108, L. 4.]

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 36, L. 11) says—'*This is so and so*', '*this thing has such and such a character*';—here the former expression expresses the general vague idea that one may have of a thing, and the second expression denotes the particular or detailed idea of the same thing; so that the definition of Doctrine comes to be this: Doctrine is a statement with regard to the general and special characters of a thing;* and it is with a view to give expression to this same definition that we have Sūṭra 26.

An objection is raised—"Is the Sūṭra, 26, intended to provide a *definition* of Doctrine? or its *division*"? 'What does this question drive at?' "What is meant is as follows:—If the Sūṭra is intended to provide a *definition*, then the words '*ṭanṭra*' (philosophy) and '*adhikaraṇa*' (implication) should not appear in the Sūṭra; as for the purposes of definition it would suffice to say simply that *Doctrine is a conviction in regard to the exact nature of a thing*, '*abhyupagama-vyavasṭhā siddhānṭaḥ*'. If, on the other hand, the Sūṭra were intended to provide a *division* of Doctrine, then the word '*sarvaṭanṭra* (all philosophies) should appear in the *Sūṭra* [as the 'theory common to all philosophies' is one of the four divisions of Doctrine]; just as it is necessary to mention the *Praṭijñā* or 'Proposition': When the Sūṭra enumerates the Factors of Reasoning, it mentions *all* the factors, Proposi-

* On P. 4, p. 1, Trans. p. 47, the *Bhāṣya* has defined Doctrine as the 'statement of fact asserted in the form *this is so*'.

tion, Statement of the Probans Corroborative Instance, Reaffirmation and Final Conclusion; similarly when speaking of the several kinds of Doctrine, the Sūṭra should mention all the four kinds: the Doctrine common to all philosophies, that peculiar to one philosophy, that resting on implication and Hypothetical Doctrine. And under the circumstances (Sū. 26 providing the *division* of Doctrine) it would be necessary to have another Sūṭra for the providing of its *definition*; and further (the required *division* having been already provided by Sū. 26) some other meaning will have to be assigned to Sū. 27 [as it could not be taken as providing the division of Doctrine, the sense in which it has been taken by the *Bhāṣya*]; and, if, in order to avoid this, Sū. 27 be taken as providing the *division* of Doctrine, then the preceding *Sūṭra* (26) will have to be totally rejected (as being useless). If it be held that Sū. 27 provides a re-division of what has been already divided in Sū. 26, then our answer is that this novel procedure (of dividing what has been already divided) would be against what the *Bhāṣya* has declared above (Text p. 9 Trans. p. 97) to the effect that 'the Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes—by enunciation, by definition and by examination', [as the *re-dividing of the divided* cannot come within any of these three]. Further a *division* is made for the purpose of restricting (the exact number of the variety of the thing divided); what purpose then would be served by re-dividing the divided? If this latter also were held to be for the purpose of the said *restricting*, then our answer would be that, inasmuch as the purpose of this restricting of the number of Doctrines has already been served by the foregoing Sūṭra (26), there is no need for this being done over again. From all this it follows that one of the two Sūṭras (26 or 27) is not the work of the sage Gauṭama."

Neither of the two Sūtras can be rejected as not the work of the sage. As a matter of fact, the former *Sūṭra* provides the *definition* and the latter the *division* (of Doctrine). It has

been already said that division serves the purpose of restricting the number; so that what is meant by Sūṭra 27, which supplies the division, is that though Doctrine is of many kinds, yet all these are included in the four here mentioned,—thus serving the purpose of *restricting* the number (to *four*).

"How can the former Sūtra (26) be taken as providing the *definition* of Doctrine?"

Vār. P. 108. The words of the Sūṭra—'*ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇābhyupagama*'—should be explained as *ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇānām arṭhānām abhyupagamaḥ*; those *arṭhas* or things being called '*ṭanṭrāḍhikaraṇāḥ*' which have the *ṭanṭrā* or *philosophy* for their *aḍhikaraṇa* or *indicator* *; and Doctrine is the *abhyupagamasamsṭhiṭi* of these things; *i. e.* the conviction or statement with regard to their character or exact nature. This means that the name 'Doctrine' cannot be applied to convictions with regard to things not philosophically real.†

Bhāṣya.

[P. 37, L. 7 to L. 11.]

Of the four kinds of Doctrine (enumerated in Sū. 27.)—

Sūṭra 28.

(1) The 'Doctrine Common to all Philosophies' is that philosophical conviction, or theory, which is not incompatible with any philosophy—*Sūṭra* (28).

As for example, such opinions as 'the olfactory organ and the rest are Sense-organs', 'odour and the rest are the objects apprehended by means of these Sense-organs', 'the Earth and the rest are material substances', 'things are cognised by means of the Instruments of Cognition'.

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* '*Ṭanṭryanṭē vyuṭpāḍyanṭē pramēyāṇi anēna iṭi ṭanṭram, pramāṇam; ṭaḍēva aḍhikaraṇam āshrayaḥ jñāpakaṭvēna yēṣāmarṭhānām ṭē ṭaṭhokṭāḥ—Ṭāṭparya.*

† 'If so, then the convictions of the Bauḍḍha would not be 'Doctrines'; so that when they would make statements against their own tenets they could not be taunted with the charge of "*Contradicting their own doctrines*". With a view to meet this objection, the *Ṭāṭparya* says that what the *Vārṭika* means is that if the thing is *believed* to be philosophically real that would make the conviction with regard to it capable of being called 'doctrine'; and certainly what the Bauḍḍha asserts is *believed* by him to be philosophically true; so that his convictions will be called 'doctrines'.

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (28).
[P. 108, L. 6 to L. 14.]

The 'Doctrine common to all philosophies' is a theory in regard to which all are agreed; *e. g.* the opinion that 'Pramāṇas bring about the cognition of Pramēyas'.

An objection is raised:—"Such a Common Doctrine does not differ from *Example* (as defined under Sū. 25); for just as there is no disagreement with regard to what serves as an *Example*, in the same manner there is none with regard to the *Common Doctrine*".

But we say that there *is* difference between the two:—In the first place an *Example* is that on which there is agreement between the two disputants, and not necessarily among all persons, as there is in regard to the *Common Doctrine*; and secondly the *Example* serves as the basis only for Inference and Verbal Cognition [as both of these Instruments of Cognition depend upon the previous cognition of relationships, of the Major Term to the Middle Term, in Inference, and of words to their denotations, in Verbal Cognition; so that the objects of these previous cognitions would serve as *Examples*]; while such is not case with Common Doctrine [which does not form the basis of Inference and Verbal Cognition alone].

"If *Example* be defined as 'the basis of Inference and Verbal Cognition', then such a definition would apply to Perception also; as Perception is the cause of both Inference and Word [and as such can be called the 'basis' of these]".

[It is not so.] As what serves as the *Example* is something known, something that forms the *object* of Perception, and which, on that account, comes to be called the 'basis of Inference and Verbal Cognition'; Perception, on the other hand, is only the *means* of that cognition (of the object); so that this latter can in no case be called the 'basis of Inference and Verbal Cognition'.

Sūṭrā 29.

THAT WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY ONLY ONE PHILOSOPHY, AND IS NOT ACCEPTED BY ANY OTHER PHILOSOPHY, IS CALLED THE DOCTRINE PECULIAR TO ONE PHILOSOPHY.—(Sū. 29.)

Bhāṣya on Sūṭrā (29).

[P. 38, L. 3 to L. 6.]

For example, the following doctrines are peculiar to the *Sāṅkhyas* :—'An absolute non-entity can never come into existence', 'an entity can never absolutely lose its existence', 'intelligences are unmodifiable', 'modification belongs to the three gross products, Body, Sense-organ and Mind, and also to the subtle causes of these (in the shape of *Buḍḍhi Ahaṅkāra* and the five Rudimentary Substances)'; and also the following which are peculiar to the *Yoga** philosophers:—'The entire elemental creation is due to the influence of the past deeds of men', 'the defects of men and also their activity are the cause of Karman', 'intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities', 'that thing alone is produced which had no existence before', 'that which is produced is destroyed'.

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (29).

[P. 108, L. 16 to L. 18.]

Doctrine peculiar to one philosophy consists in the limited or restricted acceptance of Generalities or Individualities or things possessed of these. *E. g.* that 'the sense-organs are elemental', is a doctrine peculiar to the Yoga-philosophers, and that 'they are non-elemental products' is a doctrine peculiar to the Sāṅkhyas.

Sūṭra (30).

THAT IS CALLED 'DOCTRINE RESTING ON IMPLICATION' ON THE KNOWLEDGE OR ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH DEPENDS THE KNOWLEDGE OR ACCEPTANCE OF ANOTHER FACT† (Sū. 30).

*Some people take this to mean 'Vaishēṣika philosophy', on the ground that what is ordinarily known as the 'Yoga' philosophy does not hold the view that '*asaṭ uṭpadyaṭē*'.

†In connection with this *Sūṭrā* the *Parishuḍḍhi* adds an interesting note: "Bhūṣana and others have provided two explanations of this *Sū* : (1) When an object endowed with the quality of omnisience is known, then alone is known the fact of Earth and the

Bhāṣya on Sūṭrā (30.)

[P. 38, L. 9 to L. 14].

When it so happens that a certain fact having become established or known, other facts become implied,—and without these latter facts the former fact itself cannot be established,—the former, constituting the basis of these latter, is called 'Doctrine resting on Implication' or 'Implied Doctrine.' *E. g.* when the fact that the *cogniser* is distinct from the body and the sense-organs is proved or indicated by the fact of one and the same object being apprehended by the organs of vision and touch,—the facts implied are :— (1) that there are more sense-organs than one, (2) that the sense-organs operate upon particular kinds of objects, (3) that they have their existence indicated by the apprehension of their objects, (4) that they are the instruments bringing about the cognitions of the cogniser, (5) that the substratum of qualities is a substance other than the qualities of odour and the rest, and (6) that intelligent beings cognise only particular objects. All these facts are included in the aforesaid fact (of the cogniser being distinct from the body &c. &c.); as this fact would not be possible without all those other facts.

Vārṭika on Sūṭrā (30).

[P. 109, L. 1 to L. 3.]

'Doctrine resting on Implication' is the name given to that fact which is implied in the recognition of the meaning of such sentences or assertions (as 'such and such is the reason proving such and such a conclusion'). An Example of this kind of Doctrine is given in the Bhāṣya—*when the fact that there is a cogniser &c. &c.*

SŪṬRĀ (31).

WHEN A FACT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED WITHOUT INVESTIGATION,* AND THENCE PROCEEDS THE EXAMINATION OF ITS PARTICULAR DETAILS, WE HAVE A CASE OF HYPOTHETICAL DOCTRINE (Sū. 31).

Yest having a maker ; so the former is an Implied Doctrine; and (2) the knowledge of the fact of Earth &c. having a maker includes that of the fact that there is an omniscient being,—the latter being implied by the former, and here the former is an Implied Doctrine. The *Bhāṣya* and its followers have not given this twofold explanation, as there is not much real difference between the two".

*The Vārṭika explains '*aparīkṣiṭā*' as *not mentioned in the Sūṭras*; but it appears simpler to take it as meaning 'not investigated.' The *Ṭāṭparya* construes the

Bhāṣya on Sūṭrā (31).

[P. 39, L. 3 to L. 6.]

When a fact is taken for granted without investigation, this constitutes what is called 'Hypothetical Doctrine.' *E. g.* it is taken for granted, without investigation, that Sound is a substance, and thence proceeds an investigation as to whether Sound is eternal or non-eternal,—in which investigation are examined such details of Sound as its eternality or non-eternality. An author has recourse to this kind of Doctrine with a view to show off the cleverness of his own intellect and through utter disregard for the intellect of others.

Vārṭika on Sūṭrā (31).

[P. 109, L. 6 to P. 111, L. 4.]

The *Sūṭrā* contains the word '*aparīkṣiṭābhyupagamāṭ*'; and here '*aparīkṣiṭa*' stands for '*asūṭriṭa*', 'not mentioned in the *Sūṭras*'; so that the definition of Hypothetical Doctrine comes to be that it is that which is accepted, or taken for granted, even though not mentioned in the Sūṭras; *e.g.*, that 'Mind is a sense-organ' is such a doctrine for the Naiyāyikas; and that 'the auditory organ is Ākāsha' is such a Hypothetical Doctrine for the Naiyāyikas and the Vaishēṣikas.

That which is not duly investigated—*i. e.* what is not mentioned directly in the Shāsṭra—is had recourse to *with a view to show off one's cleverness, and through utter disregard for the intellect of others*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 39, L. 5.) This is not right*. "Why so?"

Sūṭrā thus—*asūṭriṭābhyupagamāṭ hēṭoḥ yaṭaḥ ṭadvishēṣaparīkṣaṇam kriyaṭē ṭasmāṭ vishēṣaparīkṣaṇāṭ jñāyaṭē ashāsṭriṭamapi abhyupagaṭam sūṭatkārēṇa.*

*This passage of the *Vārṭika* is rather obscure. In introducing it the *Ṭāṭparya* ays-'Having provided his own explanation of the Sūṭra, the author of the *Vārṭika* proceeds to criticise the explanation given by the *Bhāṣya*.' From this it would seem that the whole of what is declared to be *na yukṭam* forms part of the *Bhāṣya*. As a matter of fact however, nowhere in the *Bhāṣya* do we find the word '*aparīkṣiṭaḥ*' explained as '*shāsṭrānabhyupagaṭaḥ*'; on the contrary, such an explanation would not be quite in comformity with the *Bhāṣya*. If the passage is really a reference to the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya*, then the proper reading

For the simple reason that it is not right to disregard others. If the teacher is fully conscious of the incapacity of the man whom he is instructing, and knows that he is incapable of comprehending what is said to him, and yet he disregards his intellect, then the man is not instructed at all; on the contrary, he only becomes confounded; and further when a man is totally ignorant and incapable of comprehension, what can be explained to him? If, on the other hand, the teacher knows the man to be capable of comprehension, and yet has no regard for him, that also will not be right; as it is highly improper to disregard a man with a high degree of intelligence. For these reasons the *Sūṭra* cannot mean that Hypothetical Doctrine is that which is accepted, though not mentioned in the *Shāsṭra.*

[Diṅnāga and others have raised a number of objections against the whole treatment of the subject of *Doctrine* in the Sūṭras]—Some have urged the following objection:—"Of all the four kinds of Doctrine that have been put forward, every one constitutes the opinion that one takes up and puts forward either directly [as in the case of the first two kinds of Doctrine, 'that which is common to all philosophies' and 'that which is peculiar to one philosophy'] or left to be implied by

would appear to be—'*aparīkṣiṭaḥ shāstrabhyupagaṭaḥ* &c.'; the meaning being that a 'doctrine which is not duly investigated and is yet accepted in the Shāsṭra, with a view &c. &c.' But this is not compatible with what follows in line 15, below. Then again, the arguments put forward by the *Vārṭika* are aimed against the *disregard for others*; while the criticism concludes with a disavowal of the explanation that Hypothetical Doctrine is the *abhyupagama* of the *ashāsṭriṭa*. So that it would seem that there is something wanting in the text of the *Vārṭika* as it stands. The whole difference between the two interpretations appears to be this: According to the *Vārṭika* the doctrine is not mentioned in the *Sūṭra* only, but, is adopted by the Shasṭra, in every other treatise dealing with it; while according to the other explanation the Doctrine would be one that is not put forward in so many words in any treatise on the *Shāsṭra*, but its acceptance is indicated by certain questions that are discussed in the treatises. It is doubtful however if the latter interpretation is really what is put forward by the *Bhāṣya*; as the words used by the *Bhāṣya* are simply—*aparīkṣiṭam abhyupagamyaṭē*, 'is accepted without investigation'; and this does not mean exactly what has been criticised by the *Vārṭika*.

presumption [as is the case with the last two kinds of Doctrine]; so that what is the use of provi ding any detailed explanation of this subject?" Others again have argued that '*Siḍḍhānṭa*,' Doctrine, is only another synonymn for '*pakṣa*', 'opinion' or 'view.'

We do not quite understand the assertion that 'Doctrine' is only another name for 'opinion.' For as a matter of fact that is called 'Doctrine' which is regarded as fully established or proved; while when the same is asserted or put forward with the firm conviction of its being an established fact, this *assertion* is called 'opinion'; so that the 'opinion' is that by *means* of which a certain fact is put forward as an *object* (to be explained) by one disputant to another; and thus the word which denotes an *instrument*—*i.e.*, the word 'opinion'—cannot be the synonym of that which denotes the *object*—*i.e.*, the word '*Siḍḍhānṭa*'. If two such words were to be regarded as synonymous, then the word '*parashu*', 'axe', would have to be regarded as synonymous with the word '*chhēḍana*', 'cutting'. As a matter fact, the axe is called an 'axe' simply, when it stands by itself, not operated upon by any action of man; and that same axe comes to be called the 'cutting instrument' wnen a man raises it and lets it fall upon a piece of wood; so that the use of the two words 'axe' and 'cutting instrument' is dependent respectively upon the absence and presence of operation by man. Similarly with all those words that are denotative of any sort of active instrumentality; such words do not denote either the *thing* alone or the *action* alone by itself; they denote the *thing* as accomplishing a certain act, as endowed with a particular activity or operation. Thus then, the word 'opinion' being a word denotative of active instrumentality,—and the word 'Doctrine' not being so,—how can the two be regarded as synonymous? Then again, the assertion that 'the Doctrine common to all Philosophies' is the same as 'opinion' shows that the *Bauḍḍha* (who makes

Vār: P. 110.

such an assertion) is truly an adept in the matter of synonyms! *Opinion* is that which is put forward only as a view to be examined and discussed; and yet it is identified with *Doctrine*, which is the name given to a view which is regarded as well-established and proved, and beyond all discussion and enquiry;—this is truly wonderful! If (with a view to escape from this anomaly) the Bauḍḍha should deny the possibility of any such thing as 'Doctrine common to all philosophies', then also, while denying such a Doctrine, he will have to adduce reasonings in support of this denial; and in adducing these reasonings he will admit the Doctrine that *a reasoning is to be accepted as proof*; and as this doctrine itself is one that is 'common to all philosophies', the adducing of reasonings would be a practical contradiction of the assertion that 'there is no such thing as a Doctrine common to all Philosophies.' If, on the other hand, he does not adduce any reasonings, even then the self-contradiction does not cease, whether the reasoning be asserted or not asserted; that is to say, if he asserts that 'there are reasonings' [in support of his view of denial of Doctrine], and then argues that 'there are no reasonings',—this involves self-contradiction; if, on the other hand, he says 'there are no reasonings', then a mere denial proves nothing. For these reasons we come to the conclusion that it is wrong to say that there is no such thing as 'Doctrine common to all Philosophies.'

Then again, you (who hold 'opinion' and 'doctrine' to be synonymous terms), also become open to the following questions:—(*a*) Do you mean that 'opinion' is the genus of which 'Doctrine' forms a component individual; so that the word 'opinion' includes Doctrine? or (*b*) that the two are precisely synoymous (with exactly the same extension and intention)? (*a*) The *first* of these views is simply not possible, for the simple reason that the extension of the word 'Opinion' is not wide enough to include Doctrine; in fact 'Opinion' cannot include 'Doctrine' because Doctrine

is not something *to be proved* (which every *opinion* is); in the case of real genuses we find that the genus 'Being' includes Substance, Quality and Action, because it is of wider extension, and being of wider extension it forms the genus; the same cannot be said of 'Opinion' (in relation to Doctrine). (*b*) As regards the second view we have already said that the two words cannot be synonymous; and if 'opinion' were a synonym for 'Doctrine' then the latter would have to be regarded as something *to be proved*; and to regard the 'Doctrine common to all philosophies' as something *to be proved* would be a contradiction in terms.

Vār. P. 111.

Another objection is raised against the third kind of Doctrine, the [Doctrine resting on Implication]—"The *Doctrine resting on Implication* does not differ from ordinary Presumption". If you assert that there is no difference between the two, our answer is simply that they do differ; as Presumption consists in the acceptance of the meaning of a statement *contrary* to that of a previous statement, which has been duly comprehended; while 'Doctrine by Implication' is that which is implied by, and in keeping with, a previous statement.*

LECTURE VI.

Reasoning.

Sūtras 32-39.

BHĀṢYA ON SŪTRA (32)

[P. 39, L. 7 to P. 40, L. 6.]

We next proceed to describe the Factors of Inference.

Sūtra (32).

(1) STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION, (2) STATEMENT OF THE PROBANS, (3) STATEMENT OF THE EXAMPLE, (4) REAFFIRMATION, AND (5) FINAL CONCLUSION;—THESE ARE THE FACTORS OF REASONING. (SU. 32.)

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*The previous statement is 'Devadatta who is fat *does not eat* during the day'; and the final cognition is '*he eats* at night'; the latter is to a certain extent contrary to the former. In the case of the Doctrine on the other hand there is no such contrariety.

"Some logicians declare that there are *ten* Factors: viz.—(1) Desire to know, (2) Doubt, (3) Capacity to accomplish what is desired, (4) Purpose and (5) Dispelling of the Doubt (in addition to the five mentioned in the *Sūṭra*);—why should not these additional five have been mentioned?" *

To the above question the *Bhāṣya* makes the following answer:—(1) As for *Desire to Know*, it is only that which urges, or brings forward, the purpose meant to be accomplished by the cognition of a thing not already cognised. Why does a person *desire to know* what is cognised? He does so simply with the view that when he comes to know it in its true character, he will either abandon it, or acquire it, or treat it with indifference; so that the ideas of abandoning or treating with indifference are the purpose served by the true knowledge of the thing; and it is for the sake of this purpose that the man *desires to know* the thing;—and certainly this *desire* does not *prove* anything [and as such cannot be regarded as a factor of reasoning, which is meant to *prove* the conclusion]. (2) As for *Doubt*, which forms the basis of the *Desire to Know*, it apprehends mutually contradictory properties; and as such it can be regarded as only proximate to true cognition; as of two contradictory properties only one can be true; † So that even though Doubt has been dealt with separately, as a category by itself [it will not be right to

* The Jaina logician, Bhaḍrabāhu (B. C. 433—357), who wrote the *Ḍashavaikālikāniryukṭi*, lays down ten Factors; though another Jaina logician, Siḍḍhasēna-Ḍivākara (A. D. 1-85) mentions only five. The ten factors of Bhaḍrabāhu are: —(1) *Praṭijñā*, Statement of the Proposition; (2) *Praṭijñāvibhakṭi* Limitation of the *Praṭijñā*; (3) *Hēṭu*, Statement of the Reason, (4) *Hēṭuvibhakṭi*, Limitation of the *Hēṭu*; (5) *Vipakṣa*, Counter-proposition; (6) *Vipakṣapraṭiṣēḍha*, Denial of the Counter-proposition; (7) *Ḍṛiṣṭānṭa*, Example; (8) *Ākāṅkṣā*, Doubting the Validity of the Example; (9) *Ākāṅkṣāpraṭiṣēḍha*, Dispelling of the Doubt; (10) *Nigamana*, Final Conclusion. The *Samshayavyuḍāṣa*, of the *Bhāṣya* stands for the '*Ākāṅkṣapraṭiṣēḍha*', and '*Samshaya*' for the '*Ākāṅkṣā*', of Bhadrabāhu. But here the parallel ceases. It would seem therefore that the *Bhāṣya* had in view a writer other than Bhaḍrabāhu.

† The Puri manuscript reads *vyāhaṭaḍharmopasaṅghāṭāṭaṭṭva*......Though the grammatical construction of this reading becomes difficult, the sense becomes clearer. With this reading, the translation should run as follows:—'Doubt is nearer to Wrong Cognition; *i.e.*, to that form of Wrong Cognition which apprehends two contradictory properties at the same time; for the simple reason that of the two contradictory properties only one can be true; so that not being of the nature of true Cognition, Doubt cannot prove anything.'

regard it as a Factor of Reasoning, as] it cannot prove anything (not being of the nature of true cognition). (3) As regards *Capacity to accomplish what is desired*,—as for instance the Instruments of Right Cognition have the capacity of accomplishing, for the cognising agent, the apprehension of the objects of cognition,—this could not form part of an argument put forward for proving a proposition, in the manner in which the statement of the Proposition forms part of it. (4) As for *Purpose*,—which consists in the ascertaining of the real nature of the thing sought to be known,—this is the *result*, and not *a factor*, of the argument put forward to prove a proposition. (5) Lastly, as for the *Dispelling of Doubt*,—which consists in the setting forth of the counter-proposition and then denying it,—this only tends to lend support to some other Instrument of Right Cognition; and it cannot be regarded as a part of the argument put forward to prove a proposition.* [Though *Desire to Know* and the rest cannot be regarded as Factors of Reasoning] yet *Desire to Know* and the rest have their use in Discussions; specially as they help the thing concerned to become known. As for the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest, on the other hand, inasmuch as these tend to bring about the true cognition of the thing, they are regarded as *parts*, factors, of the argument that is put forward to prove a proposition.†

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (32).

[P. 111, L. 6 to P. 112, L. 4].

This is a *Sūṭrā* ‡ laid down for the purpose of pointing out the divisions or kinds of 'Factors'; and the mention of the divi-

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‡ When an Inference is put forward to prove the non-eternality of Sound, the counter-proposition is asserted and denied by means of the statement 'if Sound were eternal it would not be a product'; and this is a Hypothetical Reasoning which lends support to the previous Inference; and it cannot, by itself, prove anything.

† The *Parishuḍḍhi* notes that the difference between the two lies in this that while *Desire to Know* and the rest help the Discussion by their mere *presence*, the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest help by their *cognition*. If the Desire to know is *present*, the Discussion proceeds; it is not necessary to know or apprehend the Desire. But the Statement of the Proposition, the Statement of the Probans and the rest, should be themselves *known*, before they can lead to the final cognition of things.

‡ In anticipation of the objection that the Sūṭra should have provided a general *definition* of 'Factors' before proceeding with the *division*, the *Ṭāṭparya* points out

sion is for the purpose of restriction. "What is it that has to be restricted?" What have to be restricted are such statements as that the inferential argument consists of *ten* or *three* Factors: Some people (the Jainas) declare that the inferential argument should consist of *ten* factors; while others (*e. g.* the Bauḍḍha Logician, Ḍiṅnāga, in his *Nyāyapravēsha*) hold that it should consist of only *three* Factors: so that it is for the purpose of restricting or precluding both these assertions that it becomes necessary to specify the real Factors of Reasoning, in the shape of the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest.

"But why should not *Desire to Know* and the rest be regarded as real *Factors*?"

They cannot be so regarded; because, in the first place, *Desire to Know* and the rest do not help in proving the conclusion to the other party. Those alone are real *Factors of Reasoning* which, each by itself, serve to accomplish a purpose not accomplished by the other, and which, through these purposes, combine together in the form of a single compound sentence, and thus collectively accomplish the one desired purpose of proving the conclusion to the other party;—the word 'Factor' itself denoting that the statement should form *part* of the inferential argument. "What do you mean by *Inferential Argument* here?" What we mean by 'Inferential Argument' in the present connection is that which, through the help of the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest, serves to accomplish a particular purpose;

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that what the *Vārṭika* means by using the word '*Sūṭra*' here is that the Sūṭra as it stands also serves to *indicate* the required general definition,—the word '*Sūṭra*' being used in its literal sense of '*sūchayaṭi iṭi Sūṭram*'. The required definition is indicated by the word '*avayava*' itself: an *avayava* or *part* is that which, in combination with a number of other independent parts, serves to accomplish a purpose which each of them individually could not do; and this is exactly what the 'Factor of Reasoning' is: each of the five Statements by itself cannot prove the desired proposition, but when all become combined and treated as composing a single compound sentence, they accomplish that purpose. (See *Vārṭika* below, text, l. 11.)

so that, inasmuch as the five statements collectively help in the accomplishment of that purpose of the Inferential Argument, they come to be called its 'Factors'; and *Desire to Know* and the other four (mentioned by the Jaina logician) do not, as a matter of fact, serve that purpose of proving the conclusion to the other party; and as such, these cannot be regarded as 'Factors' of the Inferential Argument.

Secondly, the *Desire to Know* and the rest cannot be regarded as 'Factors of Reasoning', because as a matter of fact, the person who puts forward a reasoning has a definitely *certain* knowledge of what he is stating; in fact it is only when a man is sure of his conclusion that he can *prove* it; and it is not possible that such a man should still have left in his mind either the *Desire to Know* it, or a *Doubt* on that subject; then as for the *Purpose* and the *Capacity to prove*, these are implied by the mere proving or asserting of the reasoning itself [so that these also need not be separately stated]; it is a well-recognised fact that no person ever seeks to prove that which is either useless or incapable (of affording the necessary information); and hence *Purpose* and *Capacity to Prove* also cannot be regarded as 'Factors of Reasoning.'

And yet 'Desire to Know' and the rest have their use in Discussions—says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 40, ll. 4-5). The meaning of this is that they give rise to Discussions; unless there is a *desire to know*, no discussion can arise; hence these should be regarded only as *arousers of discussions*, and not as *Factors of Reasoning*. And as the present is an occasion for describing what helps in the proving of a conclusion to the other party, what are mentioned are only the *Statement of the Proposition* and the rest (and not the *Desire to Know &c.*).

Vār : p. 112,

How the Inferential Argument cannot consist of only three (or two factors) we shall show later on, when we describe the fourth and fifth Factors—*Reaffirmation* and *Final Conclusion*.

BHĀṢYA ON SŪṬRA (33).

[P. 40, L. 7 TO L 10].

Sūṭra (33).

From among these (Factors) as divided above—

THE 'STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION' CONSISTS IN THE ASSERTION OF WHAT IS TO BE PROVED, THE PROBANDUM (Sūṭra 33).

That is, the 'Statement of the Proposition' is that assertion which speaks of the Subject which is intended to be qualified by that property which has to be made known or proved (by the reasoning),—this is what is meant by the words of the Sūṭra that '*Praṭijñā* consists in the mention of the Probandum'. [As an example of this, we have the statement] 'Sound is non-eternal.'

Vārṭika or Sūṭra 33.

[P. 112, L. 5 to P. 121 L. 15.]

'*From among these &c.*'—says the *Bhāṣya*; and this means that the *Sūṭra* is now going to put forward the definition of each of the Factors comprehensively enumerated in the preceding Sūṭra. The first factor, the '*Statement of the Proposition*', consists in *the assertion of the Probandum*—says the *Sūṭra*. Here the word 'Probandum' stands for that object which is qualified by a character to be made known or demonstrated; and the 'assertion'—i. e. using of words signifying the acceptance—of that constitutes the 'Statement of the Proposition'. As an example of this we have the Statement 'Sound is non-eternal'.

* An objection is raised—"The object is something *accomplished*, and as such it can never be the *Probandum, the sāḍhya*, which is something *to be accomplished*. That is to say, it is well known that the *object*, the *ḍharmin*, is that which is possessed of a *ḍharma*, property or character; and what is *well known* as an accomplished entity can never figure as something *to be made known*."

* For a full discussion on this question, *vide Vārṭika* Text, above, P. 52.

This does not affect our position, we reply. As we have distinctly added the qualification of being *qualified by a character to be made known*; we do not mean to say that an object, merely by itself as such, is the *Probandum*; but that the *Probandum* is that object which is qualified by a character to be made known or demonstrated. "If the character is yet to be made known, it cannot serve as a qualification; and if it is a qualification, it cannot be something yet to be made known. As a matter of fact that which is not known can never be a qualification; every object is qualified by a character that is well known and accomplished, and not by what is to be made known and yet to be accomplished." True; that which is not known cannot be a qualification, but (in the example cited) the *non-eternality* is a character quite well known; but it is known *as subsisting in the jar*; and what is to be made known is that same well-known character *as belonging to Sound*. "In that case what forms the *Probandum* is not *Sound* but the *non-eternality of Sound*." Inasmuch as we distinctly add the qualification 'of Sound', this objection does not affect us: when we say 'of Sound' it is clear that it is neither the character of non-eternality by itself, nor the object (Sound) by itself; but what is meant to be the *Probandum*, to be demonstrated, is that mutual relation of qualification and qualified which subsists between the object, Sound, and the character of *non-eternality*, which latter is already known as belonging to some other object; and certainly such a Probandum partakes of both (the object and the qualification). "What do you mean by the Probandum partaking of both? Which of the two is the *qualification*? Is it the *object* or the *character*? Is it the 'non-eternality of Sound' or the 'Sound of non-eternality?'" The correct view is that it is the *object* that is qualified; the fact is that the *object* is already known in a general form, but is not known in the particular form (of being qualified by a certain character); and

Vār. P. 113.

what the Inference is meant to demonstrate is some particular fact in regard to that thing.* "But of the *character* there is no knowledge even in a general form". It is not true that there is no knowledge of the *character*; the doubt meant to be set aside by the Inference is always in the form—'this character (of non-eternality), does it belong to Sound, or to things other than Sound?' [and this presupposes a knowledge of the character of non-eternality]. Thus then the conclusion is that what forms the *Probandum* is 'the non-eternality as subsisting in Sound'; and this is † certainly connected with such characters as *being a product* and the like; so that it is perfectly right to assert that the Probandum is the object qualified by a character to be demonstrated,—and that the assertion of this Probandum is the 'Statement of the Proposition.'

[The following objection is raised by the Bauḍḍha philosopher, according to whom the denotation of every word and of every sentence is negative in its character, consisting in the negation of something else]—"In the case of a judgment, which is liable to be taken as denoting two restrictions or limitations, if you accept only one of these restrictions as its denotation, then you make yourself liable to censure. So that if your definition of the 'Statement of Proposition' consists of the judgment 'the Statement of the Proposition consists of the assertion of the Probandum', it would not be right to accept either one of the two *restrictions* denoted by the judgment; for instance, if the judgment is taken as denoting '*Sāḍhyanirḍēsha ēva praṭijñā*', 'Statement of Proposition is only the assertion of the Probandum', then what is restricted is the 'Statement of Proposition',

*Both the *object* and the *character* are known; but they are not known as related to one another; and it is this relation between the two that is meant to be demonstrated by the Inference.

† Both editions have a 'na' here; but if the character of *being a product* is not connected with the *non-eternality Sound*, then the inference, 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product', would not be valid. We have therefore omitted the 'na'.

and not the 'assertion of the Probandum'; and this would mean that there can be no 'Statement of Proposition' apart from the 'assertion of the Probandum', though the 'assertion of the Probandum' there can be also apart from the 'Statement of Proposition'; so that it would not be correct to say that 'the assertion of the Probandum must be the Statement of Proposition'; and this would mean that the definition provided by the Sūṭra is not a correct one; many an 'assertion of Probandum' not being 'Statement of Proposition', *ex hypothesi*; and the definition thus becomes too wide. If, on the other hand, the judgment be taken as denoting the restriction, '*Sāḍhyanirḍēshaḥ praṭijña ēva*', 'the assertion of the Probandum *must always* be the Statement of Proposition',—then what is restricted is the 'assertion of the Probandum', and not the 'Statement of the Proposition'; and the meaning is that there is no 'assertion of the Probandum' apart from the 'Statement of Proposition', though there is 'Statement of the Proposition' also apart from the assertion of the Probandum'; and in this case also it will not be right to define the 'Statement of Proposition' as the 'assertion of the Probandum'; since *ex hypothesi*, the 'Statement of Proposition' having a wider extension, the defining factor 'assertion of Probandum' would fail to include all cases of the 'Statement of Proposition' [and the definition would thus become too narrow]. [Both these restrictions would be undesirable, as] that which is 'too wide' cannot be a true definition; *e. g. having horns* cannot be a true definition of the cow (subsisting as it does in the *cow* as also in many other animals). [And it has been shown that the proposed definition is too wide, if the restriction applies to the 'Statement of Proposition'];—similarly that which is too narrow cannot be a true definition; *e. g. being odorous* cannot be a definition of *Substance* [as it subsists only in one substance, the Earth]; [and it has been shown that the proposed definition is too narrow if the restriction applies to the 'assertion of the Probandum'].

If, in order to escape from these difficulties, the definition be taken as denoting neither of the two restrictions, then the assertion becomes meaningless. And apart from these three interpretations, no fourth can be placed upon the sentence. Hence the conclusion is that it is not right to define the 'Statement of Proposition' as the 'assertion of the Probandum'."

We do not quite understand the position that every sentence must signify some sort of restriction; for instance, when a cowherd indicates the path by saying 'this is the path leading to the city of Shrughna',—in this sentence we do not find any restriction being applied to anything. It is a case of restriction only when after a general statement some sort of specialisation is intended; that is to say, when a sentence directly signifies something general, and it is found that such generalisation leads to undesirable contingencies, people have recourse to *restriction* for the purpose of avoiding these contingencies *; in the case of the definition in question—'The Statement of Proposition consists in the assertion of the Probandum,'—we do not find any undesirable contingency in the shape of undue extension and the like; for the avoiding of which recourse should be had to restriction. And if recourse were to be had to restriction in the case of each and every sentence, then this would go directly against all ordinary usage. As a matter of fact (in ordinary usage) there is room for restriction only where there is occasion for qualification; so that it is no incongruity if in any particular case neither of the two restrictions is found possible.

The Bauḍḍha raises another objection against the definition—"If you define the 'Statement of Proposition' as 'the assertion of the Sāḍhya or Probandum,' then this definition would become applicable also to the (assertion of) such Probans

* For instance, if Perception were defined simply as 'that which is produced by sense-object contact', it would include pleasure also; hence by adding 'Cognition', the definition is restricted to perceptional *Cognition* only—*Ṭāṭparya*.

and Example as are *sāḍhya*, i.e., *not known*; *e.g.*, the Probans in the reasoning 'Sound is eternal *because it is visible*,' and the Example in the reasoning 'Sound is eternal because it is not tangible; *like cognition*' [where the *visibility* of sound and *eternality* of cognition are both such as are *not known*, they *stand in need of being proved* and as such can be called '*sāḍhya*;' so that the assertion of these would be the 'assertion of the *sāḍhya*'].''

Vār. P. 114.

I. The above objection has no force; as it is based upon an ignorance of the real meaning of the *Sūṭra*. What is meant by 'the assertion of the Probandum or Sāḍhya' being the 'Statement of Proposition' is that it is a statement asserting, or indicating the acceptance of, the object as qualified by a character to be demonstrated. As regards the mention of *visibility* in the statement 'because sound is visible' (in the first of the two reasonings cited by the objector), as also the *eternality of cognition* in the statement 'because it is not tangible, like cognition' (in the second reasoning)—both of these are the mere *mention* of the characters; and they are not true statements of an object as qualified by a character *to be demonstrated*. "But what the term '*the assertion of* the *sāḍhya*' denotes is *the non-assertion of what is not sāḍhya*; so that when you use the term '*the assertion of the Sāḍhya*,' you mean the non-assertion of what is not-sāḍhya*." But a thing is called '*asāḍhya*,' '*not-sāḍhya*,' for two reasons: firstly, it is called 'not-*sāḍhya*,' 'not something to the demonstrated,' when it is *siḍḍha* or well known; and secondly it is also called '*not-sāḍhya*,' when it is something of which any demonstration or proof is impossible; and what the term 'the assertion of *sāḍhya*' precludes is both these kinds of *asāḍhya*,

* What is *not-sāḍhya*, *not something to be proved or made known*, is what is *siḍḍha*, already *known*; so 'assertion of the sāḍhya' is the non-assertion of what is *siḍḍha* or known; and when one speaks of the *visibility of sound* or the *eternality of cognition*, we have the *assertion of what is not known at all*; and this is certainly *the non-assertion of what is known*, which is the same as '*the assertion of sāḍhya*.'

—that which is *siḍḍha*, well known, as well as that which cannot be demonstrated; and the two instances that have been cited—*viz.* the *visibility of sound* and the *eternality of cognition*—belong to the latter category of '*asāḍhya*,'—*i. e.*, that which cannot be demonstrated; so that these two cannot fall within the category of 'the assertion of the sāḍhya,*' "In a case where such character (of Sound) as *being a product* and the like, which is known to and recognised by one of the two parties in a discussion, is put forward as *sāḍhya*,—then, in that case, the mention of this character of *being a product* would be 'assertion of the *sāḍhya*,' and would, therefore, have to be regarded as 'the Statement of Proposition'." This does not affect our position; as neither of the two alternative meanings of this objection has any force at all. For, in the first place, if what the objector is referring to is the proposition in the form 'the character of *being a product* is the *sāḍhya*,' then our answer is that [in applying our definition to such a proposition, he shows that] he has not grasped the meaning of the Sūṭra.† Secondly, if he is referring to some such statement as 'Sound is a product,' then, in that case, what is urged as an objection against us,—*viz.*, that the statement in question becomes a 'Statement of the Proposition —is something that we shall readily admit; as a 'Statement of the Proposition' in this form would not militate against our philosophy. [All this we have said after having admitted, for the sake of argument, that '*the assertion of sāḍhya*' denotes the 'non-assertion of the *asāḍhya*'; but] as a matter of fact, when you assert that 'the *Statement of Pro-*

* The contention of the Bauḍḍha would have had some force if all 'asāḍhya' were 'siḍḍha' or known; as it is however, 'asāḍhya' also includes things that can never be known or demonstrated And as the instances cited fall within this latter class of 'asāḍhya,' they cannot be included under the definition.

† The Proposition 'the character of being a product is sāḍhya' is the mere mention of a character; it is *not* the statement asserting an object as qualified by the character sought to be demonstrated; and this is what is meant by the definition as given in the *Sūṭra*.

position is called *the assertion of the sāḍhya*, because this latter term means the *non-assertion of the asāḍhya'*, your assertion is not quite right; because in reality the signification of words is both positive and negative; so that it is not right to restrict the denotation of words to mere negation; in some sentences the denotation consists of affirmation, while in others it consists of negation; so that one who holds that the denotation of every sentence must consist of negation only, or of affirmation only, lands himself in difficulties [and it is on this assumption that the whole Bauḍḍha objection under consideration is based];—and we shall show later on why the denotation of words cannot consist of negation only.

II. [The second answer to the Bauḍḍha objection is as follows]—The Bauḍḍha has argued that—"if the *Statement of Proposition* be defined as *the assertion of the Sāḍhya*, this definition would apply also to such Probans and Example as are '*Sāḍhya*', *i.e.*, still to be known and demonstrated". To this our answer is that there can be no such application; as the word '*Sāḍhya*' in our definition is meant to be qualified by the word '*Siḍḍhānṭa*'; our definition does not mean the assertion of the mere *Sāḍhya*; it means the assertion of that 'Sāḍhya' *which represents a doctrine*; and as such how can it apply to the *unknown* Probans and Example? * That '*Siḍḍhānṭa*' is meant to qualify the '*Sāḍhya*' of the present *Sūṭra* is shown by the sequence; that is, by the fact that the mention of the Factors (of which the Statement of the Proposition is one) follows immediately after that of *Siḍḍhānṭa.* "If '*Siḍḍānṭa*' is a qualification of '*Sāḍhya*' because of the sequence, then the definition should be in the form '*ṭannirḍeshaḥ praṭijñā*', 'the Statement of the Proposition consist in the *assertion of that*' (*i.e.*, of the Siḍḍhānṭa)". Certainly not. It is necessary to add the word '*Sāḍhya*' for the purpose of excluding

Vār. P. 115.

* A Doctrine is that opinion which is based upon valid proofs; and certainly that which is *unknown* cannot be said to be based upon valid proofs.

the *Doctrine Common to all Philosophies*; if the definition consisted of the form 'the assertion *of that*', then as the noun that has gone before is 'Doctrine' (*Siḍḍhānṭa*) in general, the Pronoun 'that' would refer to all forms of Doctrine; so that the *Doctrine Common to all Philosophies* also would naturally become included (which would not be right); and it is for the purpose of avoiding this that the word '*Sāḍhya*', 'to be demonstrated', is added; so that what is meant is the assertion of only that Doctrine *which has to be demonstrated*, and not that of the Doctrine *accepted by all* (and hence needing no demonstration). "The exclusion of the *Common Doctrine* would be got at by the force of circumstances: Though it is true that the definition in the form '*it is the assertion of that*' would be too general and wide, yet the *Common Doctrine* could be excluded by the force of circumstances; that is, by the circumstance that the Common Doctrine does not stand in need of being demonstrated, while the other kinds of Doctrine—*that which is peculiar to one Philosophy* and the rest—are, in certain, cases* in need of being demonstrated. As an example of such exclusion we have the case of the assertion 'feed the Brāhmaṇas', where, though the word 'Brāhmaṇas' is too general, the assertion becomes restricted within certain limits by the force of the circumstance that it is absolutely impossible to feed *all* Brāhmaṇas." If the 'force of circumstances' were to be admitted in such cases, then, in the present case, nothing need have been said; even the words '*ṭannirḍēshaḥ praṭijñā*' should not be said; '*praṭijñā praṭijñā*', 'Statement of the Proposition is the Statement of the Proposition', should be the form of the definition; all the specification and restriction that is needed would be got at by the 'force of circumstances.' Please

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* This qualifying phrase has been added in view of the objection that, if the other kinds of Doctrine are all 'Sāḍhya', then there is no need of mentioning them apart from the *Saḍhya*; 'in certain cases' means *in cases of disagreement* or *difference of opinion*. In the case of the Common Doctrine, no such disagreement is possible.

do not say—'What harm would that do to us?'. How can you escape from being harmed by such a process, when there is a rejection of the definition that you put forward, in the form '*tannirḍēshaḥ pratijñā*'?

III. [A third answer is given to the Bauḍḍha objection]—The definition—'the Statement of the Proposition consists of the assertion of the *sāḍhya*'—is not open to the contingencies that have been urged against it by the Bauḍḍha; because the presence of the *Desire to Know* (*Doubt, Dispelling of Doubt, Capacity to Prove* and *Purpose*) is meant to be a qualifying factor; that is to say, the sentence 'the Statement of the Proposition consists of the assertion of the Saḍhya' is intended to be qualified by the presence of 'Desire to Know' and the other factors that give rise to discussion; so that what is meant by the word '*Sāḍhya*' is that object *with regard to which there is desire to know &c. &c.*; and the assertion of such a *Sāḍhya* is the 'Statement of the Proposition.' How, then, can this definition apply to the (unknown) Probans and Example?*

IV. [Another answer to the same *Bauḍḍha* objection]—The verbal affix in '*sāḍhya*' denotes *deserving* or *capability*; in the definition 'the assertion of the Sāḍhya', the word '*sāḍhya*'—made up of the root '*sāḍh*' and the verbal affix ('*ṇyaṭ*') which denotes *deserving or capability*—means *that which is deserving of being demonstrated*; and as the assertion of such a *sāḍhya* would constitute the *Statement of the Proposition*, this definition could not apply to the *unknown* Probans and Example; as these are not *deserving of being demonstrated*.

V. [Another answer to the same objection]—It is well known that there is a distinct line of difference between the

* As with regard to these—the visibility of Sound or the eternality of cognition—there is a palpable absurdity, so that no one ever entertains any *doubt* or *desire to know* with regard to them.

characters of the Object and the Instrument; as a matter of fact the properties of the Object are entirely different from those of the Instrument: the property of the Object is that it is *most desired by the agent*, while that of the Instrument is that it is *the most effective means*; and certainly the character of one can never become the property of another. In the case in question, in the sentence 'the Statement of Proposition consists in the assertion of the Sāḍhya', the word '*sāḍhya*' denotes the *object* (that which is desired to be proved), while the word '*chākṣuṣa*' 'visible' (in the sentence 'because sound is *chākshusa*') denotes the *means* (the word meaning 'that which is perceived *by means of the eye*). Consequently there is no chance of the latter being regarded as '*sāḍhya*', and having the definition applicable to it.

Vār P. 116.

VI. [The sixth answer to the *Bauḍḍha* objection]—Our definition cannot apply to the unknown Probans and Example, as things are divided into three distinct groups of the '*sāḍhya*' (what is to be demonstrated), the '*asiḍḍha*' (the absolutely unknown) and the '*siḍḍha*' (the well-known); so that *what is to be demonstrated* is entirely distinct from *what is well-known*, and this latter again from what is *absolutely unknown*: That is called '*sāḍhya*' (to be demonstrated) which is accepted and known by one of the two parties, and is addressed to another party as the *object* (of the action of demonstration);—that is called '*asiḍḍha*' (absolutely unknown) which is not accepted by either party;—and that is called '*siḍḍha*' (well-known) which is accepted by both parties; consequently, by reason of this difference, when one uses the term 'well-known', this does not apply either to what is *absolutely unknown* or to *what is to be demonstrated*; and similarly when the *Sūṭra* makes use of the term '*sāḍhya*' (to be demonstrated), it cannot apply to either what is *well-known* or to what is *absolutely unknown*; and if things, to which the term in question does not apply, were to be included

(in its denotation), then all things—even those that are well-known and accepted by both parties—could be regarded as included under the definition of the 'Statement of Proposition'!

VII. [The last answer to the *Bauḍḍha* objection]—In the definition '*sāḍhyanirḍēshaḥ pratijñā*'—'the Statement of the Proposition is the assertion of the *Sāḍhya*'—the word '*sāḍhya*' must stand for that thing which forms the subject of the *Statement of Proposition* and the other Factors of Reasoning; for the simple reason that it is only an object, which as qualified by a well-known character, forms the subject of the *Statement of Proposition* and the other Factors of Reasoning,—that comes *to be demonstrated* or made known as the substratum of some other qualification (not known to the other party) [and as such comes to be called '*sāḍhya*']; and certainly this cannot apply to the unknown Probans and Example.

Thus then, inasmuch as our definition cannot apply to the Unknown Probans and Example, it is not right for the *Bauḍḍha* to reject this definition and propose another, wherein he needlessly introduces the word '*iṣṭa*', 'desired'. * That is to say, some people (the Bauḍḍha logician, Subanḍhu, for instance) have thought that if the definition stands as 'the Statement of Proposition consists in the assertion of the Sāḍhya', then, inasmuch as the 'Sāḍhya' is not qualified by the adjective 'desired' the definition becomes applicable to the Unknown Probans and Example; and in view of this they have proposed other definitions of the *Pakṣa* or Subject of Inference. For instance, one of the definitions proposed (by Subanḍhu) is that 'Pakṣa is that which is desired to be demonstrated'. But here the adding of the word 'desired' is entirely useless. Inasmuch as the wrong Probans and Example are both excluded by the term

* This refers to the definition put forward by the Bauḍḍha logician Subanḍhu who says '*pakṣo yaḥ sāḍhayituṃiṣṭaḥ*', the 'Pakṣa or Subject is that which is *desired to be demonstrated*'.

'*sāḍhya*' 'to be demonstrated', it will not be right to say that the addition of the word 'desired' is for the purpose of excluding these (*i. e.* the wrong Probans and Example). And further, the qualification of being 'desired' is already got at by the fact of the '*pakṣa*' being made the *object* (of the action of *being demonstrated*, in the sentence '*pakṣo yaḥ sāḍhayiṭum iṣṭaḥ*'); as '*iṣṭa*' and '*īpsiṭa*' are synonymous terms [and the object is that which is the most *īpsiṭa*; so that when the *pakṣa* is made the object, it naturally follows that it is *īpsiṭa*, which is the same as *desired*].

"But the word 'desired' can be explained as serving the purpose of excluding the *undesired* Subjects [such propositions for instance, as 'words are not expressive', 'fire is not hot' and the like]." But in reality not one of the 'undesired' judgments cited by the Bauḍḍha in this connection, every one of which is contrary either to the arguer's own assertions or to some other valid proofs, can ever be suspected to be 'desired' [so that any effort for the purpose of excluding such judgments is absolutely uncalled for]. For instance, when the judgment 'words are not expressive' is put forward, we find that what is affirmed here is the inexpressiveness of words, and yet it is words that are used to express that idea; so that this is a clear case of self-contradiction;—then as regards the judgment 'fire is not hot', this is contrary to well-ascertained perception. In this same connection some people have also cited the judgment 'Sound is not apprehended by the auditory organ' as one contrary to perception. But this is not right* as the functioning of the

Vār. P. 117.

sense-organs is not amenable to sense-perception; as a matter of fact, the operations of the sense-organs are beyond the reach of the sense-organs themselves; so that no one can ever have any such

* The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that in course of his criticism of the Bauḍḍha definition, the author of the *Vārṭika* also criticises some of the statements made, in this connection, by the Bauḍḍha writers.

perceptional knowledge as that 'such and such a thing is apprehended, or not apprehended, by the sense-organ'; in reality the functioning of sense-organs is always a matter of inference,—such functioning being inferred from the fact that the apprehension, of colour, f. i., appears when the organ operates and does not appear when it does not operate. Hence the judgment cited is not a true example of 'contrary to Perception'; a true example of which is the judgment 'fire is not hot.' Then again, as an example of 'contrary to the Scriptures', the Bauḍḍha has cited the case of the *Vaishēṣika* making the assertion that 'Sound is eternal'; but this also, we find, is not 'contrary to Scriptures.' As the Vaishēṣika accepts the non-eternality of Sound, not on the basis of Scriptures, but on that of Inference; this Inference being based upon such facts as Sound undergoing modifications through its cause, and so forth; so that the judgment 'Sound is eternal' is contrary to Inference (and not to Scripture).* "But the Vaishēṣika accepts the non-eternality of Sound on the strength of what is declared in the *Sūṭra* (of Kaṇāḍa); so that an assertion contrary to that is a case of being contrary to Scriptures." But in this manner even the assertion that 'the jar is eternal' may be regarded as being 'contrary to Scriptures'. A real example of being contrary to Scriptures we have in the shape of the assertion that 'wine should be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa'. Another 'undesired' judgment cited by the Bauḍḍha is 'that which is contrary to well-known facts'; but we fail to understand what is 'contrary to well-known facts; as that alone is called a 'well-known fact', which is

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks: As a matter of fact the view that Sound is non-eternal has the support of Scriptures also. We have such declarations as 'Prajāpati created King Soma; therefrom *were the three Vedas born*'; but in view of the fact that there are also certain other passages that lend colour to the view that Sound is eternal,—*e. g.*, 'neither being nor non-being existed in the beginning; the Scriptures alone existed',—if we depended upon the Scriptures only, there would be an uncertainty as to Sound being eternal or not-eternal; and as this uncertainty is removed by means of Inference, the idea of the non-eternality of Sound is regarded as inferential.

cognised by means of one of the Instruments of Right Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest [so that being 'contrary to well-known facts' is nothing apart from 'being contrary to Pramāṇas']; *e.g.*, the assertion that 'the moon is not Chanḍra' has been cited as an example of an assertion being 'contrary to well-known facts'; [but the only 'well-known fact' to which it is contrary is the fact that the word 'Chanḍra' is a name for the Moon; and this fact is known only by means of Inference based upon premisses derived from ordinary usage, where it is found that whenever the older man uses the word 'Chanḍra' the younger man always understands it to mean the Moon]; so that the assertion in question is only contrary to Inference; and as such falls under the category of being 'contrary to Pramāṇas', which has already been mentioned before. With all this however, it lies within the power of the Bauḍḍha to regard all these cases as 'being contrary to well-known facts',—and then to urge that for the purpose of excluding these it is necessary to add the qualifying word 'desired' to the definition under consideration!

The whole of this matter (raised by the Bauḍḍha) we regard as highly improper. "Why so?" For this reason that 'self-contradiction' and the other defects (that have been mentioned in this connection) pertain to the assertion embodied in the 'Statement of the Proposition'; everyone of these defects is possible only in regard to the *assertion*, and not to the *object* (spoken of therein). "How so?" Because the object remains the same; the character of the object when it is affirmed is precisely the same as when it is denied. [So that when a man affirms something with regard to the object and then denies the same with regard to it, what he contradicts is his own assertion, and not the *object*, which by itself retains its own character in both cases]. "Well, the same may be said with regard to the *assertion* also; it may be said that the defects do not pertain to the assertion either." As a matter of fact

the defects do not pertain to the object; nor do they pertain to the assertion; they pertain to the person (making the assertion). The fact of the matter is that the defects of the agent are attributed to him on account of certain actions of his; so the defects, though primarily belonging to the agent, become attributed to the action, and we come to speak, figuratively, of the 'defective *action*'; thus it is that the defect of the speaker becomes indirectly attributed to the *assertion*, and we speak of the 'defective assertion'; though primarily the defect belongs neither to the *object* nor to the *assertion*. Every object, by its very nature, is endowed with a capability for performing its own functions; and if it happens to be employed in a function other than its own, this only proves the inexpertness of the person so misusing the object; similarly every assertion is, by its nature, capable of expressing its own meaning; and if it happens to be used for the expressing of other meanings, this only proves the incapacity of the person so misusing it. "Inasmuch as the assertion speaks of the *object*, which forms its *subject*, it is only right that the defects of the assertion should be called the 'defects of the *Subject*'." This is not right; as if that were right, then the defects of the *probans* &c., also would have to be regarded as 'defects of the *Subject*'; it might be said, with equal reason, that, inasmuch as the Probans (and the other objects spoken of in the premisses) also are only Subjects, in some form, the defects of these also are only 'defects of the Subject'; and the result of this would be that all the defects (of reasoning) will have to be regarded as 'defects of the subject'; so that it would not be right to urge these defects in the form that—(a) 'there is deficiency in the Probans,' or (b) 'the factors of the reasoning are defective', or (c) 'the rejoinder is faulty', or (d) 'the arguer is embarrassed', *

Vār. P. 118.

* The translation follows the interpretation of the *Tātparya*. It appears simpler however to explain the compound as—*nyūnaṭāḍiḍoṣasya ākṣēpah, svīkāraḥ, ṭasya*

and so forth [as all these should be the 'defects' of the *Subject*']. "But the necessary restriction (that the defects of the *assertion*, and not those of the Probans, would taint the Subject) would be got at through the relation of expresser and expressed (between the assertion and the Subject), and through the relation of proof and proved (which subsists between the Probans and the Subject)." This not right; as there is no ground for such restriction. "What we mean is as follows:—The Subject appears (in the reasoning) as an object of proof (forming, as it does, part of the premiss which puts forward the Probans), as also an object of the Statement of the Proposition (in the form of the conclusion); and the defects of this latter assertion may taint the Subject because this latter is expressed by that, and not because it is proved by it (which is the relation subsisting between the Probans and the Subject); so that there is nothing to show that the defects of the Probans are defects of the Subject; while as for the defects of the assertion, these are attributed indirectly to the Subject (on the ground mentioned above)." Such indirect attributing of anything is not permissible so long as its direct signification remains possible; for instance, when the assertion 'the platforms are crying out,' is made, it is found that the action of *crying out* is not possible for the *platform*; and on the ground of this impossibility we reject the ordinary direct signification of the said sentence, and take the word 'platforms' in its indirect sense of *men occupying the platforms*; and this attributing of the indirect meaning is due to the impossibility of any basis or proof for the ordinary direct meaning;—now such are not the circumstances in the case in question; where we find that it is *not* impossible for the *defects of the*

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bhāvēṇa aś ṭiṣvēna uḍbhāvanam yēṣām ṭani ḍūsaṇāni na uḍbhāvan yāni; (a) is the defect of the Probans; (b) refers to the defects of the premisses or the conclusion &c.; (c) is the defect of the rejoinder, and (d) belongs to the person putting forward the reasoning.

assertion to apply to the *assertion* itself; and it is only if there were such impossibility that the defects would be rejected in regard to the assertion and attributed indirectly to the *Subject.* If the rejection of the principal direct meaning were done by you arbitrarily, without sufficient reason, then this would be against your* own following declaration†—'If the reason of the Naiyāyika is denied, the rejection of the principal meaning becomes quite arbitrary' [where the arbitary rejection of the principal meaning is censured].

Vār. P. 119. "What we mean by the word '*iṣṭa*,' 'desired,' in our definition is what it ordinarily denotes,—that is, that which is *meant or intended* [so that by adding this word we succeed in including that which, even though not directly *asserted* by the person as the *Sāḍhya*, what he is going to prove, is yet *intended* by him to be proved]".

But this is implied by the very fact of his proving it; no one ever proves what he does not *desire* or *intend* to prove; even in a case where a man proves an *undesired* thing through fear, he cannot be said to be proving what he does not desire to prove; as by the act of proving he avoids the undesirable contingency (that he fears); and this avoidance is for him at that time, what is *desired* by him. So on this ground also the insertion of the word 'desired' is useless.

Similarly in the definition proposed by another Bauḍḍha writer—that "the Pakṣa is that which is desired in the course of an enquiry",—the insertion of the word 'desired' is useless.

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*If it were found that when the defects of the assertion are urged as tainting the assertion, they do not silence the man making the assertion,—then alone would it be justifiable to attribute these defects to the Subject; as a matter of fact however, the defects of the assertion are quite competent by themselves to silence the man.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

†Neither the *Ṭāṭparya* nor the *Parishuḍḍhi* says anything as to the author of this declaration.

And further, what is an 'enquiry'? If 'enquiry' consists in the putting forward of reasonings for and against a certain conclusion, then there must be, in this, a congregation of several things; so that it cannot be known what is 'desired' as what; it cannot be ascertained whether what is 'desired' is 'desired' as *what is proved*, or as *what proves*, or *as what refutes* or as *what is refuted*. It may be held that—"'*enquiry*' stands for *doubt*,—as when we speak of the 'enquiry' as to whether Soul exists or not, then the phrase 'doubt in regard to the existence and non-existence of the Soul' is synonymous with the phrase 'enquiry as to the Soul's existence and non-existence'." But as a matter of fact, the word 'enquiry' does not signify *doubt*; nor does the word 'doubt' signify *enquiry*. In fact the name 'enquiry' is given to that process of putting forward reasonings for and against two contradictory opinions, which follows *after the arising of Doubt* on a point, and which ends in the ascertainment or demonstration of one of these opinions; and certainly this process is not *Doubt*; as Doubt is *uncertain* cognition; and in a discussion there is no doubt, there being *certainty* in regard to both opinions in the minds of their respective exponents, who engage in a discussion only when they have a firm conviction in regard to the opinion held by themselves.

The above considerations also serve to reject the definition of *Pakṣa* as '*sāḍhyaṭvēnēpsiṭaḥ pakṣo Viruḍḍhārṭhānirākriṭaḥ*', 'that which is desired to be proved, and which is not obsessed by anything to the contrary'.* The phrase 'that which is desired' serving the purpose of excluding what is *not desired*, there is no need for the adding of the further qualification, 'which is not obsessed by anything to the contrary'. That

*It is not clear who has proposed this definition. The *Ṭāṭparya* simply says—*sṭhānānṭarīyam bhaḍanṭasya lakṣaṇam ḍūṣayaṭi*. But a somewhat similar definition is found in the *Nyāyabinḍu*, which defines the *Pakṣa* as '*svarūpēṇaiva svayamiṣṭo*' *nirākṛiṭaḥ*'.

is to say, just as in the other definition propounded by the Bauḍḍha,—'the Pakṣa is that which is desired to be proved',—the qualification '*iṣṭa*', 'desired', has been held (by one of your own logicians, Subanḍhu) to serve the purpose of excluding the undesirable *Pakṣa*, so also in the definition now being considered, you have the qualification '*īpsiṭa*', 'desired', which would serve the same purpose of excluding the undesirable *Pakṣa*; so that the latter half of the line,—'*Viruḍḍhārṭhānirākriṭaḥ*', 'which is not obsessed by anything to the contrary',—need not have been added. It will perhaps be urged that the qualification 'which is not obsessed by anything to the contrary' serves to preclude the defects of the Pak·a. But in that case, what is the use of the qualification 'desired'? If both the qualifications, 'desired' and 'not obsessed by anything to the contrary, are necessary for the purpose of precluding the defects of the Pakṣa, then the second qualification, 'not obsessed by anything to the contrary', should be added to also Subanḍhu's definition, that 'the Pakṣa is that which is desired to prove'. Thus then, when we come to examine these two definitions of *Pakṣa* (as propounded by the Bauḍḍha,) we find that while one is deficient or short, the other is too diffuse, containing superfluous qualifications.

Vār P. 120.

In one of the definitions of *Pakṣa* proposed by the*Bauḍḍhas we find the words '*svayam sāḍhyaṭvēna īpsiṭaḥ*', [and *svayam sāḍhayiṭum iṣṭah*] 'that which is desired by the person himself to prove'; and here also, the qualification 'by the person himself' need not have been introduced. "Why?" Because as a matter of fact an action always requires an agent; *e. g.* when it is said that 'the agent is cutting the tree', it is naturally implied that he is doing it *by himself*; as what a man cuts is not cut by another person; in the same manner,

*We find a somewhat similar definition given by Ḍharmakīrṭi, in his *Nyāyabinḍu*.

when a certain thing is proved by a person, it is naturally implied that it is proved *by himself*. It seems that the propounder of this fresh definition, having indicated superfluities in the definitions propounded by other logicians, himself lost sight of this defect in his own assertions.* In the *Vāḍaviḍhāna-ṭīkā* we find the following justification of the qualification 'by himself':—"The word '*sāḍhayaṭi*', 'proves', is applicable to both cases—where the man does the proving himself and where he gets it done by another person; hence the qualification, 'by himself' becomes necessary; otherwise the definition would become applicable to both cases." It is true that the word '*sāḍhayṭi*' is applicable to both cases; but we do not see any reason why such a common word should be used at all (whereby it becomes necessary to add a further qualification); the definition might very well be stated simply as 'the Pakṣa is that which is desired to prove' [which has at least this virtue that it does not necessitate the adding of qualifications]. Then again, in the case of every word, as between its primary and secondary significations, it is only the former that is generally accepted; so that there would be no such acceptance with regard to the verb 'proves' applying to the man who gets the *proving* done by another person; it is true that the word 'proves' is applicable to both, the man who does the proving himself as well as one who gets it done by another person; but, as a rule, it can apply to the man who is made to do the proving [as it is he that actually does the *proving*], and not to him who gets it done by another person; as to this latter the word could apply only *indirectly*, while to the man who actually does the proving, it applies *directly*.† Further,

* दोषान् विविच्य appears to be a better reading. As it stands, the text may be translated thus—'not having duly considered the fault of superfluity in the assertion of other persons, he himself became bewildered in his own assertions.'

†The real nominative of the verb, 'proves', '*sāḍhayaṭi*', must be the man to whom belongs the actual action of *proving*. The person who gets the proving done by

the infinitive affix '*ṭumun*' always indicates the identity of the nominative agent; and (in Subanḍhu's definition) we find the infinitive '*sāḍhayiṭum*', 'to prove'; and the Infinitive affix has always been found to indicate the identity of the agent; for instance, in the sentence 'I go *to bathe*', [the nominative of *going* is the same as that of *bathing*]; and in such cases we do not find the man saying, like a demented person, 'I am *myself* going to bathe'; so in the case in question also [the adding of the qualification 'by himself' is absurd]. Thus then, we find that even though the verb 'proves' may be common to both kinds of agents, yet, inasmuch as the root is qualified by the infinitive affix '*ṭumun*', it cannot apply to the man who gets the proving done by another person. As for the view that—"the qualification *by himself* is intended to indicate that the conclusion that the man desires to prove is independent of *Shāsṭra* (verbal authority),"—we have, in this same treatise supplied the refutation of this. [On p. 109, l. 11, where we have objected to the *Bhāṣya* definition of *Abhyupagamasiḍḍhānṭa*.] "What is the refutation that you have supplied?" We have pointed out that 'it is not right to disregard others', and so forth. Further, what is that '*Shāsṭra*', 'verbal authority', of which the conclusions would be independent? "Verbal Authority consists, in words that are not contrary to Perception and Scriptures." In that case, when you say that 'the man proves a conclusion that is independent of verbal authority,' it means that his conclusions are not valid, not supported by proofs; and a conclusion that is not supported by proofs cannot be adopted by any person in his senses; nor would it be right to seek to prove such a conclusion.

Vār : P. 121.

another person can be regarded as a nominative of the action of proving, only indirectly; on the basis of the understanding that the man who gets an act done may be regarded as having done it himself. So that so long as it is possible to take the primary agent, the actual *actor*, as the nominative, there is no justification for applying it to the *secondary* agent.

In the *Vāḍaviḍhi** the definition put forward of the *Statement of the Proposition* is that 'the Statement of the Proposition is the mention of the Sāḍhya'. This also is not a correct definition; as in whatever way it is interpreted, it is open to objection. "How?" If the sentence—"the Statement of the Proposition is the mention the Sāḍhya'—is put forward in reference to the *Pakṣa* that has been spoken of before, then the introduction of the word '*sāḍhya*' becomes superfluous; as the aforementioned '*pakṣa*' could be referred to simply by the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*', and the form of the definition should be 'the Statement of the Proposition is the mention *of that*'. If, on the other hand, the definition has no reference to the *Pakṣa*, and is meant to be independent by itself, then it becomes open to all the objections that have been urged (on p. 113, l. 20, *et. seq.*) by you against our definition [As taken by itself the 'mention of the Sāḍhya' of your definition is the same as the 'assertion of the Sāḍhya' of our definition]. "Even so, the answer that you put forward against those objections can be put forward here also (in support of our definition)." You can not reasonably do this; as you admit the force and validity of those objections (inasmuch as they have been urged by yourself), while we have never admitted it. For instance, when a man urges against another the reasoning 'your mother is bad because she is a woman', the person thus addressed can say in answer that *being a woman* is not a reason for *being bad*; a woman is said to be *bad* only by reason of her relations with men other than her husband; [while this answer would be quite effective in setting aside the assertion of the mother of the second man being bad] any such answer would not be effective in setting aside the same charge against the mother of the man who originally sought to prove the bad character of one on the ground of her being a woman [as he

* This would appear to be the original of the वादविधानटीका referred to above, P. 194.

apparontly admits tho fact that *being a woman* is a reason for being of bad character]; so that if he puts forward the answer that what proves *bad character* is, not *being a woman*, but having relations with men other than her husband,—he contradicts his own assertion that a 'certain woman is bad because she is as woman';—in the same manner, you would be courting self-contradiction, if you were to accept as true the answers that have been made against your assertion (against us), that 'the definition that the Statement of the Proposition as the assertion of the Sāḍhya, becomes applicablo also to the assertion of the unknown Probans and Example.'

We thus conclude that our definition that 'the Statement of the Proposition consists in the assertion of the Probandum' is free from all faults.

Sūṭra (34).

THE 'STATEMENT OF THE PROBANS' IS THAT WHICH DEMONSTRATES THE PROBANDUM, THROUGH ITS SIMILARITY (*i. e.* A PROPERTY COMMON TO IT AND) TO THE EXAMPLE. (Sū. 34).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 41, L. 1 to L. 3].

'That which 'demonstrates'—*i.e.* makes known, or proves—the 'probandum'—*i. e.*, the property to be proved (as belonging to the Subject),—through a property common to the Example,—is the 'Statement of the Probans.' That is to say, when one notices a certain property in the Subject (with regard to which the conclusion is to be demonstrated)* and notices the same property also in the Example, and then puts forward that property as demonstrating (or proving) the Probandum,—this putting forward of the said property constitutes the 'Statement of the Probans.' As an example (in connection with the conclusion 'Sound is not eternal') we have the Statement 'because Sound has the character of

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* The term *sāḍhya*, is used in the present context rather promiscuously. It stands for the *probandum*, the character to be demonstrated, the predicate of the conclusion,—as also for the *Subject*, the thing in regard to which that character is to be demonstrated.

being a product; as a matter of fact everything that is a product is not eternal.'

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 34.

[P. 121, L. 16 to P. 125, L. 14].

The present *Sūṭra* is a real 'Sūṭra,' a 'suggestive aphorism,' inasmuch as while directly providing the definition of the *Statement of the Probans*,—whose turn it was after the definition of the Statement of the Proposition,—it serves to indirectly *suggest* the presence of a property common to the example. The compound '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmya*' is to be taken as the Instrumental *Ṭaṭpuruṣa*,—the meaning being 'similarity to the Example.' "What is an Example?" We shall describe this later on. The '*Sāḍharmya*', 'similarity' to the Example consists in the presence in the Example of the same properties that subsist in the Probandum; the meaning thus is that the property that subsists in the Probandum is *of the same kind* as that subsisting in the Example; it cannot be the *same*; as that property which subsists in one thing cannot subsist elsewhere; that is to say, the property of one thing cannot subsist in another thing; but a property *of the same kind* may be spoken of as the *same*.

Vār. P. 122.

It were possible to define the Statement of the Probans simply as (the statement of) '*sāḍharmyam*', 'similarity' or 'common property'; but though this might suffice to indicate what is actually meant, yet it could not serve the purpose of excluding what is *not meant*; and every *common property* would come to be regarded as the *Probans*; for this reason it becomes necessary to add the word 'Example,' for the purpose of excluding what is not intended to be classed as 'Probans';* and by using the compound 'the property common to the Example' the property belonging to that which is not

*Mere 'similarity,' or presence of common properties, is present also in such middle terms are 'Contradictory' and 'Specific; so the statement of these also will have to be regarded as the true 'Statement of Probans,' if the definition did not mention the word 'Example;' as every one of these would be 'similar' to something.

an Example becomes naturally excluded; [so that this excludes the Inconclusive Probans also; as even though this has 'properties common to the Example,' it also has properties common to what is not an Example]; or this exclusion may be got at by means of restriction; the expression 'property common to the Example' being taken as emphasising two *restrictions*—(1) that the 'common property' must belong to the *Example only*, and not also to what is not Example, and (2) that there should be *similarity only*, and not dissimilarity also.

"What is it that should possess 'properties common to the Example'?"

What else could it be? It is the Probandum; as that forms the principal member (in the whole reasoning process); and also because that is the most proximate. Inasmuch as the Probandum forms the most important member, and also because it is the most proximate, the 'property common to the Example' must be that belonging to the Probandum; and here also when we speak of 'the common property belonging to the Probandum,' we imply the two restrictions,—(1) that the common property belongs to the *Probandum only*, and also (2) that there should be *similarity only*, of the Probandum. "What do you gain by this *restriction*?" What we gain is that we exclude (by means of this restriction) that (invalid) Probans which subsists in only a portion of the Probandum [and as such is *partly* 'dissimilar' also].

[The *Bhāṣya* says—'*When one notices a certain property in the Probandum, and notices also the same property in the Example* &c.; the *Vārṭika* proceeds to explain this]—The abovementioned Probans is noticed as accompanied by the Probandum and the Example. "What is this *accompaniment* of the Probans?" What is meant by the Probans being 'accompanied' by the Probandum is that it is invariably concomitant with the latter [*i.e.* wherever the Probans is,

there the Probandum also is]; and what is meant by its being 'accompanied' by the Example is that it subsists in the Example.*

Thus when we speak of the 'property common to the Example,' we get at the Probans with its two and three characteristics; we speak of the Probans as with two characteristics, with a view to those philosophers who do not admit of the existence of the '*Vipakṣa*,'—*i.e.* the substratum wherein the Probandum is never known to subsist; for one however who does admit of the existence of the '*Vipakṣa*,' the Probans has the additional (third) characteristic of *not having any property common with what is not-Example.*† With these characteristics then, there are four kinds of Probans, as follows:—(1)—(2)—two are affirmative-negative,—*i. e.* when the Vaishēṣika puts forward the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, (1) because it is a product, and (2) because having both genus and species, it is perceptible by our external sense-organ' [wherein the first Probans, 'being a product,' is one that subsists in the entire *Sapakṣa*, *all* non-eternal things; while the second, 'having genus &c. . . . being perceptible by our external sense-organ,' subsists only a part of the *Sapakṣa*, subsisting in only *a few* non-eternal things];—and (3)—(4)—two are purely affirmative,—*e.g.* when the philosopher, who holds all things to be non-eternal, puts forward the

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* Both editions read '*chāsambhavaḥ*,' 'the impossibility of its subsistence in the Example.' This would be absurd; as if the Probans does not subsist in the Example, then either the Probans or the Example must be wrong. The sense demands the reading, either '*udāharaṇē cha sambhavaḥ*,' 'possibility of subsistence in the Example,' or '*anudāharaṇē chāsambhavaḥ*,' 'impossibility of subsistence in what is not the Example.'

† The 'three characteristics' referred to are:—(1) invariably concomitant with the Probandum, (2) subsisting in that where the Probandum is known to subsist, and (3) not subsisting in that where the Probandum is never known to subsist. The third is not possible for those who do not admit of any such thing where the Probandum is never known to subsist. These three correspond, respectively, to the following three characteristics of the Probandum mentioned by Prashasṭapāda (P. 200)—(1) *anumēyēna sambaddham*, (2) *prasiddhaścha ṭadanvitē*, and (3) *ṭadabhāvē cha nāsṭyēva*. The 'example' is that where the Probandum is known to subsist.

reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, (3) because it is knowable, and (4) because it is non-corporeal' [where all *knowability* subsists in the entire *Sapakṣa, all* non-eternal things; and *non-corporeality* only in a portion of the *Sapakṣa*, subsisting in only a few non-eternal things]. Thus then, with the aforesaid two kinds of the affirmative-negative Probans, the two kinds of the affirmative Probans make the four kinds of Probans.

The exact nature of the Probans having been thus ascertained, by means of the words of the Sūṭra, the fallacious Probans becomes excluded by the same. For instance, the mention of the character that the Probans is similar to the Example *only* (and not to the non-Example) excludes the 'contradictory' and the 'inconclusive' Probans; Vār. P. 123. the mention of the character that the Probans is *similar* only (and not dissimilar) to the Example excludes that Probans which does not subsist in the Probandum, and also that which subsists in only a part of the Probandum.—An example of the "contradictory' Probans we have in the reasoning 'this animal is a horse, because it has horns'; that of the 'inconclusive' probans we have in the reasoning 'this is a cow because it has horns'; that of the Probans not subsisting in the Probandum we have in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it is visible'; and that of the Probans subsisting only in a part of the Probandum we have in the reasoning 'Atoms are non-eternal because they have odour.' "If the Fallacious Probans, the Inconclusive and the rest, become all excluded by the definition of the Probans itself, then they should not be mentioned separately; that is, if by the definition of the Probans, interpreted and amplified as above, the Inconclusive and the other Fallacious Probans become excluded, then these should not be mentioned separately, as they have been in the Sūṭra (1.2.5.)" It is not right to say that the Fallacious Probans should not be mentioned separately; as this separate mention serves the purpose of

restricting what would otherwise be too wide; that is to say, there being a possibility of many kinds of the Fallacious Probans, the enumeration of the 'Inconclusive' and the rest serves to restrict their number (to *five only*).

* Some people (*e.g.*, Diṅnāga) have raised the following objection (against our definition of the 'Statement of the Probans'):—

"'What is the '*sāḍhana*', 'the means of demonstrating', the 'Probans', apart from the 'Property common to the Example'? As a matter of fact, apart from the 'Property common to the Example' there is no other 'means of demonstrating the Probandum'; so that the *Sūṭra* should be stated in the form—'the Probans is the property common to the Example', '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyam hēṭuḥ*'. [And not in the form in which it appears, '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyāṭ sāḍhyasāḍhanam hēṭuḥ*']. It may be that the reiteration of the expression 'that which demonstrates the Probandum' serves the purpose of specifying the particular 'property common to the Example' (which, from among the numerous 'properties common to the example', demonstrates the Probandum); but even so the presence of the Ablative (in the word '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyāṭ*') is useless: there can be no such expression as '*nīlāḍuṭpalam*' [where '*nīla*', 'blue', serves the purpose of specifying that particular '*uṭpala*', 'lotus', which, from among numerous lotuses, is *blue*; the correct rendering of the expression is '*nīlam utpalam*'; so that just as in the case of qualifications we find both taking the same case-ending, so in the case in question also '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmya*' and '*sāḍhyasaḍhanā*' should appear with the same case-ending]. [The words of Diṅnāga are simply '*na pañchamī*', 'no Ablative';

* It is interesting to note that the *Tāṭparya* actually quotes fifteen lines from the work of Diṅnāga, embodying the objection here taken up by the *Vārṭika*; it is not possible, however, to translate the passage, as the text, in some places, appears to be defective; and the *Parishuḍḍhi* affords no help; it dismisses the whole subject by the assertion '*sugamo ḍiṅnāgabhaṅgaḥ*', 'the refutation of Diṅnāga is easy.'

which have been explained by his followers in two different ways; one of these has been just mentioned]. Others offer a different explanation of the 'uselessness of the Ablative.' They declare that 'the Ablative is useless, because it is always found in connection with a different thing'; that is, the Ablative is found only when the word taking that ending denotes a thing different from the thing spoken of by means of the other words in the sentence; e. g. we have the Ablative in the sentence *grāmādāgachchhati'* [where the '*grāma*', 'village', is something different from the man who 'comes', '*āgachchhati*']; while in the case in question, we find that 'that which demonstrates the Probandum' is nothing apart from the 'Property Common to the Example'; and hence the use of the Ablative in this case is meaningless. And under the circumstances, if you define the Probans as 'the Property common to the Example,' with the further qualification 'that which demonstrates the Probandum', your definition comes to be that 'the Probans is that which can be spoken of'! and this militates against your definition of the 'Statement of the Proposition' as 'the assertion of the Probandum': as we have never found any such *composite whole* as is composed of the 'object' and the 'word speaking of it'; and there being no such *Composite Whole*, neither the 'Statement of the Proposition' (which is the *word or assertion*) nor the 'Probans' (which, under your definition, is *what is spoken of*) could rightly be regarded as a 'component factor', an '*avayava*' (under which category both have been included).*"

* The reading of the Bib. Ind. edition gives better sense than that of the Chaukhambha S. S. edition, and it also fits in more easily with the explanation given by the *Tātparya* :—'When, as a matter of fact, *that which demonstrates the Probandum* is not something different from the *Property Common to the Example*, then the mention of the former becomes a mere verbal expression; and this would mean that in qualifying the latter by the former we simply qualify it by a verbal expression; so that your definition comes to be that the Probans is something that is qualified by—*i. e.*, capable of being spoken of by means of—a word. This would go against

To the above we make the following reply :—The above objection does not demand a fresh answer; as it has been already met by what has been said before; that is to say, when we explained the definition of the Statement of the Probans to mean that 'it is that statement which demonstrates the Probandum through Properties Common to the Example', we set aside all objections against the definition; so that Diṅnāga's objection does not call for any fresh answer.

The Bauḍḍha puts forward another objection :—" As a matter of fact, it is the 'Common Property' which is 'fallible' (not invariably concomitant with the Probandum) or 'infallible' (invariably concomitant with the Probandum); and hence in the definition it is this 'Common Property' that should be mentioned as qualified (by relation to the Example); and not the *statement* of that property; specially as the said qualification cannot belong to a verbal expression; it is only that to which a qualification belongs that can be *qualified*; and it is the *Common Property* to which the said qualification belongs; and not to the *Statement* or verbal expression."

Vār: P. 124.

We do not understand what you mean by saying that a verbal expression has no qualification.* As a matter of fact, there are qualifications of the verbal expression just as much as there are of the objects. What are your reasons, we ask, for regarding objects as having qualifications? "Our reason lies in the fact that the objects are actually found in both forms: that is to say, we find objects to be both eternal and

your definition of *Praṭijñā* as the '*assertion* of the Probandum'; as by this definition the *Praṭijñā*, is only verbal, an assertion; and this reasoning process is a *Composite Whole* composed of the Probans, the Praṭijñā &c., by virtue of which these latter are regarded as 'factors'; so that if the *Praṭijñā* is *word*, and the *Probans is that which can be spoken of by means of word*, then, inasmuch as no Composite Whole could be formed of the *word* and *what is spoken of by means of it*, the name 'factor' as applied to these would be a misnomer.

* Both editions have 'kāraka'; but '*prakāraka*' should be the better reading.

non-eternal, corporeal as well as not-corporeal [so that they have these qualifications.]" Well, in the same manner, verbal assertions also are capable of being spoken of as 'eternal' or 'non-eternal', 'corporeal' or 'incorporeal'; and as a matter of fact we have actually found such qualifications being assigned to verbal expressions.* For instance, one man asks —'what does this man say?'—and he is answered —'*he says that it is a cow*', '*gauḥ iti*';—and here the particle '*iti*' ('that') serves the purpose of differentiating the word 'cow' from all other words [and there can be no differentiation without *qualification*]. In fact Diṅnāga himself has made use of many sentences qualifying verbal assertions: For instance, he has defined *Discussion* as 'that assertion which is intended to establish one's own view and demolish that of others' [where 'assertion' has the qualification of being 'that which is intended &c., &c.']; so that if he now asserts that a verbal assertion can have no qualification, he clearly contradicts all his own assertions, such as the one we have quoted—*viz*: that 'Discussion is that assertion which is intended to establish one's own view &c. &c.' Thus then we find that by having recourse to extreme subtlety in finding fault with others, the Bauḍḍha philosopher falls off from popular estimation!

Another objection urged by Diṅnāga (above) is that "the Ablative (in '*Uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyāṭ*') is useless, because it is always found in connection with a different thing." But by this assertion also, our opponent goes against his own doctrine: You, Bauḍḍhas, do not admit of any *composite wholes*, such as the 'army', the 'forest' and the like, as *different* (from their component parts, *e. g.* the horses and chariots, or trees); and yet you make use of the Ablative in such assertions as— '*vanāṭ ayam vrikṣaḥ ānīṭaḥ*' 'this tree

*As for example, the Mīmāṅsaka speaks of words being 'eternal', and the Vaishēṣikas speak of them as 'non-eternal'.

has been brought *from the forest*', '*sēnāṭaḥ ayam ashvaḥ*' 'this horse has come *from the army*'. In fact, in some *Shāsṭras* we find the Ablative used even when there is no difference between the things spoken of. For instance, the *Nīṭishāsṭra* declares that '*sanḍhivigrahābhyām ṣāḍguṇyam sampaḍyaṭē*', 'the six kingly accessories follow *from peace and war*' [even though Peace and War are included among the six kingly accessories]'. Lastly, even though one of your own philosophers does not admit the existence of a *Vipakṣa* (a substratum where the Probandum is never known to subsist) as a distinct thing, yet he speaks of the Probans as '*vipakṣāḍ vishēṣaḥ*,' 'distinct in character from the *vipakṣa*',—so that how (in view of such an assertion) can the Ablative be regarded as *always* connected with (and denoting) a different *thing* [when any such *thing* as the 'vipakṣa' is not admitted, and yet it is spoken of with the Ablative ending]?

Then, as for Diṅnāga's assertion that the *Sūṭra* should read '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyasya*', [with the Genitive], and not '*uḍāharaṇasāḍhdharmyāṭ*' (with the Ablative),—this also is not right; because what special case-relation he will express depends entirely on the option of the speaker; so that, in the case in question, if what is intended to be asserted were the fact that the '*uḍāharaṇsāḍharmya*', 'the property common to the Example', is what is *expressed* by the '*sāḍhya-vachana*', 'assertion of the Probandum', then it would be right to use the genitive form, '*uḍāharaṇasāḍharmyasya*', '*of* the property common to the Example'; but what is actually intended to be asserted is the fact that the 'property common to the Example' is the *cause* (or basis) of the 'assertion of the Probandum'; and hence it is only right to use the form '*uḍāharaṇsāḍharmyāṭ*' with the Ablative denoting 'cause'. "But how can the 'property common to the Example' be the *cause*?" It

Vār. P. 125.

can be so spoken of, as the 'assertion of the Probandum' is possible when there is a 'property common to the Example'; that is to say, as a matter of fact, we find that it is only when the speaker (who asserts the Probandum) has observed a 'property common to the Example' that he is led to make the said assertion, by such accessory causes as the desire to speak, the effort put forth, the rising of the wind from the throat, the striking of the palate &c. by that out-going wind and so forth; so that the said 'property common to the Example' also indirectly becomes a 'cause' of the assertion For these reasons, it is much more reasonable to use the Ablative than the Genitive (as proposed by Diṅnāga).

As an example of the 'Statement of the Probans,' the *Bhāṣya* has cited—'Sound is non-eternal, *because it has the character of being produced*, everything that has the character of being produced has been found to be non-eternal, in the case of such things as the dish and the like.' What is it that is non-eternal?" That is 'non-eternal' which has *non-eternality*. If you ask—what is *non-eternality*?—our answer is that *non-eternality* consists in being connected with such existence as is characterised by both kinds of negation,—or simply, in such *existence* as is so characterised.* "What also is meant by '*uṭpaṭṭiḍharmaka*', *having the character of being produced*?" That which has '*uṭpaṭṭi*,' 'production,' for its '*ḍharma*,' 'character,' is said to 'have the character of being produced'; the affix 'ka' has the reflexive sense. "What is the meaning of *being produced*?" *Being produced* consists in the precluding of the absolute existence and absolute non-existence of what is already qualified by non-existence; that is to say,

* The two kinds of 'negation' are (1) the prior negation, the negation or non-existence of the thing *before* it is produced, and (2) the after-negation, or non-existence that comes *after* the production, when the thing is destroyed. Both have been added with a view to show the absolute character of the destructibility, or non-eternality of Sound,—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

when a thing is qualified by non-existence,—*i.e.* it has not existed before,—and is afterwards found to come into existence,—there is a preclusion with regard to it of absolute (eternal) existence (such existence as belongs to Ākāsha and such other eternal things), and also of absolute non-existence (such non-existence as pertains to absolute non-entities); and what is meant by the thing *being produced* is this preclusion,—or an existence qualified by this preclusion. [The *Bhāṣya* has explained the word '*uṭpaṭṭi*' to mean 'coming into existence after having not-existed'; and] this explanation of the word, by means of the sentence, as given by the *Bhāṣya*, supports our own interpretation of the word; that is to say, what the sentence 'comes into existence after having not existed', '*abhūṭvā bhavaṭi*', means is precisely what is meant by 'is produced' '*uṭpadyaṭē*.' And that which has this '*uṭpaṭṭi*,' 'production,' fcr its characteristic is spoken of as 'having the character of being produced.'

BHĀṢYA ON SŪṬRA (35).

[P. 41, Ll. 4 to 7].

"Does the aforesaid definition (stated in Sū. 34) constitute the entire definition of 'Statement of the Probans'?" No. "What then?"

Sūṭra (35).

AND ALSO THROUGH DISSIMILARITY (Sū. 35).

That is to say, the 'Statement of the Probans' is that also which demonstrates the Probandum through dissimilarity to the Example (*i. e.*, through a property that belongs to the Example and not to the Probandum). "How?" For example,—'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced,—that which has *not* the character of being produced is always eternal, *e. g.*, such substances as the Soul and the like'*

* The reading of the printed text is defective; the proper reading is '*aniṭyaḥ shabdaḥ, uṭpaṭṭiḍharmakaṭvāṭ, anuṭpaṭṭiḍharmakam niṭyam, yaṭhā āṭmāḍiḍravyam,*' as found in the Puri MSS.

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (35).

[P. 125, L. 16 to 137, L. 2].

Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 41, l. 4)—*Does the aforesaid definition constitute the entire definition &c. &c.* As in the preceding *Sūṭra*, the sense here also is that the 'dissimilarity' should be to the *Example only*, [*i. e.*, the *Vipakṣa*, where the Probandum is known to be absent], and not to what is not the Example,—and that to the *Example* there should be '*dissimilarity*' *only*, and not *similarity*.

For example, 'Sound is non-eternal because &c. &c.'—says the *Bhāṣya*. We think, however, that this declaration of the *Bhāṣya* is not quite proper; as the difference between this reasoning and that cited in connection with the preceding *Sūṭra* is merely verbal [the Probans in both being of the same kind: *the character of being produced* proving *non-eternality* also through *similarity* to the Example]. As a matter of fact, the two examples differ in words only, and not in the meaning; and mere difference in words does not make the things different. It is true that there is difference in the examples (cited in the two reasonings); but this indicates a difference between the *Examples* only, which in the former reasoning was the *jar*, and in the present case, the *Soul* [and not between the Probans put forward, which remains the same]. Then again, if the difference in the *Examples* were to make the *Probans* also different, then the present *Sūṭra* would be entirely superfluous, and should not find a place in the text; as the difference due to difference in *Examples* is already mentioned in another Sūṭra (1-1-37) For these reasons we conclude that the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is not quite the right one.

Vār : P. 126.

The right example of the *Probans per dissimilarity* we have in the following reasoning :—'This living body is not without a Soul,—as, if it were so, it would be without the life-breath,—it is only what is found to be without Soul

that is accepted by both parties to be without the life-breath,*—and as a matter of fact, the living body is not found to be without the life-breath,—hence the conclusion is that it is not without soul.' †

This *negative* reasoning, or reasoning *per contra*, serves only the purpose of denying or refuting the opinion of others.

We have thus explained the exact forms of the two kinds of Probans—‡ *Viṭa* (Affirmative) and *Aviṭa* (Negative); (the chief difference between the two consisting in this that) while the distinguishing feature of the Affirmative Probans is that it indicates by itself the real nature of things, that of the Negative consists in its refuting the views of other persons; the function of the former is to affirm and that of the latter to deny. "[The Affirmative Probans has been declared to indicate or make known by itself the real character of of things]—In which way does the Negative Probans conduce to make things known. [It must do this, or else it would not be a *pramāṇa*]?" Well, in what way is the nature of things made known by the Affirmative Probans, which is admitted (by you) to be so? "It is by means of its concomitance that the Affirmative Probans proves the conclusion and makes things known." In that case why should not 'knowability' be accepted as a true Probans (in proving the presence of Soul, for instance)—

* Such is the construction put upon the passage by the *Ṭāṭparya*; which also explains the term 'without the life-breath' to mean 'without the desire that gives rise to the act of breathing'.

† That is, without that which is the constituent cause of such functions as desire and the rest; and it has been shown that that which is the constituent cause of desire and the rest, is something entirely different from Earth and the other seven subtances, and that this must be the Soul.

‡ The names '*viṭa*' and '*aviṭa*' are *ṭanṭrānṭarasiḍḍha*, says the *Ṭāṭparya*. Does this refer to the Sāṅkhya? These names are thus explained...*That which is got at by various methods*...i. e. being invariably concomitant with the Subject, it is both concomitant and non-concomitant with the Sapaksa,*viviḍhēna prakarēṇa iṭaḥ prāpṭaḥ*; and that which is not thus got at is the *Aviṭa*.

when concomitance has this power of proving the conclusion and making things known? "*Knowability* cannot serve as a true Probans on account of the fallibility or non-universal character (of its concomitance with the Probandum, all *knowable* things not being either with or without Soul)." Then, in that case, what proves the conclusion is not *concomitance*, but *infallibity or universality* (of concomitance). And if the Probans be held to prove the conclusion though the *infallibility* (of its concomitance), then there is no room for raising the question as to how the Negative Probans proves the conclusion; because the Negative Probans also proves its conclusion through the *infallibility* of its negative concomitance (*i. e.*, concomitance of absence). "How so?" In this manner:—* Inasmuch as the Example,—stated in the form 'everything that is without Soul has also been found to be without the life-breath &c.',—precludes the the absence of life-breath from all living bodies; [*i. e.* it is a recognised fact that the living body is never without the life-breath &c.—*i. e.*, the absence of life-breath &c. is precluded from the living body]; and thus *the absence of the Soul* also becomes precluded, by virtue of the infallibility of the concomitance between *absence of Soul* and *absence of life-breath.* It might be urged that—"All that the reasoning just put forward may be taken as establishing is the preclusion of *the absence of life-breath* from the *living body* (this being a fact ascertained directly by perception); and it does not establish the preclusion of *the absence of Soul.*" But this will not be right. "Why?" Because your contention would mean that the necessary concomitance fails in regard to the *Subject.*† And

Vār. P. 127.

* The sentence as it-stands in the text means—'everything without life has been found to be without Soul'; but the *Tātparya* rightly construes thus—
-यत्तु निरात्मकं न सर्वमप्राणादिमद्दृष्टम्

† Your contention would mean that what fails is, not the concomitance between *absence of life-breath* and *absence of Soul* in all other cases,—this being known by

so far as the failure of concomitance in regard to the *Subject* is concerned, if this could be urged as a fallacy, then, in the case of the Universal Affirmative Probans also, the doubt could be urged that 'even though Sound is a product, it *may* be eternal' [and the presence of this doubt would, according to you, make the Probans fallacious] !* From all this we conclude that, just as in the case of the Universal Affirmative Probans, the conclusion is proved by the infallibility of the relation of concomitance, so in the case of the Negative Probans also the conclusion is proved by the infallibility of the negative concomitance. Thus then, we find that, just as in the case of the Affirmative Probans, the perception of one property leads to the inference of the presence of another property whose presence is infallibly (invariably) concomitant with the presence of the former property,—so in the case of the Negative Probans, the perception of the absence of one property leads to the inference of the absence of another property (whose *absence* is invariably concomitant with the absence of the former).

"If that be the case, then any particular body would have to be regarded as being inhabited by all the Souls". Certainly not; as none of the alternatives admissible under your assertion would be acceptable. The sense of your argument is as follows :—" If you hold that the absence of one property is inferred from the

perception,—but the concomitance of these in regard to the *living body*, which is the *Subject* of the reasoning in question; and this would mean that the presence of the Probandum in this particular *Subject* is open to doubt ; *i. e.* that the conclusion is doubtful. If then, it is the presence of this doubt that you are urging against us, then, inasmuch as such doubt is present in the case of every inference,—every inferential conclusion being primarily open to Doubt,—your contention would strike at the root of the entire inferential process ; if the presence of such Doubt made the Probans entirely fallacious. If, on the other hand, by *failure of concomitance* you mean *certainty to the contrary*, then, this would involve the fallacy of 'Annulment' (*Bādha*) and not 'Fallibility' (*Vyabhichāra*).—*Tāṭparya.*

* As a matter of fact, the Subject, *Pakṣa*, is always *sanḍig ḍhasāḍhyavīn*, that with regard to which the probandum is doubtful.

perception of the absence of another,—and the absence thus inferred proves the presence of Soul in the living body,—then the particular body would have to be regarded as inhabited by all the Souls; for the simple reason that the *absence of want of life-breath* would, according to you, lead to the inference of *the absence of Non-Diṭṭha* (*i. e.*, the *presence of Diṭṭha*, a particular personality); and thence one could reason as follows :—'This particular body is not without the personality (or Soul) of Diṭṭha,—as if it were so, it would be without the life-breath'; and a similar reasoning would also be put forward to prove that the body cannot be without the personality of Kapiṭṭha, * and so on." But this is not right; as none of the alternatives possible under your reasoning can be admissible : For instance, it behoves you to explain your position when the following question is put to you—Does, or does not, the name 'Diṭṭha' signify something whose distinctive functions (desiring, willing and the like, all which are meant to be indicated by the presence of life-breath) are definitely known? If the name expresses that whose distinctive functions are definitely known, then it stands only for a *particular* Soul, and the difference is merely verbal. If, on the other hand, it denotes something whose distinctive functions are not definitely known, then its absence cannot be proved; and yet it is this absence that forms the principal factor in the reasoning you have put forward. Thus then, it is clear that it is without grasping the sense of the Negative Probans that you have urged the objection that involves the absurdity of one body containing all personalities.†

* Both editions read '*diṭṭha*' here ; but the sense demands here something *other* than 'Diṭṭha'; hence we have adopted the name '*Kapiṭṭha*', which is the assumed proper name that is found in philosophical works along with '*Diṭṭha*.'

† The sense of the argument is thus explained in detail in the *Tātparya* :—In ordinary life we find that there is breathing where there is desiring, and there is no breathing where there is no desiring ; and this leads us to conclude that Breathing is the effect of D sire.—Desire itself being an effeet, like the jar, must have a

The Opponent [misunderstanding the author's explanation of the Negative Probans to mean that a correct conclusion is got at through a Probans that merely fulfills the condition that it does not subsist anywhere where the Probandum is known to be absent] raises an objection :—" If (as your above account seems to imply) the ' too exclusive ' property were a true Probans, then you would have to accept as correct such reasonings as—' the Earth is eternal *because it is odorous*'." Certainly not; you apparently have not understood what the true Probans is. It is true that the ' too exclusive probans ' is a ' Probans per dissimilarity '; but it is not such dissimilarity as is too wide; in the instance cited by you the property of ' odorousness ' is one that is too wide, subsisting, as it does, in eternal as well as non-eternal substances (*i. e.* in the eternal earth-atom and in the non-eternal jar). It is for this reason that in the case of the Negative as well as the Affirmative Probans, it is not mere

constituent cause; it has been proved that either the Body or the Sense-organs or any such material things cannot be the cause of Desire; and the only Substance that can be accepted as this cause is the Soul; thus—even though much may not be known in regard to this Soul, this much is known that it is the constituent cause of Desire; and from this it is to be understood that it cannot be present in the jar, which is devoid of breathing and desire. Thus then in the case of the jar it is found that there is invariable concomitance between the absence of such an effect as Breathing, and the presence of such a cause as the absence of Soul; so that in regard to the living body, when it is found that Breathing is present,—*i. e.*, there is absence of non-breathing,—it implies the absence of non-Soul; which proves that the living body contains the cause of breathing; and ' Diṭṭha ' &c. also are only so many names given to the Souls. The upshot of all this is that all parties are agreed as to the absence in the Jar of the cause of Desire ; *i.e.* all are agreed as to the jar being without Soul; which shows that *absence of Soul* is concomitant with *absence of Desire* ; and as in the living body this *absence of Desire* is absent, it implies the *absence of the absence of Soul.* If Earth &c. were the constituent cause of Desire, then Desire would be possible in the jar also. As a matter of fact however the jar is never found to have Desire ; so that the absence of Desire implies the absence of any cause other than Earth &c. ; and when Desire is found in the living body this sets aside the *absence of Desire*, and this implies the setting aside of *the absence of a cause other than Earth &c.* ; and this *other cause* is the ninth Substance, Soul ; whose presence in the living body is thus established by the presence of Desire, which in its turn is proved by the presence of Breathing.

negation (non-concomitance) and affirmation (concomitance) that makes the true Probans; it is the unfailing character of the negation and affirmation. "True; but why cannot that too Exclusive or Unique Property be regarded as a true Probans, which subsists only in the Subject;—and in whose case there is neither anything where the Probandum is known to subsist, nor any where it is known not to subsist [and for this reason no *failure of concomitance* is possible]? For instance, in the reasoning 'all things are eternal, because they exist' [in this case the property of *existence* is one that must subsist in *all things*, and whose concomitance must therefore be *unfailing*]." True; the property of

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existence is a *unique* one; but it is one that is not excluded from anything; and by reason of this non-exclusion it cannot be a true (Negative) Probans.* For this same reason [*i. e.* by reason of the impossibility of non-concomitance] it also follows that that property cannot be regarded as a true Probans which subsists in a part of the Subject, and in whose case there is neither anything where the Probandum is known to subsist, nor anything where the Probandum is known to be absent; *e. g.*, in the reasoning 'all things are eternal, because they are immaterial'. "Why cannot that property be regarded as the true Probans which subsists in a part of the Subject, and in whose case, though there is nothing where the Probandum is known to be present, yet it is one that is excluded from (is non-concomitant with) a thing where the Probandum is known to be absent?—*e. g.*, when for one who does not accept any eternal Subject, the reasoning is put forward —'Speech and Mind are eternal, because they are audi-

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* In the case of every Negative Probans—and the Unique Property can be a Negative Probans only,—there should be an unfailing *non-concomitance* between the absence of the Probans and the absence of the Probandum; and in the case of *existence*, no non-concomitance is possible; so that the *infallibility* required is absolutely impossible.

ble'." * This also cannot be accepted as a true Probans; as it is excluded by what the *Sūṭra* has declared: What the Sūṭra has declared is—'Also through dissimilarity'; and here what is meant is—(*a*) that the dissimilarity should be *to the example only*, and (*b*) that to the example cited there should be *dissimilarity only*; and not that there should be mere 'dissimilarity' in general; so that the reasonings cited become excluded.†

Thus then we find that the Negative and Affirmative Probans are both such as are well-known to all persons, even to the youngest boy; so that when one declares that the Negative and the Affirmative Probans are not distinct 'means of proving the conclusion', this assertion should be regarded as proceeding from one who is wholly ignorant and deluded.

Some (Bauḍḍhas) have defined the *Probans* as *that which is disconnected with* (*separate from*) *the Vipakṣa*. The view of these people may be thus explained—"The Probans should be defined as *that which is disconnected with the Vipakṣa* (that wherein the Probandum is known to be absent). If the Probans were defined simply as that *which is disconnected*, which is separate, then every case of 'disconnection' would constitute a Probans; and every 'similarity' or 'connection' would become excluded; and this inclusion of every 'disconnection' and exclusion of every 'connection' would lead

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* If the property subsisting in a part of the Subject is not accepted as a true negative Probans, simply because of the absence of a *vipakṣa*, then, there would be no ground for rejecting the Probans in the reasoning cited; as the property of *audibility* subsists in *speech*, which is a part of the subject 'Speech and Mind'; and there are plenty of things that are non-eternal and inaudible, hence there are available any number of examples of dissimilarity; such as 'that which is non-eternal is not audible'; and it is the presence of such an example of dissimilarity that the *Sūṭra* puts forward as the sole condition for a negative Probans—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† That which subsists in only a part of the Subject is dissimilar, not to the *example only*, but also to that part of the Subject where it does not subsist.

to both desirable and undesirable things being included.* Hence with a view to exclude the undesirable Probans, it becomes necessary to add the phrase 'with the Vipakṣa'; so that the true Probans is that which is disconnected *with the vipakṣa.* But if the definition consisted simply of the words 'the Probans is that which is disconnected with the Vipakṣa,' then anything and everything that would be 'disconnected with the Vipaksa' would become included; and as such things would be of several kinds, it becomes necessary to differentiate among them; and for that purpose we emphasise the fact that the Probans is that which is disconnected *with the Vipakṣa only.*† Then again, if we rested with this emphasis only, we would include under the valid Probans even such properties as abide in a part of the *Vipakṣa*;—*e. g.* the Probans in the reasoning 'this is a cow because it has horns'; as the property of 'having horns' is one that is disconnected with (absent in) the *Vipakṣa* only (*i.e.* only in what is not-cow); so that this would not be excluded by the said emphasis; and in order to exclude such invalid Probans, it becomes necessary to add the further emphasis that the property should be one that is *always* disconnected (and never connected) with the *Vipakṣa*; this would preclude the property of 'having horns', as this is also connected,—and not only disconnected,—with the Vipakṣa (being present in cows, and also in many animals that are not cows). Thus the definition proposed, when taken as thus doubly emphasised, becomes applicable to the ordinary positive

* If every similarity *to the vipakṣa* were excluded, this would be quite desirable; if, on the other hand, similarity *to sapakṣa* were also excluded, this would include such reasons as the Contradictory and the like, which would be undesirable. The phrase '*iṣṭāniṣṭasaṅgraha*' is meant to imply the undesirable contingency of the *excluding of the desirable* (*iṣṭaparityāga*) also.——*Tātparya.*

† Three kinds are possible :—(1) That which is disconnected with the *Sapakṣa* as well as from the *Vipakṣa*; (2) that which is disconnected with the *Pakṣa* as well as from the *Vipakṣa*; and (3) that which is disconnected with the *Vipakṣa* only. If the first two of these were included, then the *Unique* (or Singular) and the *Unattested* Probans also would have to be regarded as valid. Hence the necessity of the *third* alone being emphasised.

Affirmative Probans which is marked by the three characteristics (of residing in the *Pakṣa*, residing in the *Sapakṣa* and not residing in the *Vipakṣa*)."

The above definition is open to the following objections:— It is true that the proposed definition succeeds in indicating the three characteristic features of the Probans; but at the same time it excludes that which, though subsisting in a part of the *Sapakṣa*, yet fulfills all the three conditions of the valid Probans. "How so?" By your first emphasis, the definition means that the Probans is that which is disconnected *with the Vipakṣa only*; and this certainly excludes that which subsists in a part of the *Sapakṣa*; as this latter is disconnected, not *with the Vipakaṣa only*, but with a part of the *Sapakṣa* also. "But what we mean by the exclusion of that which subsists in a part of the Vipakṣa is that that cannot be regarded as a true Probans which is *always* disconnected with the Sapakṣa; *e.g.* the Probans appearing in the argument, 'this is a horse because it has horns'; and the example that we have cited of 'being a product of effort' (in the proving of the non-eternality of Sound) is not one that is *always* disconnected with the *Sapakṣa*, * being as it is, 'connected' also, by reason of its subsisting in a part of the *Pakṣa*."† In answer to this explanation we urge as follows:— If what you now put forward is the correct view, then

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* Three lines are wanting in the *Bib. Ind.* edition. This sentence as read in the Chaukhamba edition contains two '*na*'*s*; the sense demands a single 'na.'

† The emphasis—'it should be *always* disconnected with the *vipakṣa*'—precludes that which subsists in a part of the vipakṣa'; e. g. 'this is a cow because it has horns'; and the other emphasis—'it should be disconnected with the *vipakṣa only*'—would be right only after the former emphasis; so that the definition of the Probans comes to be 'that which is *always* disconnected with the vipakṣa *only*'; and this means that that which is always disconnected with the *sapakṣa* is not a Probans. So that the Probans in the reasoning, 'this is a horse because it has horns', being always disconnected with the sapakṣa, is not accepted as valid. On the contrary, the Probans in the reasoning, 'sound is non-eternal because it is produced by effort', is one that is not *always* disconnected with the *sapakṣa*; it is also connected with it, and hence it is accepted as a valid Probans.—*Tātparya.*

one of the emphasised forms that you have before given to your definition—viz : 'that which is disconnected *with the Vipakṣa only*'—becomes rejected; as such properties as the character of *being a product of effort* are not such as are disconnected *with the Vipakṣa only* ; being as they are, disconnected with a part of the *Sapakṣa* also. "Both the emphasised forms have their use in regard to a case that is not directly mentioned (or heard of)." * In that case, just as that which subsists in a part of the *Sapakṣa* is accepted as a valid Probans, so would be also that which subsists in only a part of the *Pakṣa* or Subject; that is to say, that same force (of emphasis) which establishes the validity of the Probans subsisting in a part only of the *Sapakṣa*, will also establish the validity of that which subsists in only a part of the Subject; e. g. the Probans in the reasoning—'atoms are eternal *because they have odour*'.† Thus then we find that if the two emphasised forms are taken as they stand, then the character of *being produced by effort*, which is accepted as a valid Probans, becomes

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* This aphoristic sentence is thus explained by the *Tātparya*—The emphasised form, 'that which is disconnected with the vipakṣa only', is not the only one that we accept ; as if we did so, then such properties as *being produced by effort* and the like would certainly become excluded ; the fact is that the Probans having been defined as 'that which is always disconnected with the vipakṣa', a further qualifying emphasis is added in the form that the said 'disconnection' should be with the vipakṣa only ; this latter qualification excluding the 'too common' Probans, which subsists in the *vipakṣa* also. Thus, even though a property that is connected as well as disconnected with the *sapakṣa* could be a real Probans, this fact does not militate against the emphasis that the Probans should be disconnected with the *vipakṣa only*. Even though it is true that it has nowhere been heard of or mentioned that a property subsisting in a part of *sapakṣa* is a valid Probans, yet when it is found that the validity of such a Probans is not precluded by the emphasis 'that which is disconnected with the *vipakṣa* only', it may be taken as permitted ; and it is with a view to this 'unmentioned' case that both the emphasised forms become useful.

† The Opponent has urged that though the fact of the Probans subsisting in a part of the sapakṣa being valid is not directly mentioned, it is yet taken as implied by the fact of its not being directly denied ; and it is now urged that on exactly the same grounds we should accept the validity of such Probans as subsists only in a part of the Probandum ; which is absurd.

excluded; while if the implication of the definition (in its emphasised forms) be taken, for the purpose of accomplishing what is desired by you, to be different from what it directly expresses, then, just as you get at what you desire (i. e. the validity of the Probans in the form 'being produced by effort'), you get also at what you do not desire—viz: the validity of the Probans in the form 'having odour'; and both—the exclusion of what is desired and the inclusion of what is not desired—constitute serious defects in the definition. "What you have urged", says the Opponent, "does not affect our position; since the Commentary has added a further qualification. The objection, that the definition includes the validity of such Probans as 'having odour', does not apply to the definition put forward by us; as the Commentary on the work that has proposed this definition has added the further qualification that the Probans *should subsist in the Subject* (which excludes that which subsists in only a part of the Subject)." As a matter of fact, all that the adding of this further qualification does is to exclude such Probans as 'visibility' and the like, which do not at all subsist in the *Subject*, (Atom or Sound); and in what way does it exclude that which subsists in a part of the Subject? For certainly that which does subsist in a part of the Subject cannot be said to be *not subsisting in the Subject*; similarly that which subsists in a part of the *Vipakṣa* cannot be said to be *non-subsisting in the Vipakṣa*. Thus you will have to try some other method of excluding the undesirable contingency (of having to accept the validity of such Probans as 'having odour' and the like). "Certainly, no other method is necessary, the desired exclusion being got at by means of emphasis; that is, the Probans subsisting in a part of the Subject will be excluded by the emphasised implication (of the qualification 'that which subsists in the Subject')." What is the precise form of that emphasis? Is it that *it must subsist in*

the Subject? or that *it should subsist in the Subject only*? "Well, we shall have it in the form that *it must subsist in the Subject.*" Now what exactly is the force of (i. e. purpose served by) this emphasis? Does it indicate the *possibility* (of subsisting in the Subject)? Or does it preclude the *impossibility* (of the subsistence)? As a matter of fact, the emphasis cannot be taken as serving either of these two purposes: as both, the indication of *possibility* and the preclusion of *impossibility*, are got at even without the said emphasis. Nor, lastly, is it possible for the emphasis to serve the purpose of excluding that which subsists only in a part of the Subject [even though it be admitted that it does exclude that which is absolutely non-existent in the Subject]. Thus we conclude that the emphasis in question is entirely useless. "What the emphasis does is to indicate invariable concomitance,—the meaning being that the Probans must be subsistent in the Subject, and *should never be non-subsistent in it*; and certainly that which subsists in only a part of the Subject is non-subsistent also (and as such becomes excluded by the emphasis)." It is true that the emphasis excludes that which subsists in a part of the Subject; but even so, in seeking to remedy one evil you tumble into another, as follows:—We grant that that which subsists in a part of the Subject becomes excluded; but in that case what is the use (in your definition) of the expression '*sapakṣē siddhē*', 'being known to subsist in the Sapakṣa'? "Why should this expression be omitted?" For the simple reason that the condition meant to be laid down by that expression is already fulfilled by the emphasis, which, according to you, denotes *invariable concomitance*; the fact that you put the emphasis in the form—'*dharma ēva pakṣaya*', 'it must subsist in the *pakṣa*',—shows that the *pakṣa* is restricted, while the property subsisting therein is unrestricted [and hence standing in need of restriction by means of the emphasising particle *ēva*, 'must']; and when the property is *unre-*

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stricted--which means that there is an uncertainty about its concomitance being precise or too wide,—there is a possibility of its subsisting in the *vipakṣa* as well as *Sapakṣa* ; and under the circumstances, the expression '*vipakṣē nāsṭi*', 'not subsisting in the *Vipakṣa*', may be accepted as serving the purpose of precluding the possible *subsistence in the Vipakṣa*; but what need is there of the expression '*sapakṣē siḍḍhē*' 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*' [this subsistence being, according to you, already indicated by the emphasised expression '*yo ḍharmāḥ pakṣasya*'] ?

If then, you put the emphasis somewhat differently— viz: that it must subsist *in the Subject only*,—even this involves the rejection of both the other expressions—'that it subsists in the Sapakṣa' and that 'it does not subsist in the Vipakṣa'.

"How?" That *it should subsist in the Sapakṣa* has to be rejected in view of the emphasised form now proposed by you;—it is absurd to say that *it subsists in the Subject only* and also that *it should subsist in the Sapakṣa* ; no one ever makes such an assertion as 'feed *Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa only* and *also Yajñaḍaṭṭa*'. Then as for the second expression, that *it does not subsist in the Vipakṣa*,—this is superfluous, as this is already implied. "By what is *this* implied?" By your emphasised declaration that it subsists *in the Subject only*; when you say that it subsists *in the Subject only*, it certainly follows from this that it does not subsist in anything else; so that there is no need for adding that *it should not subsist in the Vipakṣa*. Further, the qualification that *it subsists in the Subject only* does not exclude that which subsists in a part only of the Subject; so that the emphasis fails in accomplishing that same purpose for which it has been proposed. If it be held that the expression 'subsisting in the Sapakṣa' is also added for the purpose of emphasising that *it must subsist in the Sapakṣa* and that *it should subsist in the Sapakṣa only*,—then we ask, what is it that you get at by means

of this emphasis? If it implies mere *possibility* (of subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*), then this possibility is got at even without the empbasis, by the simple unemphasised assertion that *it subsists in the Sapakṣa.* If, on the other hand, it implies the invariable concomitance (of the Probans with the *Sapakṣa*), then it comes to this that that which subsists in only a part of the *Sapakṣa* is not a valid Probans. And further, the emphasised expression, *it shoul l subsist in the Sapakṣa only*, leads to the rejection of the other two expressions—'it subsists in the Subject' and 'it does not subsist in the *Vipakṣa*'; the former, because it has to be rejected as it is contradicted by the emphasised expression 'it should subsist *in the Sapakṣa only*'; and the latter, because it becomes superfluous, on account of being already implied by the emphasised expression.

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Lastly, if it be held that the expression 'not subsisting in the *Vipakṣa*' is also meant to be for the purpose of emphasis, then we ask—here also what is it that is emphasised? "What is meant to be emphasised is that *it should be non-subsistent in the Vipakṣa only* and that *it must be non-subsistent in the Vipakṣa.*" If the Probans be defined as that which is *non-subsistent in the Vipakṣa only*, then the Probans in the reasoning 'this is a cow because it has horns' will have to be regarded as valid; as it is non-subsistent *only in the Vipakṣa* [as all those animals that are hornless are also *not-cows*]. If, on the other hand, the Probans be defined as that *which must be non-subsistent in the Vipakṣa*,—this also will not be right; as this will make the middle expression superfluous: of the three expressions, the first, 'subsisting in the Subject', is for the purpose of denoting invariable concomitance;—the third, 'not subsisting in the *Vipakṣa*' is for the excluding of that which subsists in a part of the *Vipakṣa*;—and what purpose would be served by the middle expression, 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*'? If

it be held to serve the purpose of indicating mere *possibility*,—as this would be already indicated by the invariable concomitance denoted by the first expression as interpreted by you, the adding of a separate expression would be entirely superfluous.

Thus then we find that when we come to examine the proposed definition as a whole, we find that it is open to the following objections:—it involves—(*a*) acceptance of the validity of the invalid Probans, (*b*) rejection of the validity of the valid Probans, and (*c*) the rejection of other things concomitant with what is desirable.

The definition that we have been considering is that 'the Probans is that which is disconnected with the *Vipakṣa*'; now, if we come to examine this definition [*i. e.*, the definition as applying to the Probans put forward for the proving of *non-eternality*], from the standpoint of the *Sauṭrānṭika* (Bauḍḍha)—we find that no '*Vipakṣa*' is possible [all things being non-eternal, there can be nothing where non-eternality is known to be absent]; and it therefore becomes incumbent on the propounder of the definition *to explain* * what he means by the term '*Vipakṣa*' in his definition; as for ourselves we do not understand the meaning of the term '*Vipakṣa*' when no such thing as '*Vipakṣa*' is possible. Further, it is not possible to use the Ablative in connection with what does not exist; so that it also behoves you to explain the sense of the Ablative affix in the word '*Vipakṣāṭ*'. Similarly, when the *Vipakṣa* is non-existent, the Locative also cannot be applied to it; so that it is necessary for you to explain the sense of the Locative affix in the word '*Vipakṣē*' in the expression '*Vipakṣa nāṣti*' (which does not subsist *in* the Vipakṣa). Then again, when no '*Vipakṣa*' is possible, and every Probans, as 'being a product' and

* 'Even if there were some *eternal* things, which could be the '*Vipakṣa*', it would be impossible for the Bauḍḍha to *explain* or *describe* it; as for him everything is *nirupākhya*, inexplicable, indescribable '—*Ṭaṭparya*.

the like (as proving eternality) is such as is always present in the *Subject* and the *Sapakṣa*, it becomes difficult to determine from what such Probans is to be 'disconnected' [so that 'disconnected with the *Vipakṣa*' becomes an impossible qualification]. In fact the character of *being a product* is, under the circumstances, common to all, and as such it should be spoken of as '*sāmānya*', 'present, concomitant', and not as '*Vishēṣa*', 'absent, non-concomitant, disconnected'!

* The Bauḍḍha writer of the Commentary on the above definition of the Probans has declared as follows :—

"A septenary being possible, when six become excluded, we get at the Probans with its three differentias, by rejecting one and two terms". This is not right; as there are two Probans possible which are characterised by what is expressed by *two words* only. What the above-quoted passage means is that the following *septenary*—seven definitions of the Probans—are possible—(1) that it should subsist in the Subject only, (2) it should be known to subsist in the *Sapakṣa* only, (3) it should be non-subsistent in the *Vipakṣa* only, (4) it should subsist in the Subject and be known to subsist in the *Sapakṣa*, (5) it should subsist, in the Subject, and not subsist in the *Vipakṣa*, (6) it should be known to subsist in the Sapakṣa† and not subsist in the *Vipakṣa*, and (7) while subsisting in the Subject, and also in the *Sapakṣa*, it should not subsist in the *Vipakṣa*;—these seven definitions being possible, six are rejected, and the last one, with three terms is accepted as the true definition; which means that definitions with only one or

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*The footnote in both editions takes this as referring to the *Vārṭika* by Uḍyoṭakara himself. But this is not right. In the first place the words here put forward are not found in our *Vārṭika* dealing with the *Sūṭra* defining the Probans; and secondly the view is controverted here. The reference evidently is to a Bauḍḍha writer who wrote a commentary on the definition of Probans propounded by Ḍiṅnāga, or some other later writer.

† Both Editions read '*sapakṣē eva*'; but the *Tāṭparya* rightly reads '*sapakṣē cha*'.

two terms are excluded as not admissible.* But this entire exclusion (of definitions with only one or two terms) is not right; because as a matter of fact, there are several such valid Probans as are characterised by differentias expressed by only two terms. *E. g.* for one who (like the Bauḍḍha) does not accept anything as eternal, the Probans *being a product* as also *being a product of effort*, are found to possess only the differentias expressed by two terms only [*i.e. they subsist in the Subject*, and *they subsist also in the Sapakṣa*; the third condition of *not subsisting in the Vipakṣa* is not possible; as for one who accepts nothing to be eternal, there can be no '*Vipakṣa*' in the case of a reasoning proving non-eternality]; and if the three-termed definition were the only one admissible, then both these valid Probans would have to be rejected;—and further, the negative Probans, that we have in such reasonings as 'the living body is not without the Soul, as if it were so it would be without the life-breath &c.', will also

*The rejection of the six &c., is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* :—If the Probans be defined as that which subsists in the Subject only, then it would be the *asāḍhāraṇa* or *singular* Probans only that could be included in the definition ;— (2) if it be defined as that which subsists in the Sapakṣa only, then in the proving of the horse being *horned*, the *character of being a cow* would be a true Probans ;—(3) if it be defined as that which is non-subsisting in the Vipakṣa only, the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it is knowable' would be a valid reasoning ;—(4) if it be defined as that which subsists in the Subject and also in the Sapakṣa, then the too wide and hence inconclusive character also would have to be accepted as a valid Probans ; *e. g.* 'there must be smoke on the hill because there is fire' ;—(5) if it be defined as that which subsists in the Subject and does not subsist in the Vipakṣa, the *singular* Probans would have to be accepted as valid ;—(6) if it be defined as that which subsists in the Sapakṣa and does not subsist in the Vipakṣa, then the reasoning 'the atom is non-eternal because it is a product' will have to be accepted as valid. So that the seventh definition is the only one that can be accepted ; and this lays down three characteristics as necessary for the valid Probans.

What is put forward here as the *seventh* definition is the one that has been propounded by Ḍiṅnāga in his *Nyāyapravēsha* (Vide *Medieval Logic*, P. 91). c: f. also, *Nyāyabinḍu*—'The Probans has a threefold character—it must subsist in the Subject, it should subsist in the Sapakṣa only, and it should never subsist in the Vipakṣa.'

have to be rejected as invalid; as this also has only two differentias [the character of *subsisting in the Sapakṣa* being in this case impossible, as there can be no living body without the life-breath].

Thus we find that when we come to examine the definition of Probans as 'that which is disconnected with the *Vipakṣa*', it either imparts the character of the valid Probans to that which is not really so,—or it excludes that which is really so,—or it contradicts authoritative treatises, and thus militates against scriptural tenets.

Others (e.g. Diṅnāga, says the *Tātparya*) have proposed the following definition of the Probans:—"It is that which subsists in the *Sapakṣa* in two ways, and which does not subsist in its contrary; that is to say, that which subsists in two ways in that which is homogeneous to the Subject—[i. e. (1) *entirely*—subsisting in *all Sapakṣas*, e.g. the character of *being a product* as proving *non-eternality*, and (2) *partially*—subsisting in *some Sapakṣa*, e. g. the character of *being produced by effort* as proving the same]—and which does not subsist in its contrary i. e. in the *Vipakṣa*. This definition supplies an adequate description of the Probans with all its three characteristics [(1) subsisting in the Subject, (2) subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*, and (3) not subsisting in the *Vipakṣa*]."*

As a matter of fact however, the definition, as it stands, does not describe the Probans with its three necessary characteristics. If the definition stands as you have put it, which word is there to indicate that the Probans should sub-

* The *Medieval Logic* gives a chart of the 'Wheel of Reason', where nine possible forms of the Probans as proving *non-eternality* are put forward; out of which only two are selected as valid—*being a product*, which subsists in all non-eternal things, in all Sapakṣas, and *being produced by effort*, which subsists in a few non-eternal things, not in all. The *Medieval Logic* does not mention Diṅnāga's definition as here put forward; but the *Tātparya* makes a quotation from Diṅnāga's work.

sist *in the Subject*? "It has been declared by us that almost every Probans, valid and invalid alike, must subsist in the Subject.' True, this assertion has been made by you; but even this assertion does not mean that it is *only what subsists in the Subject* that can be a Probans; all that it means is that what does not subsist in the Subject is not a Probans, either valid or invalid. "But this is certainly got at by implication; when the words of the declaration are construed to mean that what does not subsist in the Subject cannot be a Probans, either or invalid, it is certainly implied that the Probans, valid as well as invalid, must subsist in the Subject." It is true that the idea that it should subsist in the Subject is got by implication; but there is nothing to imply the necessary and invariable character of this subsistence [i. e. there is nothing to imply that *every* Probans *must* subsist in the Subject]; all that the sentence means is that what does not subsist in the Subject cannot be a Probans; and all that this can imply is the mere *possibility* (of every Probans subsisting in the Subject); and possibility is twofold; it may be necessary and invariable [*i. e. universal*, which would mean that *every* Probans must subsist in the *Subject only*], or not necessary and invariable [which would mean that it *may* subsist in the Subject, and also in the *Vipakṣa*]; and [if you rested with the assertion of this twofold possibility] this would imply that even that undesirable Probans will have to be accepted as true which does not necessarily subsist in the whole of the Subject. "The validity of such a *Probans* is certainly not implied; when it is distinctly stated that the *Probans must subsist in the Subject*, that alone comes to be implied as the true Probans which must subsist in the Subject; and certainly that which subsists in only a part of the Subject, cannot be said to be one that *must* subsist in it." This is not right; as the emphasis [involved in the assertion that the Probans must subsist in Subject] has been held by you to serve an entirely different

Vār. P. 133.

purpose; as a matter of fact you put forward this emphasis for a wholly different purpose; you put it for the purpose of restricting the scope of the valid and invalid Probans [*i.e.* for the purpose of indicating what can be regarded as *Probans*, valid or invalid]; and when it is held to serve this purpose, how can it serve the purpose of excluding that (Probans) which does not subsist in the whole of the Subject? "But the emphasis could very well serve both purposes: it could exclude the partially subsisting Probans as well as restrict the scope of the valid and invalid Probans." In that case you should not have the words 'which subsists in two ways in that which is homogeneous to the Subject.' "Why so?" For the simple reason that when the pervasive (universal) and necessary character of the subsistence of the Probans in the Subject is got at by means of the emphasis in question, it means that the Subject as well as the property subsisting in it (as the Probans) are both strictly restricted; and it is only when there is no such restriction with regard to a property that there is a *twofold* possibility of its subsisting (1) *in the Sapakṣa* and (2) in the *Vipakṣa*; and as the definition would otherwise become applicable to the undesirable Probans also, it is necessary to add the qualification that *it should not subsist in the Vipakṣa*; but why add the qualification that *it should subsist in the Sapakṣa*? If it is for the purpose of indicating the *possibility* (of its subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*),—then our answer is that this indication of mere possibility would keep it *unrestricted*; as a matter of fact, mere *possibility* of subsistence would imply both entire and partial subsistence; and under the circumstances, what would be the use of having these words (of too wide connotation) [when, according to you, the duly *restricted* entire subsistence is implied by the emphasis]? In any case the phrase 'in two ways' should not be inserted in the definition at all; as this qualification is already implied in the qualification 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*', it need not be re-iterated (by means of a separate phrase);

in fact the word 'subsisting' signifying equally *both* kinds of subsistence, partial and entire, the addition of the phrase 'in two ways' savours of senselessness.

It might be argued that—"the phrase 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*' is added for the purposes of emphasis; and certainly the addition of a phrase for that purpose is quite proper." But as a matter of fact, the emphasising itself is not right. "How so?" If the emphasis means that the Probans *must be always subsisting in the Sapakṣa*, then for you the character of *being produced by effort* will not be a valid Probans (for proving non-eternality); as the character of *being produced by effort* is both *subsisting* and *non-subsisting* in the *Sapakṣa* (being present in some and not present in other non-eternal things); and as such it is excluded by your emphasised qualification; for certainly there can be no such reasonable assertion as 'feed the *Brāhmaṇa only*, and the Kṣattriya also'. If, on the other hand, you put the emphasis the other way and hold that the Probans *should subsist in the Sapakṣa only*, then this leads to the rejection of the other two qualifications; one of them being actually contrary to the sense of the emphasised qualification, and the other being already implied in the latter.*

If, lastly, you lay your emphasis on the phrase 'in two ways';—here also we ask,—what is the meaning of the emphasis? Does it mean that the twofold subsistence is *in the Sapakṣa only*, or that it should subsist in the Sapakṣa *in two ways only*? If it be meant that it should subsist in two ways in the *Sapakṣa* only, and in nothing else—that the twofoldness does not pertain either to any other *Pakṣa* or to the *Vipakṣa*,—then clearly, you should not

Var. P. 134.

* There are three characteristics of the Probans—(1) that it should subsist in the Sapakṣa, (2) that it should subsist in the Subject, and (3) that it should not subsist in the Vipakṣa. If then, it is meant that it should subsist *in the Sapakṣa only*, then this excludes that which subsists in the Subject also; and as for non-subsistence in the *Vipakṣa*, this would be implied in the qualification that it should subsist *in the Sapakṣa only*.

have the words '*subsisting in the Sapakṣa*'; as this subsistence is already implied *ex hypothesi* by the emphasis laid upon the phrase 'in two ways'; and as for the *possibility* of the subsistence in the *Sapakṣa*, this also is already implied by the very first qualification (that *it should subsist in the Subject*);—then again, when you have the phrase 'in two ways', and this phrase precludes, as you have just declared, the two-foldness of the subsistence in another Subject and that of non-subsistence in the *Vipakṣa*, *—then this phrase itself implies the possiblity of subsistence in the *Sapakṣa*; so that in any case the qualification 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*' becomes entirely superfluous. And lastly, the emphasis of the fact that *it should subsist in two ways in the Sapakṣa only* implies its subsistence in the Subject also [specially as every Probans, valid or invalid, must, by its very nature, subsist in the Subject,—according to the Bauḍḍha logician, Diṅnāga]; so that there is no need for emphasising the fact that the Probans must subsist in the Subject,—an emphasis which you have put forward for the purpose indicating the invariable concomitance of the two. "In order to avoid the absurd contingency of having to reject the emphasising of every other word of the definition, we shall"—says the Bauḍḍha—"not have the emphasised qualification that *the twofold subsistence should be in the Sapakṣa only*." But even so, the two middle expressions. [(1) 'subsisting in the *Sapakṣa*', and (2) 'in two ways'] of your definition should be rejected; and this throws you into the same predicament in which the man fell who, in trying to relieve himself of his goitre by pushing it in, managed to have his eye-bells thrown out! † If then you put the emphasis upon the

* 'Anyapaḍa' has been explained by the *Ṭātparya* as *anyā paḍē yayoḥ* (things expressed by two other words), *i. e. pakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva*.

† This 'nyāya' or maxim is not explained in the Commentaries. The Chaukhambha edition reads '*gṛihapravēsha &c.*'; but '*gaḍupravēsha*' gives better sense.

phrase 'in two ways' in another way, explaining it to mean that the Probans would subsist in the Sapakṣa *in two ways only*,—then for you such universal Probans as *being a product* and the like would not be valid! As such characters do not subsist *in two ways only* [as it subsists in non-eternal things *in only one way, i. e., in their entirety*, never only *in some*, but always in *all* non-eternal things].

Further, in now propounding a definition with *three* terms you exclude the Probans which fulfils only two conditions, and which you have accepted to be valid in your philosophy (*vide* Text, p. 128). The *Negative* Probans also, under your definition, ceases to be a true Probans [as it does not subsist in the *Sapakṣa* in two ways]. If it be argued that the Negative Probans is really not a true Probans, then we ask—why has the Bauḍḍha philosopher made a great effort to establish the validity of the negative Probans? [And inasmuch as he has actually done so, it cannot be right for him to argue now that it is not a true Probans].

If, in order to avoid all these difficulties, you do not lay any emphasis on any term of your definition, then you include also such Probans as subsist in only a part of the Subject, and also that which is inconclusive [not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum, being non-subsistent in things other than the *Vipakṣa* also].

The above arguments also serve to demolish the definition propounded by Ḍiṅnāga in another work of his, * which is as follows:—

"The Probans is that which subsists in the Subject and is invariably concomitant with a part of it [i. e. with the Probandum in general]." Specially because, as the definition stands, it includes also that which does not extend over the whole of the Subject; and as such has already been criticised and rejected.

* The *Ṭāṭparya* calls this '*ḍiṅnāgasya praḍeśhānṭaralakṣaṇam*'.

Reverting again to Diṅnāga's former definition, we find that the term '*asan tadatyaye* is exactly similar' to the '*vipakṣē nāsti*' of a previous definition [and as such, is open to all those objections that we have urged against this last, on *Text*, P. 180, L. 13 *et seq.*]

Other writers (Bauddhas) have proposed the following definition—"*Tādrigavinābhāvidharmopadarshanam hētuḥ—the Probans is that which is indicative of the presence of a character which is never apart from like things.* Here the term 'which is never apart from like things' indicates the two characteristics of *not subsisting in the Vipakṣa* and of *subsisting in the Sapakṣa*, and the term 'indicative of the presence' denotes *presence in the Subject*; and thus we get the Probans * with its three characteristic features."

The upholders of this last definition have held that the term 'which is never apart from like things' indicates *subsistence in the Sapakṣa* and *non-subsistence in the Vipakṣa.* But this is not right; it is true that the words, 'which does not subsist apart from like things' indicate that *it does not subsist in the Vipakṣa*; but in what way does it indicate that *it subsists in the Sapakṣa*? Certainly when a character does not subsist in the *Vipakṣa*, it does not necessarily follow that it

Var. P. 135. must subsist in the *Sapakṣa*. And (if this is not indicated by any term in the definition) *audibility* also would be a true Probans (in proving the non-eternality of Sound)! As *audibility* never subsists apart from *non-eternal* things [and the only condition that excludes such *singular* Probans, —viz: that *it should subsist in the Sapakṣa*—is absent from the definition]. But we shall grant (for the sake of argument), that the term 'subsisting not apart from like things'

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* The *Tātparya* says *pakṣadharmatvēna hētorabhidhānam, tēna trilakṣaṇapravibhāvitātmā hētuḥ ityarthaḥ*. From this it is clear that in place of '*pakṣaḥ*' we should read '*pakṣadharmaḥ*.'

does indicate *subsistence in like things* (*i. e.* subsistence in the *Sapakṣa*); but even so what is there to indicate that the Probans should subsist *in the Subject* itself? "That is indicated by the term '*upaḍarshana*'". Certainly it cannot be indicated by that word; as the word '*upaḍarshana*' denotes only *mention* or indication; as a matter of fact, the word '*upaḍarshana*', which is explained as '*upaḍarshyaṭē anēna*,' only means 'that by which things are indicated', *i. e.* the *indicative*; and certainly it has no power to imply that it is indicative of presence *in the Subject* or anywhere else. "But (if it is not indicative of presence in the Subject) wherein else could the presence be of which it would be indicative?" Wherever there might be a possibility of its presence. "Where is there such possibility?" Certainly in the *Sapakṣa*;—thus then, the meaning of the definition comes to be—'the Probans is that which is indicative of the presence, in *the Sapakṣa*, of a character which is never apart from the '*Sapakṣa*'*; and under this definition *visibility* would be a valid Probans (for the proving of *non-eternality* of sound); as *visibility*, according to the Bauḍḍha, never subsists apart from non-eternal things; [as for him there is no such eternal generality as '*rūpaṭva*'; and according to the definition *subsistence in the Sapakṣa* being the only condition, the absence of *visibility* in Sound would not matter]. For the sake of argument we shall grant that your 'indicative' does indicate the presence *in the Subject* of the character which is never apart from the *Sapakṣa*'. But even so, by what means do you exclude that Probans which subsists in a *part* only of the Subject. "That also is done by the same word 'indicative', *upaḍarshana*". That cannot be; as all that that word denotes is mere *possibility* (of subsistence in the Subject). If you think that the word '*upaḍarshana*' denotes sub-

*Both editions read '*ubhiḍhānahēṭuḥ*'; but the correct reading apparently is '*abhiḍhānam hēṭuḥ*.

sistence in the *whole* of the Subject,—then you are sadly mistaken; as the word '*upadarshana*' denotes mere *possibility*; only the possibility of subsistence in the Subject is denoted by the word; and it does not indicate anything as to subsistence in the whole of the Subject [and until this is done the partially subsisting Probans cannot be excluded]. If, by some stroke of reasoning, recourse be had to emphasising (certain terms, with a view to get what is necessary), none of these would be capable of excluding the partial Probans; so that the objection against the definition would remain in force as before.

The propounders of this last definition have cited two examples of the Probans—(*a*) the character of *being produced by effort* as proving *non-eternality*, and (*b*) *Smoke* as proving *fire*. Now, as regards (*b*), it has already been declared that *Smoke* does not *prove* fire [this has been declared by the *Vārṭika* itself, on p. 59, l. 14, and also by Ḍiṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*, quoted is *Medieval Logic*, P. 87]. And as regards (*a*), the character of *being produced by effort* cannot be a Probans (in proving the non-eternality of Sound). "Why so?" For the simple reason that the said character of *being produced by effort* does not subsist in the Subject (Sound); as a matter of fact, *being produced by effort* is not a property of Sound; there is no Sound that is *produced by effort*,—every Sound being produced by conjunctions and disjunctions.* It may be that (though not the immediate and direct cause of Sound) *effort* is certainly the indirect cause of Sound [the contact of the vocal chords, for instance, being due to the Effort put forth by the speaker]; but in that way all things may be said to be the

* When a man speaks, what *produces* the Sound, is the contact and separation of the wind thrown out of the throat with the vocal chords: and so in every case the immediate cause of Sound consists in the waves of air coming into contact with something; Sound is produced by disjunction in the case of the Sound proceeding from the splitting of the bamboo.

indirect cause of Sound! So that it is futile to have any such specification as 'produced *by effort*'; the reasoning may be put forward simply as–'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is produced.*'

Vār. p. 136. Then again, when you put forward, in proof of the non-eternality of Sound, *the character of being produced by effort*, expressing this latter by means of the abstract noun '*prayaṭnānanṭarīyakaṭva*'—what does the abstract noun (*ānanṭarīyakaṭva*) mean? (a) Does it mean *production*? (b) Or *perception*? (a) If it means *production*, then that alone would be enough to prove non-eternality*; and it is needless to put forward the term as 'being produced *by effort*'; certainly it is no use putting up the reasoning in the form 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product of *Ḍēvadaṭṭa*' [it being enough to say that it is a *product*]; so that your reasoning should be in the form 'because it is produced' [and the qualifing phase 'by effort' becomes superfluous]. If 'being produced' were not invariably concomitant with *non-eternality* (and as such failed to prove it conclusively), then alone would it have served a useful purpose to add the qualification 'by effort'. As in the case of every Probans, it is necessary to add qualifications only if, in the unqualified form, it is found to be inconclusive or too wide. (b) If on the other-hand, *perception* is what you mean by the abstract term '*ānanṭarīyakaṭva*', then also, this *perception* alone would have the required capacity (of proving non-eternality); and in this case also the qualification ('by effort') would be superfluous. As things perceived are not of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal (as according to the Bauḍḍha nothing is eternal); nor are they of two kinds—perceived after effort and not-perceived after effort.† "You will perhaps

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* Both editions read '*ṭannaiva*'; this is incompatible with what follows; the reading should be '*taḍeva*'.

† Both editions read '*prayaṭnānanṭar yaka*';. The *Ṭāṭparya* reads '*prayaṭnānanṭarana &c.*'; this latter gives better sense.

argue that the generality '*ghaṭaṭva*' is eternal, and it is also perceived after effort."[1] But you yourself have denied this (by holding that there are no such eternal generalities as '*ghaṭaṭva*' and the like). Thus the conclusion is that in the proving of the non-eternality of Sound, '*prayaṭnānanṭarīyakaṭva*' cannot serve as a valid Probans. Further, the character of *being produced by effort* is also not invariably concomitant with the Subject; and the term 'Sound' which is the Subject of the reasoning in question, includes *all* Sounds (and *all* sounds are not *produced by effort*). If, then, you put forward the reasoning as referring to a *particular* Sound (and not to *all* Sounds),—thus also the Probans, *being produced by effort*, would apply only to the first sound-unit, and not to the endless sound-units that follow each sound-unit; so that the fact remains that the Probans does not subsist in the *whole* Subject. It may be urged that "that particular sound which is *produced by effort* is certainly *non-eternal*." True; but in that case, for your *Probans* you must have something other (than the character of *being produced*); as the true Probans should subsist in the *whole* of the Subject (which *being produced by effort* does not do).

Then again the Bauḍḍha writer has made the following assertion:—"Things not produced by effort are of three kinds—(1) some are eternal, as the Akāsha is held to be by some philosophers, (2) some are not eternal, as the lightning, and (3) some are absolute non-entities, as the 'sky-flower.'" This shows what an acute logician and clever dialectician the Bauḍḍha is, when he makes the wonderful assertion that an *absolute non-entity* is 'something' and 'is not produced by effort'! That which is 'eternal' can certainly be 'something'; but you cannot call it 'not produced by effort'; for example, the Ākāsha cannot be said to be *produced by effort*;

[1] The sense is that if there were things perceived after effort and things not perceived after effort, then alone would the qualification 'after effort' have had any use; as it is, all things are perceived only after effort.

nor can it be spoken of as 'not produced by effort'; as this term speaks of the character of being due to effort as qualifying, 'production'; the term meaning 'that whose production is due to effort'; and as there is no 'production' of Akāsha, you cannot speak of it either as 'not produced by effort,' or as 'produced by effort.' This same reasoning holds good regarding the case of Negation also; as negation

Var. P. 137. also cannot be spoken of either as 'produced by effort' or as 'not produced by effort.'

Thus then, all other proposed definitions of the Probans having been found to be defective, we must accept that which has been propounded by the sage Gauṭama.

THE STATEMENT OF THE EXAMPLE.

Sūṭrā (36).

THAT FAMILIAR INSTANCE,—WHICH, THROUGH SIMILARITY TO WHAT IS TO BE PROVED (*i. e.* THE SUBJECT), IS POSSESSED OF A PROPERTY OF THAT (SUBJECT)—CONSTITUTES THE 'STATEMENT OF THE EXAMPLE.'

BHĀṢYA ON SŪ. (36).

[P. 41, L. 9 to P. 42, L. 6.]

*'*Similarity to what is be proved*' consists in the presence of the same property in both; when by reason of this similarity, the familiar instance is found to be *possessed of a character of that same,—i. e.*, the character of what is to be proved. "*What is to be proved*' is of two kinds—(a) in some cases it is the property as qualified by (belonging to) the object;—as when we assert the 'non-eternality *of Sound*'; and (2) in others it is the object as qualified by the property, as when we assert that 'sound is non-eternal'; and it is this latter that is referred to by the pronoun 'ṭaṭ' [in the compound *ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*] (in the *Sūṭra*) [and not the *probandum*, which is what is usually spoken of as '*sāḍhya*']. "How do you know that it is this latter that is meant by the word '*sāḍhya*' here?" For the simple reason that we find the 'property', '*ḍharma*', mentioned separately from 'that', '*ṭaṭ*' [so that '*ṭaṭ*' and '*ḍharma*' could not be the same]; the word '*ṭaḍḍhamabhāvī*' means 'that which has the *bhāva* or presence of the *ḍharma* or property of '*ṭaṭ*' or 'that'; that is to say, that familiar instance which is possessed of a property that belongs also to the Subject; and it is such an instance which can be spoken of as 'possessed of a property of the subject', in virtue of its similarity to that Subject.

Bhāṣya, P. 42.

For instance, in the reasoning 'sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced', what the *probans*, 'being produced', means is that *being produced, it ceases to be*,—i. e. *loses itself*,—i. e. is *destroyed*; here we find that *being produced* is meant to be the *means of proving* (*i. e.* the probans) and *being non-eternal* is what is *proved* (the probandum); and the notion that there is the relation of *means and object* between the two properties can arise only when the two are found to co-exist in any one thing; and it arises only by reason of the 'similarity' (of a number of things in every one of which the two properties are found

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* The wording of this *Sūṭra* is not clear. The meaning is clear enough—that is the right example which possesses two properties in common with the Subject,—one property whose presence in the Subject is to be proved, and the other that which is already known to subsist in it. But the difficulty arises from the presence of the word '*sāḍhya* in the Sūṭra. Ordinarily this word stands for the probandum, that whose presence in the Subject is to be proved; that the word cannot mean this in the present Sūṭra is made clear in the '*Vārṭika*. The translation has adopted the explanation

to co-exist) ; so that when one has perceived the said relation in the familiar instance, he naturally infers the same in the Sound also ;—the form of the inference being 'Sound also is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced, just like such things as the dish, the cup and like'. And this is called 'Statement of the Example', '*uḍāharaṇa*', because it is what is the means of establishing, between the two properties, of the relation of means and object.

Vārṭika on Sū. (36.)

[P. 137, L. 4 to P. 138, L. 4.)

That familiar instance . . . . . constitutes the 'Statement of the Example'—says the Sūṭra ; and this Sūṭra is only meant to be an indicative of what the 'Statement of Example' is.†

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provided by the *Tāṭparya*, *as* follows :—'*Sāḍhyasāḍharmya*' must mean the similarity of the Instance *to the Subject*,—this similarity, in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product,' consisting in the presence of the property of *being produced*, which is the probans ; as this is *equally* present in the Subject, Sound, *which is to be proved* as 'non-eternal', and in the Instance, dish, &c. ; and on the basis of this similarity, the Instance is found to possess *another* property meant to belong to that same Subject (Sound),—that is, *that* the connection of Sound with which is to be proved, *e. g.* the property of non-eternality ; and the dish, &c., are actually found to be possessed of this last property.

There is yet another difficulty ;—*uḍāharaṇa*, as a factor of reasoning, is a *verbal statement* ; how can a familiar instance, which is an object possessing certain properties, be called a 'statement'? This difficulty has been sought to be cleared by the *Vārṭika*. (See below).

The translator has adopted the interpretation of the *Vārṭika* and the *Bhāṣya*. But the Sūṭra is capable of a much simpler interpretation—*sāḍhyena (dharmiṇa aniṭyaṭvena) sāḍhāranyāṭ (samānāḍhikaraṇyāṭ, sāḍhyasamānāḍhikaraṇam ḍharmāntaram uṭpaṭṭidharmakaṭvamavalambya) ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī (sāḍhyadharmavān)* ;—translated thus—'That familiar instance which, possessing a property that is known to be co-existent or concomitant with the probandum, possesses also the probandum.' The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* appear to have been led away by the impossibility of there being any '*Sāḍharmya*' (similarity) between the Instance (which is an object, a *ḍharmin*) and the Probandum (which is a property, a *ḍharma*). But the *Bhāṣya* itself (p. 42, ll. 2-3) affords an explanation which shows that '*sāḍharmya*' *means* 'concomitance in a single substratum', and not *similarity* ; and that this concomitance is between the two properties—*e. g.* non-eternality' (probandum) and 'being produced', both of which, known to be concomitant, should subsist in the Instance.

† 'And it cannot be regarded as actually pointing out the *form* of that Statement ; as the *statement* must be verbal ; and as such it cannot be defined as the *familiar instance*.

The term '*sāḍhyasāḍharmya*' means 'similarity to what is to be proved'; this also implies two emphasised restrictions—*viz.* (1) that the similarity should be *only to what is be proved*, and not to what is contrary to what is to be proved, and (2) that to what is to be proved there should *be similarity only*, and not *dissimilarity* also;* both these restrictions should be taken as implied by the term, inasmuch as by reason of the said 'similarity' the 'familiar instance' comes to be possessed of 'a property of the subject.' "Is there any *similarity to what is to be proved* by which the Instance becomes *not possessed of a property of the subject*? [And inasmuch as the term 'similarity to what is to be proved', would imply the *possession of the property of the Subject* also, the adding of this last term to the definition is entirely superfluous, and it is also needless to have recourse to any emphatic restriction.]" Certainly it does become *not possessed of the property of the Subject*; e.g. when *action* (motion) is cited as an instance to prove the eternality of sound on the ground of its *incorporeality*.† For these reasons we conclude that what is meant is that instance which comes to possess a property of the Subject, by reason of its 'similarity to what is to be proved'; and this is what is meant by the term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*'. A familiar instance, such as above described, which becomes qualified by the character of being 'possessed of the property of the Subject' by virtue of its 'similarity to what is to be proved,' constitutes the 'State-

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So what is put forward in the Sūṭra is a definition, not of the statement, but of that which the Statement speaks of.'—*Ṭāṭparya*. See *Vārṭika* below. The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that as even this indirect description suffices to give an idea of what the *Uḍāharaṇa* is, no exception can be reasonably taken to the Sūṭra.

* The first restriction precludes the 'too-wide' character, which is similar to eternal as well as non-eternal things; and the second precludes the *partial* character, which is partly similar and party dissimilar.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† In the reasoning 'Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like action', action has certainly this 'similarity' to Sound that both are 'incorporeal'; but even with this similarity,' Action is not possessed of *eternality*, which is the 'property of the Subject', which should be present in the Instance. And this becomes excluded by the

ment of the Example';* this has been called '*Uḍāharaṇa*', because the relation, between the two properties, of being the *means of proving* and the *proved*, is indicated by it [*uḍāhriyaṭē anēna*].†

"Well, if the *lyut* affix in the word '*uḍāharaṇa*' has, as you say, the sense of the Instrumental, the *uḍāharaṇa* should be in the form of a verbal expression; so that the 'Instance' being an *object*, it is not right to speak of the two as in apposition to each other [the Sūṭra speaks of the 'familiar instance' as the '*Statement* of Example'; and certainly an *object* cannot be spoken of as a *statement*]; for instance, the verbal expression 'having horns' can never be in apposition to the *cow*."

This objection has no force at all; as what the Sūṭra does is to mention the 'familiar instance' as a qualification of the 'statement'; it certainly does not mean that the Instance, by itself, constitutes the 'Statement of the Example'; what it means is that when the familiar instance is *stated* as being 'possessed of the property of the Subject' by virtue of its 'similarity to what is to be proved', we have the 'Statement of the Example.'

The term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' is to be explained in the following manner: '*Ṭaḍḍharmaḥ*'=the property *of that*, *i.e.*, of what is to be proved; and 'what is to be proved' is of two kinds, it is a *property* and it is also an *object*; in one case

term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*', and also by the restriction that there should be *similarity* to the *Sāḍhya* only; as the 'incorporeality' forms a similarity not to Sound only, but to many other things also, eternal and non-eternal alike.

* It is interesting to note that with regard to *Vārṭika*, lines 7-12, the *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that 'no one agrees with what the *Vārṭika* has said here;......and very little useful purpose is served by it.'

† The 'Statement of the Example' is that in which it is shown that by virtue of its 'similarity to what is to be proved,' the Instance is 'possessed of a property of the Subject'; that is there is invariable concomitance between the *similarity* (which in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the jar,' consists in *being a product*) and the 'property of the Subject' (*non-eternality*).

(the former) it is the object that forms the qualifying factor, and in the other it is the *property* that is the qualifying factor; and in the present case, 'that' should be taken as standing for the *object*; for the simple reason that the *property* is mentioned separately by itself*; that is to say, the properties of *being a product*, &c., belong to the *object*, and not to the *property*. And further, if *property* were meant here to be 'what is to be proved,' then it would be absurd to speak of the 'similarity' of the Instance to it; for certainly there can be no 'similarity' between the *property* and the *instance*; as a matter of fact, the 'similarity to what is to be proved of the Instance must be to an *object* only; and the final Re-assertion also must refer to the *object*.—For these reasons the term 'what is to be proved' must here stand for the *object* (*i. e.* the *subject* of the syllogism); and the Example is that instance which (while being similar, &c. &c.) possesses that property whose existence is to be proved in the *Subject*. Such an Example (in the case of proving the non-eternality of sound) we have in the shape of such objects as the Dish and the like, all which have the character of *being produced* and are found to be *non-eternal*.

Var: P. 138.

Sūṭra (37).

AND THE OTHER KIND OF 'STATEMENT OF EXAMPLE' IS THAT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN THE FOREGOING SŪṬRA.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 42, L. 8 to P. 43, L. 8].

What is meant to be described is that 'familiar instance which constitutes the Statement of Example'; so that what the Sūṭra means is that the other kind of Statement of the (heterogeneous) Example consists in *that familiar instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, is not possessed of a property of that Subject. E. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced,—

* Both editions read च पृथक् but the च is superfluous.

everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, for instance, the Soul and the rest';—here 'Soul and the rest' constitute the required 'familiar instance,' which, through their 'dissimilarity to what is to be proved'—*i.e.* on account of their not having the *character of being produced*,—are not 'possessed of the property of the subject,'—*i.e.* the property of *non-eternality*. When we find that in the case of the Soul, the character of *being produced* being absent*, it does not possess non-eternality, we infer the contrary in the case of Sound,—'because Sound is possessed of the character of *being produced*, Sound is non-eternal'.†

When the Probans is stated with a view to similarity—i. e. in the affirmative form,—what constitutes the *Statement of the Example* is that familiar instance which, through its similarity to what is to be proved, is possessed of a property of the Subject; and when the Probans is stated with a view to dissimilarity,—i. e. in the negative form—the *Statement of the Example* consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved,

* The reading '*sya—bhāvāṭ* is wrong; the correct reading given in the Puri Ms. is '*syābhāvāt*.'

† The *Ṭāṭparya* takes exception to the example cited in the *Bhāṣya*:—"Both the examples cited in the *Bhāṣya*—that of the Homogeneous Example as well as that of the Heterogeneous Example—are those of the 'affirmative-negative' kind; and in the latter case it has declared that the absence of the property to be proved is due to the absence of the character which proves it; and this is not right, as in the case of the 'affirmative-negative' reasoning, even though a heterogeneous Example be available, the right course is always to cite the homogeneous Example; as the *dissimilarity* of a thing is recognised always after its *similarity*; so that it is not right to have recourse to the roundabout way when a straight road is available for the same purpose". This contention appears to be favoured by the *Vārṭika* also, which says that an instance of the heterogeneous example is to be found cited in connection with the '*Negative*' reasoning. The instance that the *Ṭāṭparya* would have is found in the following reasoning—'The living is body with Soul because otherwise it would be without the life-breath,—like the *jar*', where the 'property' of the Subject—the living body—*having the life-breath*—is not present in the jar. What the *Bhāṣya* itself proceeds to explain in the next sentence shows that the instance cited cannot be the right one; if it is true that 'when the probans is stated affirmatively, the example cited should be homogeneous', then in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it has the character of being produced*.'—where the probans is stated affirmatively—the right example could not be the *heterogeneous* one; while if the reasoning is put forward in the form 'the living is body is with Soul, as *otherwise it would be without the life-breath*'—where the probans is stated *negatively*—we would have the heterogeneous example of the *jar* as cited by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

does not possess the property of the Subject. In the former case, the observer perceives, in the Instance, that it possesses two properties so related that the presence of one proves the presence of the other, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the presence of one should prove the presence of the other;—and in the latter case he observes in regard to the Instance that there are two properties so related that the absence of one proves the absence of another, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the said properties are similarly related, the absence of one proving the absence of the other.

This process (of corroboration by means of familiar instances) is not possible in the case of fallacious Probans; and it is for this reason that they are regarded as 'fallacious', as not true probans. The subject of this related capacity of the Probans and the Example is very subtle and difficult to grasp; it can be rightly understood only by exceptionally wise and learned men.

Vārṭika on Sūṭrā (37).

[P. 138, L. 6 to P. 140, L. 1.]

The full definition intended by the Sūṭra is that the 'Statement of the Heterogenous Example' consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of the Subject.' An instance of this second kind of Example should be found in connection with the negative Probans (above).

[The *Vārṭika* proceeds to discuss the several emendations that have been proposed in the reading of the last two *Sūṭras*]—Some people would read Sūṭra (36) as—' *sāḍhyasāḍharmyāṭ ṭaḍḍharmabhāviṭvam ḍriṣṭānṭasya uḍāharaṇam*; and their motive in proposing this change is that this reading [which gives the sense that 'the Statement of the Example is that character of the Instance which consists in its being similar to what is to be proved and which possess the property of the subject'] precludes the absurdity (apparent in the reading generally adopted) of the identification of the *Instance* (which is a material object) with the

Statement of the Example (which is purely verbal). When questioned as to the exact meaning of the expression '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāviṭvam*', 'the character of possessing the property of the Subject,' they explain that—the said 'character' consists in the connection of the character to be proved (the probandum) and the character that proves it (the probans); i. e. the instance is said to 'possess the property of the Subject' when it is connected with the probandum and the probans; hence what the abstract noun '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāviṭvam*' denotes is the co-existence (concomitance) of the probans and the probandum.

Others have found fault with this reading of the *Sūṭra* *. But as we do not accept this reading, the objection urged against it does not concern us.

The Opponent argues—"Even in your own reading of the *Sūṭra* (as read by Gauṭama himself), there is this flaw that the term '*bhāvī*' (in the compound '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvi*') is entirely superfluous; as every one of the factors (of reasoning) is (by its very nature) the *bhāvī* of 'what is to be proved'; the meaning of the term '*bhāvī*' being '*bhāvayaṭi*', 'that which indicates'; and certainly every one of the factors is *indicative of what is to be proved.*"

Our answer to this argument is that the interpretation of the term '*bhāvī*' that is here criticised does not represent our view of the meaning of the *Sūṭra* [so that we need not concern ourselves with it].

Some writers object to the term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' on other grounds. This is how they argue:—"The exact denotation of the term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' may be explained on the analogy, either of the term '*uṣṇabhojī*', or of the term '*ḍaṇḍī*';

* The objection consisting in the fact that the reading '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāviṭvam* ....*udāharaṇam*'—Where the 'statement' is spoken of as the 'character'—involves the same absurdity that has been sought to be avoided: just as 'statement cannot be the 'instance', so also it cannot be the 'character'.

if it is explained on the analogy of the former, then as the word '*uṣṇabhoji*', is explained as '*uṣṇam bhokṭum shīlam yasya*',—one who is in the habit of eating hot food',—the term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhavī*' would mean '*ṭaḍḍharmam bhāvayiṭum shīlam yasya*', where the word '*bhāvayiṭum*' would be synonymous with '*gamayiṭum*', and the term would mean 'that which is in the habit of indicating the property of the subject'; and this, the *Vārṭika* has just declared, is *not* what is meant by the author of the *Sūṭra*; so that this explanation does not call for any remarks. As for the term '*ḍaṇḍī*', this means '*ḍaṇḍam yasya asṭi*' 'one who possesses the stick'; so that on the analogy of this, the term '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' would mean '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvaḥ yasya asṭi*'; and under this explanation, the term '*bhāvī*' would be entirely superfluous; as the only way in which you would expound the compound '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' would be as follows—*ṭaḍḍharmashcha asau bhāvashcheṭi ṭaḍḍharmabhāvaḥ, sa yasya asṭi*; and for the expression of the qualified relation meant to be conveyed by means of this, the form '*ṭaḍḍharmabhāvī*' should be justifiable only if it were not possible for that relation to be expressed by means of a simpler word. As a matter of fact, however, we find that it is not possible for a property to be a '*ṭaḍḍharma*' and, at the same time, an '*abhāva*'; and it is only if this were possible that the qualifying term '*bhāva*' would be necessary in connection with '*ṭaḍḍharma*'. Thus then (the term '*bhāva*' being entirely superfluous), you should have the term '*ṭaḍḍharmī*' [which would mean 'that which possesses the property of the Subject', which is all that is required]."

Vār : P. 139.

Our reply to the above criticism is that it would not be right to have the term in the form '*ṭaḍḍharmī*', in the sense of *possessing the property of the Subject*; as the *possession of the property of a thing* is of both kinds; that is, properties are of two kinds—those that are affirmed and those that are denied; and in the affirmative reasoning the familiar instance

is one which possesses the property that is *affirmed*; *e. g.* in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it has the character of being a product', it is found that the Dish is a familiar instance in regard to which the presence of the two properties of *being a product* and *non-eternality* are affirmed; so that it is only right to have the word in the form '*ṭaḍḍharma bhāvī*', and explain it as that which possesses the property *in its positive form*, the correlation being explained as *ṭaḍḍharma-shcha asau bhāvaṣhcha*. Then again, we do not understand how we could have the term in the form '*ṭaḍḍharmī*'; as a matter of fact, in a case where the *Bahuvrīhi* compound is possible, there is no room for the possessive affix (*ini*);* so that if we have to be advised at all we should be advised to have the form '*ṭaḍḍharmā*' (a Bahuvrīhi compound). Further, there are some people (the Bauḍḍhas for instance) who hold that such properties as *being produced* and *non-eternality* (in fact, all things) are mere negations [according to the Bauḍḍha everything is *apoha*, a negation of its contrary]; and with a view to reject their view it is necessary to emphasise, by means of the word '*bhāva*', the fact of the *positive* character of the properties.

A Bauḍḍha logician, Subanḍhu†, has made the remark that "*Praṭijñā* and the other two factors of reasoning have been badly confounded by the definitions provided by Gauṭama." We have seen however that every one of the three Factors has been very correctly defined; so that by declaring that they have been 'badly confounded', the writer has only given proof of his being a mighty logician!

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* The idea meant to be expressed is *that which possesses the property of that*; and this is more easily expressed by the Bahuvrīhi compound '*ṭaḍḍharmā*' than by means of the form '*ṭaḍḍharmī*', which necessitates the adding of the possessive affix '*ini*.'

† It has been suggested that this name should be Vasubanḍhu. But the *Ṭāṭparya* often speaks of '*saubanḍharam lakṣaṇam*', which shows that there was a Bauḍḍha logician named 'Subanḍhu.'

[The author next proceeds to discuss some other definitions of the *Statement of Example* that have been proposed]—Some writers have defined the 'Statement of Example' as 'that which is known as such', *ṭaṭhā dṛiṣto dṛiṣṭānṭaḥ.* What does this mean?—we ask. The following explanation has been provided—(1) "The Subject being meant to be proved as having a certain character,—*non-eternality, e. g.*,—that which is* *known as having that character* constitutes the *Example*; (2) similarly when what is meant to be proved is the fact of the Subject having the character of varying with the variations of its cause, that which is known to possess this character forms the Example, which possesses the character to be proved as well as that which proves it."†

Our objection to this definition is that, however much you try, you can not, without renouncing your own doctrines, establish any connection of concomitance between the character of *being a product* and *non-eternality;* for the simple reason that according to the tenets of the *Bauḍḍha*, there is difference in the time (at which the two characters are present), and there is cessation of the thing; that is, the character of *being produced* is present at one point of time and *non-eternality* at an entirely different point; as at the time that the thing exists, its prior negation and destruction are not present.‡

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* Both editions read '*yamasiḍḍho*', which is apparently a mis-reading for '*yaṃsiḍḍho.*'

† The Bauḍḍha logician Ḍharmoṭṭara in his *Nyāyabinḍuṭikā* explains the word '*praṭyayabhēdabhēdi*' in the following words:—"The word '*kṛiṭaka*' denotes the character of having several varying characteristics; the terms that we put forward in the proving of the said character of *kṛiṭakatva* are '*praṭyayabhēdabhēḍi*', '*prayaṭnānanṭarīyaka*' and the like; and every one of these also implies the same character of possessing varying characteristics. In the term '*praṭyayabhēḍabhēdi*', '*praṭyaya*' stands for *cause*, '*bhēda*' for *variations*, and '*bhēdi*' for *that which is amenable to variations*; so that the whole word means *that which has the character of varying with the variations of its cause*; this indicates the character of *being produced*, which, in its turn proves *non-eternality*."

‡ According to the Bauḍḍha everything has only a momentary existence; so that at the moment that there is *prior negation* of the Dish, the *Dish* itself is not there; nor is it there when its *destruction* is present; and it is only when both prior negation and

The same reasons also serve to discard such other definitions of *Example* (proposed by Bauḍḍha writers),— as, (1) that it is that which represents the correlative (substratum) of the two characters, the one to be proved and the other proving it, and (2) that it is that which indicates the concomitance of the probans with the probandum and the non-existence of the probans where the probandum is absent'.

Sūṭrā (38).

THE 'STATEMENT OF THE RE-AFFIRMATION' IS THAT WHICH, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EXAMPLE, RE-ASSERTS THE SUBJECT, AS BEING 'SO' [*i. e.*, AS POSSESSING THE CHARACTER WHICH HAS BEEN FOUND, IN THE EXAMPLE, TO BE CONCOMITANT WITH THE PROBANDUM]—OR AS BEING 'NOT SO' [*i. e.* AS NOT POSSESSING THE CHARACTER WHICH HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE EXAMPLE TO BE CONCOMITANT WITH THE NEGATION OF THE PROBANDUM].

Bhāṣya.

[P. 43, L. 11 to L. 17].

The term '*uḍāharaṇasāpēkṣaḥ*' means 'depending on the Example'—*i. e.* on the strength of the Example.

(*a*) When the Example cited is the homogeneous one, which is similar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Dish is cited as the example to show, that it is a *product* and is *non-eternal*—we have the 'Re-affirmation' or 'Application' stated in the form 'Sound, *is so*'—*i. e.* 'Sound *is a product*'; where the character of *being a product* is applied to the Subject *Sound*. (*b*) When the Example cited is the heterogeneous one, which is dissimilar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Soul is cited as an example of the substance which, *not being a product*, is eternal,—the 'Re-affirmation' or 'Application' is stated in the form 'Sound is not so'; where the character of *being a product* is reasserted of the Subject, Sound, through the denial of the application of the character of *not being produced*. Thus there are two kinds of *Re-affirmation*, based upon the two kinds of *Example*.

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destruction co-exist in a thing that it can be regarded as *non-eternal*. Then again, the *Dish* that is *produced* must be entirely different from that which is *destroyed*; as the same Dish cannot continue for three moments; so that the co-existence of *being produced* and *non-eternality* is impossible for the Bauḍḍha.

The term '*upasamhāra*' (in order to be made applicable to the *Verbal* re-affirmation) should be explained as *that by means of which there is reassertion* (*ūpasamhriyaṭē anēna*).*

Vārṭika on Sūṭra 38.

[P. 140, L. 4 to L. 12].

'*The Statement of the Re-affirmation is &c. &c.*' says the Sūṭra ;—*e. g.* [in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product'] 'so is Sound also a product'.

[This factor of Re-affirmation is essential in the statement of every reasoning ; as] the expression '*as* the Example *so* the Subject' serves the purpose of adumbration. "What do you mean by this *adumbration*?" Of the *probans* (the character of *being a product*), as perceived in the Example, the invariable concomitance (with the *probandum*, non-eternality') having been duly recognised, the said expression (as embodying the Re-affirmation) serves to point out the *similitude* (to that character) of the same character subsisting in the Subject [and the indicating of this *similitude* is what is meant by 'adumbration'] ;—*e. g.* 'This, Subject, Sound, is also a product', [*i. e.* this character of *being a product* being of the same kind as the character of *being a product* which has been found in the Dish to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, 'non-eternality']. Or the *Re-affirmation* may be regarded as serving the purpose of indicating the possibility [of the concomitance of the probans and the probandum] in the Subject also ; just as it is found in the Example. "But this *possibility* has already been pointed out in the statement 'because it is a product (Sound is non-eternal)'."

* On this Sūṭra, the *Parishuddhi* remarks as follows :—When the Sūṭra speaks of the two kinds of Re-affirmation, it refers to the definitions that it has given of the two kinds of Example in the two preceding Sūṭras. The two kinds of Example have been defined separately ; but the corresponding two kinds of *Re-affirmation* are defined in one Sūṭra. The *Tāṭparya* observes that the definition common to both kinds of Re-affirmation would be in the form—उदाहरणापेक्षः उपसंहारः (साध्यस्य) उपनयः—*i. e.* 'Re affirmation consists in the re-assertion of the Subject (as possessing the probans), on the strength of the Example.'

Certainly, this last statement does not afford the required information; all that it points out is the mere relation of cause and effect; what the statement 'because it is a product it is non-eternal' points out is only that the presence (in Sound) of the character of 'being a product' *would* prove the presence in it of 'non-eternality'; and whether this character of 'being a product' does, or does not, actually subsist in Sound, is learnt only by means of the *Re-affirmation*,—in the form of the proposition 'the character of *being a product* does subsist in Sound.'

When the Example cited is a homogeneous one, the Re-affirmation is in the affirmative form, '*so also is* the Subject'; and when the Example is a heterogeneous one, it is in the negative form, 'the Subject is *not so*.'

Sūṭrā (39).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 43, L. 17 to P. 45, L. 10.]

Even though the Statement of the Probans and Re-affirmation are both of two kinds, yet of one uniform character is—

THE FINAL CONCLUSION, WHICH IS THE RE-STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION ON THE BASIS OF THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBANS. (Sūṭra 39).*

The Probans having been stated either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, we have a recapitulation (of the entire reasoning) in accordance with the Example; and this recapitulation constitutes the Final Conclusion; which is in the form—'Therefore, having the character of product, Sound is non-eternal.' This has been called '*Nigamana*' (Final Conclusion), because it serves to connect or string together (*nigamyanṭē anēna*) the Proposition, the Statement of the Probans, the Statement of the Example and the Re-assertion; the word '*nigamyanṭē*' being synonymous with the '*samarṭhyanṭē*', ('are, supported') and '*sambadhyanṭē*' ('are connected').

* As a matter of fact the Final Conclusion is what is established or proved, while the Proposition asserts what is yet to be proved; but the two refer to the same thing; that which appears in the conclusion as *proved* is precisely what has appeared before in the Proposition as *to be proved*. So that there is no incongruity in speaking of the Conclusion as being the Proposition.

When the Probans has been stated *per* similarity, the *Proposition* is in the form of the Statement 'Sound is non-eternal';—the *Probans* is stated in the form 'because it has the character of being a product';—the *Example* is in the form 'things like the dish, which have the character of being a product, are all non-eternal';—the *Re-assertion* is in the form 'Sound also has the same character of being a product'; —and the Final Conclusion is in the form 'therefore, having the character of being a product, Sound is non-eternal.' Similarly, when the Probans is stated *per* dissimilarity, the *Proposition* is in the form 'Sound is non-eternal';—'because it is has the character of being a product' (*Probans*); —such things as the Soul which are not products are eternal' (*Example*);—'Sound is not a thing that is not a product' (*Reassertion*);—'therefore not being a non-product, Sound is non-eternal' (*Final Conclusion*).

In every inferential statement, which consists of the (five) 'Factors,' several distinct *pramāṇas* co-operate towards the accomplishment of the end (in the shape of inferential cognition). For instance,—(*a*) in the inference bearing on Sound, the *Proposition* ('Sound is non-eternal') comes under 'Probability' [which is a 'source of knowledge' according to some philosophers]; specially as Trustworthy Assertion (in regard to the *eternality* of Sound, such *e. g.* as the Vedic texts 'all this was existing, O son, etc.') is found to be contrary to, and rejected by, Perception and Inference; and any assertion, unless it is heard directly from a Riṣi, cannot by itself be accepted as 'trustworthy' (except when it is found compatible with well-recognised facts);—(*b*) in the *Statement of the Probans* we have an 'Inference', being deduced, as it is, from the cognition of similarity by the Statement of the Example;* this has been explained clearly in the *Bhāṣya* dealing with the *Statement of the Example*;—(*c*) the *Statement of the Example* represents 'Perception'; the deduction of the unseen (unknown or uncertain conclusion) from the seen (what is perceived in the Example) being only natural;—(*d*) the *Re-assertion* is in the form of 'Analogy' as it is expressed in the form 'as that *so this*', or 'this is not as that is', when there is denial of the analogous character; in which case the *Re-assertion* is of the denial of the contrary character;—(*e*) the *Final Conclusion* serves to show how all the Factors combined are capable of bringing about the cognition of a single

* The Probans is recognised as such only when the reasoner has become cognisant of the invariable concomitance between the Probandum and the Probans as perceived in the thing that is cited as the Example.

object (in the shape of the *Probandum* through that of the *Probans*).

There is mutual relationship also among the five 'Factors'. *E. g.* (*a*) If there were no *Proposition*, there would be no basis on which the *Statement of the Probans* and the other Factors could proceed;—(b) if there were no *Statement of the Probans*, the instrumental efficiency of what (towards the bringing about of the cognition) could be shown (by the Inference)?—what again would that be whose connection with the Example and the Probandum could be shown?—on the basis of what again could there be the *Final Conclusion* consisting in the re-statement of the Proposition?—(c) if there were no *Statement of the Example*, what would that be to which there would be similarity, or dissimilarity, of what is put forward as the means (Probans) of proving the probandum?—on the strength of similarity to what too would the final recapitulation proceed?—(d) if there were no *Reassertion*, the character put forward as proving the Probandum, not having its presence in the Probandum reasserted, could not accomplish its purpose;—(e) lastly, in the absence of the *Final Conclusion*, there would be nothing to indicate the mutual relationship among Proposition and the other Factors, or the fact of their combining to accomplish a common purpose *; and what too would it be that would be declared as proved by means of such expressions as 'so is this.'?

Bhāṣya : Page 45.

We now proceed to show the purpose served by each of the five 'Factors of Reasoning.' † (a) The *Proposition* serves the purpose of mentioning the relations between the character to be proved and the *Subject*; (b) the *Statement of the Probans* serves the purpose of stating the fact of a certain character, which is either similar or dissimilar to what is stated in the *Example*, proving what is to be proved;—(c) the *Statement of the Example* serves the purpose of indicating the presence, between the two characters, the relation of 'proof and proved' (Probans and Probandum), as manifested in a single substratum;—(d) the purpose served by the *Reassertion* is to indicate the co-existence (in the Subject) of the character put forward as Probans with that put forward as the Probandum;—(e) and the *Final Conclusion* serves the purpose of showing

* The translation is in accordance with the printed text; the reading of the Puri MS. is better—'*nigamanābhāvē cha anabhivyakta.........pravarṭanam.. ......kasyēṭi*'; this reading affords better syntax.

† Though the purpose of each Factor has already been shown under the *Sūṭra* defining each of them, yet the Author proceeds to explain it again, for the good of his disciples.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

that it is not possible to deny, in regard to the particular Probandum, (and Subject) the relation of 'proof and proved' which has been found, in the Example, to subsist between the two characters. *

When the Probans and the Example have been duly put forward in the correct form, in the manner described above, there is no opportunity for the Opponent to urge (against the reasoning) any 'Casuistry',—in the shape of urging contrary arguments vitiating either the similarity or the dissimilarity of the Probans—or any one of the many 'Clinchers.' The Opponent who has recourse to 'Casuistry' does so (with effect) only after he has shown the doubtful character of the relation of 'proof and proved' between the two characters as found in the Example; and as a matter of fact a Probans is put forward as such only when its relation of 'proof and proved' to the Probandum has been duly grasped in the Example,—and not when its mere 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity' to the character in the Example has been recognised. [So that when the Probans is duly stated, there can be no room for Casuistry or Clinchers being urged against it].

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (39).

[Page 140, L. 14 to P. 141, L. 17].

The Final Conclusion is the re-statement of the Proposition—says the *Sūṭra.* That is to say, when it is found that every one of the Factors put forward is based upon a valid Instrument of Knowledge as bearing upon what has been asserted in the Proposition,—there is a re-statement of the same Proposition, for the purpose of precluding the possibility of any notion contrary to the Probandum being entertained; and this 're-statement' is what constitutes the *Final Conclusion.* Thus then, the *Sūṭra* being explained in this

* The *Final Conclusion* thus is not the same as the *Proposition*; the latter puts forward the fact only tentatively, as requiring confirmation by the reasoning with the aid of the Probans and the Example, while the former puts it forward as one fully established, and thus precluding the possibility of the truth being contrary to it. This cannot be done by the *Proposition*; as if it did, then the rest of the Factors would be entirely futile.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The above remarks of the *Ṭāṭparya* show that the writer was conscious of the objection that every syllogism involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*; and has supplied a reasonable answer.

manner) there is no room for the Opponent (to urge the objection that he has brought forward).*

Granting the Opponent's contention—[that "the *Final Conclusion* cannot be stated until the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum has been perfectly ascertained beyond dispute; and as this cannot be done until all five factors, *including the Final Conclusion*, have been asserted; so that it is not right to say that the *Final Conclusion* asserts the fact as *proved*, and as such differs from the *Proposition* which states it only as *to be proved*"]—we proceed to consider, with a view to meet his arguments, what he has to say, and so reproduce here his own words†:—"*Reassertion* and *Final Conclusion* cannot be regarded as distinct Factors of Reasoning; as there is no difference in the purpose served by them (and those served by *Statement of the Probans* and *Proposition* respectively)." Now it is clear that this sentence as it stands, gives no sense at all; for, [the sense of the Opponent apparently is that Reassertion serves the same purpose as the *Statement of the Probans* and the *Final Conclusion* the same purpose as the *Proposition*; so that] if the reasoning put forward in the sentence means that in proof of the one-ness or identity of *Statement of Probans* and *Reassertion*, the reason is put forward that *their purpose is the same*,—our answer is that the reason thus put forward is not valid; as the Probans put forward—'non-difference of purpose'—is

* This refers to the view propounded by some logicians that the *Final Conclusion* need not be stated, as what is asserted therein is nothing more than what has already been asserted in the *Proposition*. This objection is met by the *Vārṭika*. The sense of the explanation is as follows :—The first four Factors of the inferential statement do not show that the reasoning put forth is free from the fallacies of 'annulment' and 'neutralisation'; this is done only when the *Final Conclusion* is asserted; after which it is clear that there is no possibility of any reasonings to be put forward against the conclusion thus arrived at. This cannot be done by the *Proposition*, which only propounds the assertion as one *to be proved*; the *Final Conclusion* however asserts the fact as *proved*, and hence not open to doubt or cavil or dispute of any kind.

† We cannot trace this quotation. It may be from one of Diṅnāga's works; as this philosopher, along with many other Bauḍḍha logicians, lays down only *three* Factors of Reasoning.

found to subsist in things where the Probandum (identity) is known to be absent; that is to say, as a matter of fact it is found that there are cases where 'non-difference of purpose' is *not* found when the things are identical, while it *is* found when they are diverse and many: *e. g.*, when there are many and diverse jars, the *purpose* served by them—that of containing the water that is fetched—is one and the same, and yet the jars are not identical. If (in order to meet this difficulty) you explain that what you mean by the two Factors being *not-different* is (not that they are identical, one and the same, but) that they serve the same purpose; even then your Probans fails to be valid; as in that case the Probans would be one that is already implied in the Proposition; *e. g.* what your Proposition means is that 'the *Statement of the Probans and the Reassertion are not different* (*i. e. ex hypothesi, they serve the same purpose*),'—and the Probans is '*arṭhāvishēṣāṭ*', which also means 'because there is non-difference in their purpose';—and further, it has already been explained by us before that the purpose served by the *Statement of the Probans* is in reality entirely different from that served by the *Re-assertion*; so that the Probans put forward—'because of the non-difference of their purpose'—is one that is absolutely 'unknown'.

Vār. P. 141.

The above arguments also serve the purpose of setting aside the view [of those philosophers who postulate only *three* Factors of Reasoning, and who have declared] that—"there should a rejection of all the Factors, save (1) the one that asserts the relation of the Probans and the Subject, (2) that which states the relation (of concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum) and (3) that which states the proposition to be proved."

The Opponent raises on objection against the form of the *Reassertion*,—"When you state the *Reassertion* in the form—'As that (the Dish) is so is this (Sound) also',—what is the exact signification of 'so'? Does it signify (1) *absolute*

similarity (between Sound and Dish)? or (2) the similarity consisting in their having the character of being a *product in general*? or (3) the similarity consisting in their being a *particular product*? It will not be right to take the word as signifying *absolute similarity*; as (if there were absolute similarity between Sound and Dish) in that case 'so is this' would not be the right term to use *. Nor will it be right to take the word as signifying the similarity consisting in the two being a *particular product*; because the *character of product* that belongs to Sound is entirely different (from that belonging to Dish). So the only alternative possible is that the similarity signified is only one that consists in both having the *character of product in general*; and this similarity is already found expressed in the *Statement of the Probans* [so that the *Reassertion* cannot be held to be a Factor distinct from the *Statement of the Probans*]."

This objection also is highly improper, we reply. As the purpose served by the *Reassertion* is that of showing *analogy*; and this 'analogy' is not based upon, and does not necessarily imply, the presence of the *Probans* (the particular character of *being a product*, as subsisting in the Dish) in the Subject (Sound) [all that the analogy implies in reality being the presence in Sound of that particular character of *being a product*, which is of the same general category of *being a product* as that whereof another particular form subsists in the Dish also]. So there is no force in the argument urged by the Opponent. Then again, it is strange that you should speak of the character of 'being a product *in general*' in connection with Sound (which, is a *particular* thing); for when you speak of 'being a product' along with Sound, you at once *specify* that 'being a product' (as one belonging to a particular product, 'Sound); and how can this *specified* character be the character *in general*? Thus then we find that what the *Statement of the Probans* does is to indicate the

'* Absolute similarity' is possible only in case of identity, and when we wish to speak of two things as '*identical*' we use the expression 'this is the *same* as that', and not 'as that is so is this.'

presence of a *particular form of a general character*, [and as such it is not the same as the *Reassertion*, which indicates the analogy between that particular form as present in Sound and that which is present in the Dish].

This same fact serves to set aside the view that *Reassertion* is already included (in the *Statement of the Example*). For it has already been pointed out that what the words 'As that so this' express is *analogy*; and this analogy is expressed by the *Reassertion*, and not by the *Statement of the Example*.

Similar arguments serve also to set aside the view that the *Final Conclusion* is the same as the *Proposition*.

The two Examples that the *Bhāṣya* has cited—one exemplifying the *negative* and the other the *affirmative* reasoning,—each consisting of the five Factors, are entirely distinct from each other; and it should not be understood that the two form a single sentence, which is both negative and affirmative.

SECTION (7).

Factors Supplementary to Reasoning.

Hypothetical Reasoning (*Ṭarka*).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 45, L. 11 to P. 47, L. 8.]

After the Factors of Reasoning, it is necessary to define *Ṭarka*, Hypothetical Reasoning.* This is what is declared in the next *Sūṭra*.

Sūṭra (40).

WHEN THE REAL CHARACTER OF A THING IS NOT WELL KNOWN, THERE IS PUT FORWARD, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING THAT REAL CHARACTER, A REASONING (IN SUP-

* Because this is mentioned in the opening Sūtra, next to '*Avayava*', and also because it serves the purpose of strengthening the inferential conclusion by setting aside its contrary.

The Viz. Series edition has a superfluous '*ṭarkaḥ*' here; it is absent in the Puri MSS.

PORT OF A CERTAIN CONCLUSION) WHICH INDICATES THE PRESENCE OF PROOF (SHOWING THE UNDESIRABILITY OR ABSURDITY OF A CONTRARY CONCLUSION);—AND THIS IS CALLED 'HYPOTHETICAL REASONING'.

As a matter of fact, when the real character of a thing is not well known, there is a desire to know it;—this desire appearing in the form 'may I know it.' After this comes the doubt as to the thing possessing this or that particular character—one of two contradictory characters; * this doubt appearing in the form—'is this thing so and so, or it is not so and so?'; and when one comes to ponder over these two contradictory characters, if he finds proofs in support of one of them, he accepts (or assents to) it,—this assent being in the form 'there are proofs supporting this fact; and as there are proofs, the thing must have this character, and not the other.'†

As an example of this kind of reasoning, we have the following (in regard to the cognitive Soul being a product and having a beginning, or being beginningless):—First of all there arises a *desire to know* the real character of the *cogniser*, the agent who cognises what is to be cognised,—this desire being in the form 'may I know the real character of the cogniser.'—Then comes the *doubt* in the form—'has this cogniser a beginning or is it beginningless?'—thus the real character of the thing being in doubt, and not well known, the enquirer accepts and assents to that particular character in support of which he finds proofs and grounds for acceptance. For instance (in the particular case cited) the proof would be in the following form—'If the cogniser were beginningless, then alone would *Metempsychosis* and *Release* be possible for him;—*Metempsychosis* consisting in the functioning, one of after the other, of pain, birth, activity, defect and ignorance, among whom that which follows is the cause of that which precedes it; and *Release* consisting in the disappearance, one after the other, of these same (as declared in Sū. 1·1·2); and both of these would be impossible for him, if the cogniser had a beginning; for in that case the cogniser would be connected with a particular set of body, sense-organs, intellection and

* Doubt is a necessary element in *Ṭarka*; as it is only when there is doubt as to the presence of this or that particular character that we can have a reasoning which shows the impossibility of the presence of one, and hence the certainty of the presence of the other character; and it is this reasoning that constitutes *Ṭarka*.

† The proof in support being in the form of the absurdity or impossibility of the other alternative.

sensations, only when he would come into existence for the first time; so that these, body and the rest, could not be the products of his own past actions; and further, anything that is born also ceases to be (very soon after); so that, becoming non-existent or destroyed, he would not exist to undergo the experiences resulting from his actions;—thus then for any one cogniser, it would be absolutely impossible to have either connection with more than one body, or disconnection (separation) from any body at all.' If (in another instance) the reasoner finds no such proof forthcoming, he does not accept or assent to the conclusion.* It is reasoning of this kind that is called '*Ṭarka*', 'Hypothetical Reasoning.'

Bhā. P. 47.

[The *Sūṭra* says that *Ṭarka* is 'for the purpose of knowing the real character of the thing'; against this an objection is raised:]—"Why should this reasoning be said to be 'for the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character', and not to be that *knowledge* itself [appearing as it has been represented to do, in the form 'the thing must be so and so, and of no other kind', which is the form in which the knowledge of the real character of things appears.]?"

Our answer to this is that it would not be right for us to speak of the reasoning as embodying the *knowledge* itself, because, as a matter of fact, it is indecisive, being purely permissive in its character,—the reasoner simply assenting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters, on the strength of the proof adduced; and he does not (by this reasoning alone) accurately determine, or decide, or ascertain † that the thing must be so and so.

"How then does the reasoning serve the purpose of bringing about the knowledge of the real character of things?"

The true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrument of Cognition (which becomes fully operative and effective) when following after the reasoning, which has been duly considered and found to be free from all deficiencies, and which appears in the form of assent to the conclusion indicated by the said Instrument of Cognition; ‡ and it is in this manner that the

* The Viz. S. edition reads *ṭachchānujānāṭi*, which is clearly wrong; the correct reading is *ṭammānujānāṭi*, as the Puri MS. and the *Ṭāṭparya* read.

† The author puts forth several synonyms with a view to show that the form in which the reasoning appears is totally different from that of a definite, fully ascertained cognition,—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The reading of the Viz. S. edition is again defective: in L. 4, for *lakṣaṇānugraho* we should read '*lakṣaṇādāhā*,' as read by the Puri MS., by the *Ṭāṭparya* and also by three other MSS. as mentioned in the footnote in the Viz. S. edition.

reasoning serves the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character of things *.

Thus then, we find that Hypothetical Reasoning serves the purpose of restoring or resuscitating the *Pramāṇas* or Instruments of Cognition (which have become shaken by doubts in regard to the truth of the conclusions arising from them), and (thereby) assents to and confirms those conclusions; it is for this reason that it is mentioned along with '*Pramāṇa*' in the Sūṭra (1.2.1) which defines *Discussion*.

This Hypothetical Reasoning assents to or confirms the notion as to the real character of a thing whose real character is not known; *i. e.* the idea of the thing *as it really exists*, which is what is meant by its 'real character'; *i. e.* the character that is free from all misconceptions with regard to the thing.†

Vārṭika.

[P. 141, L. 20 to P. 145, L. 12.]

When the real character of a thing is not well known etc. etc.—says the Sūṭra. This Sūṭra is to be interpreted as before [to constitute such a definition of *Ṭarka* as differentiates it from all homogeneous things, like doubt, as also from all hetergeneous things, like Desire]. '*Avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvē arṭhē*', *when the real character of a thing is not known*,—the 'real character', '*ṭaṭṭva*', of a thing consists in that form in which exists; when this is '*avijñāṭa*',—*i. e.* known only in a vague general sort of way. "Whence do you get the meaning that the thing is *known in a vague general sort of way* [when the actual term is

Var. P. 142.

'*avijñāta*', *not known*]?" Our answer is that that meaning is got from the actual words that are used—viz. '*avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvē arṭhe*', 'when the *real character* is not well known'; when the Sūṭra uses the term 'when the *real character* of the thing is not well known', it clearly indicates that the *thing is known* in a general sort of way; for if the

* By declaring that the true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrument of Cognition, the author means to lay stress upon the fact that *Ṭarka* can never, *by itself*, be the independent means of any knowledge—*Ṭaṭparya*.

† For '*yaṭhābhāva*', read '*ṭaṭhābhāva*', which gives better sense and is supported by the *Vārṭika* (opening line of the Vārṭika on this Sūṭra.)

thing were not known even in this general way, the author would not use the words 'when the *real character* of the thing &c.', he would simply say 'when the thing is not known.'

Another objection is raised :—"The term '*avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvē*' is a compound; and the real signification of the compound is not clear: whether it is to be taken as meaning 'one *by whom* the real character is not known,' or as 'one of which the real character is not known'. If it is asked what difference this makes—our answer is that if the compound is explained as 'one *by whom* the real character is not known', then it qualifies the *cogniser*, and the meaning of the proposed definition would be that 'Hypothetical Reasoning is that reasoning which serves the purpose of bringing about *the cognition in a person by whom the real character of the thing is not known*;—if on the other hand, it be explained as 'that *of which* the real character is not known' [this would apply to the thing cognised]."

The right interpretation is to construe the compound through the Genitive.

"But as a matter of fact, there is no particular reason that would help us to get at the real signification of the compound; there is no special reason (one way or the other) which could enable as to ascertain whether the compound is to be construed through the Genitive or through the Instrumental."

That the construing through the Genitive is the correct interpretation is clear from the use of the word '*arṭhē*', 'thing'; we have the phrase '*avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvē arṭhē*', where '*arṭha*' is that which is *arṭhyamāna, which is wanted* *, and as such must stand for the *object* (and not the agent, of the act of *knowing*); and this shows that the compound should be construed through the Genitive, and not through the Instrumental.

* Both editions read '*aryamāṇaṭvāṭ*'; but the correct reading would appear to be '*arṭhyamānaṭvāṭ*'.

Another objector now comes forward:—"Even without the mention of the word '*arṭha*', what is meant could be got at; even if we had not the word '*arṭha*', we could construe the compound as 'that *of which* the real character is not known'."

[To this objection the Author, at the first instance, gives an obtuse reply]:—Even so, the exact signification of the compound would remain doubtful.

"Well, in that case, we need not have the compound, we may have the full phrase '*na vijñāṭam ṭaṭṭvam yasya*' (that of which the real character is not known)."

It is true that you get what you want even thus (by dropping the compound); but the compounding is for the purpose of brevity or terseness of expression.

[Not satisfied that the real explanation has been given by the Siḍḍhānṭin, the objector reiterates his point]:—"Even though we do not have the word '*arṭhē*', the idea of *that of which the real character is not known* is got by implication".

We have already said that (without the word '*arṭhē*') the real nature of the compound remains doubtful; and further [if you have recourse to *implication*, for getting at the desired meaning, then] you might as well drop the entire definition; *i. e.* if you feel justified in dropping the word '*arṭhē*' on the ground that the required sense is got at by implication, then you might as well define Hypothetical Reasoning as 'a reasoning', and leave all the rest to be got at by implication! It is therefore essential to have the word '*arṭhē*', 'thing'; and this for the purpose of excluding the *cogniser*.

* Another objection is raised:—"We need not have the term '*avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvē*', as that idea is got at by implication: if we have the definition in the words—'Hypothetical Reasoning is that reasoning which serves to bring about the cognition of the real character of a thing on the basis of proof'—it naturally follows that *the real character of that thing is not already known*".

* The whole of this objection and its answer has dropped out of the *Bib. Indica* Edition.

We have already said that [if you depend upon *implication*] you might as well drop the entire definition.

"The entire definition may be dropped; and we may define *Ṭarka* simply as '*Ūha*'. What would that matter to us?"

The rest of the definition is necessary for the purpose of excluding that '*Ūha*' (Imagination) which has been postulated as a quality of Buḍḍhi (according to the Sāṅkhya). As a matter of fact, in all philosophical parlance we have both kinds of '*Ūha*'—pertaining to *known* things as well as pertaining to things *not known*; and the former kind of '*Ūha*' has been postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* as a quality of Buḍḍhi,—along with '*shushrūṣā*' (attention), *shravaṇa* (listening), *avaḍhāraṇa* (ascertaining), *vijñāna* (knowing), *ūha* (imagining), *apoha* (rejecting), *ṭaṭṭvābhinivēsha* (intense desire to get at the truth); and according to this view there is an '*Ūha*' that pertains to things whose real character is already definitely known; that is to say, when a man imagines, he recalls to his mind what he already knows; so that this '*Ūha*' is one that applies to things already known; but this cannot be '*Ṭarka*' or 'Hypothetical Reasoning', (as we understand it); as this is that '*Ūha*' which pertains to things *not already known*; [so that if we defined *Ṭarka* simply as '*Ūha*', the said '*Ūha*' of the Sāṅkhyas would become included, which would be wrong.*]

Vār. P. 143.

A fresh objection is started—"The genitive-ending should be used; *i. e.* inasmuch as it is impossible to construe the sense of the Locative, we should have the form *avijñāṭaṭaṭṭvasya arṭhasya* (in the Sūṭra; for *the thing whose real character is not well known* becomes an objective when it comes to be known; and for the expressing of this objective character, the Genitive is more suitable (than the Locative); as when we speak of '*ghaṭasya vijñānam*', 'cognition *of the jar*'."

* The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks—'Though according to the *Nyāya*, *Buḍḍhi*, not being a substance, could have no quality, yet inasmuch as other philosophers have declared it to be so, there would be a danger of their *Ūha* being included here.'

There is no force in this objection; we reply. As a matter of fact, the significations of case-endings are interchangeable; so that we may take the Locative ending (found in the Sūṭra) as used in place of (and having the force of) the Genitive; such an interchange we find in one of the Sūṭras of Kaṇāda himself, which runs as follows—'*iṣau ayugapaṭ samyogavishēṣāḥ karmānyaṭve hēṭavaḥ*' [where the Locative in *iṣaū* has the force of the Genitive; the meaning of the Sūṭra being, 'the several unsimultaneous particular conjunctions *of the arrow* are the causes of its several actions of motion']. (*Vaishēṣika Sū.* 5-1-16.)

"But why should we have any such interchange in the present instance? We can admit the interchange only in cases where some useful purpose is served by the change; as for instance in Kaṇāḍa's Sūṭra just quoted, where the sense of the Locative in the phrase '*iṣau ayugapaṭ samyogavishēṣāḥ*' (by being changed into the Genitive) gives the following meaning (which could not be afforded by the Locative itself): 'the cause of the diverse actions are those particular conjunctions that are *of* (*belong to*) *the several parts of the arrow*.' In the case under consideration however we do not find any such useful purpose served by the change; so that any such interchange of the case-endings would be highly improper."

The interchange is not at all improper;* as it serves the very useful purpose of indicating all the special features of what has been indicated in a general way; that is to say, what *Ṭarka* does is to make known the special features of a thing that is already known in its general form; and of these special features, while some are mere conjuncts (connected with the thing by mere conjunction, *e.g.* the smoke in relation to the Fire), others are constituents (which enter into the very constitution of the thing, *e.g.* the eternality

* Though the Chaukhambha S. edition and the *Ṭāṭparya* both read simply '*na yukṭaḥ* (which would mean that the objection is not rightly taken), we have adopted the reading of the Bib. Ind. edition, with two '*na's* which sounds better as a retort to the opponent's '*na yukṭaḥ*' and gives better sense.

of the Soul) [and if we had the Genitive ending with the noun *arṭha* in our Sūṭra, it might include the conjuncts, but it could never include the constituents; while both become included if we have the Locative form '*arṭhē*'].

The term '*Kāraṇopapaṭṭiṭaḥ*' in the Sūṭra means '*pramāṇopapaṭṭiṭaḥ*', and '*upapaṭṭi*' means *sambhava*, *possibility*; the sense being that the man reasons thus—'as proofs *are possible* in support of this conclusion with regard to the thing, it must be so.'

The *Bhāṣya* proceeds to cite an example of Hypothetical Reasoning: When a certain cogniser knows a thing in a vague general sort of way, there arises a desire in his mind to know the real character of that thing;—for instance, with regard to this same cognising agent he desires to know whether this *cogniser* is a product, having a beginning, or it is beginningless; *and of these two alternatives he accepts, assents to, one* *—as the *Bhāṣya* says (P. 46, L. 3); and this assent is in the form—'this cogniser should be beginningless'; this is the reasoning that is called *Ṭarka*.

The Opponent raises another objection:—"The form in which this assent appears makes it a *true cognition* itself; why then should it be said that *it is for the purpose of bringing about the cognition, etc., etc.*"

Our answer is that the assent cannot by itself be called 'true cognition'; as it is devoid of that certainty of conviction (which should characterise every true cognition); it is not in the form 'this *is*, must be, so', but only in the form 'this *should* be so', *e. g.* 'the cogniser *should be* beginningless';

Vār. P. 144.

this is how one assents to a conclusion in support of which he finds proofs.

"In what way then, does this assent become '*ṭaṭṭvajñānārṭha*', *i. e.*, serving the purpose of bringing about the true cognition?"

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* The Chaukh. S. edition reads '*ēkaṭaram*', but the *Bhāṣya* reads simply '*ēkam*'. The Bib. Ind. S. has a reading which is totally corrupt.

It does so through an examination of the subject-matter of the proof; that is, by means of *Ṭarka* one examines the object of suspected contrary characters, in regard to which he finds proofs (in support of one of those characters), and decides in favour of one of them, 'this must be right'; so that the said proofs (or Instruments of Knowledge) come to apprehend—bring about the true cognition of—that thing, after it has been duly examined by the Hypothetical Reasoning (which thus is *of use in bringing about the said true cognition*).

There have been several objections against the separate treatment of *Ṭarka* :—(A) Some people hold that *Hypothetical Reasoning* does not in any way differ from *Doubt* and *Definitive Cognition*; they agree that *Hypothetical Reasoning* must be in the form of either *Doubt* or *Definitive Cognition*; if it is in the form of the former, then, having been already included in that, it should not be mentioned separately; and if it is in the form of the latter, then it is included in that. (B) Others (some Naiyāyikas) have held that Hypothetical Reasoning is only a form of *Inference*; '*hēṭu*', '*ṭarka*' '*anvaya*', '*anvīkṣā*', all these, according to them, being only so many names of *Inference* itself. (C) Others again (other Naiyāyikas) hold that *Hypothetical Reasoning* is that particular kind of *Inference* which depends upon corroborative proof (in the form of absurdity of the contrary conclusion).

(A) First as regards the view that *Hypothetical Reasoning* does not differ from *Doubt* and *Definitive Cognition*, our answer is that this view cannot be accepted; as it shows that you (who propound it) do not know the real form of the cognitions (appearing in Doubt, Definitive Cognition and Hypothetical Reasoning); it seems you have been led away by our statement that '*Hypothetical Reasoning* applies to things whose real character is not well known' (which indicates the point of similarity between *Hypothetical Reason-*

ing and *Doubt*). But the fact of the matter is that, though it is true that Hypothetical Reasoning applies to things whose real character is not well known, yet you do not seem to have grasped the form of the Cognitions (resulting from Doubt, Definitive Cognition and Hypothetical Reasoning): the cognition arising from *Doubt* is in the form of uncertainty —'is it so or so?'—while that arising from Definitive Cognition has a degree of certainty attending it—'it must be so'; while *Hypothetical Reasoning* (giving rise to a cognition which is endowed with neither certainty nor uncertainty) becomes separated, on the one hand, from Doubt, by the force of the 'presence of Proofs' (which removes the absolute uncertainty of the doubtful cognition),—and, on the other hand, it does not attain to that degree of absolute certitude which attends *Definitive Cognition*; as in Hypothetical Reasoning there is no recognition of specific details; and it is this recognition of specified details that brings about *Definitive Cognition*; and this recognition is absent in *Hypothetical Reasoning*.*

(B) This same argument serves also to set aside the view that Hypothetical Reasoning is only a form of Inference; for the simple reason that in the former there is no recognition of specific details. "What then is the form of this Reasoning?" It always appears in the form 'it should be so.'

(C) Lastly those people, who hold that Hypothetical Reasoning is only that Inference which depends upon *yukṭi*, admit by this same assertion that it is different from Inference pure and simple. '*Yukṭi*' being the same as 'proof', what the

* The whole of this passage is corruptly read in both editions. The Chaukhamba Series Edition reads—'*Samshayāṭ nirṇayāṭ prachyuṭaḥ kāraṇopapaṭṭisāmarṭhyāṭ samshayē kāraṇopapaṭṭirasṭi nirṇayam* &c.' The meaning of the passage is that *Ṭarka* falls off from *Samshaya* and does not attain *Nirṇaya*; so that the '*nirnayāṭ*' is entirely misplaced. Again '*samshayē kāraṇopapaṭṭirasṭi*' is an absurdity. We have adopted the following reading '*samshayāṭ prachyuṭaḥ*' *kāraṇopapaṭṭisāmarṭhyāṭ kāraṇopaṭṭirasṭi nirṇayam* &c.,—which is an improvement on the Bib. Ind. S. Edition; though this latter also gives the same sense.

assertion of these people means is that 'Hypothetical Reasoning is cognition depending on possibility of proof'; so that this involves a difference in names only (from our own view). If by '*yukṭi*' you do not mean 'proof', then, it behoves you to explain the exact signification of the word '*apēkṣā*', 'dependence', as occurring in the compound '*yukṭyapēkṣam*'; that is to say, you have to explain what is it upon which the Inference depends in the bringing about of the cognition of its Subject. If you mean by '*yukṭyapēkṣa*' that the Inference depends upon other Instruments of Cognition, then it becomes necessary for you to explain the character of the *help* (that is accorded to Inference by the other Instruments of Cognition); that is to say, you should explain in what way Inference is helped by Sense-Perception and Verbal Cognition. If this help by Sense-Perception and Verbal

Vār : P. 145.

Cognition consists in the fact of their bearing upon the same subject as the Inference, then what would Hypothetical Reasoning be? [*i. e.* it would be only a form of Inference, and as such would be included among the 'Instruments of Cognition', and would not deserve to be mentioned and dealt with separately];—specially as in such a case of Inference (as you would make out Hypothetical Reasoning to be) what you would have is only the combination of the three Instruments of Cognition (Sense-Perception, Verbal Cognition and Inference). As a matter of fact however the notion of 'it may be' or 'it should be' (which follows from Hypothetical Reasoning) must be due to a cause wholly different from that of the *certain cognition* which is brought about by Inference),—because it is entirely different in its character,—just as the cognition resulting from Sense-Perception is entirely different in character from that resulting from Inference. "We might also argue as follows—Hypothetical Reasoning must be regarded as Inference, because, like Inference, it depends upon the recognition of the relationship (of concomitance) between the Probans and its

substratum." This only shows that you do not comprehend the real nature of Hypothetical Reasoning; as a matter of fact, Hypothetical Reasoning *does not* depend upon the recognition of the relationship of the Probans and its substratum. "How is that?" Simply because neither of the two—neither the Probans nor its substratum—is recognised in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning; in a case where both are recognised,—the character that is put forward as the Probans, as also the Subject in which that character subsists—there alone we have *Inference*; in a case however where the only thing that is recognised is the *Subject*, and not the Probans, we have a case of *Hypothetical Reasoning*; so that it is not right to say that this latter depends upon the recognition of the relation between the Probans and its Substratum.* Then again, *Inference* becomes operative only after the character subsisting in the Subject has been cognised; which is not the case with Hypothetical Reasoning, which operates also after the cognition of characters belonging to things other than the Subject; e. g. in the reasoning—'There should be a human agent here, because here we find horses being driven', where the character cognised is that of 'being driven', which does not † subsist in the Subject, the 'human agent'; so that here we have a reasoning (Hypothetical), which serves the sole purpose of precluding the possibility of the thing being a mere post, and proceeds on the basis of the cognition of a character belonging to something other than the Subject.

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* As an example of *Ṭarka* we have the reasoning—'If the Soul were a product, his metempsychosis and Release would both be impossible'. On the other hand, a negative Inference—to which Taṛka has been held to be reduced—is in the form—'The living body cannot be without a Soul, as, if it were so, it would not have breathing &c.' Now in this latter we fully recognise the concomitance between the *body* and the *presence of breath &c*; but in the former case, we do not recognise any such concomitance between the *Soul* and the character of *being a product*, which, in fact, does not belong to the Soul at all; so that in this case there is nothing that could bring to the mind the concomitance between the Probans and its substratum.

† A 'na' here is essential; the Chaukhambha S. Edition supplies it.

This *Hypothetical Reasoning resuscitates the Instruments of Cognition, and hence is mentioned along with these latter,*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 47, ll. 6-7); and this means that *Hypothetical Reasoning* cannot itself be regarded as an *Instrument of Cognition*, as it does not actually bring about the cognition of things [all that it does it to strengthen the conviction obtained by means of an Instrument of Cognition].

Sūṭra (41).

Nirṇaya—Definitive Cognition.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 47, L. 8 to P. 48, L. 14].

In regard to the subject-matter of the above-described Hypothetical Reasoning—

"WHEN THERE IS AN ASCERTAINMENT OF THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE THING AFTER DULY DELIBERATING OVER THE TWO SIDES OF THE QUESTION—AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF A CERTAIN CONCLUSION AND ALSO THAT IN ITS CONFUTATION*—WE HAVE WHAT IS CALLED 'DEFINITIVE COGNITION', 'NIRṆAYA'"—(Sūṭra 41).

In regard to every matter of dispute we have two opposite views—one seeking to establish the truth of a certain conclusion with regard to the thing under investigation, and the other is the denial of that conclusion, which seeks to confute the former view; and these two,– the arguments favouring and the arguments demolishing—are based upon—*i. e.*, put forward with a view to—the 'conclusion' (*pakṣa*) and its 'confutation' (*praṭipakṣa*); and the two sets of arguments themselves, when appearing together,—*i. e.* when

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* By '*pakṣa*' and '*praṭipakṣa* are meant respectively –(1) the argument in favour of a certain conclusion, and (2) the argument against that conclusion. Such is the interpretation by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*. But the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* of Rādhāmohana takes *praṭipakṣa* ' as the arguments against the view opposed to the said conclusion.

put forward side by side,—come to be spoken of respectively as the '*pakṣa*' (a certain view) and '*pratipakṣa*' (the contrary view). And of these two views, it is necessary that one should be rejected and the other established; and when one is established, the '*ascertainment*' with regard to that is called '*Definitive Cognition*', '*Nirṇaya*'.

An opponent [being misled by the terms '*pakṣa*', 'one view', and '*pratipakṣa*', 'contrary view', to think that the whole definition refers to *Discussion*, and it implies the presence of an element of *Doubt*] urges the following objection:—"It is not possible to have the said *ascertainment* by means of the '*pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*'. In every Discussion what happens is as follows:—(A) At first, one disputant states one view and supports it* with arguments, and rejects all the objections that the other party could bring against that view;—(B) the second disputant thereupon refutes the arguments put forward by the former in support of his view, and also answers the arguments urged against the objections put forward by himself;—(C) so it goes on, until one (set of arguments) stops; and where one has stopped, the other becomes established; and it is by means of this latter set of arguments *alone* (and not by both, as said in the *Sūtra*) that we have that 'ascertainment of the real character of the thing' which is called 'Definitive Cognition'. [So that it is not right to speak of the 'ascertainment' as obtained through both '*pakṣa and pratipakṣa*']; specially as in a *bona-fide* discussion, both parties are equally *certain* as to the truth of their allegations, and there is no element of *Doubt* in their minds; or else, they would not engage in the Discussion."

Bhāṣya P. 48.

The answer to the above is that, as a matter of fact 'ascertainment' is got at through both. "How is this proved?" In the following manner, we reply. Every Discussion ends in showing the possibility or reasonableness of one view and the impossibility or unreasonableness of the 'confutation' of (the arguments against) that view, [or *vice versa*, the reasonableness of the confutation and the unreasonableness of the original view]; and it is only when we have *both* of these—the *reasonableness* and *unreasonableness*—that

* The Viz. S. Edition reads a superfluous '*tam*' here; which is not found either in the Puri MS. or in the reading adopted by the *Tātparya*.

they *conjointly* set aside the doubt or uncertainty attaching to the real character of the thing; while if we do not have them both, the uncertainty continues to remain.

'*After deliberating*'—*i. e.*, after having carried on due deliberation. This 'deliberation' consists in the bringing to light—*i. e.*; formulating—the two sides of the question; whereby it provides the occasion for reasonings to operate,—*i. e.*, to be put forward (with a view to ascertain the truth).

What is declared here in this *Sūtra* must be taken as referring to mutually contradictory views pertaining to one and the same thing. When it is found that the two contradictory characters subsist in *similar* things (and not in the *same* thing), then both being possible, both are accepted; for the simple reason that due investigation has shown such to be the real state of the things; for example, when the definition of *Substance* is stated in the form 'Substance is that which has Motion,' it is found that a Substance, for which Motion is possible or certain, 'has motion,' while at the same time, there are substances for which no activity is possible, and these certainly 'have no motion' [so that in regard to this case both views, 'Substance has motion' and 'Substance has no motion,' are admissible, and as such cannot be called 'contradictory views.']. Even with regard to the same thing, if the two contradictory characters are predicated in reference to different points of time, then there is an option with regard to time [both being accepted as true, in reference to different points of time];—*e. g.*, the same substance which, at one time being moving, is said to 'have motion,' may be admitted to 'have no motion' at another time, when either the motion may not have yet appeared, or it may have ceased.

When the *Sūtra* declares, that '*Definitive Cognition is that ascertainment which is got at after duly deliberating the two sides of a question*,' this is not meant to apply to *all kinds of definitive cognition*; for in the case of Perception, which is born of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, the *definitive cognition* consists simply in the 'ascertainment of the object';—it is only in regard to a thing in doubt, which is under investigation [and with regard to which a Hypothetical Reasoning has been put forward], that 'definitive cognition' consists in *the ascertainment got at by duly deliberating the two sides of the question*;—while lastly, in regard to the

subject-matter of Discussions and Scriptures there is no 'deliberation' (or doubt).*

Thus ends the First *Daily Lesson* in the First *Discourse* of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya.*

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (41).

[P. 145, L. 14, to P. 148, L. 8.]

'In regard to the subject-matter of the abovementioned Hypothetical Reasoning'—says the Bhāṣya—*'when there is ascertainment after etc., etc.'* (Sū. 41).

The connection and purpose of this definition also is as before.†

'After deliberating'—*i.e.*, after due deliberation.

'Pakṣapraṭipakṣābhyām'—this compound should be expounded as *'pakṣāṭ cha praṭipakṣāṭ cha'*. ‡ By the word *'pakṣa'* here is meant the argument in support of the first view; and by

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* In the case of Perception we have neither 'deliberation' nor the 'two sides of the question';—in the case of things under investigation we have both; while in the case of Discussion, we have the 'two sides of the question', but no 'deliberation',—as each party is equally certain of his view; and in the case of Scriptures, there may be 'two sides'; but there is no 'deliberation' or 'doubt.'

The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* remarks that in the case of 'Inference for one's own benefit, also, there is neither 'doubt' nor 'two sides.'

† The connection being that in the opening Sūṭra, 'Definitive Cognition' has been mentioned immediately after 'Hypothetical Reasoning';—and the purpose lies in the differentiating of 'Definitive Cognition' from all other like and unlike things.

‡ The Bib. Ind. reads पक्षाभ्यविपक्षात्; the Benares Edition drops it entirely; the former reading is meaningless. The *Ṭāṭparya* reads पक्षात् प्रतिपक्षात् which gives very good sense, as translated. The *Ṭāṭparya* adds the following explanatory note: 'The author lays stress upon the fact that both the contradictory views help in the ascertainment; he does this with a view to meet the objection that—the first view representing arguments in support of a certain conclusion, may lead to ascertainment; but no ascertainment could be helped by the arguments against that conclusion. What the author really means is that the latter helps indirectly, while the former does so directly.

the word '*praṭipakṣa*' is meant the objection against the arguments supporting the first view* of the thing in question;—and the ascertainment of the real character of the thing, which is got at by means of these two, *pakṣa* and *praṭipakṣa*, is called 'Definitive Cognition.'

The Opponent raises the question:—"In the definition that the *Sūṭra* propounds, is it meant to lay the emphasis —(A) on 'Definitive Cognition', or (B) on the expression 'by the two sides of the question—the arguments &c., &c,' or (C) on 'of the deliberating'? † (A) If the meaning be that 'that alone is Definitive Cognition which is got at by means of the two sides &c.'—the restricting emphasis being laid on the term 'Definitive Cognition'—then this would be contrary to the assertion (made in a previous Sūṭra) that 'Perception is cognition (definite) produced by the contact of a sense-organ with the object'.‡ (C) The same objection is applicable if the definition is explaimed as 'that alone is Definitive Cognition which is got at after

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deliberating &c.' [as in the case of Perception there is no 'deliberating &c]. (B) If, lastly, the meaning be that 'all that is got at by means of the two sides of the question must be Definitive Cognition only',—then it comes to this that we have Definitive Cognition resulting from both

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* The Bib. Ind. Edition reads '*praṭipakṣavishayasya*', which is wrong: the correct reading—*pakṣaviṣayasya*, is supplied by the Benares Edition.

† These alternatives are not very happily expressed in the *Vārṭika.* The *Ṭāṭparya* explains them clearly as follows:—(A) The sense of the definition, according to the first alternative would be that '*that alone is Definitive Cognition which is got at &c. &c.*';—(B) according to the second alternative it would mean that '*all that is got at by means of the two sides of the question* must be Definitive Cognition'; (C) and according to the third alternative, the meaning would be that, 'that alone is Definitive Cognition which is got at after *deliberating* &c. &c.'

‡ This assertion means that Definitive Cognition is got at without having either 'deliberation' or 'the two sides of a question'; while, *ex hypothesi*, that alone can be Definitive Cognition which is 'got at by means of the two sides &c., &c.'

[i.e. from the *presence* as well as the *absence* of 'the two sides of the question; which is absurd]." *

To the above question our answer is as follows:—[We accept the *first* of the three alternatives put forward by the Opponent; and] the restriction implied in that first alternative is meant to refer only to the subject-matter of the Hypothetical Reasoning, and not to other matters; the meaning being that whenever there is 'Definitive Cognition' in regard to what has been the subject-matter of Hypothetical Reasoning, such Definitive Cognition is 'got at *only after due deliberation of the two sides &c.*'; and the two conditions laid down—(a) that it is got at *after deliberation* and (b) *through the two sides &c.*—do not † apply to all *Definitive Cognitions* in general. "Why should the definition be taken as restricted to the subject-matter of Hypothetical Reasoning only?" For the simple reason that 'Definitive Cognition' has been mentioned (in the opening Sūṭra) next after 'Hypothetical Reasoning', the definition propounded is taken as restricted to the subject-matter of that Reasoning; and further, as a matter of fact it is possible to get at Definitive Cognitions in other ways [than by 'deliberating over the two sides of this question]', so that the restriction laid down in the Sūṭra could not rightly be taken to apply to every kind of Definitive Cognition. "What, then, is the definition of *Definitive Cognition in general*?" 'Definitive Cognition' in general may be defined as that ascertainment which makes the thing known. This *Definitive Cognition* in general, when pertaining to objects of cognition,

* In this case there would be no such restriction as that 'that alone is Definitive Cognition which is got at by means of the two sides of the question *only*'; so that this would mean that that is Definitive Cognition which is got at by means of the presence of the 'two sides', as well as from their absence. 'And such a definition would be too narrow' says the *Ṭāṭparya*; that is, it would not apply to the true Definitive Cognition which follows *only* from the *presence* of the two sides, and not from their *absence* (also).

† This *na*, found in the Benares Edition, is essential.

is obtained by means of the 'Instruments of Cognition' exclusively, as well as by the several 'Instruments of Cognition' conjointly (with the arguments against, and in favour of, a certain conclusion); and the distinction made is that in the case of the subject-matter of Hypothetical Reasoning, the Definitive Cognition is obtained conjointly (by the 'Instruments of Cognition' and the arguments *pro* and *contra*); while in the case of other matters, it is obtained by means of the 'Instruments of Cognition' exclusively. [This is what is meant by the *Bhāṣya*, p. 48, ll. 10—13].

In regard to the subject-matter of Discussions and Scriptures, there is no 'deliberation' (or doubt)—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 48, l. 13). This means that in the case of Discussions, Definitive Cognition is got at only by means of the two sets of arguments for and against a certain conclusion; and neither in this case, nor in the case of Scriptural matters, is there room for 'deliberation or doubt'; because so far as Discussions are concerned, both parties to it are equally *certain* as to their conclusions [and there is no element of *doubt* on either side]; —and as regards Scriptural matters, the Definitive Cognition is obtained entirely with the help of the Scriptures themselves [and there is no room for any other sources of information; so that in this latter case there is neither 'deliberation' nor the 'two sets of arguments' *pro* and *contra*].

Another objection is raised—"You have taken the words '*pakṣa*' and '*praṭipakṣa*' to mean the arguments for and against, respectively, against a certain conclusion;—this is not right; as there are no grounds for taking them as such; that is to say, when you take the words '*pakṣa*' and '*praṭipakṣa*' to mean the arguments for and against a certain conclusion,—what is the ground on which you take them so? Why cannot the two words be taken in their ordinary literal significations ['*pakṣa*' standing for a *certain view*, and '*praṭipakṣa*' for *the opposite view*]?"

The reason, why the words cannot be taken in their literal significations, lies in the fact that the two *views* are *objects* (of cognition); and an *object* cannot make things known, being itself a thing made known; [so that these could not be the means whereby we could get at the Definitive Cognition];— it is for this reason that we take the words to signify the *two sets of arguments*, which do make things known, and are not themselves *objects*.

"If such is the case, why should not the Sūṭra itself have contained these words themselves? * That is, the Sūṭra, in that case, should have been read as—'*vimrishya sāḍhanopālambhābhyām arṭhāvaḍhāraṇam nirṇayaḥ*'; such a reading would make the meaning clearer; and we do not perceive any advantage in preferring a term (*pakṣapraṭipakṣābhyām*) simply on the ground of its containing fewer syllables (than the other term, '*sāḍhanopālambhābhyām.*"

What is urged here would not be right; as the words actually found in the *Sūṭra* are there for the purpose of indicating the identity of subject-matter. That is to say, what is meant is that 'Definitive Cognition' pertains to that same subject which forms the subject-matter of the two sets of arguments [and this matter is none other than the *views*]; and if we had the *Sūṭra* in the form '*sāḍhanopālambhābhyām-nirṇayaḥ*', it would not be clear to what matter the resultant Definitive Cognition pertains; whereas by means of the terms '*pakṣa*' and '*praṭipakṣa*' both become clearly indicated—the two sets of arguments, as well as their subject-matter.

"In that case the term '*arṭha*, 'object', need not be there; as it is already indicated. 'By what is it already implied?'
Var. P. 147. When you speak of the 'ascertainment obtained after deliberating over the two sides &c.', it is clearly indicated that the 'ascertainment' is of a

* The correct reading is तयोरेव वाच्यम् as found in the Benares Edition.

certain *object*; so that it is unnecessary to have the term '*arṭha*' (in the Sūṭra)."

It is not unnecessary to have the term, we reply:* By the direct mention of the term '*arṭha*' what is meant to be shown is that the Definitive Cognition may pertain to either of the two; that is to say, even though the 'object' is already implied, yet the term '*arṭha*' is used with a view to show that the Definitive Cognition may pertain to the one or the other of the two views.†

[The *Vārṭika* next takes up the objection that has been urged in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 47, l. 13 *et. seq.*]—" It is not right to say that *ascertainment follows from the two sets of arguments*; because, as a matter of fact, it follows from only one‡. As a matter of fact, we know that ascertainment never follows from the two sets of arguments *conjointly*§; it follows from only *one of these*—from that one which remains unshaken."

In answer to the above it is said in the *Bhāṣya* (p. 48, l. 1) that '*the ascertainment is got at through both.*' " How is that?" Well, as a matter of fact, when both sets of arguments are rejected, the deliberation or doubt does not cease; nor does the doubt cease when neither of the two is rejected; it is only when one set is rejected and the other remains unshaken that (doubt disappears, and) Definitive Cognition is obtained; and [as both these processes, the re-

* The Benares Edition reads simply न, अनर्थकम् which would mean 'what is urged is not right; it *is* necessary to have the term.' But the *Tāṭparya* reads न न अनर्थकम् which is better, being more forcible as a retort. The Bib. Ind. reading is defective.

† It would seem that Vāchaspaṭi Mishra is not satisfied with this answer; the *Ṭāṭparya* provides another:—The presence of the word 'arṭha' is meant to preclude the contingency of the *views* being merely imaginary; what is meant is that the *thing* to what the *views* appertain must be a *real* thing.

‡ The Benares edition reads simply अविगमे: which is meaningless. The Bib.-Ind. Edition reads एकस्माद्विगमे: which is right.

§ The Benares Edition reads सहिताभ्याम् instead of समस्ताभ्याम् and the former is clearer.

jection of one and the non-shaking of the other, are necessary] it follows that both sets of arguments *conjointly* form the means of Definitive Cognition.

"If such be the case," the Opponent asks, "then, at what precise stage is the Definitive Cognition obtained? Is it obtained at the first stage (when the arguments *in favour of* a certain view come up)? Or at the second stage (when the arguments *against* that view come up)? Or at the third stage (when the answer to these latter comes up)?"

At all points, we reply; for such is the fact [that sometimes the Definitive Cognition is obtained at the very first stage, at other times at the second, and sometimes at the third stage]. Or, perhaps, it would be correct to say that it is obtained at the *third* stage (at which the Definitive Cognition *must* appear). "How so?" The process is as follows:—One man seeks to establish the first view by means of arguments,—on this; the second man *either* desists, on perceiving the arguments urged, *or* on perceiving that the arguments urged are fallacious, is moved to activity by a desire to point out the defects in the said arguments*, and puts forward arguments that demolish the former view;—the former man either desists from further reasoning, if he finds his opponent's arguments (against the first view) sound; or, if he finds that the defects (in his own argument) as urged by these arguments (of the second man) are not real defects, then he proceeds to urge this fact (by way of answer to his opponent);—thereupon the arguments against the first view having been set aside, the argument that might have been urged in support of a second view also becomes set aside. "How does that follow?" It follows from the fact that the arguments in favour of the first view have been found to be absolutely free from defects; and when the arguments in favour of one view have been found to be free from defects, there is no room for the

* The Benares Edition reads दोषोद्दि[illegible] which is correct.

urging of arguments in favour of any other view; so that any such second view becomes (*ipso facto*) rejected*; and the result is that there is Definitive Cognition of that view the arguments in support of which have been found to be unshaken. Thus it is found that Definitive Cognition is obtained conjointly from the *probability* (or reasonableness) of the first view and the *improbability* (or unreasonableness) of the opposite view.

Some people have held that 'Definitive Cognition' is only Inferential. Some philosophers declare that Definitive Cognition is the same as Inferential Cognition, and not different from it. But this view is not right; because Inference stands in need of the recognition of the relationship between the *Probans* and the *Probandum*; which is not necessary in the case of Definitive Cognition†; specially as we find that Definitive Cognition is the result or effect brought about by *Instruments of Cognition*; while Inference is itself an *Instrument* of Cognition, Definitive Cognition is cognition itself (brought about by the instrumentality of the said Instrument); and further, Definitive Cognition pertains to its own subject-matter, while Inference pertains to its own subject-matter as well as to others; e. g. the *perception of smoke*, in so far as the cognition of smoke itself is concerned, is 'Definitive Cognition', and not 'Inference'; when, however, by means of that same *perception of smoke* one gets at another cognition (of *fire*), then it becomes '*Anumāna*' (Inference);—as then it becomes that *by whose instrumentality* the other thing is *inferred*; and the final

Vār: P. 148.

* The Bib.-Ind. Edition reads निवर्त्तते च द्वितीयः &c which may be translated as—'there being no room for arguments in support of a second view, every such other view ceases to exist.' The translation has adopted the reading of the Benares Edition where the च is absent.

† The *Tātparya* adds that there are certain Definitive Cognitions that may be regarded as purely inferential cognitions; but all of them are not such; so that it is not right to identify *all* Definitive Cognitions with Inference.

resultant cognition, in this case, is that of *fire*. If the term '*Anumāna*' (Inference) is construed substantively (as ***anumīyaṭē yaṭ, that which is inferred***, and not as that ***by whose instrumentality*** a thing is inferred),—and then ***Definitive Cognition*** is alleged to be the same as '*Anumāna*',—then, in that case, such an allegation should be received with acceptance; on the other hand, if the term '*Anumāna*' is construed instrumentally (as that ***by whose instrumentality a*** thing is inferred),—and then it be alleged that Definitive Cognition is the same as '*Anumāna*',—then we must repudiate the allegation; as there is certainly a difference between cause and effect; and '*Anumāna*' is a ***cause***, an ***instrument***, while ***Definitive Cognition*** is the ***effect, the result*** (brought about by that instrument). So that Definitive Cognition cannot be regarded as the same as '*Anumāna*', ***Inference***.

Thus ends the ***First Daily Lesson*** in the ***First Aḍhyāya*** of the *Nyāyavārṭika* of Uḍyoṭakara.

DISCOURSE I.

Second Daily Lesson.

SECTION (1).

Controversy.

Bhāṣya on Sū. 1.

(P. 48, L-15 to P. 50, L. 3).

* There are three kinds of Controversy—(1) Discussion, (2) Disputation and (3) Wrangling. Of these—

DISCUSSION CONSISTS IN THE PUTTING FORWARD (BY TWO PERSONS) OF A CONCEPTION AND COUNTER-CONCEPTION, IN WHICH THERE IS SUPPORTING AND CONDEMNING BY MEANS OF PROOFS AND REASONINGS,—NEITHER OF WHICH IS QUITE OPPOSED TO THE MAIN DOCTRINE (OR THESIS), AND BOTH OF WHICH ARE CARRIED ON IN FULL ACCORDANCE WITH THE METHOD OF REASONING THROUGH THE FIVE FACTORS. (SŪ. 1).

When two contrary particular characters are alleged to subsist in the same substratum, they are called '*pakṣa and pratipakṣa*', 'conception and counter-conception', being, as they are, like opponents to each other; *e.g.* when we have two such allegations as—'soul is' and 'soul is not'; when, however, the contrary characters are conceived to subsist in different substrata, they are not called 'conception and counter-conception'; *e. g.* such conceptions as 'Soul is eternal' and 'Buḍḍhi is non-eternal.' '*Parigraha*', '*putting forward*,' means asserting, or laying stress upon, the thing being of a particular character. And it is this asserting of two contrary characters that constitutes Discussion.

The distinctive features of this Discussion are next put forward:—(1) *In which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings*—*i. e.* in which a conception is supported by means of proofs and reasonings, and also condemned by means of proofs and reasonings; so that what is

* The connection of the two Daily Lessons is thus explained in the *Parishuḍḍhi*—The entire method of reasoning with all its accessories has been explained in the First Daily Lesson. All this reasoning helps the reasoner to arrive at a definite conclusion either by himself alone, or by holding a consultation with others. In the latter case there arise occasions for discussion and mutual criticism; and it is this latter method of arriving at a conclusion that constitutes the subject-matter of the Second Daily Lesson. Controversy, according to a certain writer, whom the *Parishuḍḍhi* calls the [illegible], is of four kinds—जल्पः,—प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो जल्पः:—वादः:—and प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वादः; while according to the "Vāhyas" (outsiders, *i. e.* Bauḍḍhas) there is only one kind of Controversy.

meant is that both the *supporting* and the *condemning* are done by means of proofs and reasonings.* 'Supporting' here stands for establishing, and 'condemning' for denying or rejecting. These two, 'supporting' and 'condemning' of the two conceptions, proceed hand in hand, in a connected manner,—until one of the two conceptions becomes rejected and another established; so that there is ultimately 'condemnation' of that which has been rejected and 'supporting' of that which remains unshaken.

As a rule *Clinchers* are employed in Disputation; so that their use is precluded from Discussion. But even though Clinchers, are, as a body, precluded from Discussion, yet the use of some of them is permitted,—this is what is meant by the qualification 'not opposed to the main doctrine'; †—for instance, it is permitted to employ, in Discussion, the Clincher, in the shape of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction,' which has been defined (in Sū. 1-2-6) as 'that which contradicts the accepted thesis.' Similarly the

*The footnote in the Vizianagram Sans. Series says that the 'supporting' is done by means of proofs only and the 'condemning' is done by means of reasonings only. But this is contrary to what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*. The last says—Though in Wrangling also there is putting forward of conception and counter-conception, yet herein we have no 'supporting' of the counter-allegation; as in Wrangling there is only demolishing of each other's positions, and no supporting at all;—though in Disputation there is supporting of the counter-conception, yet this supporting and condemning are not always by means of such reasonings as have all their factors entirely valid. So that from both Wrangling and Disputation Discussion becomes distinguished by reason of its having both the supporting and condemning done in accordance with reasonings and proofs. The *Vārṭika* explains the compound '*pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhanopālambhaḥ*' somewhat differently: It takes it as a *maḍhyamapadalopī* compound, expounding it as '*pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhanaḥ pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhanopālambhashcha*'—*i.e.* the supporting is done by means of proofs and reasonings, and the condemnation of that supporting is also done by means of proofs and reasonings.

† The *Vārṭika* does not accept this interpretation; according to it, this qualification is meant to exclude the *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* thus explains the difference in the two interpretations:—We have a general rule that 'no animals should be killed,' then we have the exception 'the *Agniṣomīya* animal should be killed'; so here we have the general rule that in वाद no clinchers are to be put forward, and then there is the exception, that the *apasiḍḍhānṭa* clincher should be urged. Thus according to the Bhāṣya. According to the *Vārṭika* the sense is that there is a natural tendency to urge *all* clinchers in जल्प; and hence there is the exclusive selection of the *apasiḍḍhānta* as the only one of the clinchers to be urged.

The *Pārishuḍḍhi* goes on—'From among the 22 clinchers, there are *six* that can not by their very nature, be urged in वाद—(1) प्रतिज्ञाहानि, 2) प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास, (3) निरर्थक (4) अर्थान्तर 5) अविज्ञातार्थ and (6) अपार्थक;—there are *seven* which even though possible, should not be urged—(1 प्रतिज्ञान्तर (2) हेत्वन्तर (3) अज्ञान (4) अप्रतिभा (5) विक्षेप (6) मतानुज्ञा (7) पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण;—there are *seven* again which *may* be urged—(1) विरोध (2) अप्राप्तकाल (3) न्यून (4) अधिक (5) पुनरुक्त (6) अननुभाषण (7) अपसिद्धान्त;—there are *two* which, when urged, put an end to the controversy—(1) हेत्वाभास (2) निरनुयोज्यानुयोग.

qualification 'carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors' has been added with a view to indicate that it is permitted to employ, in Discussion, the two Clinchers of 'Deficiency,'—which is defined as 'that which is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning' (Sū. 5-2-12)—and 'Redundance'—defined as 'that which puts forward superfluous Probans and Example.' (Sūṭra 5-2-13).

[One purpose of the term 'in which the supporting and condemning are by means of proofs and reasonings' having been already explained, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to point out other purposes served by the same term]—(1) Even though 'proofs and reasonings' are included among the 'Factors' [so that the presence of 'proofs and reasonings' is already implied in the qualification 'in accordance with reasoning through the Five Factors'], yet 'proofs and reasonings' have been added separately, with a view to indicate that the proofs and reasonings urged by the two parties should be inter-related (and not independent of one another); otherwise it would have to be regarded as 'Discussion' when both parties go on urging arguments, each in support of his own view (without any regard to arguments propounded by the other).*—(2) In some cases, it is found that even without the use of the 'Factors of Reasoning', several Proofs accomplish their purpose (of determining the real nature of things); so that it would be real Discussion also when the 'supporting' and 'condemning' are carried on by means of such proofs (as are independent of the Factors);—and it is this fact that is indicated by the adding of the term 'by means of proofs and reasonings' [while, in the absence of this term, the said form of Discussion would not be included in the definition, which, in that case, would make the presence of the 'five factors' essential].—(3) Lastly, the term 'in accordance with proofs and reasonings' has been added for the purpose of precluding the notion that Disputation does not admit of those Clinchers that are employed in Discussion,—Disputation being defined (in the next Sūṭra) as 'that in which the supporting and condemning are carried or by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers'; that is to say, this definition of Disputation might give rise to the notion that Disputation is that wherein the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of Casuistry &c. only (and never by means of proofs and reason-

* For instance, when one party goes on propounding, from his own standpoint, arguments in support of the eternality of Sound, and the other person putting forward from his point of view alone, arguments in support of its non-eternality; and neither takes any account of the arguments urged by the other.

ings); while wherever the supporting and condemning are carried on by meansof proofs and reasonings, it is *Discussion* always (and never *Disputation*);—and with a view to preclude this notion, the Sūṭra has added the term 'by means of proofs and reasonings'. [The sense being that, as a matter of fact, some of the Clinchers employed in Discussion may be employed in Disputation and *vice-versa*, and yet there is this distinction that, in Discussion the supporting and condemning are done strictly in accordance with proofs and reasonings, while in Disputation, they are done by means of Casuistry, etc., *also*].

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪ. (1).

[Page 148, L. 12 to Page 162, L. 10.]

There are three kinds of Kaṭhā—Discussion, Disputation and Wrangling—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 48, L. 15). This does not mean that these three alone are entitled to the name of '*Kaṭhā*' (as stories also are called *Kaṭhā*); what is meant is that *investigation into the nature of things*—which investigation, carried on by means of controversy between two parties, is called '*Kaṭhā*'—is of three kinds only; that is to say, when the nature of things is investigated, this investigation is carried on in these three ways;—this investigation thus being in the form of either 'Discussion or Disputation or Wrangling.' Of these, Discussion is that which is held by a person with his tutor and such other friends; while Disputation and Wrangling are held with a person who desires to gain victory over him. These three kinds of Controversy having to be defined in the order in which they have been mentioned, the Sūṭra proceeds to provide the definition of Discussion.

Discussion consists, etc. etc. (Sū. 1-2-1). *Discussion consists in the putting forward of the 'pakṣa and praṭipakṣa'*? (Bhāṣya P. 49, Ll. 5-6).

Vār. P. 149.

Now what are these—'*pakṣa and pratipakṣa*'? The Bhāṣya answers—'*Pakṣa and Praṭipakṣa*' are names given to *two contrary particular characters subsisting in the same substratum,—i.e.*, at the same time and in an uncertain manner.—By 'particular characters' here are meant the *special features of a thing*; as a matter of fact, when a thing

is known in a general way, and its special features are not definitely known, there is investigation or controversy with a view to ascertain this special feature; so by '*pakṣa and pratipakṣa,*' 'conception and counter-conception' are meant two particular features or characters* as subsisting in the same thing; when such contrary characters are found to subsist in different things, they do not give rise to any controversy; as it is quite possible for them to really subsist in the two separate things; for instance, when we have such two conceptions as 'Buddhi is non-eternal' and 'Soul is eternal.' Similarly when the characters are not mutually contradictory, they do not give rise to controversy; as a matter of fact it is only when the characters are mutually contradictory that they give rise to controversy,—and not when they are not contradictory; *e. g.* when we have such two conceptions as 'substance has motion', and 'substance has qualities.' Similarly also the conception of the two characters should pertain to the same point of time; as they do not give rise to controversy, when pertaining to different points of time; as it is quite possible for two contrary characters to subsist in the same thing at different points of time; *e.g.*, when we have such two notions as 'substance has motion' and 'substance has no motion',—each of these referring to different points of time. Lastly, the notion of the two characters should be *doubtful*; it is only when there is uncertainty about them that they give rise to controversy; and not when there is certainty about them; because there can be no controversy when a certain, definitive cognition has already been obtained.†

The two 'contrary characters', as above described, are what have been called (in the Sūṭra) '*pakṣa and prati-*

* The correct reading is वस्तुधर्मौ विशेषौ as in the Benares edition.

† A long passage is wanting in the Bibliotheca Indica edition,—it is supplied by the Benares edition—after गुणवच्चेति (P. 9) we should read एककालाविति विरुद्धाव-धेर्मौ विचारमयोरवकाशःन् प्रमाणोपपत्तेःयथा क्रिया.वत् द्रव्यं निष्क्रियञ्चेति कालभेदे सति अनवधिताविति अनिश्चितौ विचारस्यायोगवत: नावधिताविति,—then follows निर्णयो

pakṣa'; and the 'putting forward' of these consists in the *asserting* or laying stress upon the thing being so and so,—in the form 'this object is possessed of this character, and not of that'; this putting forward of the two contrary characters is what is called 'Discussion'.

This 'putting forward of the two contrary characters' being common to all the three forms of Controversy, the Sūṭra proceeds to add further qualifications with a view to distinguishing 'Discussion' from the other two: *—*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings*—*i. e. wherein is done*—in which there is—*supporting and condemning by means of proofs and by reasonings* (Bhāṣya, P. 49, ll. 6-7). The locative ending in '*asmin*'—'in this'—indicates the subject-matter, the word meaning *in this controversy.*

An objection is raised—"How can *supporting* and *condemning* both be done by means of reasoning? Reasoning is not an Instrument of Cognition or Proof, being a mere aid to other Proofs; as it has already been explained above that Reasoning is not included in any of the four Instruments of Cognition or Proofs; nor is it an independent Proof. Thus then, not being of the nature of a Proof or Instrument of Cognition, how can it be the cause or *instrument* of *supporting* and *condemning*?"

We do not mean that Reasoning is the cause or instrument of *supporting* and *condemning*; what we mean is that Reasoning serves the purpose of investigating the real nature of the thing over which the Instruments of Cognition or Proofs are operating, and thereby it helps these Proofs; so that the Instruments or Proofs come to determine the real character of the thing that has been duly investigated by the Reasoning. (*cf.* *Vārṭika*, above, P. 144, ll. 2-3]. Thus, being an aid to the Proofs, 'Reasoning' comes to be mentioned

* The Bib. Indica reading [illegible] is meaningless—the correct reading being [illegible] as given by the Benares Edition.

(in the present Sūṭra) along with 'Proofs', in reference to Discussions [as already explained in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 46, ll. 6-7].

Var. Page 150.

Another objection is raised :—"What is meant by saying that there is *supporting* as well as *condemning* in Discussion? (a) Does '*sāḍhana*' stand for the *act of* supporting, and '*upālambha*' for the *act* of condemning? [the words being construed substantively—as '*sāḍhyaṭē iṭi sāḍhanam*' and *upālabhyaṭē iṭi upālambhaḥ*)? (b) or '*sāḍhana*' is that *by which* the supporting is done, and '*upālambha*' is that *by which* the condemning is done. [The two words being construed instrumentally—'*sāḍhyaṭē anēna*' and '*upālabhyaṭē anēna*]? (a) If the two words '*sāḍhana*' and '*upālambha*' are meant to be taken substantively—standing respectively for the *act of supporting* and the *act of condemning*,—then it is not right to say that they are done 'by means of proofs and reasonings'; as neither proofs nor reasonings bring conviction to other persons; that is to say, proofs as well as reasonings bring conviction to the person himself, while Controversy is for bringing conviction to others; so that there can be no supporting and condemning (in this sense) by means of proofs and reasoning. (b) If, on the other hand, the words '*sāḍhana*' and '*upālambha*' are to be taken instrumentally,—standing respectively for *that by which supporting is done* and *that by which condemning is done*,—then, it is unnecessary to add the further qualification that 'it is in accordance with the five factors'; for the simple reason that what is meant by the term 'factors' is already implied in the term 'in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings', where 'supporting' and 'condemning' stand for the *means* of supporting and condemning."

The above objection does not hold, we reply. As it is for an entirely different purpose; that is to say, the purpose served by the further qualification, 'in accordance with

the five factors; is entirely different; as we shall explain later on. *

[The Opponent takes up the other signification of the words]—" But if the words '*sādhana*' and '*upālambha*' are taken as the *act* of *supporting* and of *condemning*,—with reference to what subject would they be done 'by means of proofs and reasonings'? 'It has already been explained that they are done with reference to the *conception and counter-conception*,—the *supporting* being with reference to the *conception* and the *condemning* with reference to the *counter-conception.*' It is true that it has been so explained; but this is not the right explanation. 'What is wrong in this explanation?' Its unreasonableness lies in this, that as a matter of fact, the *condemning* is not (always) with reference to the 'counter-conception'; it may be that the *supporting* 'by means of proofs and reasonings' is with reference to the *conception*; but the *counter-conception* does not form the subject of *condemning*. 'What we say is, not that the *condemning* has for its subject the *counter-conception*,—but its *supporting*; *i. e.*, it is the *supporting of the counter-conception* that forms the subject of the *condemning*.' But the word 'condemning' being mentioned in proximity to the word 'counter-conception',—how can the act of *condemning* become connected with something *other than the counter-conception*,—in the shape of its *supporting*? 'Such connection is due to capacity and incapacity; that is to say, that alone is *condemned* which is *capable* of being condemned; and the *counter-conception* is *not capable* of being condemned; for the simple reason that a thing, whether it is *condemned* or *not* condemned, retains its own character; it remains the same when you condemn it, as when you do not condemn it [and so the counter-conception retaining its own natural character, should never be the

Vār P. 150 :

* Though the words '*sādhana*' and '*upālambha*' may be rightly taken both ways—substantively as well as instrumentally,—yet the answer that is now given is on the basis of the second interpretation—the words being taken as the *means* of supporting and condemning.—*Tātparya.*

subject of *condemning* ', The same might be said with regard to the *supporting* also: the *supporting* also being a *means*, an instrument, can never abandon its own character; so that it will not be right to say (as you have said) that the *condemning* is of the *supporting* (of the *counter-conception*)."

Just so, we reply; there can be no *condemning* of the *instrument* or of the *objective*; the Objective is always efficient in its own sphere; and so also is the Instrument; neither of these has an efficiency in other spheres; so that if it is found inefficient in such other spheres, the fault does not lie with either the Objective or the Instrument. "Whose then is the *condemning*?" The *condemning* is of one who is caught or defeated? "Who is it that is defeated?" The person: *not understanding* and *misunderstanding* (of the real nature of things) both belong to the person, not to the Objective or to the Instrument; so that when the person describing a thing, makes use of such Objectives and Instruments as are inefficient, he is defeated; so also is the person who fails to understand the thing as described; and this character or position of the person is expressed by means of words; so that when one speaks of the 'counter-conception' (counter-allegation) as being 'condemned', he imposes upon the *words* a character which really belongs to the person.*

"But how is this (that the condemning is of the supporting of the counter-conception) got out from the words of the Sūṭra?" It is rightly got out from the words of the Sūṭra. "How?" The term '*pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhanopālambhaḥ*' is to be expounded as '*pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhanaḥ*'---'*pramāṇaṭarkasāḍhannopālambhaḥ*;—the sense clearly being that the *supporting is done by means of proofs and reasonings* and *the condemning of*

* The objective and the instrument are always efficient; they are made inefficient by the person who employs them in spheres not their own; and in this the fault lies with the person. For instance, when a person strikes the air with a sword, and the sword fails to cut, the fault lies with the man, and not with the instrument, sword—which is quite capable of cutting wood,—nor with the air, which is quite capable of blowing. So that when we speak of the condemning of the *supporting*, we use the word figuratively.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

the supporting is also done by means of proofs and reasonings,—the second or repeated word '*sādhana*' being elided, as already implied; just as we have in the case of the compound '*uṣtra-mukhī*', 'camel-faced.' [where the compound is expounded as '*uṣtrasya mukham iva mukham yasyāḥ*'].

"In what way is Discussion distinguished from Disputation and Wrangling, by means of the qualification *in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings*? For like the 'putting forward of a conception and counter-conception', this also (the *supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings*) is common to all the three forms of controversy."

It is not common to all the three forms of Controversy. The fact of the supporting and condemning being done *by means of proofs and reasonings* is restricted to Discussion only; that is, it is 'Discussion' only where the supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings; and where these, supporting and condemning, are done by means of Casuistry &c., it is 'Disputation' or 'Wrangling.'* Just as, though the *presence of horns* is common to the cow and the *gavya*, yet the *contracted neck* (peculiar to the *gavaya*) and the *hanging dewlap* (peculiar to the cow) serve to ditinguish the *gavaya* and the *cow* (respectively); similarly the fact of *supporting and condemning being done by means of proofs and reasonings* distinguishes 'Discusion' from 'Disputation' and 'Wrangling' (even though the *putting forward of conception and counter-conception* is common to all the three).†

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* The correct reading is '*jalpavitaṇḍe*', as in the Benares edition.

† The distinction is thus explained in the *Ṭātparya*--Whether or not the Reasoning Factors actually employed are based upon sufficiently valid proofs and reasonings, it does not matter; but in Discussion the parties themselves are quite certain as to their being so; and there is no deceit; both parties being free from passion, they do come to a right understanding after all. In Disputa ion and Wrangling on the other hand, it is admissible that even the learned man may put forward reasons and arguments that he knows to be untrue; so that there is room for Casuistry &c.; even though these latter donot lead to the correct conclusion being arrived at, yet it is enough for the party if they succeed in averting his defeat.

"*Disputation is that in which the supporting and condemning are done by means of casuistry, futile rejoinder and clinchers*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 49, l. 17—P. 50, l. 1). From this it would seem that in Discussion no Clinchers are to be employed; as these are laid down in regard to another form Controversy; and when there are no Clinchers used in Discussion, there can be no real 'condemning' either."

Our answer is that, even though Discussion is said to be that *in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings*, yet there is room for the employment of Clinchers also; so that the objection does not quite lie with our view. The fact of the word 'condemning' being there is itself an indication that Clinchers are admissible in Discussion.

The opponent retorts—"Well, if all the Clinchers are admissible in Discussion, then it does not really differ from the other forms of Controversy: and the difference is merely in names. If by the term 'condemning' it is meant to be indicated that the Clinchers are to be employed in Discussion, then the difference lies in names only; and there is no real difference between Discussion and Disputation; as in both Clinchers are employed."

This is not right, we reply; as the two qualifying terms (that follow in the Sūtra) serve the purpose of *restricting**; it is because the term 'condemning' indicates the employment of all the Clinchers, that it becomes necessary for the *Sūtra* to add the two further terms, 'not opposed to the main thesis' and 'in accordance with the five Factors,' in order to restrict the actual use of the Clinchers (*i.e.*, to indicate the admissibility of some and the inadmissibility of the rest).

Vār : P 151.

In this connection, while giving an example, the *Bhāṣya* (on P. 49, ll. 11—12) has said that the qualification 'not opposed to the main thesis' indicates the permissibility of the urging (in Discussion) of the Fallacy of Contradiction. But this is

* The Bib. Indica reading नानियमार्थं is wrong. नियमार्थं is correct, as in the Benares edition.

not right; as that is got at from another term; as a matter of fact the permissibility of the fallacy of Contradiction is indicated by a different term; for instance, in the next term, 'in accordance with the *Five Factors*,'—while the Clinchers of 'Deficiency' and 'Redundancy' (are indicated by the term '*five*'), the term 'Factors' indicates the possibility of the urging of the Defects of the *Factors* also [and as the Probans is a *Factor*, its defects become thus indicated, and the Fallacies, of 'Contradiction' and the rest, are only 'defects of the Probans']. Under the circumstances, if the term 'not opposed to the main thesis' also indicated the same fact, it would be a mere superfluous repetition [*literally*—'mere pounding of what is already pounded']. So that our conclusion is that the explanation given in the Bhāṣya is not the right one.

"Is the term 'not opposed to the main thesis' then entirely superfluous?"

It is by no means entirely superfluous; as it serves the purpose of indicating the Clincher of *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*, 'ground-shifting'; the Clincher of 'ground-shifting' has been defined (in Sūṭra, 5-2-23) as 'when a person, after having accepted a certain doctrine, proceeds with the controversy indiscriminately, not always in conformity with the accepted doctrine, it is called *ground-shifting*'; and it is this that is meant to be indicated by the term in question. So that the term is not absolutely superfluous.

"Whence do you get at this restriction, that in Discussion only these two Clinchers—*Fallacy* and *Ground-shifting*—are to be employed (and none of the other twenty-two)?"

This restriction is got at from the fact that it has been declared that Discussion is that form of Controversy which one holds with his Teacher (and such other friendly persons). That is to say, Discussion is that form of Controversy in which an honest seeker after truth enters into controversy with his Teacher and other friends,—with a view to the three purposes (of knowing what he does not know, of removing

his doubts, and of obtaining the corroboration of what he knows already); so that for the sake of this seeker after truth, it is necessary for the other party to put forward explanations and arguments so long as the enquirer does not obtain the true knowledge he is seeking; as he is not an opponent (to be silenced, but an honest seeker to be illumined); [so that in this only such Clinchers can be used as either elucidate the truth or expose the untruth];—and the Controversy that one enters into with an opponent is not 'Discussion', but 'Disputation'; and in this latter it is only right that every Clincher should be made use of. *

Another objection is raised:—"The term 'in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings' would imply that there is proving and disproving (establishing and demolishing) of both views. That is to say, if Discussion is that in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings,—then it follows that both parties in it are equally capable of putting forward 'support' and 'condemnation' in due accordance with proofs and reasonings; which would mean that it is possible for the views and conceptions of both to be established and demolished! †"

This absurdity does not arise, we reply; as this is not exactly what has been asserted; it is not asserted that there are proofs available for both parties; all that is meant is that it is incumbent on both to put forward in 'supporting'

* For instance, the Clincher 'Embarassment' does not help the enquirer to a knowledge of the truth; 'Redundancy' also serves only to confuse the man, and so obstructs his knowledge of truth. Similarly with several other Clinchers; all which should find no room in honest Discussion; but are admissible in Disputation, where the aim is not so much to get at the truth, as to silence the opponent.

† Both the contrary views being equally capable of being supported by proofs and reasonings, it would mean that both are correct; that is to say, the thing in question is possessed of two contrary characters!—*Tātparya.*

their view (what they honestly think to be) *proofs* only; and it does not follow that these should be *real* proofs. Similarly with 'condemning' also. *

Other philosophers have offered the following definition of Discussion :—'*Svaparapakṣayoḥ siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham vachanam vāḍaḥ*', 'Discussion is conversation for the purpose of establishing and demolishing one's own and another's conceptions.' †

Here we find the term '*sva*' (one's own) and '*para*' (another's) inserted as qualifying the term 'conception'; and as a matter of fact, there can be no reasonable explanation of this,—(A) because none of the alternatives possible is admissible, and (B) because the compound involved is an impossible one (as will be shown later on, on P. 154, l. 14 *et. seq.*).

Vār : P. 152.

[A] What, we ask, is the exact signification of the terms '*sva*', 'own' and '*para*' 'another's'? (a) Do they stand respectively for *possessing* and *discarding*? (b) or for *what is to be proved* and *what is to be found fault with*? (c) or for the *Previous* (*Wrong*) *view* and *the Final* (*Right*) *view*? (d) or for a *certain view* and *the contrary view*? (e) or for *the first view* and the *second view*? (f) or for the assertion, by means of diverse verbal expressions, of the diverse characters of a single thing possessed of several

* The *Ṭāṭparya* thus explains—In Discussion there is a check upon the assertions of the two parties; this check being in the form that only such arguments in support and condemnation should be put forward as the person himself considers to be sound, and not what they themselves know to be unsound; such unfair arguments being admissible in Disputation and Wrangling only. This check does not mean that the conceptions in support of which such arguments are put forward are necessarily true. So that in Discussion also Casuistry &c. are permitted; but only so far as is necessary for the knowing of truth; without which it would be impossible to get at the truth.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* calls this definition '*saubanḍhavam lakṣaṇam*', 'Subanḍhu's definition'. We know of a Bauḍḍha logician 'Vasubanḍhu', who flourished about 480 A. D. (*Medieval Logic*, P. 75). From what follows in the Vārṭika, p. 156, l. 17, this 'Subanḍhu' must be the author of the *Vāḍaviḍhāna* or *Vāḍaviḍhī*. This work along with its commentary is criticised here and also before. pp. 120—121.

characters [the assertion of one character by one man being '*sva*', and the assertion of another character by another man being '*para*']?

As regards (a), it is not possible for the words '*sva*' and '*para*' to stand for *possessing* and *discarding*; as it is impossible, in this connection, to ascertain the exact relation of 'who' or 'what'. That is to say, if the word '*sva*' means *possessing*, there can be no connection with 'who' or 'what'; so that it cannot be ascertained *of whom* it is '*sva*' and *what* is '*sva*'. "*Possessing* means *making own*; so that it would be *sva* for the man who makes it his *own*." But it is just this that we are considering—what is meant by this *making own*. "When a man has reasons for having the idea of *mine* with regard to something, that is his *sva*; and the thing with regard to which he has no grounds for that idea of *mine*, that is *para*." What is pointed out here as the sense of '*sva*' may be possible in the case of the ordinary man (who deals with such belongings as land, grains and the like) *; but no such *sva* or *para* (in the said sense) is possible for the philosophical author (who deals with such things as *Sound being non-eternal* and the like); and yet the proposed explanation would seem to be intended for the latter case. Then again, what forms a man's *possession* always accomplishes something for his benefit; † and certainly the upholder of a theory is not in any way benefitted by that theory. The conclusion therefore is that the terms '*sva*' and '*para* cannot stand respectively for *possessing* and *discarding*.

* The purport of this answer is thus explained in the *Tāṭparya*:—In the case of such possessions as land, grains &c., a man is said to have *possession* over them when he has the power of utilising them to his own purpose, this possession being acquired by earning ; and no such idea of *possession* can have any connection with such things as *Scund asserted to be non-eternal* and the like. And it is just such things that Coutroversy deals with.

The Benares Edition reads [illegible] &c. &c, But the reading of the Bib. Indica Edition gives better sense.

† '[illegible]' of the Bib. Indica reading is apparently wrong.

(b) As regards (b)—If the terms '*sva*' and '*para*' be held to stand respectively for *what is to be proved* and *what is to be found fault with*, this would mean that the view that a man has got to prove is his '*sva*' (own) view, and that which he has got to find fault with or criticise is '*para*' (another's) view. And this explanation certainly evinces a wonderful adroitness in the manipulating of words and their meanings! * '*Sāḍhanīya*' is symonymous with '*Sāḍhya*' [which latter denotes the *view* that the man puts forward and claims *to prove*]; how then can there be any such expression as '*sāḍhanīyaḥ svapakṣaḥ*', '*what* the man has got to prove is his *own view*'? [as this would be tautological] †, That is to say, the very definition of a man's 'own view' (as propounded by the Bauḍḍha philosopher himself) is *that which is intended to be proved*; and this is exactly what is meant by the term '*Sāḍhanīya*'! Then again, such terms as '*one's own view*' and '*another's view*', are used only for the purpose of differentiation; so that in the term 'one's own view', that '*view*', which is differentiated by the qualification 'one's own', cannot stand for anything in a general form (that could be common to the denotation of the other term); or else (if it did so), the qualifying term 'one's own' should be meaningless.‡ "But it has been found that even generic terms have specific denotations." § Cer-

* The Benares edition, as well as the *Ṭāṭparya* read शब्दार्थे in plase of शास्त्रार्थे

† The qualifying term '*Sāḍhanīya*' being synonymons with the qualified term '*Svapakṣa*', 'own view'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The question is—The term '*Sva*' in '*svapakṣa*'—does it, or does it not, serve to specify and particularise, something which, without it, would be too gereral? If it does, then the term '*Sva*' cannot have any such wide denotation as 'that which is to be proved'; [as this would not be a specified or particularised denotation at all]; it must mean something else (in a more specified form). If on the other hand, the term does not serve to specify or particularise, then as a qualifying term, it fails in its purpose, and becomes absolutely meaningless.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

§ '*It has been found*'—The Bib. Ind. edition reading is 'स्वपदृष्टमेतत्'. The Benares edition and the *Ṭāṭparya* both read 'इति दृष्टमेतत्'. This latter is better; as with the other reading, the passage would cease to be संबद्धःग्रन्थ; and that it is a संबद्धग्रन्थ is clear from what follows in the next sentence, and also from the explanation given by the *Ṭāṭparya*, as follows:—"It is true that a qualifying term has a

tainly, words that denote *particular* things can never be 'generic'; in fact, restricted as they would always be by their context and such other circumstances, they would be 'specific' terms.* Then again, we do not quite understand what is really meant by the assertion—"the view to be proved is '*sva-pakṣa*', 'one's own view', and the view to be found fault with is '*para-pakṣa*', *another's view*". The expression 'to be proved' standing for '*pakṣa*' (according to the Bauḍḍha logician's definition of '*Pakṣa*' as *that which is intended to be proved*,)—*what is to be proved* may be spoken as '*pakṣa*' †; but *finding fault with* can have no connection with any '*pakṣa*' ‡ itself (which *ex hypothesi* is *what is to be proved*); as even after effective fault is found with it, the '*para-pakṣa*', 'another's view', remains a '*pakṣa*', a 'view', all the same. "In that case, what would be the subject-matter of 'fault-finding' or criticism?" In some cases of criticism, the object criticised is something that has formed the subject matter of demonstration (by the other party); while there is very often such criticism also as has no connection with either *one's own* view or the view of the *other party* [*e.g.* when criticisms are urged against side-issues or hypothetical opponents]. "Which is that criticism which is connected with demonstration? and what is this

Vār. P. 153.

particularised denotation; but even so, the term does not cease to be a *generic* term [for even the particularised denotation includes a number of things]; and as such it can still have a generic denotation [so that the qualifying word '*sva*' can still have its denotation restricted to what is to be proved, and yet this can be regarded as a 'generic' denotation, including a number of things *to be proved*.]—*Tāṭparya*.

* So that '*svapakṣa*', even though denoting 'things to be proved', in general, can never, in actual usage, have any such wide denotation; it will always be restricted to a particular *thing to be proved* as determined by the context and other circumstances under which it would be used. For 'प्रकरण' the Bib. Ind. edition reads 'प्रमाण'.

† The Benares edition reads, for पक्षो, 'पक्षः पक्षो'. But the former gives better sense.

‡ Both editions read 'स्वपक्षेण'; but the correct reading is '
clearly indicated by the explanation provided by the *Tāṭparya*. Mere criticism does not deprive the *view* of its character of being one 'view' of the thing under discussion.

'demonstration'?" 'Demonstration' is the name given to that five-factored verbal expression which is put forward in support of a certain *pakṣa* (or view);—and this verbal expression may (in some cases) be deficient, and (in other cases) redundant, and it may also contain such Factors as are not quite valid;—and when (one or the other of) these defects is pointed out, we have a criticism that is connected with the demonstration,—the said demonstration being the actual subject of the criticism. There may, however, be occasions for bringing forward, in course of a discussion, other kinds of criticism also; and it is these other kinds of criticism that have no connection either with the demonstration, or with *one's own view*, or with *another's view*; such criticism, for instance, as consists in the urging of the 'Faulty Rejoinder', or of such arguments as are meant simply to embarass (the opponent by trickery, which has no connection at all with the point at issue). "It is true that criticism can have no direct connection with or bearing upon a *pakṣa* or view; but that criticism which aims at the demonstration of another's view,—even though it does not wipe out of existence the *view* itself, yet—in as much as it serves to reject its demonstration, it is right to say that it 'discredits', 'impairs' or 'damages' ('*ḍūṣayaṭi*') that view [so that it can be called the 'criticism, *ḍūṣaṇa*, of the *pakṣa*' indirectly, in the sense of *ḍūṣayṭi iṭi ḍūṣaṇam*, that which 'impairs', though directly what it does is only the rejecting of the demonstration]." But it is not right to employ, in the body of a definition, words in their indirect or figurative sense; as definitions are put forward for defining the real character of things; the true purpose of a definition consists in defining or specifying the true thing; and certainly there can be no *defining* or *specifying* by means of words used in their figurative sense,* there being no limit to the indirect figurative significa-

* And further, the Bauḍḍha logicians have themselves laid down the law that—'it is not right to renounce the direct signfication of a word, unless such renunciation be absolutely necessary.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

tions of a word. And further, if it be held that it is correct to say that 'the criticism sets aside the *view*', taking the term 'sets aside' in its figurative sense (of indirectly *impairing* or *damaging*), then you might as well define *Discussion* as 'assertion for the purpose of setting aside another's view'.* "What would be the advantages of such a definition?" Well, the text of the Sūṭra would be considerably shortened; and [yet the required meaning would be obtained; as] both the *proofs* (propounded in support of one's own view) and the *criticism* (aimed against another's view) serve the same purpose, indirectly, of *setting aside another's view*. "But we prefer the other form of the definition, as it saves us from having to take both terms (*proof* and *criticism*) in their indirect signification." [If you fight shy of having recourse to indirect signification] Then, in that case, it would be best to state the definition in the direct form—'Discussion is assertion for the purpose of establishing and setting aside the demonstrations of the views.' In this form the definition would be quite explicit and perfectly in harmony with its subject-matter. "But all criticisms donot bear upon demonstrations (as you have yourself explained, above, l. 3); so that the objections you have urged against our definition are equally applicable to the definition now proposed by you." Certainly, the objections are not equally applicable; for it is possible for *some* criticism to bear upon the Demonstration (of other views); and in as much as *some* criticism always does bear upon 'demonstration', even though we have the statement in the general form ('criticism of demonstration'), yet the necessary restriction (of the 'criticism', as that alone which bears upon demonstration) would be obtained by the force of possibility. For these reasons the conclusion is that it is not right to explain the terms 'one's own' and 'another's' as 'what is to be proved' and 'what is to be found fault with', respectively.

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* The Bib. Indica edition reading परपक्षनुद्यर्थं gives no sense. The Benares edition reads परपक्षविदुषणं. But from what follows below, l. 15, the correct reading should be परपक्षाविदूषणेन

(c) " We may then explain the terms ' one's own ' and ' another's ' as standing for ' the previous (wrong) view ' and ' the final (right) view '; that is to say, what have been called the ' *Purva*—Previous or Wrong—*pakṣa*, ' view ', and the ' *Uṭṭara*—Final or Right—*pakṣa*, view ', are what are meant by the terms ' one's own view ' and ' another's view.' "

Vār. P. 154.

This also cannot be accepted ; as the employment of ' proof ' and ' fault-finding ' has been restricted ; that is, in your own (Bauḍḍha) Sūṭra you have declared that ' the terms *one's own* and *another's* are connected with proofs and criticisms'*, which means that *proving* and *fault-finding* are restricted in their scope,—the sense being (as indicated by the order in which the terms ' proof ' and ' fault-finding ' are mentioned) that all the *proving* should bear upon *one's own view* and all the *fault-finding* should bear upon *another's view*; and such being the restriction laid upon the employment of *proving* and *fault-finding*, [if you explain the terms ' one's own view ' and ' another's view ' respectively by the terms ' Wrong view ' and ' Right view'], all the fault-finding should always be aimed† at the *Right view* ; [and all the *proving* should bear upon the *Wrong view*] and it would come to this that the upholder of the *Right view* would *find fault* with his own view! ‡ Then again, the ' own view ' of the upholder of the ' Right view ' must always be different from the ' Wrong view [so that it is not that the ' own view ' is not always the ' Wrong view ', as the above restriction would have it]. Further, that the terms ' one's own ' and ' another's ' signify the 'wrong view' and the

* This is clearly a ' Sūṭra by the Bauḍḍha logician. The Bib. Indica edition reads तेन साधन; but the Benares edition has ते साधन ; and the *Tāṭparya* quotes the whole Sūtra as ते साधनदूषणे: स्वपरपक्षाः सम्बध्यन्ते and this is the reading adopted in the translation.

† The Benares edition reads नियमे for नियमतः The latter gives better sense.

‡ The *Bibliotheca Indica* reading is defective ; there should be a ' दूषणं ' after ' विषयं ' in l. 5 ; this is the reading of the Benares edition.

'right view' is indicated neither by the etymology of the terms, nor by any law, nor by usage. *

(*d*) and (*e*) The above arguments also serve to set aside the theories that the terms 'one's own' and 'another's' stand for 'a certain view' and the 'contrary view' (d),—or for the 'first view and the 'second view' (e).

(*f*) "The real explanation of the terms 'one's own view' and 'another's view' is that they are applied to the one and the same thing—*viz.* 'view' or 'theory'—which, when specified as 'to be proved comes to be called '*one's own* view', and when specified as 'to be found fault with', as '*another's* view.'" This explanation may be right; but in that case the use of the Dual number (in '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*') would not be right. We do not deny that one and the same thing may have a twofold character; but, in that case, what we would urge is that the Dual number is not right; that is to say, as a rule, when one and the same thing is spoken of as specified by several qualifications, it does not take either the Dual or the Plural number; *e. g.* when people observe Dēvaḍatta with an umbrella and also with a stick, they donot speak of him as '*chhaṭriḍaṇḍinau āgaṭau*', '*two* men, with stick and umbrella, have come.'

Thus it is found that none of the alternative explanations of the terms 'one's own' and 'another's' as occurring in Subanḍhu's definition is acceptable; so that it is not right to employ such terms in the definition.

[B] [The second objection against Subanḍhu's definition indicated on p. 152, l. 1 is next explained]—The proposed definition cannot be accepted, as the compound '*svaparapakṣa*' is an impossible one. For, in the first place, the compound could not be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa*, as the exact forms of the 'relation' and the 'relative' are not †

* The reading of the *Bib. Indica* edition is corrupt. The Benares edition supplies the correct reading—न परिभाषा न रूढिः

† This 'न', as read in the Benares edition, is essential.

discernible. Whenever there is compounding of the Genitive, there is a clear discernment between the 'relation' and the 'relative'; *e. g.* in the compound '*rājapuruṣaḥ*' [where the *puruṣa*, the servant, is clearly discerned from the *rājā*, the King]. And [not only are the two clearly discerned, but] the two are entirely distinct; whenever we have the notion of 'the relation and the relative', the two are entirely different from each other; as for instance, in the same compound '*rājapuruṣaḥ*'. "But we find the Genitive compounded also in cases where the two factors are not entirely different; *e. g.* in such compounds as '*sēnāpatiḥ*' [where the '*pati*', the commander, is not entirely different from the '*sēnā*', army], and '*pānakāṅgam*' [where the '*aṅga*', the *ingredient*, is not distinct from the '*pānaka*', *drink*]." This contention is not right; simply because the fact urged cannot be admitted: what man in his senses can fail to recognise that what is denoted by the term 'drink' is distinct from what is denoted by the term 'ingredient', or that the 'army' is something different from the 'units composing the army'? That the 'army' and such other collective nouns actually denote things different from their constituents has been explained by us in course of our treatment of the relation of 'qualification and qualified.'

Vār : P. 155.

If you think that the term '*sva*' signifies '*own*', and the term '*pakṣa*' signifies *the thing to be proved* *,—this also will not be right; as this interpretation has been already rejected (above under *b*, on p. 152, l. 13). It has been already shown by us how the term '*sva*' cannot signify *own*. † For these reasons there can be no Genitive compound in the term under consideration. The same reasons also preclude the possibility of its being taken as a *Karmadhāraya* compound; for such a compound also could be expounded as 'the *sva-artha*'—*svashchāsau arthashcha*—where '*sva*' would appear as

* The *Bib. Indica*. edition reading is corrupt. The Benares edition supplies the correct reading—[illegible]

† Both editions read स्वत्वेन भवति. The sense demands स्वशब्दो न भवति.

the qualification of the '*arṭha*', which, it has been shown, it cannot be; and also because there is no difference between the two [and yet both these are conditions essential for a *Karmaḍhārya* compound.] For the same reasons, the term cannot be taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; specially as [if the compound, '*Svapakṣa*' were taken as *Bahuvrīhi*, it could only mean 'one who has the *sva*, *i. e.*, himself, for *pakṣa*, what is to be proved'; so that] in that case the *proving* or *demonstration* will have for its object the demonstrator himself! Therefore we cannot take the word as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound. "The term *sva* can certainly mean *that which has to be proved*; and as such it is possible for it to be a qualification of the *pakṣa*."* This will certainly not be possible; for the simple reason that if '*sva*' means *what is to be proved*, then it becomes only another synonym of the word '*pakṣa*': the terms '*pakṣa*' and '*sāḍhanīya*,' 'what is to be proved' are clearly synonymous†; and certainly there can be no co-ordinate *Bahuvrīhi* compound between synonymous terms; *e.g.*, there can be no such expression as '*vṛikṣa-ṭarum*‡ *chhinaṭṭi*', (where 'vṛikṣa' and 'ṭaru' are synonymous). The proposed explanation also involves a self-contradiction: If the term '*pakṣa*' denotes something different from what is denoted by '*svapakṣa*' (as it should certainly do if the compound '*svapakṣa*' is to be taken as suggested),—then this would go against your own assertion that 'Proposition consists in the declaration of the *pakṣa*.'§ "How so?" Because as a matter of fact it is the *svapakṣa* that forms the subject-matter of the Proposition [and yet your last assertion speaks of the Proposition as asserting the *pakṣa*, which, according to you, is not the same as *svapakṣa*.]

* The objections against the term '*sva*' being a qualification, are based upon the idea that the term means *own*, i. e., *capable of being employed as one wishes*. They should therefore cease if the term were explained as 'what is to be proved.'

† The Bauḍḍha definition of *Pakṣa* being स्वः साधयितुमिष्टः; 'What is intended to be proved'.

‡ The Bib. Ind. reading is wrong. The Benares edition reads correctly वृक्षतरुम्,

§ Both editions read स्वपक्षः but the स्व is clearly not wanted.

If, on the other hand, *pakṣa* is not different from (but the same as) *svapakṣa*, then any such assertion as '*svaparapakṣayoḥ siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham vachanam vāḍaḥ*' (which is your definition of Discussion), would be an impossible one [firstly because the term '*parapakṣa*', would involve an internal contradiction, *pakṣa* being the same as *svapakṣa*, the term would mean '*paraṣvapakṣa*', where *para* and *sva* are contraries; and secondly because the term '*svapakṣa*' would involve a superfluity, the qualifying term '*sva*' being entirely superfluous, if '*pakṣa*' itself be the same as '*svapakṣa*'] And no other compound (except the *Genitive Ṭātpuruṣa*, the *Karmaḍhāraya* and the *Bahuvrīhi*) are possible in the term '*svapakṣa*' [So that it is absolutely impossible to have any such compound, in the present connection]. Nor can the term be taken as a *sentence*, [*i.e.*, as a combination of syntactically related terms not compounded; for the simple reason that there are no syntactical terminations at all]. Thus the conclusion is that the term '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*' is absolutely abortive.

Let the question of the exact signification of the terms '*sva*' and '*para*', and also that of that relation of 'qualification and qualified' between the terms '*sva*' and '*pakṣa*'* rest for the present. What we should like to know is—why you do not compound the words,—stating your definition in the form '*svaparapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham vachanam vāḍaḥ*' (instead of '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*, &c. &c.)? "What would be the advantage in this?" The advantage would be that you would get at the same idea, and in a much terser form.

Some writers give the following answer to our question;—"If we compound the words as suggested, then we have the absurdity of '*siḍḍhi*' establishing and '*asiḍḍhi*' (demolishing') applying to both (*svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa*)" This contention is not right; as this absurdity remains (even in the

* Both editions read स्वपरपक्षयोः but the correct reading should be स्वपक्षपक्षयोः; what has been discussed is the relation between स्व and पक्ष and not between स्व and पर.

form in which you have given your definition); and it is not avoided by not compounding the words?* "How?" In this way: The expression '*sv parapakṣayoḥ siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*' also is capable of being construed as '*svapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham parapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*' [which would mean that *siḍḍhi* and *asiḍḍhi*, *establishing* and *demolishing*, apply to both *svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa*]. "Such a construction would be inadmissible, on account of incapability (impossibility); that is to say, the compounded expression '*svapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*' (which enters into your explanation of the construction) is an impossible one; for the simple reason that it is baset with internal contradictions: For instance, if one makes an effort to *establish* an idea, it would be nugatory if the effort were also made to *demolish it*, and similarly if one makes an effort to *demolish* an idea, it would be nugatory if the effort were also made to *establish* it. [So that it is absolutely impossible to construe both factors of the compound '*siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*' with each of of the two factors of the compound '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*']."

Our answer to the above is that, if the said absurd construction is not possible in the case of the uncompounded expression, and it is on that ground that the compounding is avoided, then, exactly the same may be urged in the case of the compounded expression (*svaparapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*) also; where also the absurd construction, whereby both *establishing and demolishing* become applicable to both views, would be impossible [on the same ground of its involving internal contradictions].

Vār. P. 156

Others have put forward the following reply (to our question as to why the definition is not stated in the compounded form)—"[If we had it in the suggested compounded form]. there would be a possibility of the Singular and Plural numbers; that is to say, if we had the compounded term ('*svaparapakṣasiḍḍhyasiḍḍyarṭham*'), as the exact number-

* दोषोऽसमासकरणेन is the correct reading, as given in the Benares edition.

ending would not be clearly discernible in the body of the compound itself, it would be necessary to have the uncompounded form, in order to clearly indicate what the exact number intended is; otherwise, how could we know that the discussion is 'the assertion for *the establishing and demolishing* of the *two views*, one's own and another's *svaparapakṣayoḥ*)—and *not* that of *one view* or *several views* (*svaparapakṣasya* or *svaparapakṣāṇām*)?" This explanation also is not right, we reply; as the contingency urged is an impossible one: as regards the possibility of the singular number, the form '*svaparapakṣasya*', it is absolutely impossible for any assertion to both *establish* and *demolish* the same single view*;—secondly, as regards the possiblity of the plural number (in the form '*svaparapakṣāṇām*', as a matter of fact it is absolutely impossible for any such notion to be ever entertained that any single inferential argument can ever prove *several views*:—so that your suspicion as to the undesirable contingencies is entirely without foundation.

The third answer given to our question is that the law of compounding is not a compulsory one. These people dilate upon the fact that the rules laid down for the compounding of words are not meant to compel one to have recourse to compounding. They argue as follows:—"There is no such compulsory injunction that compounding must be done in every possible case; so that (the rules being merely permissive, in some cases we have the compound, and in others we have the words uncompounded, appearing with their own syntactical endings; *e. g.*, we have both forms—'*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*' (uncompounded) and the compounded form '*rājapuruṣaḥ*'." Our answer to this explanation is that when both are equally possible†, why should you have the *uncompounded* form (by preference)? When you assert that the laws of compounding are not compul-

* The *Bib. Ind.* reading is entirely corrupt. The correct reading is supplied by th Benares Edition—एकस्य शक्यम् सिद्धसिद्धये वचनम्

† The right reading is [illegible] as in the Benares Edition.

sory, you mean that both (compounding and not compounding) are equally admissible; and when both are equally admissible, why should you insist on using the uncompounded form? "We shall retort with the same question to you—Why should you insist on the compounded form?—and there would be no end to such question and counter-question." Certainly there would be an end to the question as addressed to us: Our answer to your retort is that, we prefer the compounded form on account of its terseness; as a matter of fact, the compounded form is terse and the uncompounded form is diffuse; and as the use of verbal expressions is only for the purpose of comprehensively expressing ideas, it behoves *you* to explain for what purpose you employ the diffuser expression (when exactly the same purpose would be served by the terser expression)? "We do not accept the view that the *terseness* or *diffuseness* of verbal expressions pertains to the smaller or larger number of letters or syllables in them." This is no answer; as it does not meet the objection at all. By simply asserting that you do not admit *terseness* or *diffusion* to consist in the smaller or larger number of syllables, you do not get rid of our objection. "Why?" Because your work, the '*Vāḍaviḍhāna*',* is regarded as a '*shāsṭra*', a scientific work, written for the instruction of pupils; and the contention that you do not admit terseness and diffuseness as pertaining to the number of syllables is very much out of place, in reference to such a work [which, being meant for the instruction of pupils, should not contain a single syllable more than what is absolutely necessary to convey the required idea]

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[Having disposed of the first term '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*', of Subanḍhu's definition, the author takes up the criticism

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* If with the *Bib. Ind.* edition we read वादविधान, the meaning is 'the definition of Discussion'. वादविधान however is a Bauḍḍha logical work already referred to above, on P. 121, and its टीका on P. 120. From this it would seem that this work is by Subanḍhu.

of the second term, '*siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*']—The term '*siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham*'—'for the establishing and demolishing'—also is not quite right. "Why?" Beacause the '*siḍḍhi*',—'establishing'—cannot here be taken in either of the two senses that it admits of. To explain—The term 'establishing'—*'*siḍḍhi*'—when used, is used in two senses;—it means either (a) *to manifest* or (b) *to produce*.—(a) Now in the present connection it cannot mean *producing*; for in that case Proposition and the other reasoning Factors would cease to be '*sāḍhana*' (the means of bringing about the '*siḍḍhi*' or establishing of things)†; as certainly things are not *produced* by Proposition, &c.; in fact when these latter are called '*sāḍhana*', what is meant is that they bring to light what already exists; so that if '*siḍḍhi*' meant *producing*, the name '*sāḍhana*' ('means of *siḍḍhi*') would be wholly inapplicable to Proposition, &c.—(b) If, on the other hand, '*siḍḍhi*' is taken to mean *manifesting*, this also will not be right; because as a matter of fact it subsists in the enquirer (the person who propounds the question to be discussed by the two parties). To explain—If you hold that 'establishing'‡ means *manifesting*, and not *producing*,—this may be an effective way of meeting the objection urged (by us against the view that 'establishing' means *producing*); but it involves a contradiction in terms; as both 'establishing' and 'demolishing' consist in convincing the Enquirer or Questioner (the Umpire, one who propounds the question to be discussed by the two parties); so that the 'establishing' and 'demolishing' being in the form of the conviction produced in the Questioner's or Umpire's mind, they would subsist in the Enquirer;—how then could they be spoken of as '*of the view*' (as they are spoken of by you)? In fact it behoves you to explain the

Vār: P. 157.

* From what follows, '[illegible]'—the reading of the Bib. Ind. edition—is clearly wrong.

† The correct reading is [illegible], as in the Benares edition.

‡ '[illegible]' is rightly omitted in the Benares edition.

exact meaning of the genitive ending (in the term '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*', as occurring in your definition). "Certainly it is not difficult* to explain the sense of the Genitive; as the *view* is after all the subject-matter of both; 'establishing' and 'demolishing' (being in the form of *conviction*) have a *view* for their subject-matter, and it is in this sense that they are spoken of as being '*of* the view'." This is not quite right, we reply; at the time that these two, 'establishing' and 'demolishing', of which the *view* is the subject-matter, come about,—(a) is the view itself an already fully accomplished or established entity—or (b) is it not? (a) If it is already an accomplished entity, then 'establishing' of the view cannot consist in the convincing of the Umpire [as *ex hypothesi* the view is an established entity even before this conviction is brought about]; in fact in that case 'establishing' would be that from which the conviction follows. "From what does the conviction follow?" It follows from the fact of the thing actually being as it is represented to be; that is, the Umpire becomes convinced of a certain view being true, when he finds that the thing in question is really as it is represented to be by that view. "How is one to know that the thing is represented as it really exists"? This is ascertained from the connection of the Instruments of of Right Cognition: that is to say, the thing is recognised as really being as it is represented to be only when it is found that the representation is in full accordance with what is indicated by the Instruments of Right Cognition.†—(b) If, on

* 'न दुर्वचः' of the Benares edition is more in keeping with what follows than 'च दुर्वचः' of the *Bib. Ind.* edition.

† The *Tātparya*—A View is said to be *established* when it becomes related to *establishing*; and *establishing* consists in its having the support of the Instruments of Right Cognition; this means that the thing is really as the view in question represents it to be; and it is from this that there follows the 'conviction of the enquirer'. That is, the enquirer is convinced of the correctness of the view, because the thing in question is really as that view represents it to be. So that it is not true that the 'establishing' of the view consists in the convincing of the enquirer. And

the other hand, the view is *not an established* entity, at the time that its 'establishing' comes about,—then this would mean that the convincing *of the enquirer* (which, according to you, is 'establishing') is brought about *before* the use of the *means of establishing* (*i. e*, the proofs, that would make the view an *established* entity); and under the circumstances there would be no need for the Discussion [which would consist in the putting forward of these proofs, with a view to convince the enquirer; so that when this *convincing* will have been brought about *before* the proofs are put forward, what would be the use of putting these forward at all?]. And further, it may be that the 'establishing' of a view consists in convincing the enquirer; but how about 'demolishing'? It has been shown above that *criticism* or *fault-finding* (which is held to be the means of 'demolishing') does not actually bring about the *demolishing* of the *other view*.* "What *fault-finding* does is to set aside the proving or establishing of the other view; and it is the *setting aside of the establishing* that is indireatly spoken of as 'demolishing.'" You mean to say that whenever criticism is propounded, what it does *directly* is to set aside the *establishing* of the criticised view, and on the ground of its setting aside the *establishing* the criticism may indirectly be said to bring about the *demolishing* of the view. But this will not be right; as there is no necessity; the direct signification of a term is not renounced unless there is some necessity for it; in fact we admit of indirect significations only when the direct signification is found to be an impossible one; *e. g.*, in the well-known instance of the expression 'the platforms are crying' [where we take the word 'platforms' to indicate the *men on the*

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as it is shown that the conviction of the enquirer is not the same as 'establishing', but *follows from* it, it involves a 'contradiction' to say that 'the *establishing* of the view *consists* in convincing the enquirer.'

* The *Bib. Indica* edition reads परपक्षसिद्धिः in place of परपक्षासिद्धिः. The sense of the argument, with the former reading, wonld be that the criticism of one view does not establish the other view; and it is only if it did so that it could be said that the criticism also brings about the enquirer's conviction.' But from what follows it is clear that the correct reading is परपक्षासिद्धिः

platforms, because it is found that the 'crying' of the *platforms* themselves is an impossibility]. Then again, 'indirect signification' is a contrivance for explaining the meaning of ordinary assertions in ordinary popular parlance; and certainly the sentence under consideration—*viz*: your definition of Discussion as 'assertion for the purpose of establishing and demolishing one's own and another's view'—is not an ordinary assertion in popular parlance [occurring as it does in a scientific treatise]. Others (with a view to escape from the said difficulties attaching to the acceptance of the indirect signification of the term 'demolishing') offer the explanation that the 'demolishing' of a view consists in its *not making known or recognised what it asserts* [*i. e*., when a certain view asserts a fact, if it fails to carry conviction and does not make that fact recognised, it is said to be 'demolished']* But in this case also, if this 'not bringing about the conviction of what is asserted' refers to the convincing of the enquirer, then the objections already urged remain in force.

Var: P. 158.

"What do you mean?" What we mean is that the term 'demolishing *of the view*' would be open to the objections that have been urged against the 'establishing' *of the view*. Thus then [if you use the terms '*establishing of the view*,' and '*demolishing of the view*,' you must admit that] 'establishing' and 'demolishing' are two properties belonging to the 'view,' in virtue of which (properties) the 'view' comes to be spoken of as 'established' and 'demolished'. And such being the case, this would certainly be against your assertion that 'establishing' and 'demolishing', being in the form of *knowing* and *not knowing*, subsist in the person (the enquirer). That is to say, if 'establishing' and 'demolishing' are *pro-*

* So that, in this case, 'demolishing' does not consist in being subject to fault-finding (as in that case it could not pertain to the *view*); it consists in its failing to bring about the required knowledge or conviction; and this certainly pertains to the *view*; and there is no renouncing of the direct signification of the word 'demolishing.' —*Tātparya*.

perties of the view, then it is wrong to say that they subsist in the person. If, with a view to save this last assertion of yours from being rejected, you insist upon asserting that 'establishing' and 'demolishing' do subsist in the person,—then in that case, your other assertion,—that 'establishing' and 'demolishing' are the *manifestation* and *non-manifestation* of the view—becomes wrong, and rejected. "We shall then explain 'establishing' as *being true* (*i. e.* being shown to be exactly as known by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition) and 'demolishing' as *being untrue* (*i. e.* being shown to be *not* as should be known by means of the Instruments of Right Cognition)." In that case also, it becomes wrong to say that 'establishing' and 'demolishing' consist in *convincing the enquirer*. [In sheer despair, and being honestly anxious to know what the correct view would be, the Opponent asks.]—" What then is meant by 'manifestation' and 'non-manifestation'?" [The Author makes a friendly answer]—These are only the names of those properties in virtue of whose presence things come to be spoken of and recognised as such; *i. e.*, 'manifestation' and 'non-manifestation' are just those properties of things on account of whose presence things come to be spoken of and recognised as 'manifested' and 'unmanifested'.*

Then again, no adequate explanation can be found of the word '*arṭha*', 'Purpose' [as occuring in Subanḍhu's definition of Discussion as '*svaparapakṣayoḥ siḍḍhyasiḍḍhyarṭham vachanam*']; as none of the meanings possible is admissible in this connection. In the present context, the word '*arṭha*' or 'purpose' could have only one of the following three meanings—(*a*) aim or benefit, (*b*) motive, (*c*) denotation

* Though 'manifestation' and 'non-manifestation'—consisting of being operated upon by the right instruments of cognition, and in not being so operated upon,—may be said to belong both to the Thing and the Person, yet the said characters are always recognised and spoken of as belonging to the *Thing*; and for this reason, they are regarded as the properties of the Thing, and not of the Person.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

or meaning; (*a*) we have the word '*arṭha*' used in the sense of 'benefit', when we speak of *rice* being '*brahmaṇārṭha*' (for the purpose of the Brahmaṇa); and [it has been asserted by the Bauḍḍha writer that] in this meaning we include* all the four kinds of assertion (proof, criticism, seeming proof and seeming criticism);—(*b*) we have it in the sense of 'motive' when we ask a man *kimarṭham āgaṭosi* ('with what motive have you come?);—(*c*) and we have it in the sense of 'meaning', when we put the question '*gauriṭyabhiḍhānasya korṭhaḥ*' ('what is the meaning of the expression *gauḥ*?').

(*a*) In the present context it is not possible for the word '*ārṭha*' or 'purpose' to be taken in the sense of *aim* or *benefit*; because of the qualifications 'Right and Wrong' (that another passage in the Bauḍḍha work has added). That is to say, 'one's own view' has been characterised as 'right' and 'another's view' as 'wrong'; such being the qualifications added, how can the sense of 'benefit' fit in with this? Certainly the qualifications 'right' and 'wrong' cannot apply to the *seeming proof* and the *seeming criticism*,—'rightness' cons'sting in *being supported by proofs* and 'wrongness' in *being open to criticism* [and not in *being supported by seeming proofs and being open to seeming criticism*]. [With a view to avoid this difficulty] it may be held that what is meant by views being 'right' and 'wrong' is (*not* that it is 'supported by proofs' and 'it is open to criticism', but) that 'the thing really exists as the view represents it to be' and 'it is not as the view represents it'; so that *rightness* consists in the thing being really as it is asserted to be; and '*wrongness*' in its not being so. But in that case, as this fact (of the view representing or not representing the thing as it actually is) would be an *object* of knowledge,—the explanation you have put forward would be clearly incompatible with your theory that the purpose of the Discussion consists in convincing the enquirer as to the view

* Neither editio gives the correct reading. From the *Ṭāṭparya* it is clear that the correct reading is वाक्यसंग्रहः'

being right or as wrong; for what is an object of conviction cannot constitute the conviction itself [so that 'rightness' and 'wrongness' being *objects* of cognition, it will not be right to speak of them *as 'right'*, or *as 'wrong'*.] *

(*b*) If the word '*arṭha*', 'purpose' be taken to mean *motive*,—then also the person putting forward *seeming proofs* or *seeming criticisms* cannot be said to be a true controversialist (carrying on 'Discussion') "Why?" For the simple reason that 'establishing' and 'demolishing' can never be the *motive* (*i. e.* consequence) of *seeming* proofs and *seeming* criticisms [when a man wishes to *prove* a fact, he brings forward *real*, not *seeming*, proofs]; and certainly no 'establishing' can ever form the motive of urging *seeming proofs*, nor 'demolishing' that of urging *seeming criticisms*;—and the person urging these would not be a true controversalist; so that your explanation brings about the absurdity that one who has been defeated (by being shown to have brought forward seeming proofs and seeming criticisms) is a person who was not a controversalist,—*i. e.* not a party in the Discussion!

Vār : P. 159.

(c) Lastly, if the word '*arṭha*', 'purpose,' be taken to mean *denotation* or *meaning*,—this also will be unacceptable; as the exact nature of that *denotation* can not be determined; specially as neither your *Sūṭra-writer* (in his *Vāḍaviḍhāna*)

* It has been argued by a Bauddha writer that the word 'purpose' has to be taken in the sense of *aim*, as it is then alone that we are able to include all the four kinds of assertion possible in the course of Discussion—Proof, Criticism, Seeming Proof and Seeming Criticism. Our contention, says the *Ṭāṭparya*, is that the inclusion of all these has been rendered impossible by the subsequent addition of the qualifications 'right and wrong'; one's own *pakṣa* or view being characterised as 'right' and another's view as 'wrong'; now all assertions embodying all *proofs* and *seeming proofs* would be in support of one's own view, and all *criticisms* and *seeming criticisms* would be against another's view; but the view that would be supported by a *seeming proof* would not necessarily be the 'right view'; similarly the view that would be attacked by a *seeming criticism*, would not necessarily be the 'wrong' view; hence having added the qualifications 'right and wrong', the Bauddha has made the inclusion of the *seeming proof* and *seeming criticism* impossible. This eing so, there is no point in taking the word 'purpose' to mean *aim*.

nor the *Bhāṣya-writer* in his (*Vāḍaviḍhāna-ṭikā*) has vouchsafed any such explanation as that such and such 'denotation' is expressive of 'establishing and demolishing.' "Certainly it has been declared (by the Bhaṣya-writer) that that which is capable of expressing the *establishing and demolishing* constitutes their *denotation**." True such an explanation has been given; but according to this explanation the use of the actual words 'establishing and demolishing' would come to constitute Discussion [as those words are *par excellence* 'that which denote *establishing* and *demolishing*.']

† No other meaning of the word '*arṭha*', 'purpose', (except the three just considered) is possible in the sentence in question. So the conclusion is that the use of the word in the definition is entirely improper.

Further, when propounding the definition in the form—'Discussion is assertion for the purpose of establishing and demolishing, &c.'—the writer did not properly examine what he had said before and what he was saying now. For in view of what he had said before, the word 'assertion' (as occurring in the proposed definition) would clearly be that which had been put forward against the (orthodox) Logician's reasons; while the aphoristic style in which the definition has been put forward gives to it the appearance of a generalised axiom; from which it would seem that *all 'assertions'* were meant to be included. ‡ And this certainly constitutes a self-nugatory procedure.

* The Benares Edition reads 'वाचकमिति' which is better than 'वाचकत्वेति'.

† *E. g.* The word 'arṭha' also means *property*; but that cannot fit in with the definition of Discussion. The *Ṭāṭparya* begins this sentence with 'न च तत्र' instead of 'न चा' and explains तत्र as meaning 'in the Bauḍḍha writer's Sūṭra'.

‡ The exact meaning of this whole sentence cannot be clear without reference to the actual text of Subanḍhu's work. But it is clear that the general sense is as expressed in the translation. The reading 'वचनत्वं वचन' of the *Bib. Ind.* edition is better than 'वचनत्ववचन' of the Benares edition.

Thus it is proved that when we come to consider the words of Subanḍhu's *Sūṭra*, we find that they contradict his own philosophical tenets and also go against all well-known conceptions.

It has been shown that the words of the Sūṭra (of Subanḍhu) are entirely incapable (of affording the correct conception of what 'Discussion' is); we next proceed to show how the same is the case with the words of the commentary on that Sūṭra:—

(A) In the first place, the compound '*svapakṣa*' of the original has been explained by the Commentary as '*svasya pakṣasya*'; and this is not right; as we have already shown (above, P. 152) that no satisfactory explanation of the term '*sva*' is available; every possible meaning of the term '*sva*' having been shown to be impossible, the use of the expression '*svasya pakṣasya*' is highly improper.* In support of the expression '*svasya pakṣasya*' it might be urged that the Dual form of the Genitive and Locative being exactly alike (as in the word of the original '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*)', the expression '*svasya pakṣasya*' has been added with a view to show that it is meant to be Genitive (not Locative). But this explanation itself will not be right; as it is impossible for the word to be construed as Locative; that is to say, apart from the *pakṣa* (View) itself there is nothing *to be established*, of which the *pakṣa* could be the *receptacle* (and as such be spoken of by means of the Locative ending in '*pakṣayoḥ*'); so that there is no possibility of the word being construed as Locative.† That being not possible, any specification (of the Genitive) is absolutely uncalled for.

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* The correct reading is 'अतोऽयुक्तम्' as in the Benares edition, and not 'अतोऽर्थे' as in the Benares edition.

† What is *to be established* is a certain idea or conception; and the receptacle of ideas, according to the Logician, is the Soul; while according to the Bauḍḍha Ideas have no receptacle. So that in either case the *pakṣa* could not be regarded as the receptacle of the *establishing*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

(B) Secondly, it is also wrong to add the qualifying term '*yukṭāyukṭayoḥ*', 'right and wrong' (to '*svaparapakṣayoḥ*' of the original); as none of the alternative explanations (of 'right and wrong') that are possible can be accepted in the present connection. For instance, in what do 'rightness and wrongness' consist?—(a) Do they consist in *proof and criticism*?—or (b) in the connection with proof and criticism? —or (c) in the fact of the thing being and not being as represented?* (a) In the first place *proof and criticism* cannot constitute 'rightness and wrongness', "Why?" Because *proof and criticism* have been mentioned separately (by the Bauddha writer); the writer himself says '*ṭē sāḍhanadūṣaṇaiḥ*' 'these (*i. e*, the rightness and wrongness) are due to proof and criticism',—where *proof and criticism* are mentioned as entirely different. If the terms 'right' and 'wrong' denoted *proof* and *criticism* (respectively), then it would be superfluous to have the additional sentence in the form '*ṭē sāḍhanaḍūṣaṇaiḥ*'; as the 'proof and criticism' will already have been included in the pronoun '*ṭē*' (which, according to your explanation, stands for *rightness and wrongness*; so that the further mention of 'proof and criticism' would be superfluous). "The expression 'these are due to proof and criticism' is meant to qualify and specify the *rightness* and *wrongness* [the sense being that

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the particular kind of *rightness* meant is that which is ascertained by the fact of there being *proofs* in support, and *wrongness* is ascertained by the fact of being open to *criticism*; so that 'rightness and wrongness' and 'proof and criticism' are not exactly synonymous]." This explanation will not hold; as in that case you should have the nominative case-ending; if the Sūṭra, 'these are due to rightness and wrongness' were to qualify the 'rightness and wrongness', then the proper case-ending would be the nominative, and the Sūṭra should read as '*ṭē sāḍhanaḍūṣaṇāni*';

* The right reading is तथाऽतथेति.

for example, when we have the relation of qualification and qualified,—as we have between '*nīla*', *blue* and '*kamala*,' lotus, we do not have the form '*nīlam uṭpalaiḥ*' (with the Instrumental ending).* (b) "What is meant is the *connection with*, or *presence* of (proofs and criticism); that is to say, the *connection with proofs* constitutes 'rightness' and the *connection with criticism* constitutes 'wrongness' [and this sense would not be got if we had the nominative case-ending]." This is not right, we reply; as it can not be definitely indicated; that is to say, it can not † be indicated (by the Bauḍḍha writer) that the connection with 'proofs and criticisms' is of such and such a kind. [For 'connection with proof' can only mean 'the presence or existence of that which proves what is to be proved'; and similarly 'connection with criticism' can only mean 'the presence or existence of what vitiates that which is to be criticised'; in both cases real *existence* of certain things is implied; and no such *real existence* of anything can be admitted by the Bauḍḍha]. In fact the expression '*sāḍhanēna yogaḥ*', 'connection with proof', can be used only when the exact denotation of these words has been ascertained; and when this has been already ascertained, there is no further necessity of propounding 'proofs.'‡ And further (if 'rightness and wrongness' consist of *connection with proof and criticism*, then) the *convincing of the Umpire* would not be *by means of* 'rightness and wrongness'; so that what you say now would contradict your assertion that 'the convincing of the Umpire is *by means of* rightness and wrongness.' The conclusion therefore is that 'rightness' and 'wrongness' cannot be rightly held (by you) to consist in *connection* (with proof and criticism). (c) "Well, then, we shall take 'rightness' and 'wrong' to consist in the

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* It may be noted that the form analogous to 'yukṭāyukṭaṭvē—ṭō *sāḍhanaḍūṣaṇaiḥ* would be '*uṭpalam nīlaiḥ*'.

† An additional न is necessary here; as found in the Benares edition.

‡ The sense of this rather subtle argument is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*:— The Bauḍḍha will perhaps say that even though he cannot admit the *real* existence of

fact of the thing actually being and not being (respectively) as represented." This also is not admissible; as in that case the sense of *instrumentality* would be impossible. That is to say, the *rightness* and *wrongness* that would consist in the *thing being and not being as represented* would be something *to be determined* (the object of the action of *knowing*); and they would not be the *means of determining*; so that not being *instruments*, they should not take the Instrumental ending (in *yukṭāyukṭaṭvēna* of the Bauḍḍha's Sūṭra), and the correct form would be '*yukṭāyukṭaṭvasya*' (with the Genitive ending).

(*C*) *Thirdly*, it is not right to speak of the '*convincing of the Umpire*'; as this is incompatible with the avowed purpose of your treatise. In course of your explanation of the purpose of your treatise, you have declared that—"the treatise has been written for the purpose of removing doubts, and misconceptions"; and certainly when you go on to assert that "establishing and demolishing consist in the convincing of the Umpire", you are clearly unmindful of what you have said in the former passage; for in the Umpire's mind there are no 'doubts and misconceptions',—what he puts forward being a definite assertion always affording a well-defined and correct conception; so that the Umpire does not stand in need of being 'convinced'. As regards your contention that—"the convincing of the Umpire will naturally lead to the convincing of the disputant also; as, it is entirely on account of his undue attachment to his own view that the

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anything, yet it is possible for him to admit their *illusory* or *imaginary* existence; and this will suffice for the conception of 'connection with proofs'. But our contention would, then, be that even so the determining of the exact meaning of the expression 'connection with proofs' will depend upon the ascertaining of what is 'proof' and what is *to be proved*; so that 'what is to be proved' will have to be definitely known before we can have the conception of 'connection with proof'; this will mean that the conception that a certain fact *is proved* will have to be present long before there can be any conception of 'connection with proof'. But when it will have been already known that a certain fact *is proved*, where will be the necessity for propounding any further proofs, or of pointing out its 'connection with proof'?

disputant fails to grasp and perceive the true thing even though present before his eyes [so that when the Umpire has been convinced, the convincing of the disputant follows as a matter of course]",—what we find is that your phrase "fails to grasp the true thing even though present" involves a self-contradiction;* for if a thing is cognised (by an honest and fully capable person) as otherwise, how can it be called 'true'? "But it may be that even though grasping the fact, he does not accord his consent to the other party". Even so, it will not be not right to say that *he does not grasp it* (when, as you say, he actually does grasp it).† Further, you say that "the convincing of the Umpire will lead to the convincing of the disputant";—but this is not possible; as the means ‡ of conviction are different: as a matter of fact, the means whereby the Umpire is convinced are entirely different from those by which the disputant could be convinced; and certainly an instrument bearing upon one cannot bring about its action (or effect) in another. The said assertion is not right for the further reason that what is asserted is not necessarily true; there is no such hard and fast rule as that Discussion is carried on for the purpose of convincing the Umpire; as Discussion is often found to be carried on with one's Teacher and such other persons,—in which case there is no Umpire at all. "But when the man is not merely desirous of getting at the truth, but enters into a Discussion

Var : P. 161.

* As a matter of fact, if a man is fully equipped with the requisite mental capacity, and approaches the question with a calm, unbiassed and intent mind, he cannot fail to grasp the real nature of the thing, after the operation of all the instruments of cognition bearing on that thing. [And the disputant who is a party to an honest Discussion is exactly of the kind described.]—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† And further the 'attachment to his own view' is not possible in Discussion, when both parties are free from all such undue prejudice; nor is there a desire for mere victory over the other party; the motive being only ascertainment of truth; so that when the truth has been ascertained, there is no possibility of due consent not being accorded.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The Benares Edition throughout reads कारण; but the *Ṭāṭparya* has करण.

with a desire for reward, honour and fame,—there is certainly the necessity for an Umpire." True in such a case an Umpire would be necessary; but it will not be a case of 'Discussion'. "We cannot accept this; as we do not accept the threefold division of Controversy; all Controversy is the same; and its purposes are several—in the form of getting at the truth, reward and so forth." This contention is not right; as in the first place what you are putting forward now has been prohibited: you have yourself prohibited the holding of 'Discussion' for the man desirous of obtaining praise, honour and reward; and secondly, as for your contention that you will not accept our view because you do not accept the three-fold division of Controversy,—the actuality of things does not depend upon non-acceptance* (or acceptance); in fact (it is the other way) the acceptance follows when the thing actually exists; and that there actually are three kinds of Controversy, we shall prove by showing that both Disputation and Wrangling differ, in their character, from Discussion. Hence we conclude that it is on account of your ignorance of this distinction among them that you say you do not accept the threefold division.

(D) Fourthly, it has been asserted that—"the term '*pakṣasiddhi*', 'establishing of the view', indirectly indicates (*i. e.* figuratively expresses) the *conviction with regard to the establishing of the view*; just as the *contemplation of the Void* is indirectly indicated by the term 'void.'" But (it seems to have been forgotten that) figurative expression (or indirect indication) is not arbitrary; such indirect indication is permitted only when the expression is one that is met with in common usage, and yet its literal signification is found to be an impossible one (*lit.* not supported or vouched for by any right cognition)†; and further we have also shown above, (*Text*,

* Both editions read अनभ्युपगमानवस्थ: ; but from what follows, the correct reading would appear to be अभ्युपगमानवस्थ:

† The *Bib. Ind.* edition reads प्रमा.प्र.कत्वेन But the Benares edition and the *Tātparya* read अप्रमाणकत्वः and on p. 157, l. 18 we have the term अप्रमाणकत्वः in a similar context.

p. 153, l. 11) that it is not right to make use of figurative expressions in the body of a definition.

(E) Fifthly, you go on to add the following explanation :—"When it is said that *Discussion is assertion for the purpose of establishing &c. &c.*, it is meant to include the four kinds of assertion—of *proof*, of *seeming proof*, of *criticism* and of *seeming criticism.*" This again is not right; as you have qualified the whole thing by the terms 'right and wrong'; and with this qualification, how can there be any inclusion of the four kinds of assertion? [as 'seeming proof' or 'seeming criticisms' cannot bring about *right* establishing or *right* demolishing].

(F) Sixthly, you make use of the term '*aḍhikaraṇa*'; this must (in the present context) refer to 'one who has been appointed, *aḍhikṛiṭaḥ*, by the two disputants'. But in a Discussion there is nothing of which the Umpire so appointed could be the *receptacle** [and unless he is a 'receptacle', he cannot be spoken of as '*aḍhikaraṇa*', as it is a dictum accepted by all that '*aḍhikaraṇa* is the *āḍhāra*, or receptacle']. "But the Umpire can be called '*aḍhikaraṇa*', as being the receptacle of the conviction (produced by the Discussion)." This is not right; as we have already refuted this view; we have already answered this contention by pointing out that the conviction is with regard to the *view*, and not with regard to the Umpire. "But there is discussion (and consequent conviction) only during the existence of the Umpire [*i. e.* when the Umpire is there; so that in this sense he could be called '*aḍhikaraṇa*', which also stands for the Locative Absolute, which signifies *during the existence of*]." This is not possible; as Discussion is actually found to take place in other circumstances also; (*i. e.* even during the absence of the Umpire) Discussion is held with the Teacher and such other persons. "But in such a Discussion (where there are no

Vār : P. 162.

* नाधिकरणाभावात् of the Benares edition is the correct reading.

Umpires*) it is necessary to explain (a) what would be the investigation, (b) of what it would be, and (c) where (between whom) it would be." But it is well-known that (b) the investigation is of *Discussion*, which consists in the putting forward of proofs and criticisms with regard to the establishing of a certain conclusion ; – (a) its 'investigation' consists in the due discernment of the real proof from the seeming proof, and of the real criticism from the seeming criticism ;—and (c) to this investigation both parties are entitled (*adhikṛiṭa*); so that [the only '*adhikaraṇa*' possible in Discussion consists in the two parties ;and] there is no room for any other kind of 'Locative' (in the shape of '*adhikaraṇa*', in the form of the Umpire).

(G) Lastly, (in your work) you have urged the objection that the definition suggested by you may make the name applicable to the agreeable and disagreeable expressions used by the Umpire and the disputant (in course of subsequent brawling in the streets),—and then you have tried to answer this objection. But as a matter of fact there is no room for any such objection at all;(1) as no such street-brawling could have any direct bearing on the establishing and demolishing of the views under consideration,—(2) as the addition of the qualifications 'right and wrong' (excludes such brawling). And in trying to answer such an incoherent objection, you have surrendered yourself.† For the objection has absolutely no connection with what has been said before (*i. e.* the term 'for the purpose of the establishing and demolishing') and after (*i. e.*, the subsequent qualification 'right and wrong'). In fact if you found it necessary to answer even an incoherent objection, all that you should have said was that the objector had not understood the original *Sūṭra* (of Subandhu embodying the definition).

* The *Ṭāṭparya* appears to make this—यदि प्राश्निका न सन्ति a part of the Text.

† An incoherent question can be put only by a senseless person ; and it draws an answer also only from a senseless person ; so that by seeking to answer the objection, you have proved yourself to be senseless.

Thus we find that the *Sūṭra* (of Subanḍhu) along with its commentary is not compatible with reason; so that we should accept that definition which (as propounded by Gauṭama) has been shown to be entirely reasonable.

Sūṭra (2).

Jalpa-Disputation.

DISPUTATION IS THAT WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH THE SAID CHARACTERISTICS AND IN WHICH THERE IS SUPPORTING AND CONDEMNING BY MEANS OF CASUISTRY, FUTILE REJOINDER AND CLINCHERS (ALSO). (Sū. 2)

Bhāṣya on Sū. 2.

[P. 50, l. 6 to l. 21.]

'*Endowed with the said characteristics*',—*i. e.* (a) it puts forward a conception and counter-conception,—(b) consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings,—(c) is not opposed to the main doctrine,—and (d) is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through Five Factors.

'*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of casuistry &c.*'—*i. e.* the peculiarity of Disputation (as distinguished from Discussion) lies in this that here the supporting as well as the condemning are done also by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers.

An objection is raised—"As a matter of fact, no *supporting* of any thing is ever done by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers; all these serve the purpose only of condemning (or opposing) things; as is distinictly expressed in their general definitions as well as detailed classifications: For instance, the general definitions of these (as provided in the *Nyāya-Sūṭra*) are—(a) 'Casuistry consists in opposing an assertion through the assumption of an alternative meaning' (1. 2. 18),—(b) 'Futile Rejoinder consists in opposing an assertion through similarity and dissimilarity', (1. 2. 10),—and (c) 'Clincher consists in the indicating of the disputant's misunderstanding and failing to understand the point at issue'. (1. 2. 19); and in the detailed classification of each of these also it is clear that every one of them serves the purpose of only opposing assertions. There is nothing in the Sūṭra as we have it from

which one could understand that Casuistry &c., serve to *support* conceptions through opposing (their contraries); this sense could be got at only if we had the Sūtra in the form that 'in Disputation, *opposing* is by means of Casuistry, &c.' (dropping the term '*supporting*' altogether)."

[The answer to the above objection is as follows]—As a matter of fact, both *supporting* and *condemning* are done by means of *proofs*; and Casuistry, &c., come in only as auxiliaries, serving the purpose of guarding one's own view; and they never, by themselves, serve as the means of supporting. That is to say, when a person *supports* by means of proofs, Casuitry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are employed as auxiliaries,* serving, as they do, the purpose of guarding one's own view;—as a matter of fact, whenever these are employed they guard one's own view by attacking or opposing the other view. This is exactly what is declared later on in the Sūṭra—'Disputation and Wrangling serve the purpose of safeguarding the conception of truth—just as the fencing of thorny boughs serves the purpose of safeguarding the sprouting of seeds.' (4-2-50) Similarly when a person condemns a counter-conception by means of proofs, if he employs Casuistry &c., they become helpful in setting aside or warding off the attacks that might be made against that condemnation. So that Casuistry, &c., are employed only as subsidiary auxiliaries; [there is this difference, however, that] as regards *supporting*, they never by themselves serve as the direct means (always serving as subsidiary auxiliaries),—but as regards *condemning*, they do by themselves, serve as the direct means also.†

Vārṭika on Sūtra—(2).

[P. 162, L. 11 to P. 164, L. 14.]

'*Disputation is that which, &c. &c.*'—says the Sūṭra. The meaning is that Disputation has all the aforesaid characteristics of Discussion, and (in addition) it is that wherein supporting and condemning are done by means of Casusitry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers also.

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* The words [illegible] स्वपक्षरक्षणार्थत्वेन तु are wanting in the Puri manuscript; but this must be due to लेखकप्रमाद, caused by the same word स्वपक्षार्थत्वेन तु occurring twice.

† The *Varṭika* has taken exception to the whole of this question and answer in the *Bhāṣya*, It is interesting to note that the न्यायसूत्रविवरण takes साधनोपालम्भ as साधनाय उपालम्भ *attacking for the purpose of supporting*.

"It is not right, says the Opponent, "to say that Disputation is *endowed with the said characteristics*; for the restriction in regard to only particular Clinchers being employed (that has been laid down in regard to Discussion) is not held to apply to Disputation. If the definition of Disputation is stated in the proposed form, it would read thus *—'Disputation is that assertion of conception and counter-conception in which supporting and condemning are by means of proofs and reasonings, which is not opposed to the main doctrine, which is carried on in due accordance with the method of reasoning through five Factors, and in which supporting and condemning are done by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers';—and it will not be right to define Disputation thus; because, with regard to the two terms 'not opposed to the main doctrine' and 'carried on in accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors', it has been pointed out (by the *Bhāṣya* on the preceding Sūtra) that they serve the purpose of restricting the number of Clinchers to be employed in Discussion, out of the whole lot of Clinchers whose admissibility would (in the absence of these two terms) be indicated by the term 'condemning'; so that in the said definition the two terms—'not opposed to the main doctrine' and 'carried on in accordance with the method of reasoning through the five Factors'—serve the purpose of *restricting*;—as a matter of fact, however, so far as Disputation is concerned, there is nothing to be *restricted* [as it admits of the the employment of *all* Clinchers]; so that the two terms, being as they are only for the purpose of restricting the number of Clinchers, should not be transferred or introduced into the present definition. For these reasons, it is not right to say that Disputation is 'endowed with the said characteristics.'"

Var: P. 163.

There is no force in this objection, we reply. Firstly, the transference of qualifications depends entirely upon plausibi-

* The छल in l 16 is entirely superfluous.

lity; so that only that much of the 'said characteristics' would be transferred (to the present definition) as is found to be applicable. "What is thus applicable?" The qualification—'in which supporting and condemning are done by means of proofs and reasonings'—is what is quite applicable (to Disputation); so what is meant by saying that Disputation is endowed with the *said characteristics* is that it has all these qualifications which are directly mentioned in the definition of Discussion [and not those that are only *implied* by the particular conditions peculiar to Discussion only; and the said 'restriction' belongs to this latter category]. Instances of this method of transference of qualifications are found in the Sūṭra of another philosophical system also: For instance, we have the two *Vaishēṣika-Sūṭras*—'The perception of colour is due to inherence in several substances and to the peculiarities of the colour' (4-1-8), and 'this explains the perceptions of taste, odour and touch' (4-1-9), where [what is mentioned in the former *Sūṭra* is said to apply to the latter *Sūṭra* also: and yet] the 'peculiarity of colour' of the former is not transferred to the latter; the 'inherence in several substances' being the only qualification that is so transferred, and this simply onthe ground that this is the only qualification that is found applicable to the latter case.* Exactly in the same manner, in our present context, that much alone can be transferred (from the former Sūṭra) as is found applicable (to the latter); and what is applicable is only what is directly mentioned as the characteristic of Discussion; so that this is all that is transferred (to the present Sūṭra), and not the *restriction implied* by the two terms; for the simple reason that there is nothing to be restricted. Or,

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* The reading of this whole passage, in the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition is corrupt; in l. 4 '[illegible]' should be read in place of '[illegible]'. In line 6, '[illegible]'—though found in both editions—would give better sense if read as '[illegible]'—'*the peculiarity of colour' is not transferred because it is not applicable.*' But in the translation we have adopted the reading as it is, and attributed to it the only sense that it can give.

secondly, we may expound the compound '*yaṭhokṭopapannaḥ*' as '*yaṭhokṭopapannēna upapannaḥ*'—one '*upapanna*' being elided on the ground of its being got at by implication from the single term '*upapanna*'; just as we have the compound '*goraṭhaḥ*' [which stands for '*gobhīḥ yukṭo raṭhaḥ*,' the '*yukṭaḥ*' being eilded, on the ground of its being got at by implication.] [The term '*yaṭhokṭopapannaḥ*', as thus expounded, will mean *endowed, upapanna, with what has been directly mentioned, yaṭhokṭopapanna,*; *i. e.*, endowed with those characteristics that are directly mentioned in the preceding Sūṭra, and not with those that are only indirectly implied]. "How do you get at this meaning?" We obtain it, as has already been explained, on the strength of the possibility of application; as a matter of fact there is no possibility in Disputation of the restriction implied by the two words; so that these, as such, can not be transferred (to its definition).

"If such be the case, then how do you justify the *Bhāṣya* [which apparently transfers the entire definition of Discussion, along with its implications, to the definition of Disputation]?" There is no force in this objection; as all that the Bhāṣya does is to explain (what is indicated directly by) the sequence of the two Sūṭra-texts,—the sense being that what is to be transferred to the latter Sūṭra is only that which is directly stated in the former as the definition [and this does not bring in the implications at all].

[The *Bhāṣya*, p. 50, l. 9 *et.-seq.* has raised the question as to Casuistry &c., being incapable of *supporting* any conclusion, and has answered it by pointing out that these are auxiliaries to proofs, serving the purpose of safeguarding one's view from attack. The *Varṭika* takes exception to this, and represents, as follows, the view of the critic]—No *supporting* (proving) or *condemning* (disproving) of any view can be done by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers; as every one of these is a kind of improper answer. For instance, Casuistry can never serve the purpose of supporting

or condemning any view, for the simple reason that it is an improper answer; Casuistry is a form of answer that is highly improper; and being so, it cannot do any *supporting* (proving) or *condemning* (disproving). Similarly with Futile Rejoinder (and Clinchers). "But these serve as auxiliaries; that is to say, when a certain proving or disproving is done by means of proofs and reasonings, Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are brought in for the puropse of safeguarding it, whereby they come in useful as auxiliaries."* But this explanation also is not acceptable; for the same reason of Casuistry and the rest being improper answers [no real safeguard can be provided by what, by its very nature, is improper and wrong, and which, therefore, cannot be a useful auxiliary].† "For what purpose then are these employed? If Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers cannot do either proving or disproving, and if they cannot come in as useful auxiliaries,—then for what purpose would they be employed at all?" They are employed simply for the purpose of demolishing the arguments of others; that is to say, Casuistry &c. are employed only by a disputant who is carried away by the idea of demolishing the arguments that have been put forward.‡ That controversy wherein Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are (consciously) employed, is
Vār. P. 164.
not a *Discussion* at all. But this should not be understood to mean that Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are either true *proofs* or

* This is the answer that has been given by the *Bhāṣya*.

† The Benares edition reads अस्मदुक्तोत्तरत्वात् for असदुत्तरत्वात्. The former would mean 'On account of the answer that we have already given.' The *Bib. Indica* reading gives clearer sense.

‡ In Discussion proper, Casuistry &c. are absolutely incapable of even obstructing a proof; but a person might employ them, when, in his anxiety for obstructing the proof put forward by the other party, he fails to realise the fact of their being *improper answers*. If, however, he is conscious of their being improper answers, then he cannot employ them in a Discussion; such conscious use of improper answers being possible only in Disputation and Wrangling [where even though, being improper and wrong, they cannot actually do any proving or disproving, yet they suffice to accomplish the discomfiture of the other party.]—*Tātparya*.

auxiliaries (in the other two forms of Controversy, Disputation and Wrangling); for the exact circumstances under which Casuistry &c come to be employed (during Disputations and Wranglings) are as follows :—When a right proof has been adduced by one party, the other has his mind confounded by that fact, and (while in this confused state of mind, and unable to bring forward the proper answer) he puts forward Casuistry and the rest, * with the hope that his opponent might be upset by the Casuistry &c. and thus become defeated in the Disputation [securing to himself the victory that is the sole motive of Disputation or Wrangling]. Casuistry and the rest, therefore, are never to be employed by a person desiring to get at the truth ; they are to be employed by those whose sole desire is for victory over his opponent, [so that so long as this end is secured, it does not matter whether or not *proving* or *disproving* is actually accomplished].

Thus it is that 'the assertion of a conception and its counter-conception' becomes a 'Discussion', when no such improper answers as Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are employed,—and 'Disputation' or 'Wrangling', when these are employed.

In the *Bhāṣya* on the preceding Sūṭra (p. 49, l. 1) 'conception and counter-conception' have been explained as consisting in the allegation of two contrary characters as subsisting in the same substratum ;—and the same applies to the present case also.

"But as a matter of fact, it is not possible for two contrary characters to subsist in the same substratum; for it is absolutely impossible for a single thing to have both characters. If two contrary characters could subsist in the same substratum, it would mean that a single thing can have two (opposite) characters; and as this is an absolute impossibility, it is not right to speak of 'two contrary characters subsisting in the same substratum.'"

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* The right reading for छलादौ is छलादीनपि as read by the Benares Edition.

There is no force in this objection; as it is quite possible for two contrary characters to be alleged as subsisting in the same substratum, when one is real and another merely imaginary; *i. e.* one of the two characters subsists in reality in the thing, while the other has a purely imaginary existence. And in this sense it is quite right to speak of the thing as possessed of two characters. *

"Well, if two contrary characters can co-exist in a single substratum, we fail to understand how they are 'contrary' to each other †."

There is no force in your contention, we reply; as it is quite possible for the two to be regarded as 'contraries' even when they are so related that one merely alters the nature of the other; *i. e.* in this case 'contrariness' would consist merely in the altering of the nature of the other,‡ and not either in the setting aside or destroying of each other [and it would be only in the latter two cases that two 'contraries' could not co-exist in a single substratum].

Sūṭra (3)

Viṭaṇḍā-Wrangling.

THAT SAME DISPUTATION IS WRANGLING WHEN THERE IS NO ESTABLISHING OF THE COUNTER-CONCEPTION.§ (Sū. 3)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 51, L. 2 to L. 7]

The aforesaid Disputation becomes 'Wrangling';—with this further qualification that it is without any establishing of the counter-conception. That is to say, out of the above

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* धर्मौ विरुद्धम् of the *Bib. Ind.* edition gives no sense; the right reading is धर्मिणि युगपत् as found in the Benares Edition.

† There is the natural law that of two contraries one must destroy the other; how then can there be co-existence of any two contraries?

‡ The च in l. 13, found in the Bib. Ind. edition, is wrong.

§ The 'Sacred Books of the Hindus' edition reads the *Sūṭra* as 'स्वपक्षविपक्ष' This is not supported by any of the available commentaries, nor by the Puri manuscripts nor by the explanations given by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*. The last says—'The *conception* of the critic himself is what is called *counter-conception* here,—as opposed to the view that he is criticising.'

described two allegations in regard to two contrary characters as subsisting in the same substratum,—which have been called above, 'conception and counter-conception'—the Wrangler does not establish one (that which he himself holds), but only goes on to criticise the (proofs adduced for establishing the) conception of the other person.

"In that case the definition of Wrangling had better be stated in the form that it is that Disputation *which is without a counter-conception*."*

But as a matter of fact, the statement that the Wrangler makes in attacking his opponent's view could constitute his own 'view'; and what is meant (by there being no establishing of the counter-conception) is that he does not proceed to establish the proposition which he lays down as to be proved by himself. And (for this reason) it is better to have the definition as it stands in the Sūṭra.†

Vārṭika on Sū. (3)

[P, 164, L. 16 to P. 165, L. 4]

That same Disputation is Wrangling when &c., &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The term 'when there is no establishing of the counter-conception' means that the Wrangler, who holds the view representing the counter-conception, does not establish any view.

Others have argued as follows—"It is best to define *Wrangling* as consisting of *criticism only*; the qualification *only* indicating that the Wrangler has no *view* of his own".‡

* When there is no *establishing* of the critic's own view, it follows that he has no *view* of his own to establish; for unless an attempt is made by a person to establish a certain idea, the idea cannot be called a 'pakṣa', a *view*.

† When the wrangler confines himself to merely criticising the opponent's view, he does so with the idea that when the opponent's view has been rejected as wrong, it would follow as a necessary consequence that his own view is right; so that he does have a *view* of his own; but it is stated in wrangling, only in the form of the attack on the other view; this 'criticism' being figuratively spoken of as his 'view'.—So that the meaning is that though the wrangler has a view of his own, yet he does not make any attempt at *establishing* it, apart from the attack that he directs against the other view. Hence it is only right to speak of there being no *establishing* of his own view; but it would be wrong to say that *there is* no other view.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

‡ This according to the *Ṭāṭparya*, is only a presentation of the objection as urged in the *Bhāṣya*.

Such a definition would be highly improper,* we reply. Because as a matter of fact the critic actually accepts four things; when propounding a criticism, the critic accepts —(1) the presence of the view criticised, (2) the fact that the conception of the other party represents a wrong idea, (3) the presence of the propounder of that other view, and (4) the presence of himself, as the person to whom the other view is propounded;—and all this would be impossible if you said that the critic accepts and states *the criticism only*.

Vār. P. 165. "Even if we mention *the criticism only*, all the rest (of the above four) would be naturally implied by it." In that case, (if mere implication were accepted) it would be just as well to define Wrangling as 'Wrangling';—the idea that it attacks the view of the other party being implied by the etymological signification of the name '*Viṭaṇḍā*', 'Wrangling' itself,—which means 'that whereby (a certain view) is wrangled' (*viṭaṇḍyaṭē yayā*).

For these reasons we conclude that it is best to accept the definition as stated in the *Sūṭra*.

ADHYĀYA I.

Daily Discourse II.

Section (2).

Of the Fallacious Probans.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 51, L. 8.]

The '*Hēṭvābhāsas*', 'Fallacious Probans', are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans, and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to *appear* as such. And these—

(1) THE SAVYABHICHĀRA (INCONCLUSIVE), (2) THE VIRUḌḌHA (CONTRADICTORY), (3) THE PRAKARAṆASAMA (NEUTRALISED), (4) THE SĀḌHYA-

* 'चतुर्णां' of the Benares edition is the right reading.

SAMA (UNKNOWN), AND THE KĀLĀṬĪṬA (MISTIMED) —ARE THE FALLACIOUS PROBANS.* (SŪṬRA 4).

Vārṭika on Sūṭra (4).

[P. 165, L. 7 to P. 171, L. 14.]

The 'Fallacious Probans' are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to appear as such—says the *Bhāṣya*; and such Fallacious Probans are the following:—(1) *Inconclusive,* (2) *Contradictory,* (3) *Neutralised,* (4) *Unknown, and* (5) *Mistimed* (or Annulled).

"Wherein lies the 'similarity' of what are not true Probans to the true Probans, in virtue of which they *appear* as Probans?"

The following are the points of *similarity*:—(a) *Being put forward after the Proposition*: Just as the true Probans is put forward aftor the Proposition, so also is the Fallacious Probans; and this constitutes a 'similarity'. (b) *Possessing of anyone of the characteristics of the Probans*; *i. e.* the true Probans that is put forward in proof of the Proposition is endowed with three characteristics [(1) it is concomitant with the Probandum, (2) it subsists in a substratum where the Probandum is acknowledged to subsist, and (3) it is acknowledged not to subsist where the Probandum is known to be absent]; and if what is put forward happens to possess any one of these three, this constitutes a 'similarity' to the true Probans; or according to the view that the Probans need fulfil only two conditions (the first two of the three mentioned), the 'similarity' may be said to consist in the possessing of any one of the *two* characteristics of the Probans.† [While their 'similarity' consists in the above] their

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* The name of the fifth is कालातीत in the Bhāṣya edition (Vizianagram Series); and also in the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध and the Ṭāṭparya; it is अतीतकाल in both editions of the *Vārṭika* and in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण

† The former similarity is *formal*, and the latter *real*, says the *Ṭāṭparya*; and it proceeds to add that though the trne Probaus should fulfil *five* conditions—it should not be *annulled* and it should not be *neutralised*, in addition to the three conditions

difference lies in the fact that while one proves, the other does not prove; *i. e.* the true Probans actually proves the Proposition and the Fallacious Probans does not. "To what is this difference due?" It is due to the fact that while the true Probans fulfills all the conditions, the Fallacious Probans fulfills only a few of them.

"What is the purpose of this *Sūtra*?"

It has been explained that it serves the purpose of restricting (the actual number of the Fallacious Probans) by means of the classification put forward. "What is it that has to be restricted by the classification?" As a matter of fact, the extent of the Probans, right and wrong, is vast, appearing in numerous ways; and it is necessary to curtail or restrict this vast extent. "In what numerous diverse ways do the Probans, right and wrong, appear?" Well, as a matter of fact, if we take into consideration the diversities of time, of person, and of the thing to be proved, their number cannot be counted; but in a general way, if we take into consideration only the diversity due to the relation of the Probans to the Probandum, the number of Probans, right and wrong, on being computed, comes to be 176. *E.g.* the diversity in a character concomitant with the Probandum is *sixteen-fold*; so also is the diversity of that character which subsists in only a part of the Probandum; and so also that of the character which does not subsist in the Probandum; and in both of these cases the Probans may be put forward in a qualified form, which will admit of a further twofold diversity due to the fact of either the *qualifying* factor or the *qualified* factor being unknown; and this would afford 64 diversities; the further diversity caused by the fact of the *qualifying* factor

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mentioned in the text,—yet the Author has mentioned only three; it being immaterial how many are mentioned, as all that the Author means to point out here is that the Fallacious Probans should fulfil *some*, not all, conditions of the true Probans.

or the *qualified* factor being inapt*, yields another 64 [and these 64 and 64, along with the former three, 16, 16 and 16, make up 176].

Out of these, we are going to cite examples of those sixteen kinds of Probans (right and wrong) that are concomitant with the Probandum†:—(1) That which is concomitant with the Probandum, and also with things homologous to it (*i. e.* in which the predicated character is known to subsist) and with things not similar to it—*i.e.* with the *Reverse*, (that wherein the predicated character is known not to subsist); *e. g.* 'sound is eternal (or non-eternal), because it is *knowable* (where *knowability* subsists in sound, in all *eternal* things and also in all *non-eternal* things); [this is too wide];—(2) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue (that which is similar to the Probandum in possessing the predicated character), and which subsists in a part of the Reverse (that wherein the predicated character is known to be absent)‡; *e. g.* 'this is a cow, because *it has horns*' (where

* Both editions read अयथार्थत्वे &c. But the correct reading apparently should be only अयत्वे. This is clear from P. 169, l. 13 below.

† It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that among older writers, the terms '*pakṣa*' and '*sādhya*' are used promiscuously. Later writers use the term 'pakṣa' for the *subject* of the Proposition, and '*sādhya*' for the predicate of the Proposition, *i. e.* that which is asserted of the *subject*. But no such restriction of usage is found among older writers. For instance, in the present context, '*sādhya*' is the same as '*pakṣa*'; as is clear from the text of l. 2, on next page. In fact the term '*sādhya*' is used in its literal sense of *what is to be proved*; and the confusion in usage is due to the diversity of opinion as to the exact nature of what is actually *proved* by the Inference. This has been discussed in detail by the *Vārtika* on Su. 1-1-5 (*Translation*, pp. 172-174.) Bearing this in mind, the next sentence exemplifying the (1) of the 16, may be rendered according to modern usage as—'that which subsists in (is concomitant with) the Subject, and also in things where the predicated character is known to subsist, and also where the predicated character is known not to subsist';—and so throughout in the present constext; but we prefer to use the term 'probandum', as it means *what is to be proved*, and as such is an exact equivalent to the original term '*sādhya*', so that it lends itself to the same uses as the original term.

‡ With a view to guard against having to insert the parenthetical explanation at each step, it may be stated here that the term 'Homologue' will, in the present context, stand for what the text calls '*sajātīya*', by which is meant the '*sapakṣa*' of the

it is found that *horns* are present in the animal present, and is present in all *cows* and also in some *non-cows*); [this is too wide];—(3) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue, and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, because *it is a product*' [where the character of product subsists in sound, and in its homologues, the non-eternal jar etc.; and it does not subsist in the *eternal* Soul); [this is *valid*];—(4) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.*, 'sound is eternal, because *it is a product*' (where the character of *product* subsists in sound, but in no other eternal thing, and it is found in all non-eternal things); [this is contradictory];—(5) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, which does not subsist in the Homologue, and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'sound is eternal, because *while being possessed of generality and individuality it is perceptible by our external sense-organ*' (where the character stated is found to be present in sound, it is not present in any eternal thing, and it subsists in *some* non-eternal things); [this is contradictory];—(6) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, and does not subsist in either the Homologue or the Reverse; *e. g.*, 'sound is eternal, because *while possessed of generality and individuality, it is perceptible by the auditory organ*, like the jar' (where the character mentioned is one that subsists in sound, but not in any other thing, eternal or non-eternal; [this is too specific];—(7) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in a part of the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse also;—*e. g.* 'this is a non-cow, because *it has horns*' (horns are found in non-cows and in cows also); [this is too wide];—(8) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in the Homologue and in a part of the Reverse;—*e. g.* 'Sound is eternal because it

later writers, that in which the predicated character is admitted by both parties to subsist; and the term 'Reverse' will stand for '*vipakṣa*', that in which the predicated character is admitted by both parties to be non-subsistent.

is *intangible*' (intangibility subsisting in all eternal things and also in some non-eternal things); [this is too wide];—(9) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in a part of the Homologue, and also in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because having generality and individuality, it is perceptible to us by our external sense-organs*'; here the qualifying term 'having generality and individuality' is added with a view to exclude Generality (which has no generality), Inherence (which also has no generality) and Individuality (which has no further individuality); the term 'perceptible to us' serves to exclude atoms; and 'perceptible by external organs' excludes the Soul; [this reasoning is valid];—(10) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* when a person states the following reasoning entirely on the basis of his own doctrine—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product' [which is *valid* if the man holds that sound is actually *produced*; and yet the reasoning to the contrary also would be valid—'Sound is eternal *because it is not a product*'—when put forward by the man on the basis of his own doctrine that Sound is never *produced*, it is only *manifested*]; [this is *valid*];—(11) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal, *because it is perceptible by external sense-organs*'; [this is contradictory];—(15) that which is

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concomitant with the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the living body is not without soul, as (if it were) it would not be the receptacle of the sense-organs'; [this is *valid*];—(16) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse; *e. g.* 'all things are eternal because they are knowable'; [this is too specific]. These are the sixteen kinds of Probans concomitant with the Probandum; out of these, five (3, 9, 10, 11 and 15) are true Probans,

and the rest are only *apparent* (fallacious) Probans. Of the former five, two, the *third* and the *ninth*, are affirmative-negative, not subsisting in the Reverse at all; the *tenth* and *eleventh*, as propounded by a person entirely on the basis of his own doctrines, are universal-affirmative; and the fifteenth is negative.

The following are the sixteen kinds of Probans subsisting in a part of the Probandum (the second group of sixteen, mentioned in the *Text* at the bottom of p. 165):—(1) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and is concomitant with the Homologue and the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Earth, Water, Fire and Ākāsha are non-eternal, *because they are inodorous*';—(2) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind have generality and individuality and are perceptible by our external sense-organs, *because they are non-eternal*';—(3) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind are non-eternal *because they are products*';—(4) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind are eternal, *because they are products*'*;—(5) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and subsists in a part of Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind are possessed of generality and individuality and are perceptible by our external sense-organs, *because they are eternal*';—(6) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and does not subsist in either the Homologue or the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal *because it has for its non-constituent cause a disjunction born of disjunction*';—(7) that which subsists in part of the Probandum and

* This subsists in a part of the Probandum, as *Ḍhvamsa* is an eternal thing and is a product. The reading अनित्ये is wrong; as the reasoning with this word would be perfectly valid.

in a part of the Homologue, and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'atoms are non-eternal *because they are inodorous*';—(8) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, in a part of the Homologue and in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal*';—(9) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum and in a part of the Homologue, and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'speech and mind are non-eternal, because possessed of generality and individuality they are perceptible by our external sense-organs'*;—(10) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Colour and Cognition are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal, like sensation*'; when this reasoning would be put forward on the basis of a definite (Bauḍḍha) doctrine [according to which the *skanḍhas* of Sensation, Name and Impression, which are different from the *skanḍhas* of Colour and Cognition, are non-eternal, and as such constitute the Homologue with which the 'incorporeality' is concomitant]; †—(11) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and in whose case there is no Homologue ‡; *e. g.* 'the eye and cognition are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal, like Colour &c.*';—(12) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, which does not subsist in the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'sound and mind are non-eternal, *because they are audible*';—(13) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum §, in whose case there is no Homologue and which is concomitant with the Reverse;

Var : P. 168.

* The Benares Edition reads बाह्याध्यक्षतो for बाह्य.ध्यक्षौ; neither is satisfactory; the former gives better sense; but the syntax is not clear.

† The words enclosed within brackets in the Benares Edition are not wanted.

‡ साध्यसपक्षातोवैकदेश of the *Bib. Ind.* edition is wrong reading. The correct reading is supplied by the Benares edition—साध्यैकदेश.

§ In several places in this para. the Benares edition reads स.ध्यैकदेशावृत्ति but the original reading at the very outset is साध्यैकदेशवृत्ति; and *ex-hypothesi* every one of these sixteen is साध्यैकदेशवृत्ति.

e. g. 'sound and mind are eternal*, *because they are products*';—(14) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the eye and cognition are eternal, *because they are corporeal*';—(15) that which subsists in a part the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the body† is not without Soul, because (if it were) it would not be the receptacle of the sense-organs';—(16) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse;—*e.g.* 'All things are non-eternal *because they are incorporeal.*' All these sixteen kinds of Probans, subsisting as they do in only a part of the Probandum, are all fallacious.

The following are the sixteen kinds of Probans not subsisting in the Probandum (the third group of sixteen mentioned in the *Text*, bottom of p. 165):—(1) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, and which is concomitant with the Homologue and the Reverse; *e.g.*, 'the Earth is non eternal, *because it is inodorous*';—(2) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which is concomitant with the Homologue and subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is not audible*'; —(3) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and does not subsist in the Reverse‡; *e. g.* 'Sound is a *thing* (*i. e.* a Substance, a Quality or an Action), *because it is inaudible and is possessed of a generality*';§—(4) that which

* The reading अनित्ये would make the reasoning quite valid, which it is not.

† The reasoning with the term 'शरीरत्' 'body' is invalid; if it were 'जीवच्छरीरं', living body', it would make it valid.

‡ विपक्षावृत्तिः and विपक्षवृत्तिः, both readings will suit here; but the *Tātparya* favours विपक्षावृत्तिः :

§ If mere 'inaudibility' were put forward, that would apply to Generality etc. also, which are not '*artha*'; so that the Probans, in that case, will not be विपक्षावृत्तिः; hence the further qualification of *possessing generality* is added; which excludes Generality and the rest, which have no generality at all.—*Tātparya.* 'The name *artha* applies to Substance, Quality and Action'—says the Vaishēṣika Sūtra 8·2-3.

does not subsist in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and which is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is a *thing*, because it has no generality';—(5) that which does not subsist either in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and which subsists in the Reverse;* *e. g.* 'Sound has a cause, *because it is not a thing*';—(6) that which subsists neither in the Probandum, nor in the Homologue, nor in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal, *because it is a nonentity*';—(7) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue and which is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is intangible, *because it is a substance*';—(8) that which does not subsist in the Probandum and which subsists in a part of the Homologue and also in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound has a cause *because it is corporeal*';—(9) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound has a receptacle *because it is visible*'; this reasoning fulfulling the said conditions according to the doctrine of the Vaishēṣikas†;—(10) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which is concomitant with the Homologue and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal *because it is not audible*'; this reasoning being urged on the basis of a particular doctrine (of the *Sauṭrānṭikas*, for whom nothing is eternal, whence no 'Reverse' in the said reasoning would be possible);—(11) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is corporeal*';—(12) that which does not subsist in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is a non-entity*';—(18) that which does not

* विपक्षवृत्ति is the correct reading; विपक्षावृत्ति would make this identical with (6).

† Tuis has been added with a view to meet the objection that Iuherence is visible and yet without a receptacle, and so *visibility* is not non-subsistent in the Reverse. According to the Vaishēṣikas however Inherence is *not visible*, being beyond the reach of the Senses, and knowable only by Inference (see *Prashasṭapāḍa*, P. 329).

subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal *because it is inaudible*';—(14) that which not does subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; 'Sound is eternal *because it is incorporeal*';*—(15) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal *because is is a non-entity*';—(16) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse; *e. g.* 'All things are non-eternal *because they are non-entities*.' All these sixteen, not subsisting in the Probandum, are *Fallacious Probans*.

Var: P. 169.

"It has been said above (p. 166, l. 1), that the two groups of sixteen will afford 64 varieties,† through the diversity caused by either the qualifying factor or the qualified factor being unknown [when the Probans is stated in a qualified form];—now how does this come about?" This comes about from the fact of both the concomitant and the non-concomitant Probans being stated in a qualified form; that is to say, the sixteen that are concomitant with the Probandum (the first group of 16 described above) and also those that subsist in part of the Probandum (the second group of 16 described above),—these 32 become 6 when we take into consideration the diversity caused by the fact of either the qualifying factor or the qualified factor being *unknown*. Of these we shall give examples of the concomitant Probans first—(1) 'Sound is non-eternal, *because being undenotable it is knowable*'; where the qualifying factor (*being undenotable*) is unknown (sound being known to be something

* The Benares edition reads अमूर्तत्वात् for अभवत्वात्; and (15) has dropped out of the *Bib. Ind.* edition. It is supplied by the Benares edition thus—साध्याननुवृत्ति-रविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षावृत्तिः नित्यः शब्दोऽभावत्वात्.

† The *Bib. Ind.* reading is corrupt. The correct reading is scpplied by the Benares edition 'चतुःषष्टि' for 'तुपचः षड्भ'.

quite denotable by words);—(2) 'Sound is non-eternal *because being knowable, it is undenotable*'; where *being undenotable* is the qualified factor and is unknown. We can find similar varieties in regard to every one of the 16 Probans concomitant with the Probandum; and the same examples will serve in both cases (by reversing the qualified and qualifying factors, as just shown). As examples of similar varieties of the Probans that subsists in a part of the Probandum, we have the following:—(1)' Earth, Water, Fire, and Ākāsha are non-eternal, because *being undenotable they are inodorous*', where the qualifying factor (*being undenotable*) is unknown;—(2) 'the same, Earth etc., are non-eternal, because *being inodorous they are undenotable*', where 'undenotability' is the qualified factor and is unknown. Similarly with all other Probans subsisting in a part of the Probandum.

Similarly we may trace the 64 varieties due to the diversity caused by the fact of the qualified or the qualifying factor being inapt *E. g.*, 'Sound is non-eternal, *because being a product it is knowable*' [where the qualified factor, *knowability*, is inapt, being absolutely incapable of proving what it is put forward to prove], and 'Sound is non-eternal, *because being knowable it is a product*' [where *knowability* is the qualifying factor, and is inapt]. Similarly with every one of the examples.

Similar 64 varieties would be available, due to the diversity caused by the qualifying or the qualified factor being doubtful; *e. g.* 'this is the peacock's sound, because while containing the *ṣadja and the other notes of the musical scale, it does not consist of distinct letter-sounds*,' [where the qualifying factor, the presence of the other notes besides *ṣadja*, is doubtful, the peacock's voice being held to consist almost entirely of the 'ṣadja' note alone]; and 'this is the peacock's sound, *because while not consisting of distinct letter-sounds, it contains the ṣadja and other notes of the musical scale*' [where the presence of the other notes is the qualified factor, which is doubtful].

The (3 times 64, 192) instances enumerated above are those in which both parties admit of the *unknown* and *doubtful* characters of the qualifying and qualified factors entering into the nature of the Probans subsisting in the Probandum. Those instances again where only one or the other of the two parties admits of the *unknown* character, will be 128, made up of those that are concomitant with the Probandum and those that are not concomitant with it (subsisting in only a part of it)*. The same 64 varieties again become 192 (3 times 64) through the diversity caused by—(1) the fact of the qualified and qualifying factors being *not co-existent*, (2) the fact of the qualified and qualifying factors being *doubtful*, and (3) the fact of the qualifying and qualified factors being *inapt*. Again there are 123 varieties caused by the diversity due to the qualified and the qualifying factors having unknown substrata,—unknown to one or to both parties. These again, as before, lead on to another group of 192†. For example—'This place is fiery because it is smoky' [where the qualified factor, the *place*, is held by both parties to be not the substratum of *fieriness*‡]; and 'the Soul exists because it has the qualities of Desire and the rest' [where the *Soul*, as the substratum of *existence* or of the *qualities*, is not accepted by one of the parties, the Bauḍḍha or the Vedāntin, for instance.]

Var: P. 170.

Following is an instance where the qualifying factor is inapt, not-concomitant and unknown :—'Sound is non-eternal, because while following after effort it is a product' [where the qualified factor, *being a product*, is itself apt to prove *non-eternality*, and the qualification 'following after effort' is

* द्वात्रिंशं शतम् would be 132; but as the number will be only twice 64, the *Tātparya* rightly interprets it as 128, expounding the compound द्वात्रिंशं as 'thirty less than 2'.

† A whole line is wanting in the *Bib. Ind.* edition—after द्वात्रिंशं शतम्:—ध॰ ... अथैकतरासिद्धा द्वात्रिंशं शतम् ते पुनः पूर्ववदेव द्वानवतं शतम्

‡ It having been shown above (*Text*, P. 52) that what is proved by the Inference is not the *place* as being fiery,—but the *Fiery Place*.

entirely superfluous, and hence inapt].* The following is an instance where the qualified factor is not-concomitant, and inapt:—'Sound is non-eternal, because while differing with the difference in its cause, it is apprehended.'†

The following is an instance where the qualified factor is not co-existent:— 'Primordial Matter exists, because there is uniformity among its diverse modifications'.‡ The following is an instance where the qualifying factor is not co-existent— 'The words *colour*, *taste*, *odour*, *touch* and *sound* have denotations entirely different from that of the word *sandal*, because, while not bearing (to the sandal,) the relation of compound and component, they are referred to by means of that word'.§ The same reason when stated inversely affords the instance of the non-existent qualified factor.||

An instance where the Probans put forward is actually known to be otherwise, we have in the following argument as put forward by others (the Mīmānsakas)—'Word is eternal, because it is repeated (by several persons).' [Where, as a matter of fact it is known that repetition proves, not only eternality, but non-eternality also, as will be shown below, in Aḍhyāya II]. The following again is an instance

* The same reasoning, when stated in the form 'because while being a product, it follows after effort', would also be an instance of the qualified factor being inapt etc., etc.

† 'Being apprehended' is the qualified factor; and as it belongs to eternal things also, it is *inapt*, unable to prove *non-eternality*, which is proved by the other character, of 'differing with difference in the cause'.

‡ What is meant by this reasoning is that every modification of matter—in the shape of the several things of the world—shows this uniform character that it is of the nature of pleasure, pain and stupefaction. The fallacy of this lies in the fact that the 'uniformity' found in the modifications is put forward to prove the existence of Primordial Matter; so that the Probans is in a substratum other than that of the Probandum.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

§ We have the assertion 'colour &c. of the sandal', which shows that the things, colour &c., belong to the sandal and are not its component parts. So that the absence of this relation subsists in the *things*, colour &c.; while what are referred to by means of the word 'sandal' are the words 'colour' &c.

|| *i. e.* when stated in the form—'because while they are referred to by means of the word *sandal*, they do not bear the relation of compound and component.'

Up to this, we have had 832 varieties.

where the qualifying factor is doubtful and unknown—'This place is fiery, because while being smoky it gives light',—this reasoning being urged while the presence of smoke is merely suspected.* When the same reasoning is put forward in the inverse form ('because while giving light it is smoky') we have an instance of the doubtful qualified factor.

Thus then we find that the *doubtful*, the *unknown*, and the *non-concomitant*, (which have been shown to be 32 in number) become sixty-four, through the diversity caused by its being unknown to both or one of the two parties.† And these, by the computation indicated above, make up the number 384. The same number we have in connection with those Probans that are known to be otherwise. The same computation applies to those in whom the qualifying factor is contradictory, and also to those in whom the qualified factor is contradictory. And examples of these are to be found under the *Vārṭika* dealing with the individual Fallacious Probans (on the next five Sūṭrās), and may also be observed by the student himself.

Thus then, by the several computations detailed above, the number of Probans, right and wrong, through due distinction being drawn between the diversities attending the qualifying and qualified factors, comes to be 2032. And if we take into consideration the diversities due to *being unknown* and other defects of the Probans, the variety becomes innumerable. As for the Probans not subsisting in the Probandum, inasmuch as they are absolutely non-existent (in the Probandum) they could not be qualified by any qualifications; and as such they are not mentioned under the defects attending the qualified and qualifying factors.

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* reads धूमाविश्वासे for धूमाविश्वासो which is found in both editions. The translation follows the reading of the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† The reading in both editions is corrupt. The translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Ṭāṭparya*, in the following words—ये चाज्ञातासिद्धा-स्तावत्त्वेन द्वात्रिंशत् उभयान्यतरासिद्धतया चतुःषष्टिर्भवन्ति.

Thus have been described in full detail those Probans that are concomitant and non-concomitant with the actually existing Probandum. Of these the sixteen principal varieties of the 'unknown' Probans are such as do not subsist in the Probandum. The Inconclusive Probans have only six main varieties; among those concomitant with the Probandum, the number of the Contradictory Probans is only four; and the last of them, subsisting in every possible Probandum, is *too universal*. The other Fallacious Probans, which are *Unknown*, *Inconclusive* and *Contradictory*, are, each of them, diversified through being non-concomitant and unknown; * and the examples of these are to be found among those we have already cited.

Vār: P. 171.

Some people assert that the Inconclusive Probans is the same as that which is not unconcomitant with the contradictory. But this is not right; simply because it is an impossibility; we have already explained that '*avyabhichāra*', *absence of non-concomitance*, is not possible in reference to two contradictory things (*i. e.* nothing can be concomitant with two contradictories). If however we do admit of such concomitance, then the number of varieties of such a Probans becomes 25; there are five Probans; and each of these being opposed (or contradicted) by similar and dissimilar Probans, give rise to five pentads. Examples of every one of these twenty-five varieties are not possible; hence they are not illustrated.†

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* The Benares edition reads शेषविरुद्धानैकान्तिकासिद्धा अव्यतिरेकाप्रसिद्धभेदेन बहुप्रकाराः। The passage as read in the *Bib. Ind.* edition would mean—'the other Fallacious Probans, which are Inconclusive, become, diversified through being non-concomitant—contradictory and well-known-non-concomitant'. The former reading is decidedly better.

† The 'five pentads' are thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—There are two kinds of the universal affirmative Probans, that which is concomitant with the Homologue and that which is not so concomitant; the negative Probans is only one; and the positive-negative Probans is of two kinds, that which is concomitant with the Homologue and that which is not concomitant with it. These five are opposed by similar and dissimilar Probans; *i.e.*, the universal affirmative Probans is contradicted by another universal affirmative Probans; as also by the other four kinds; similarly

Such are the Fallacious Probans, whose varieties have been briefly described as above; and with a view to include all these varieties, the Author has put forward the Sūṭra, which sets out the divisions of the Fallacious Probans. "We find that the fact that the number of Fallacious probans is five is implied by the definitions provided (in the next five Sūṭras); *i. e.* that the number of Fallacious Probans is five is clearly indicated by the five Sūṭras that propound the definitions of the five Fallacious probans; so that the present Sūṭra, if it were simply meant to restrict the number to five, would be entirely superfluous." It is certainly not superfluous; as all that the definition does is to differentiate (a thing from like and unlike things); that is, all that the definitions (provided in the next five Sūṭras) do is to differentiate the Fallacious Probans from one another; and they do not restrict the number to five; the definitions do not indicate that the number of Fallacious Probans is five only.

Sūṭra (5).

The Inconclusive Probans (1).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 51, L. 11 to P. 52, L. 5].

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans—

'The Inconclusive* is that which is tainted by indecision.'—Sū. 5.

The term '*vyabhichāra*', 'indecision', means *non-fixity on any one point*†; and that which is accompanied by this 'indecision' is the 'indecisive'. As for example, in the reasoning

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with each of the other four kinds; so that with each of the five there are five contradictories; thus giving the number 25, which is the number of those that are concomitant with contradictories.

*The term, अनैकान्तिक is explained by the न्यायसूत्रविवरण as follows—'एकस्य', साध्यस्य साध्याभावस्य वा 'अन्ते' अविचलतयावस्थितिः इति एकान्तः। तद्वान्: 'ऐकान्तिकः'. उभयस्मिन् अन्ते वा नियतः न एकान्तः:— says the *Bhāṣya* below (P. 52, l. 4). On this Sū. the *Tāṭparya* remarks that the terms 'inconclusive' and 'indecisive' being synonymous—which is the term defined and which the defining term should vary with the student. If he knows the meaning of 'inconclusive' and not that of 'indecisive' then the latter shall be for him the defined term, and the former the defining term, and so *vice versa*.

†*I. E.*, When a Probans is found to be concomitant with neither *the probandum only*, nor the *negation of the probandum only*,—but with *both*—then it is said to be 'tainted by *vyabhichara* or indecision'.

'Sound is eternal, *because it is intangible*,—the jar which is *tangible* has been found to be non-eternal,—and Sound is *not tangible*,—therefore, being intangible, Sound must be eternal', —we find that the character of *intangibility* has been put forward as proving the character of *non-eternality*; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of *proof and proved* (Probans and Probandum); [as all non-eternal things are not tangible, *e. g.* Buḍḍhi is non-eternal and yet it is intangible]; for we find that the *Atom* is tangible and yet eternal*. If the Soul and such other things (which combine *eternality* with *intangibility*) be cited as the instance (supporting the reasoning), then,—inasmuch as the Probans has been defined (above, in Sū. 1-1-34) as 'that which establishes the Probandum through similarity to the instance',—' intangiblity' will have to be regarded as the Probans; and this would be found to be not necessarily concomitant with *eternality*,—*e. g.* in the case of *Buḍḍhi*, which is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal*. So that in both kinds of instance [in that of dissimilarity, in the case of *jar* cited before, which is tangible and non-eternal,—and in that of *similarity*, as in the case of *Soul*, which is intangible and eternal], there is 'indecision', non-concomitance, (between *intangibility* and *non-eternality*); and thus they cannot be accepted to be related as *probans and probandum*; and thus, not fulfilling the conditions of the Probans, what is cited in the above reasoning cannot be a true Probans.

[If the term 'अनैकान्तिक:' be taken as embodying the definition, and 'सव्यभिचार:' as the term defined, in that case the word अनैकान्तिक:, should be explained as follows:]—In the reasoning cited, eternality is one *anta*', *point*, and 'non-eternality' is another one '*anta*', *point*; that which subsists in—is concomitant with—*one point* would be '*ēkānṭa*', *one-pointed*; and the contrary (that is not concomitant, with *one*) would be '*ānaikānṭa*', *not one-pointed*; as this would be concomitant with both (the Probandum, *eternality*, and its contrary, *non-eternality*).†

Vārṭika on Sūṭra 5.

[P. 171, L. 16 to P. 173, L. 16].

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans, the Inconclusive is that which is indecisive—says the *Bhāṣya*. The

* So that we cannot deduce *intangibility* from *eternality*.

† In this case the definition of this Fallacious Probans will be 'that which is positively or negatively concomitant with (*i. e.* whose presence or absence is concomitant with) both, the probandum as well as the reverse'; and this will be a true definition, as serving to exclude all the other Fallacious Probans, the *Contradictory* etc.

term '*ēkānṭa*' means *that which is fixed on one point* (*ēkasmin anṭē niyaṭaḥ*').

"What is *indecisiveness?*"

Indecisiveness consists in the Probans subsisting in the Probandum, in the Homologue and also elsewhere; hence that Probans is called 'indecisive' which, while subsisting in the Probandum and its Homologue, subsists in other things also; and such subsisting constitutes 'indecision' (or non-concomitance, with the Probandum). In connection with every individual thing, except *Knowability* (which belongs to all things), there are two aspects (positive and negative); *e. g.* 'eternality'—'non-eternality', 'pervading'—'non-pervading', and so on; and if it is found that what is put forward as the Probans applies to both these aspects, it is called 'Inconclusive.'

[The Bauḍḍha urges the following objection]:—

Var: P. 172.

"The term 'inconclusive' being a negative term (*not-conclusive*), does the negative particle connote Paryuḍāsa, *exclusion* (so that 'not-conclusive', denoting *exclusion* of something, which implies the inclusion of others, stands for that something *positive*, which is *other than conclusive*)? or merely *prasajyapratiṣēḍha*, preclusion (so that 'non-conclusive,' denoting mere preclusion which does not imply inclusion, stands for a simple negation or non-existence, the *absence of the conclusive*)?* 'What does this mean?' It means that if *exclusion* is meant, then every Fallacious Probans can be called 'Inconclusive': If 'Inconclusive' stands for *what is non-conclusive*, then every kind of Fallacious Probans becomes included in the term; [as it is only the true Probans that is 'conclusive', every Fallacious Probans would be *not-conclusive*]; and this would mean that there is only one kind of Fallacious Probans (the Inconclusive). If, on the other hand, the negative particle means *simple* preclusion or non-existence, the term 'inconclusive' would mean the *non-existence of the conclusive*; and certainly this *non-existence*

* As a rule, in negative compounds the former connotation is accepted.

could not stand for *indecision* or *non-concomitance* [as *concomitance* and *non-concomitance* are properties belonging to positive things; and they can never subsist in m re *non-existence*, which, by its very nature, is something with egard to which nothing can be predicated]; so that in this case it wound be wrong to call any Fallacious Probans 'inconclusive.'"†

Our answer to the above is that we do not admit the view that the negative particle (in 'Inconclusive') connotes *exclusion*; we hold that it connotes *Preclusion*. "But *Preclusion* (implying only *non-existence* of certain things) would be mere *negation* (with regard to which nothing could be predicated)." *Non-existence* is not mere negation; as it serves to qualify a positive character; the term 'inconclusive' means *that character which is possessed of this qualification that it does not subsist in only one aspect of a thing*; where the *non-subsisting* appears as a definite qualification of the character; and as such it cannot be regarded as a mere negation; as a matter of fact, no relation of qualification and qualified can belong to a mere negation; no mere negation could ever be spoken of as 'subsisting in one aspect of a thing' or 'not subsisting in one aspect of the thing.' "Why so?" Because we find this true in the case of the negative compound '*Non-Brāhmaṇa*'; in this compound word 'non-brāhmaṇa' we find that the negative particle connoting *preclusion*, serves to preclude what follows in the next term ('*brāhmaṇa*'); and certainly it does not signify mere *negation*; and exactly similar is the case with the term under consideration ('Inconclusive', which also is negative compound.‡

† For a discussion as to the signification of the negative particle, our reader is referred to the writer's *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, P. 237.

‡ In connection with this discussion the *Ṭaṭparya* makes the following observation:—The orthodox Naiyāyika view is that the negative particle in a negative compound always connotes *exclusion*; and this also is the most reasonable view. But the answer given by the author of the Vārtika to the Bauḍḍha objection is put forward in the other way, because the Bauḍḍha himself is very fond of *preclusion*, and employs this to criticise everything; so that our author, in order to make his answer all the more effective, offers it on the basis of the Bauḍḍha's own view. So

The example of the 'Inconclusive' Probans (cited in the *Bhāṣya*) is—' Sound is eternal, *because it is tangible.*' [When Sound is called *'asparshavān'*, the possessive affix in this term is explained as '*shabdasya asparshatvam,*' where] the Genitive ending (in '*shabdasya*') indicates a difference between 'Sound' and 'intangibility'). Now what is this ('intangibility' as different from 'Sound')? The 'intangibility' (of Sound) may *mean* either that *it enjoys its own existence* while not being the receptacle of *tangibility*, or that it is *related to existence* while not being the receptacle of *tangibility*;—in both cases it would be something different from the *Sound* itself; so that the Genitive ending would be fully significant. "How can this be? [How can the meaning of 'intangibility' be as explained?]" It must be accepted to have the said meaning, on the ground that the term 'intangible' is used when the said idea is present, and it is not used when it is not present; that is to say, when a certain thing enjoys its existence while being *tangible*, the term 'intangible' is not used with regard to it,—nor is it used in connection with what is an absolute non-entity; it *is* used however in connection with a thing which enjoys its existence while being *intangible*. And further, we can learn the exact meaning of the term 'intangible' by following the exact signification of the sentence that expresses the same idea; and we find that the word 'intangible' means exactly what is meant by the sentence 'the thing is related to existence while not being the receptacle of tangibility'. [So that it is clear that we may take the term 'intangibility' in either of the two senses mentioned above].

[The *Bhāṣya*, p. 52, l. 4, has indicated the possibility of the Sūtra being interpreted in such a manner as to make

that what our text means is that 'even admitting your view that the negative compound connotes *preclusion*, we hold that what is precluded is not a mere insignificant non-entity, but a positive entity qualified by the non-existence of another positive entity'.

'*savyabhichārah*', 'indecisive', the name of the thing defined, and to take the term '*anaikāntikah*', 'inconclusive', as embodying the definition; the Opponent takes objection to this]—"The transference (of the term 'inconclusive', '*anaikāntikah*' to the position of the definition) is not possible; as it would not be proper. [If you define *Savyabhichāra* as '*anaikāntika*', your definition being in the form 'the Indecisive is that which is inconclusive', then there would be this difficulty that] as a matter of fact the term 'inconclusive' has nowhere been explained, with the help of which explanation we could understand the exact nature of the 'Indecisive' Probans. So that it is not right to define the Indecisive Probans by the word 'inconclusive'."

Such a definition would not be at all improper, we reply; as what is meant by the term 'inconclusive' is known from ordinary usage; there is need for an explanation, in a scientific treatise, of only such things as are not known from ordinary usage; it would be absolutely futile to provide explanations of things that can be known from ordinary experience; and we know it from ordinary experience that the word 'inconclusive' signifies *that which subsists in both aspects of a thing*. If you think that it is improper to make use of terms that have not been explained in the treatise itself, then it would become necessary to provide adequate explanations of such ordinary words as 'pain' and the like! The conclusion thus is that the view expressed by the *Bhāṣya* is quite reasonable.

Var: P. 173.

"Such a definition as has been propounded in the Sūtra would not be a correct definition, as it would not be comprehensive."

What you mean is that the definition of the Inconclusive Probans provided by the *Sūtra* does not include all kinds of Inconclusive Probans,—such for instance as the *Too Specific* Probans [which, as subsisting in neither of the two aspects of the Probandum, could not be said to *subsist in*

both aspects] *. But what you say is not right; as the *Too Specific* Probans is actually included in the definition. "How?" [When we speak of *subsisting in both aspects*, we mean subsisting either positively or negatively; *i. e.* what is meant is that when it is found that the Probans put forward is such as can either be *affirmed* or *denied* in reference to *both aspects*, *i. e.* to the Probandum as well as its Reverse, it is called 'inconclusive'; and certainly] the Too Specific Probans also, when taken negatively, is actually found to be such as has its negation common to both aspects; and thus is capable of being called 'Inconclusive'.

Some philosophers have included the 'Neutralised' Probans under the 'Inconclusive'. They argue thus—" An example of the Neutralised Probans we have in the reasoning—'The Soul is non-eternal, because it is something different from the Body'; and here we find that *Difference from the Body* is something that subsists in eternal as well as non-eternal things (*e. g.* in the Atom and in Buddhi); and thus it fulfills the conditions of the 'Inconclusive' Probans." Those philosophers have failed to grasp the exact signification of diversity of definitions and diversity of examples; when we assert that 'the Inconclusive is that which is indecisive', we provide a definition of the Inconclusive or non-concomitant Probans; and if the characteristics mentioned in this definition were found in the 'Neutralised Probans', then alone could the definition be said to be too wide, (as including a Fallacious Probans other than the Inconclusive); but the fact that a certain example of the Inconclusive Probans is found to fulfil the conditions of some other kind of Fallacious Probans, does not

* An example of the Too Specific Probans we have in the reasoning —'the Earth is eternal, because it is odorous;' here it is found that 'odorousness' would fulfil the conditions of the definition if it subsisted in *both* eternal and non-eternal things; as a matter of fact it subsists in neither; as belonging to *Earth* alone, it subsists in no other eternal or non-eternal things.

constitute a defect in the definition of the 'Inconclusive' Probans; as the only circumstances that make a definition defective are—the non-inclusion of what is meant to be defined and the inclusion of what is not meant to be defined; and certainly neither of these defects is shown (by the fact of a certain concrete example fulfilling the conditions of more than one definition) *. In this connection it would be well if you looked into the definition of the 'Neutralised' Probans, which follows later on.

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Sūtra (6).

The Contradictory Probans (2).

A CERTAIN DOCTRINE (OR VIEW) HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED, THE PROBANS THAT IS CONTRADICTORY TO IT IS CALLED THE 'CONTRADICTORY.'—(SŪ. 6).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 52, L. 7 to L. 16.]

The term '*ṭaḍvirodhi*', 'contradictory to it', means *that which contradicts it, i. e.* that which contradicts (sets aside, renders impossible †) the doctrine that has been accepted. *E. g.* [When the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* on Yogasūṭra III-13 ‡ makes the two statements]—'This world, being a modification, ceases from manifestation, because its eternality is denied'—and—'Even when thus ceasing, it continues to exist, because its utter destruction is denied.' Here we find that what the Probans in the former reasoning—'because its eternality is denied'—means is that 'no modification can be eternal'; and this is certainly contradictory to the doctrine enunciated in the second statement, that 'even when ceasing, the modification continues to exist.' "How?" Well, the 'manifestation' of a thing is only the *attaining of existence*, and 'ceasing' is *falling off*; so that if the modification, when *fallen off* (*apēṭa*, ceasing) *from its existence* (*vyakṭēḥ*, from manifestation), does 'continue to exist', then it is not possible to deny its eternality; because the very fact that the modification continues to exist even after manifestation

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* 'च [illegible]' is the reading in both editions; the Benares edition puts the च within brackets; but without the च the sentence remains incomplete and meaningless.

† In *Bhāṣya* on Su. 5-2-4, 'is contradicted' has been explained as 'is rendered impossible'.

‡ The real words of the योगभाष्य are [illegible] &c. as quoted in the *Vārṭika*.

should constitute its *eternality*; and 'denial of its eternality' should necessarily imply the possibility of the modification falling off from its existence; as it is only what actually falls off from existence that has been found to be non-eternal; while that which *still exists* does not fall off from existence;—so that 'continuing to exist' and 'falling off from existence' are two mutually contradictory concepts; and as such can never co-exist. Thus it is found that the Probans put forward ('denial of eternality') actually rejects the very doctrine (*of continuity of existence*) on whose basis it is put forward.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 6.

[P. 173, L. 18 to P. 175, L. 3.]

A certain doctrine having been accepted, the Probans contradictory to it is called '*Contradictory*'—says the Sūṭra. Now what is the real meaning of the *Sūṭra*? Its meaning is that the Contradictory Probans is that which is contradictory to something that has been admitted. When thus interpreted, it includes all the different kinds of the 'Contradictory Probans' which would otherwise remain unnoticed; that is to say, the definition is made to include all the general kinds of the Contradictory Probans; as thus interpreted, the definition

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* There is a marked difference between the Bhāṣya's account of the Contradictory Probans and that given by the later Logicians. It is clear from the Bhāṣya that what is meant is that the Probans is contradictory to some doctrine that its propounder has already accepted. The later Logicians define it as *that which proves the contradictory of the proposition which it is put forward to prove.* The earliest mention of this later view is found in the *Vārṭika*, which puts it forward as an alternative explanation of the definition given in the Sūṭra. The words of the Sūṭra afford directly the meaning assigned to them in the Bhāṣya; but how the words may be made to yield the later view is thus explained in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण—वादिना व्याख्यादिविवक्षितसिद्धान्तम् -अनभिमतसिद्धान्तम् अभ्युपेत्य—अनूद्य—तद्दूषणाय प्रयुक्तः तद्विरोधी साध्याभावसाधक हेतुः विरुद्धः। [when the opponent repeats the view he is going to refute and then propounds the refuting reason, this reason is contradictory] अथवा साध्यम् अभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य तत्साधनाय प्रयुक्तो यो वस्तुगत्या साध्याभावसाधको हेतुः [That which really happens to prove a conclusion contrary to what it is meant to prove]. The former of these two explanations is not right; the latter represents the generally accepted view.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* thus distinguishes '*Viroḍha*' from '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'—'We have *Apasiḍḍhānṭa* when the assertion made goes against what the speaker himself has declared previously on the basis of a more authoritative pramāṇa; while there is *Virodha* when the assertion itself contains within itself the elements of contradiction, when one part of it asserts one thing and another part a totally contradictory thing.'

means 'that which contradicts or sets aside an admitted fact, and that which is contradicted or set aside by an admitted fact'.*

"In that case [if the Probans is 'Contradictory' when it sets aside or is set aside by an admitted fact], there would be only one kind of 'Fallacious Probans', the *Contradictory* only [as all the five kinds fulfil the conditions herein laid down as pertaining to the *Contradictory*]."

It is quite true that the Contradictory Probans is the only one kind of Fallacious Probans. The fact is that all the varieties of Fallacious Probans *are* included in the common name 'Contradictory', on the ground of every one of them having the common character of being 'contradictory' in the above-mentioned sense (that it is set aside by or sets aside an admitted fact); but though similar, they are subdivided into five sub-classes; just as though all things are included in the name 'knowable', yet they are divided into sixteen classes. "In that case the *Contradictory* itself should not be mentioned (as one of the five sub-classes)" It would not be right to omit it †; as it is necessary to mention that also for the purpose of indicating the special features of what has been comprehended in a general way; just as in the case of 'knowable' (where 'knowable' is mentioned as one of the 16 classes also); (the special feature meant to be indicated is that) while the other four kinds of Fallacious Probans, the *Inconclusive* and the rest, have a two-fold character—that of being *contradictory* and that of being *inconclusive*, or *mistimed*, or the rest,—the *Contradictory* has the single characteristic of being *contradictory* only; so that being of a kind different, in this respect, from the other four, it is necessary to mention it separately; just as in the common expression of '*ṭriṇolapa*' [where though the '*ulapā*', *soft grass*, is already included in '*ṭriṇa*', *grass*, yet it is mentioned apart from the latter because it is distinguished from

Vār: P. 174.

* The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—That which so sets aside or is set aside, either in its own form, or in its character of Probans. That is either the Probans that is put forward embodies in itself a conception opposed to an admitted fact; or it, *as a Probans*, proves a conclusion that is opposed to an admitted fact.

† The *Bib. Ind.* edition omits 'न च वक्तव्यम्' which is necessary.

the other kinds of grass by being *soft*]. Thus then, inasmuch as the Inconclusive and the other three Fallacious Probans fulfil a two-fold condition, it is only right that they should have a two-fold name ('Inconclusive-Contradictory', 'Mis-timed-Contradictory' and so on);—*e. g.* the *Inconclusive Probans* is 'inconclusive' because it subsists in the Probandum, and also in its Homologue and its Reverse, and it is 'contradictory', as it makes impossible the form of the Probans as it puts it; and similarly with the other three kinds of Fallacious Probans.

The example (cited in the Bhāṣya, of the Contradictory Probans) is—'*This threefold world ceases from manifestation, because of the denial of its eternality*',—'*though ceasing, it continues to exist, because of the denial of its destruction*';—here we find that the 'denial of destruction' (put forward in the second statement) implies that the *eternality* of the world is an *admitted fact**; and this is 'contradicted' by the 'denial of eternality' (in the first statement); so that the two statements are found to nullify each other; and this nullification of each other constitutes their 'contradiction.' †

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* The 'अनित्यत्व' is wrong; there should be no अ

† It might be urged against this view that the Probans 'denial of eternality, in contradicting the 'denial of destruction', contradicts a doctrine laid down in the *Shāṣṭra* of the Sāṅkhyas; and as the authority of the Shāṣṭra is unimpeachable, the said Probans may be said to be *annulled* by the more authoritative statement of the Shāṣṭra; so that this should be an instance of the *annulled*, rather than of the *contradictory*, Probans. This is the objection that is sought to be met by the *Vārṭika* by indicating that the two statements are 'contradictory' (and not *annulled*) because they upset each other, and there is no upsetting of only one by the other (as there is in *annulment*). That is to say, when a Probans is found to be rejected by a more authoritative proof, then alone is there an 'annulment' of it; while in the two statements in question, neither is really more authoritative than the other; both are found in the *Shāsṭra*; so that there is no superiority and inferiority; both are of equal authority; and hence they upset each other; wherein lies their *contradiction.—Ṭāṭparya.* It seems however that the *Vārṭika* does see some force in the objection that might be urged; and therefore proposes another interpretation of the definition; and it is interesting to note that it is this second interpretation that has been accepted by the later Logicians.

Or, the 'contradiction' may be said to be that between the Proposition and the Probans; *i. e.* when there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans, we have what is called the 'Contradictory' Fallacious Probans.* "But the 'Contradiction of the Proposition' has been dealt with separately, among the Clinchers; where then could it appear as a Fallacious Probans (as distinct from being a Clincher)? For this reason it is not right to define the Contradictory as that wherein there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans." There is no force in this objection; inasmuch as the 'contradiction' subsists in both (the Proposition as well as the Probans), we may speak of it as belonging to the one or the other, according as we choose. When we speak of 'the contradiction of the Proposition and the Probans', it is clear that the *contradiction* subsists in both; so that if we choose to speak of the *contradiction* (simply) as *in the Proposition* †, then we call it the 'contradiction of the Proposition' (which is mentioned among the Clinchers); while if we choose to speak of the contradiction as *in the Proposition by the Probans*,—or *in the Probans*, *by the Proposition*—then we call it a case of the 'Contradictory Probans' (which is mentioned among the Fallacious Probans); so that there is nothing wrong in making use of the two terms, 'Contradiction of the Proposition' and 'Contradiction of the Probans'.‡ As an example of 'Contradiction

* The example cited in the *Bhāṣya* will fit in with this definition also: 'ceases from manifestation' means that there is 'ceasing' from *manifestation only*, and not from *existence*; while 'denial of eternality' implies *cessation from existence*, complete destruction; as what is meant by a thing being non-eternal is that it is liable to cease entirely from existence; and thus the 'denial of eternality', which is the Probans *contradicts* the Probandum, 'ceases from manifestation'.

† The reading of this whole passage is defective in both editions. The *Bib. Ind.* reads प्रतिज्ञया in both places; the Benares edition reads प्रतिज्ञया in the first sentence and प्रतिज्ञायया in the second. But from the explanations given by the *Ṭāṭparya*, it appears better to read प्रतिज्ञ:या : in both places.

‡ In the first the contradiction subsists *in the Proposition*,—this contradiction being by any other part of the five factors of the reasoning; it may be that the Proposition contains a contradiction in its own terms, or that it is contradicted by the Probans, or by the Example, or by any other well-ascertained fact; so that the 'contradiction of the Proposition' is a very much wider term; as is made clear by the *Ṭāṭparya* on Su. 5-2-4;—while in the second, the contradiction is *of the Proposition* (it is true), but (particularly) *in the Probans* and *by the Probans*.

of the Probans' (where the contradicting is done *by* the Probans) we have the reasoning—'Sound is eternal, *because it is a product*' [where the character of *being a product*, which is admitted by both parties, as subsisting in Sound, and which is what is ascertained by Direct Perception, contradicts—*i. e.* renders impossible—the Proposition that Sound is eternal];—
—an example of the 'Contradiction of the Proposition' (where there is contradiction involved in the terms of the Proposition itself) we have in the reasoning where the Proposition is stated in the form—'the ever-existent Soul does not exist'* [Here we have a Clincher, and not a Fallacious Probans];—as an example where there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans [where the Probans not being one that is universally acknowledged, is not authoritative enough to render the Proposition impossible and absurd; and both thus being of equal strength, there is mutual rejection] we have the reasoning—'Substance is something different from Quality, because no such different thing (different from the Qualities) is ever found to exist'

Vār : P. 175.

[Here also we have a Clincher, and not Fallacious Probans]. † Another example of 'Contradiction of the Probans' we have in the reasoning—'there is no single entity, because the word *entity* is used in reference to a group', where the very use of the word 'group' implies the admission of the existence of a *single entity*; as the group is certainly a single entity. ‡ [This is a Fallacious Probans].

* The contradiction lies in the literal signification of the word '*ātmā*'; literally the word means the *ever-existent*, being explained as *aṭāṭi-sāṭatyēna varṭaṭē*.

† This is precisely the example that has been cited by the Bhāṣya under Sū. 5-2-4, where the following explanation is added, to show that no superiority attaches either to the Proposition or to the Probans. 'If it is true that Substance is something different from Quality (as the Proposition puts it), then it is absurd to say that nothing different from Colour and other Qualities is ever found to exist (as the Probans puts it); on the other hand, if it is true that no such different thing is perceived, then it is absurd to say that Substance is something different from Qualities.

‡ The point in which this second example of 'Contradiction of Probans' differs from the former example—'Sound is eternal because it is a product'—is this:—the character of *being a product* is such an universally acknowledged and hence authoritative Probans that it would render the Proposition of eternality absurd, even if it were (for the time being) not admitted by one of the two parties: as its truth can be easily brought home to him; while the Probans in the second example—'because the word *entity* is used in reference to a group'—is one that is based entirely on usage, and as such cannot have its truth brought home to the man not accepting that usage; so that it would contradict, or render absurd, the Proposition, only if both parties acknowledged its truth.—*Tatparya.*

Sūtra (7).

The Neutralised Probans—the Third Fallacious Probans.

THE NEUTRALISED PROBANS IS THAT WHICH IS PUT FORWARD TO ESTABLISH A DEFINITE CONCLUSION, WHILE IT IS ONE THAT ONLY GIVES RISE TO SUSPENSE (AND VASCILLATION) IN REGARD TO THE POINT AT ISSUE.

Sūṭra (7).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 53, L. 2 to L. 12.]

The term '*prakaraṇa*', 'point at issue', stands for the two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is definitely ascertained;—the '*chintā*', 'suspense', in regard to such point at issue, consists in that desire to ascertain the truth, that whole process of investigation, which, starting with the doubt, ends with the definitive cognition;—now that Probans which really only gives rise to the said suspense, if put forward as leading to definitive cognition, does not differ (in point of being doubtful) from the point at issue; as both sides would be equal (equally doubtful); and thus being *similar to (sama) the point at issue (prakaraṇa)*, it does not lead to any definite conclusion.* Example—'Sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it the properties of the eternal thing; and we have found, in the case of such things as the Dish and the like, that what is not found to possess the properties of an eternal thing is non-eternal.'

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* The two opposite views, which constitute the 'point at issue', have been here called '*prakaraṇa*' in the sense that these views are what are *made the probandum (sāḍhyaṭvēna prākriyaṭē)* by the two parties......The 'suspense' in regard to these views, is due to the real truth on the point being not known; *e. g.* when a man puts forward the fallacious reasoning—'Sound is *non*-eternal because the properties of an eternal thing are not found in it'—the person to whom this is addressed falls into a suspense, as he does not find, in Sound, either such properties as are invariably concomitant with *eternality*, or such as are inseparable from non-*eternality*; having therefore his doubts thus aroused, he proceeds to enquire and investigate. So that the urging of *the non-finding of the properties of an eternal thing*, as brought forward to prove *eternality*,—while it leads only to a doubt as to *eternality* and *non-eternality*,—constitutes the Fallacious Probans called '*Prakaraṇasama*'......'Both sides would be equal'—*i. e.* just as the *not finding of the properties of the eternal thing* would indicate *non-eternality*, exactly in the same manner would *the not finding of the properties of a non-eternal thing* indicate *eternality*.........The explanation of the term as '*similar to the point at issue*' (*prakaraṇasya samaḥ*) is only by way of indicating what the etymology of the word signifies; it is not meant that *similarity to the point at issue* constitutes the denotation of the term; in fact what the term really denotes is only *being neutralised* (having an opponent equally strong).—*Ṭāṭparya.*

That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the Probans is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to the Probandum and its Reverse), is 'equal to doubt' (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a Probans, therefore, has been called 'Indecisive';— in the case of the *Prakaraṇasama*], on the other hand, what gives rise to the '*prakaraṇa*', the *point at issue*, is (not *Doubt*, but) only that factor of Doubt which consists in the fact of there being found nothing which could favour either of the two opposite views; *e. g.* in regard to the reasoning cited, we find that in *Sound*, properties of an *eternal* thing are not found, just as properties of a *non-eternal* thing are not found; and this not finding of peculiarities favouring either of the two views gives rise to 'suspense in regard to the point at issue'. "How?" Because in the contrary case (*i. e.* in the case of our finding peculiarities favouring either of the two views), there would be an end to the 'point at issue' (one of the views being definitely ascertained); for example, if we actually found, in Sound, properties of the *eternal* thing, it would no longer be a 'point at issue'; or if we found in it properties of the *non-eternal* thing, then also it would cease to be a 'point at issue'. Thus then we find that, inasmuch as such a Probans gives rise to (lends support to) both the opposite views, it cannot lead to a definitive cognition in regard to either one of them. *

Vārṭika on Sū. 7.

[P. 175, L. 6 to P. 176, L. 7].

The Neutralised Probans is that which &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra; now the question arises—From what does the 'suspense in regard to the point at issue' arise? It arises, we reply, from the real truth not being known. Inasmuch as when the real truth in regard to a thing becomes known, all suspense with regard to it ceases, the conclusion is that what gives rise to the suspense in regard to the point at issue is the not

* The difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised probans, as brought out in the Bhāṣya, is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*—The Probans in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because properties of an eternal thing are not found in it' would be called 'Inconclusive', only if the *not-finding of the properties of a eternal thing* were known to subsist in a thing which is admitted by both parties to be *eternal*; or *e. g.* the not-finding of the properties of the non eternal thing were known to subsist in a thing admitted by both parties to be *non-eternal*. As it is however, neither of these two conditions is fulfilled by the case cited, in which all that we have is that in Sound, there is *not-finding of the properties of the eternal thing*, and also the *not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing*; that is all; and these two circumstances neutralising one another, we call the Probans 'neutralised.'

knowing of the special features of a thing, which is known in a vague general way. For example, in the reasoning—'Sound is eternal because it is not found to possess the properties of a non-eternal thing'—we find that because there is 'non-perception' (of the real character, and of the properties of the eternal as well as of the non-eternal thing), there is doubt (*i. e.* there are two opposite views); so that what is put forward as the Probans is not a true Probans.

An objection is raised—"This Probans does not in any way differ from the *Unknown* Probans; because the *non-perception of the properties of the non-eternal thing* in Sound is as much *unknown* (lit. *to be proved*) as the *Eternality* itself [so that the reasoning cited affords the example of only the *Unknown* Probans; which shows that the *Neutralised* Probans should not be mentioned apart from the *Unknown*]." *

It is by no means the same as the 'Unknown' Probans; as in the case of the 'Neutralised' Probans what is put forward as the Probans is that which only gives rise to doubt (diversity of views); that is to say, when the character put forward as the Probans is as much 'unknown' and ('to be proved') as the Probandum itself, it is called the 'Unknown'; while when the character put forward as the Probans is only such as gives rise to doubt and suspense (and diversity of views), it is called the 'Neutralised' Probans. †

* The case of the reasoning cited is held to be one of neutralised Probans, in view of the fact that just as there is *non-perception of the properties of the eternal thing*, so there is also the *non-perception of the properties of the non-eternal thing*; hence both are neutralised by each other. It is contended by the opponent that under the circumstances, both the non-perceptions would be uncertain, unascertained; and as such this should fall under the 'unknown' Probans. The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—Both the opposite views are 'Sāḍhya' *to be proved*; and it is these that constitute '*prakaraṇa*', according to the Bhāṣya; so that '*prakaraṇa*' and '*sāḍhya*' being synonymous, '*prakaraṇasama*' comes to be only another name for the *sāḍhyasama*, the 'unknown' Probans, defined in the next Sūṭra.'

† So that even though the etymological signification of the two names '*sāḍhyasama*' and '*prakaraṇasama*' is the same, their actual meanings are entirely different: the 'Unknown' being that which is uncertain and still to be ascertained; while the 'neutralised' is that which is thwarted by an equally doubtful contrary.

There are some people who hold that there is no difference between the 'neutralised' Probans and the 'inconclusive' Probans, as both of them give rise to doubt. But for these people there would be no difference between Perception, the Inconclusive Probans and the Neutralised Probans; as Perception also is a cause of doubt! "[In the case of Perception, it is not Perception alone that produces doubt, but] Doubt is produced by a group or composite (of three factors); so that the said absurdity cannot arise in connection with Perception. That is to say, Doubt is brought about by a composite cause, consisting of the following three factors—the perception of similarity, uncertainty in regard to the peculiar features, and the remembrance of the peculiar features (as shown above, under Sū. 1-1-23); and it is not brought about by *perception* alone; hence (not being a cause of Doubt) Perception could not be regarded as non-different from the Inconclusive Probans and the Neutralised Probans." The assertion that Doubt is brought about by a composite or group does not set aside the fact urged; *i.e.* when you say that Doubt is brought about by a group (of causes), you do not deny the fact of Perception being a cause of Doubt; so that what we have urged against you still remains in force. *

Then again (there is a further difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised Probans)—What is meant by a reasoning having a 'neutralised' Probans is that the character that it puts forward (as the Probans) is one of two contrary characters, both of which are equally unperceived; that is to say, when both the peculiar characters of a thing are equally not-perceived, if one of them is put forward for the removing of the doubt, it is a case of the 'neutralised' Fallacious Probans; specially as it is impossible to regard the non-perception of both peculiar features as a 'neutralised' Probans; that is to say, it is not

Vār : P. 176.

* When you say that the cause consists of a group, it follows that every component of this group is itself a cause, as a group of non-causes could not be a cause.

possible to indicate (as *neutralised* Probans) the non-perception of both peculiarities. *

Some writers have cited (as an example of the Neutralised Probans) the character of *being different from the body* (as put forward to prove the eternality of the Soul); but this example does not fall within the scope of the Sūṭra; because if the man knows the truth (in regard to the Soul's eternality),—then, even though he perceives its being different from the body,—he does not proceed to enquire into the matter; while, if he does not know the said truth,—if he perceives its being different from the body,—he proceeds with the enquiry; so that 'being different from the body' is an 'Inconclusive' Probans; and as such does not fall within the scope of the present Sūṭra. †

Sūṭra (8).

(4) *The Unknown Probans.*

THE UNKNOWN PROBANS IS THAT WHICH, BEING STILL TO BE PROVED, IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE PROBANDUM. ‡

Bhāṣya.

[P. 53, L. 14, to L. 19.]

[As an example of this Fallacious Probans, we have the reasoning]—'Shadow is a substance',—the Probandum, to prove which is put forward the Probans 'because it has motion';

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* This is added with a view to meet the objection that the *non-perception of two contrary characters* would be common to both the opposite views; so that such a Probans would fall within the 'Inconclusive' or 'Indecisive' Probans; that the 'Neutralised' would be included in the 'Inconclusive'. What is meant by the text is that in the case of 'Neutralised' Probans, the *non-perception of both characters* cannot be put forward; it is the non-perception of only one of the two characters that is put forward; and as such, each non-perception is thwarted by the other.

† 'In the case in question, as shown both negatively and affirmatively, what gives rise to doubt and consequent enquiry and suspense is, not the perception of the character of being different from the body, but the not knowing of the truth; and as such it does not fulfil the conditions of the 'neutralising' Probans as laid down in the Sūṭra. It does, on the other hand, fall within the 'Inconclusive' Probans; as the character of *being different from the Body* is found to belong to eternal as well as non-eternal things.

‡ 'That whose subsistence in the Subject is as unsettled as that of the Probandum'—says the न्यायसूत्रविवरण. The *Tāṭparya* has the following notes on the text of the Sūṭra:—The definition here provided is meant to include all the four kinds of असिद्ध—आश्रयासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध अन्यतरासिद्ध अन्यथासिद्ध as every one of them is *still to be*

and this Probans does not differ from the Probandum, inasmuch as it is still to be proved; and hence it is an 'Unknown' Probans. Because that Shadow 'has motion' is not known, and it has got to be made known, just as much as the Probandum (that Sound is a substance). What has got to be 'known' or ascertained is the following—'Does the shadow move, like the man? or is it that as the object obstructing the light moves along, there is a continuity of the obstruction, which leads to the continuity of the *absence of the light*, and it is this *absence of light* which is perceived (as the shadow)?' What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as 'shadow' is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed (by the moving object); as 'obstruction' is only *negation of approach*.*

Vārtika on Sū. 8.

[P. 176, L. 9 to P. 177, L. 6.]

The Unknown Probans is that which, being still to be proved, is not different from the Probandum,—says the Sūṭra. The meaning of this is that when the character put forward by way of proof is such that it does not differ from the Probandum,—*i. e.*, which is such as has still got to be made known, just as the Probandum,—it is that Fallacious Probans which has been called the 'Unknown.' We have an example of this in the reasoning—'Shadow is a substance *because it has motion*';

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proved and as such similar to the Probandum. If the definition had been stated simply as—'the *sādhyasama* Probans is that which is unknown', then, we could not include in this that Probans which is unknown to only one of the parties (and *known* to the other); while this becomes included when we add **साध्याविशिष्ट**, as the Probandum also is unknown to only one of the two parties. And if we had only the term **साध्याविशिष्ट** then this would apply to the **अन्यतरासिद्ध** only; as it is only this that is exactly similar to the Probandum,—in that both are unknown before proof (by one party only) and both become known after proof; and all the other kinds of unknown would become excluded. Hence the Sūṭra has added the term '*sādhyatvāt*', *being still to be prore d*; the Probandum also is *still to be proved*; or else it would not be a '*probandum*' at all; hence the Probans is called 'unknown' because it is *still to be proved*; and some of the unknown are such as wanting in proof only temporarily (such as **अन्यतरासिद्ध**), while others have this want permanently, not being capable of being proved at all; and to this latter class belong the **स्वरूपासिद्ध** and the **आश्रयासिद्ध**. It might seem that the definition applies to all *that i‹ to be proved*, and hence it applies to the Probandum also. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the definition has to be taken as subject to the general definition of 'Fallacious Probans'; so what the definition means is that the 'Unknown' is that *probans*, which &c. &c.; and this cannot apply to the Probandum.

* In the last sentence, the readings adopted in the body of the text are defective; the correct readings are supplied in the footnotes; and these are supported by the two Puri Mss. also.

where we find that the *moving* of the shadow requires proof exactly as its *substantiality* does. [In this manner the reasoning provides us with an example of the Probans which is itself *absolutely Unknown*, which is the first kind of 'unknown' Probans, the *Svarūpāsiddha*.]. "But its *mobility* follows from its being seen in different places. That is to say [in support of the *mobility* of the shadow we have the following five-factored reasoning]—'Shadow is mobile, because it is found in a different place,—everything that is found in a place other than where it has been before is found to be a *moving* object, as for instance, the Jar,—shadow is found in a place different from its former place,—hence shadow has motion." This argument is not right; as the Probans herein put forward is one whose *substratum or basis is unknown* [which is the second kind of the Unknown Probans, the *āshrayāsiḍḍha*]; that is to say, even as you put it, your Probans is one *whose substratum is unknown*; the perceiving of the shadow in a different place would be possible (and apt) only if the shadow had *substantiality* [as it is only a substantial thing that can be seen in different places]; as a matter of fact however the *substantiality* of the shadow is still unknown (unsettled and unproved);* so that the Probans (*being found in different places*) comes to be one *whose very substratum or basis* is unknown (and unsettled). Even admitting that there is *perception of the shadow in different places*, we find that it is still tainted by the fallacy of being '*unknown*', in the sense that it is capable of being otherwise explained; that is to say when one perceives the shadow in a place other than it occupied before, this is due to other causes than the *moving* of the shadow [*i. e.*, it is purely circumstantial]; and being due to other causes it does not prove † what it is meant to prove. [Thus providing us with an example of the third kind of the 'Unknown Probans' that which is 'otherwise known,' *Anyaṭhāsiddha*,' circumstan-

* The *Ṭaṭparya* supplies a series of arguments against the substantiality of Shadows. The Mimānsaka Bhāttā admits *Ṭamas* as a substance; but the Prābḥākara holds it to be mere *absence of light*. (See Prābhā Mim. pp. 266—268).

† Read साधयति for साधति

tial.] * "But how otherwise can *the perception of the shadow in different places* be explained?" We can explain it as due to the continuity of the absence of light following from the continuity of the object obstructing the light; that is to say, as the object obstructing the light moves along, we perceive things (the spot of earth for instance) qualified by the absence of light; and it is to this 'absence of light' that we give the name 'shadow.'

Thus it is shown that there are three kinds of the *Unknown* Probans—(1) the *absolutely unknown*, which is exactly similar (in this respect) to what is sought to be proved by it, (2) that *whose basis is unknown*, and (3) that which is *otherwise known* (the circumstantial). †

Var: P. 177.

The reasoning—'Sound is eternal, *because it is intangible*'—is not a right example of the *Unknown* Probans; as the *intangibility* of sound is neither *to be proved*, nor is it one *whose substratum is unknown*, nor is it capable of being *otherwise*

* It is only when the relation of the Probans to the Probandum is *natural* that the former can prove the latter; and not when it is circumstantial or accidental. The well-known example of this circumstantial Probans is provided by the reasoning—'this child must be dark because he is Maitra's child,' where the darkness of the other children of Maitra is due to causes other than that of being Maitra's child; it is due to such causes as the eating of a particular kind of food by their mother. So that the relation between 'Maitra's child' and 'darkness' is purely accidental; and as such the one is possible without the other. In cases of valid Probans, the Probans is such that it cannot be explained except on the basis of the Probandum, which it therefore establishes; but here the Probans being capable of being explained otherwise than on the basis of the Probandum, it does not necessarily prove this latter. This is what is meant by the Probans being '*anyaṭhāsiḍḍha*', 'Otherwise known.'

† The *Varṭika* has deduced examples of all three from the single reasoning cited in the *Bhāṣya*; the *Ṭāṭparya* supplies distinct examples:—(a) In the reasoning 'Sound is eternal because it is visible,' the *visibility* of Sound is something *absolutely unknown*; (b) in the reasoning 'there can be no God, because he has no body,' the *bodilessness* put forward has no basis or substratum if there is no God; and (c) 'He is dark because he is Maiṭra's child' has a Probans, 'being Maiṭra's child,' which is one whose relation to the Probandum is purely accidental. The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds—'Where the Subject is unknown we have *Āshrayāsiḍḍha* (b); where the Probans itself is unknown we have *Svarūpāsiḍḍha* (a); and where the concomitance it unknown we have *Vyāpyaṭvāsiḍḍha*. By 'unknown,' is meant either *uncertainty* or *conviction to the contrary*

explained. We have already provided proper examples of the Unknown Probans in accordance with our explanation of the definition provided by the Sūṭra. So that the objection urged (by the Bauḍḍha) on the basis of the said example ('Sound is eternal because it is intangible') is entirely beside the mark; in fact it only shows that the objector has understood neither the meaning of the Sūṭra, nor the literal meaning of the words, nor the exact nature of the Fallacious Probans, nor the exact nature of the wrong Example. *

Sūṭra (9).

(5) *The Belated or Mistimed Probans.*

THE BELATED OR MISTIMED PROBANS IS THAT WHICH, AS ADDUCED, IS BEHIND TIME.

(*Sū*. 9.)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 54, L. 1, to P. 55, L. 5.]

When one factor of the thing adduced as Probans is found to be affected by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced behind time; and it is then called 'Belated.' Example—'Sound is eternal, *because it is manifested by conjunction*, like Colour; the Colour that is *manifested by the conjunction* of light with the jar is one that was in existence before, as well as after, its *manifestation*; similarly the Sound also that is *manifested*

* A Bauḍḍha writer has tried to find fault with the definition provided by the Sūṭra; and he has done this on the basis of an example that he has cited. He says that the reasoning—'Sound is eternal because it is intangible, like, Buḍḍhi'—provides an example of the Unknown Probans; and yet it does not fulfil the conditions of the definition. Because, he argues, the term '*sāḍhyāvishiṣṭaḥ*' in the Sūṭra can only mean that *whose example is not different from the Probandum*; and yet the example in the said reasoning, *Buḍḍhi*, is one that is known to be *not eternal*; so that it is *not* 'not different from the Probandum,' which is *eternality*. The *Vārṭika* admits all this and meets it by simply pointing out that the example taken up by the objector is not the right example;—and that by selecting the example that he has the objector has shown that—(a) he has not understood the meaning of our Sūṭra; the present Sūṭra is meant to provide a definition of the Unknown Probans, while the reasoning cited by him provides an instance of the Indecisive Probans, which has been defined in a preceding Sūṭra;—(b) that he has not understood the literal signification of the term '*sāḍhyāvishiṣṭaḥ*,' which was never meant to be taken as a Bahuvrīhi compound as the objector has taken it;—(c) that he does not understand the difference between the *wrong probans* and the *wrong example*; as what he should have pointed out in the reasoning was the defect in the '*Probans*,' 'intangibility'; while what he has done is to point out a defect in '*Buḍḍhi*' which is only an *Example*.

by the conjunction of the drum and the stick, or by the conjunction of the wood and the axe, is one that is in existence before and after its *manifestation* ; so that, being *manifested by conjunction*, Sound must be regarded as *eternal*.' This is not a valid Probans; because *when adduced, it is behind time*. *

*It is clear from this passage and from the explanation of the कालातीत हेत्वाभास as given here and in the *Vārṭika*, that the conception of this fallacy has undergone a complete change at the hands of the later logicians. The latter regard that Probans as कालात्ययापदिष्ट which is found to be opposed to a well-ascertained fact ; when, for instance, the *coolness* of fire is adduced as *Probans* ; in accordance with this view they have given to their fallacy the name of बाधित, 'annulled ;' while what the *Bhāṣya* means is that we have the कालातीत fallacy when one part of the Probans is found to be such as is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is put forward ; *e.g.* 'manifested by conjunction,' as adduced to prove the eternality of sound, is found to be a Probans of which one part, *conjunction*, is not present at the time that Sound appears, though it was there *before* that appearance ; so that it is behind time, 'belated.' The name कालातीत—Belated—can rightly be applied to only this ; the बाधित of the moderns was never *true* ; so that the name 'belated' cannot apply to it. With a view to meet this discrepancy between the two views, the *Ṭāṭparya* has adopted the method of a very forced interpretation of the Bhāṣya. It says that the opening sentence of the Bhāṣya states both views—the '*svamaṭa*,' his own view, as also the '*paramaṭa*,' the view of others ; the *Ṭāṭparya* taking care to brand what clearly is the Bhāṣya view as '*paramaṭa*,' and the modern view as '*svamaṭa*' : and it gets the two views out of the two meanings of the word *arṭha*, 'thing,' in the *Bhāṣya*. According to the view of the *Ṭāṭparya*, 'thing' stands for the *Subject* of the Proposition, in which the Probans should subsist ; and the *Subject*—like every other thing—has two factors, the thing itself and its qualities : and when one of these factors—the quality—is found to be affected by lapse of time, we call it 'belated' ; *e.g.* when *coolness of fire* is urged as proving its eternality, we find that the *coolness*, which is adduced as a quality of the subject, *Fire*, is 'belated,' because its contrary has been already definitely ascertained. By the view of the *Bhāṣya* itself the 'thing' is the *Probans* itself ; and it is called 'belated,' when not the whole of it, but only a part of it is found to be *behind time* ; as in the case of the Probans 'manifested by conjunction' ; where it is found that though the *manifestation* is true, the *conjunction* has passed off when the Sound appears. And when the *Ṭāṭparya* finds the example given in the *Bhāṣya* not fitting in with its own view, it seeks to meet this difficulty by saying that the example according to the true view has not been given in the *Bhāṣya*, because several examples of it have already been given ; when for instance it has been said that no conclusion can be deduced from what is contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception or to scripture ; so that the *Bhāṣya* cities an example only according to the *paramaṭa*. This method however is not quite in keeping with the practice of *Bhāṣyas*. All *Bhāṣyas*—that of *Vāṭsyāyana* among them—err more on the side of diffuseness than of conciseness.

The *Bhāṣya* view really does not lend support to the modern view of the fallacy of Annulment ; if only a *part* of the Probans is 'behind time,' it cannot be said to be contrary to, and hence *annulled* by, well-ascertained facts of perception etc. ; so in order to remove this difficulty, the *Ṭāṭparya* has taken the term 'one part' of the *Bhāṣya* to refer to the *Subject*, and not to the *Probans*. As regards the objection that might be urged against the *Bhāṣya* that it does not—if its own explanation of the Sūṭra is accepted—mention the 'annulled' at all among the Fallacious Probans,—it has to be borne in mind that a true *Fallacious Probans* is that which has some semblance of being a valid Probans, and as a matter of fact, anything so absurd as the *coolness of fire* cannot be said to have any 'semblance' to a valid Probans. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that we can apply the term 'behind time' or 'belated' to only what was true before, but is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is adduced ; and this also can never apply to anything so absurd as *coolness* of fire. So that the modern view would appear to be unsupported, not only by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika*, but also by the *Sūṭra*.

In the case of Colour, the time at which the manifesting *conjunction* appears does not go beyond (*i. e.* does not differ from) that at which the manifested *colour* exists; as it is only during the time at which the conjunction of the light and jar is present that colour is perceived; while Colour is not * perceived when the conjunction has ceased to exist. The case of Sound however is entirely different; for instance, it is only after the conjunction of the drum and stick has ceased that Sound is heard by the man at a distance; in fact it is heard at the time of the Disjunction (*i. e.* at the time that the stick has ceased to touch the drum); so that the manifestation of Sound is *beyond the time* of the conjunction; and as such it cannot be *caused* by that conjunction; because as a rule when the *cause* has ceased to exist, the *effect* does not appear [so that if conjunction were the cause of the manifestation of Sound, the latter should cease after the former has ceased]. Thus then, it is found that what is adduced as the Probans is not 'similar to the example'; and as such it cannot prove the Proposition; hence it is a Fallacious Probans. †

[The Bauḍḍha logician has defined the 'Belated Probans' as that which is adduced at a time other than that at which it should be adduced; *e. g.* when one party has urged the reasoning simply as 'Sound is eternal, like the jar', and he adduces the Probans, 'because it is a product', only *after* he has been asked 'Why?' Having thus explained and exemplified the *Sūṭra*, the Bauḍḍha has found fault with it as follows:—The question—'Why?'—that the Opponent puts—is it put *after* the first party has completed his say, or *before* that? If the former, then the first party is open to the clincher of 'Deficiency', his reasoning being *deficient* in that it does not state the *Probans* at all, and hence it cannot be a case of Fallacious Probans being urged. If on the other hand the question is put *before* the first party has completed his say, then the *Probans* does not cease to be a truly valid Probans, simply because it is urged after some time; if it fulfills all the condi-

* This न is absolutely necessary. It is found in the Puri Mss.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the Fallacious Probans as here explained would only be a form of the *Unknown* Probans, and as such the 'Belated' should be the same as the 'Unknown'; and the fact that, even hough this objection should have been brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* if the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* was really *paramaṭa*, yet it has not been urged—has been met by the specious reasoning that the defect was so apparent that the *Bhāṣya* did not think it worth while to urge it. But we have to remember that the 'Belated' as explained by the Bhāṣya, is not included in any of the three kinds of 'Unknown' accepted by the older logicians स्वरूपासिद्ध आश्रयासिद्ध and अन्यथासिद्ध (see above); it falls under what the later logicians have called the भागासिद्ध the *partly* 'unknown', of which however no mention is found either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Vārṭika*.

tions of the valid Probans, it does not lose its validity simply because of the interruption by the over-zealous Opponent. This is met by the *Bhāṣya* by rejecting the suggested interpretation of the *Sūṭra*]——The Sūṭra does not mean that 'belatedness' consists in the reversing of the order of the Factors of Reasoning. Why? Because we have the general law that—'when one thing is by its inherent capability connected with another thing, the connection subsists also when they are remote from one another, and on the contrary when the two things are not connected at all, mere proximity is ineffective';—and according to this law even when the Probans is stated in an order other than the usual one, it does not lose its character of the 'Probans'—which consists in its *similarity* or *dissimilarity* to the Example (Sū- 4-1-34 and 35); and so long as it does not lose the character of the 'Probans', it cannot be called a '*Fallacious*' Probans. And further, the 'reversing of the order of the Factors' is what has been stated (in Sū. 5-2-11) as constituting the *Clincher* of 'Inopportune'; so that if the same were mentioned here (as a 'Fallacious Probans'), that would be a needless repetition. Thus we conclude that such is not the meaning of the Sūṭra.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 9.

[P. 177, L. 8 to P. 178, L. 8.]

The 'Belated' Probans is that which, as adduced, is behind time—says the Sūṭra. That is to say, that Probans which, as adduced, has one factor of it affected (tainted) by lapse of time, and is thereby partially vitiated, is said to be 'behind time', and this is what is called 'Belated.' Example—'Sound is eternal, *because it is manifested by conjunction.*' As a matter of fact, at the time that Sound is heard, the Conjunction is not there; so that 'Conjunction', which is adduced as the Probans, is one that is beyond the time of the *hearing* (of the Sound); that is, there is no Conjunction at the time

* The examples of 'annulment' by the more authoritative contrary cognition of the Subject are thus supplied by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—(1) 'The jar is all-pervading, because it is an entity, like Ākāsha'—where the all-pervadingness of the jar is opposed to what we know of the jar by perception;—(2) 'the atom is made of component parts, because it is corporeal, like the jar'—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the atom by Inference;—(3) 'the Meru consists of stone, because it is a mountain, like the Vinḍhya'—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the Meru from the scriptures. The following is an example of the annulment of the conception of the Probans as adduced—(1) 'Water and Air are hot', because their touch is different from that of Earth, like Fire'—where the fact of the touch of Air being different from that of Earth is opposed to our perception; and so on.

that the Sound is heard; for instance, when wood is being cut, the sound of the cutting is heard after the conjunction of of the wood and the axe has ceased.

"This Probans—'because it is manifested by Conjunction'—is no other than the *Inconclusive*; inasmuch as it has been found that *non-eternal* things also are so manifested; for example, the jar (which is manifested by the conjunction of light)."

There is no force in this contention; as in the reasoning (cited by us as the example) what is meant to be proved by *manifestation by conjunction* is only *continuity of existence*; that is to say, what is meant by the proposition is not that sound is *eternal, everlasting*, but that it *continues to exist*, it *stays*; so that the Probans cannot be said to be 'inconclusive'; for nothing *that does not stay* is ever found to be 'manifested by Conjunction' [and if it were so found, then alone could the Probans be regarded as 'inconclusive'].

The *Sūṭra* cannot mean that what constitutes the 'belatedness' of the Probans is the reversing of the order of the reasoning-factors; as the power (of the factors) is such; that is to say, by merely being stated last (after the other factors have been stated) the Probans does not lose the character of 'Probans', which consists in 'similarity to the Example'; and so long as it does not lose the character of 'Probans', it cannot be called a 'Fallacious Probans.' Then again, the 'reversing of the order of the Factors' has been mentioned as a Clincher, called 'Inopportune' (under Sū. 5-2-11); so

Var: P. 178.

that if the same were meant by the present *Sūṭra* also, there would be a needless repetition. "But that *reversing of factors* which constitutes the 'belatedness' of the Probans consists in the fact that it is adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down; and certainly this is not the same as the Clincher 'Inopportune' [which consists in the whole reasoning being stated at a single stretch, in which the Probans is stated

last, instead of coming just after the statement of the Proposition]." What you mean is that (while in the 'Inopportune' reasoning, all the factors are put forward at a single stretch, but in an improper order,) what happens in the 'Belated' Probans is that it is adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down to the position of an unproved conclusion; so that the latter cannot be the same as the Clincher.* But in this case it behoves you to point out by what it is 'levelled down.' "It is levelled down by the non-mention of the Probans." If the 'levelling down' is due to the non-mention of the Probans,—in what way does this constitute any defect *in the Probans*? "It is certainly a defect of the Probans that it is adduced last." That it is stated last is not the fault of the Probans; it is the fault of the speaker; as a matter of fact, by itself the Probans cannot prove anything; its doing so is dependent upon its being adduced by the reasoner; so that the fault lies with the reasoner, and not with the Probans; specially as the Probans remains efficient (also when adduced afterwards),—as has been explained (in the *Bhāṣya*).

Thus then, we conclude that the Sūtra cannot mean that the 'belatedness' of the Probans consists in the reversing of the order of the reasoning Factors,—nor in its being adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down.

* न निग्रहस्थानम् is the correct reading in both places. The difference between the two is as follows—In both there is a reversal of order among the Factors; but in the case of the Clincher, the person, by his own accord, propounds the entire reasoning in a topsy-turvy order, mentioning the Probans last; while in the case of the Fallacious Probans what happens is that when the first party propounds the reasoning, he puts it in an incomplete form, not mentioning the Probans at all;—but his opponent questions him as to how the proposition is proved by his reasoning,—which question brings down the proposition to the level of an unproved assertion, by showing that the reason that would prove it has not been adduced,—whereupon the first party, adduces the *Probans*; this belated propounding of the Probans constitutes the fallacy of 'belatedness'; and in this case the intervening question of the opponent is necessary; while in the Clincher, there is a spontaneous perversity on the part of the reasoner, who puts the Probans last.—*Tātparya*.

Lecture (3).

CASUISTRY.

(Sūṭras 10—17)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 55, L. 6 to L. 8].

Next we proceed to describe *Casuistry.* *

Sū. 10.

CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN OPPOSING A PROPOSITION BY ASSIGNING TO IT A MEANING OTHER THAN THE ONE INTENDED. (Sūtra 10).

It is not possible to cite specific examples in connection with the general definition; they will be cited along with the definition of the several kinds of Casuistry.

Vārṭika on Sū. 10.

[P. 178, L. 14 to L. 16].

Casuistry consists &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. A certain proposition having been put forward (by the first party), containing a word with a wide signification, which conveys more than one meaning,—if opposition is offered to it by imposing upon it a meaning entirely different from that intended by the person (propounding the proposition),—this constitutes *Casuistry.*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 55, LL. 8-9].

The division of Casuistry is as follows—

Sūṭra (11).

IT IS OF THREE KINDS—(*a*) VĀKCHHALA, VERBAL CASUISTRY, (*b*) SĀMĀNYACHCHHALA, GENERALISING CASUISTRY, AND (*c*) UPACHĀRACHCHHALA, FIGURATIVE CASUISTRY.—Sūṭra (11).

Vārṭika on Sū. 11.

[P. 178, LL. 16—17].

It is of three kinds—This is meant to restrict the number of the particular kinds of Casuistry; and as in other cases,

* The sequence is thus explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—When the disputant finds that his reasoning is vitiated by a fallacy, and he finds himself unable to remove the fallaciousness, he, still desperately trying to snatch victory to himself, puts forward

so here also, these three kinds include all the several kinds of Casuistry.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 55, L. 11 to P. 56, L. 18].

From among these—

Sūtra (12).

(A) VERBAL CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN ASSUMING A MEANING OTHER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED BY A WORD,—WHEN THE MEANING (INTENDED) IS NOT DEFINITELY SPECIFIED.—Sūtra (12).

For instance, when the proposition is put forward in the form—'*navakambalo*' *yam māṇavakaḥ*,' where what the speaker means is that 'the young boy is one *whose blanket is new*,' the compound word '*navakambalaḥ*' being equivalent to the expression '*navaḥ kambalo yasya*,—though this latter uncompounded expression sufficiently clearly defines the particular idea desired to be conveyed, the same is not done by the *compounded* word '*navakambalaḥ*' (which is ambiguous, being capable of affording more than one meaning);—and what the Casuist does is to assign to the compounded word a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker, and expounding the compound as '*nava kambalāḥ yasya*', takes it to mean that the young boy is one who *has nine blankets*, and says—'you say that the young boy has nine blankets';—having thus imposed upon the man an idea that he never intended to convey, he proceeds to oppose the assertion by showing its absurdity—'this boy has only *one* blanket, where are the *nine* blankets?' Thus this is a case of Casuistry which is urged on the occasion of an ambiguous word being used; and being based upon a *word*, it is called '*Verbal*' Casuistry.

This Casuistry is to be met by urging the necessity of the Casuist himself pointing out the peculiar circumstances favouring his own interpretation of the ambiguous word; for instance, the word '*Navakambalaḥ*' is ambiguous,—signifying 'one who has a *new* blanket' and also 'one who has *nine* blankets'; under the circumstances, when you take it to mean

improper answers—of which there are two kinds—Casuistry and Futile Rejoinder. The former comes first, as though wrong in sense, it is verbally and apparently right, while *Jāti* is more absurd, as it involves the contradiction of one's own assertions.

'one who has nine blankets' (and then turn to me and say that the man has only *one* blanket, and not *nine*), this is hardly fair; as it is necessary to point out the peculiar circumstances that favour either of the two possible significations,—from the statement of which peculiar circumstances it would be known that the word (in the context in question) expressed that particular meaning;—as a matter of fact you have no such peculiar circumstances that you could urge (in favour of your own interpretation); so that what you have brought against us is a false and futile attack.* Further, the connection of a word with its denotation is well known in the world to consist in the conventional restriction of a certain word having a certain denotation—in the form that 'of such and such a verbal expression such and such is the denotation'; and this conventional restriction is found to be general (wide) in the case of general terms, and particular (specialised) in the case of particular terms; and whenever these words are used, they are used according to previous usage, and never in a way in which they have never been used before; the use of a word again is only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of its meaning, and it is only when the meaning has been comprehended that there follows any activity (as resulting from the hearing of that word). Thus the use of words being for the sake of bringing about the comprehension of its meaning, the exact usage of the general term is determined by the force (of circumstances); *i. e.* when such expressions are used as—'take the *goat* to the village,' 'bring *butter*', 'feed the *Brāhmaṇa*'—every one of these words ('goat' 'butter' and 'brāhmaṇa') is a general or common term, and yet it is applied, in actual usage, to particular individuals composing what is denoted by that term; and to what particular individuals it is applied is determined by the force of circumstances; the term is applied to that particular individual (goat, for instance) with which it is found possible to connect the direction of the particular activity (of *taking to the village*, for instance); it being absolutely impossible for the entire generality (of *all Goats* f. i.) to be connected with the direction expressed by the words ['take to the village',] [no one man at any one time could take to a village all the goats that there are in the world, all of which are denoted by the general term 'goat']. Similarly the term under discussion, —'*navakanbalaḥ*' is a general term [as it has two significa-

* The Puri MS. reads '*abhiyoga*' for *niyoga*.

tions]; and as such, when it is used it has to be taken as applied to that to which it has the capability to apply, under the circumstances;—so that when it is addressed in regard to a person having only one *new* blanket, it has to be taken as signifying 'one who has a new blanket'; and under the circumstances, the *possessing of nine blankets* being found impossible, the word cannot signify 'one who has *nine* blankets'. Thus when you assign to your opponent's word a meaning that it cannot possibly convey, your attack must be regarded as entirely futile.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 12.

[P. 178, L. 17 to P. 179, L. 10.]

'*When the meaning is not definitely specified*' *&c.*—says the Sūṭra. What is said to have its meaning *not definitely specified* is that word or sentence which, as actually heard, is general (wide in its scope); as an example of *a sentence that is general* or *ambiguous*, we have—'this boy is *navakambala*' [which means 'the boy has a *new* blanket' and also 'the boy has *nine* blankets']; and an example of the general or ambiguous *word* we have the word '*ashvaḥ*' [which when taken as a *noun*, denotes the *horse*; and when taken as a *verb*, denotes 'you have become large', '*ashvaḥ*' being the First Preterite, second person, singular form of the root '*shva*'].

An objection is raised—"It is never possible to speak of anything by means of an unspecified or general term; as in actual usage no such word is ever used whose denotation is not specified. In fact nothing can be spoken of by means of an unspecified term; nor is it right to use any such term; whenever any expression is used,

Var. P. 179.

* At the time that the exact denotation is fixed by convention for the first time, it is not said to pertain to any particular individual; the denotation fixed is entirely generic in its character; and it comes to be applied to particular individuals only through the force of such circumstances as the particular context in which the term is used, the particular person using it, the particular person to whom is addressed, the particular time and place at which it is used, and so on. So that when the speaker has used a general term on a particular occasion and under particular circumstances, his exact meaning can be easily determined; and the fact that the word has a vague generic denotation is not his fault; the fault lies with the original convention that fixed that denotation; and as this convention is fixed by persons other than the particular speaker who uses the word, he cannot be blamed for making use of such a word: blaming him for it is altogether unfair.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

it always brings about the comprehension of a particular thing; and any indication by it of a generic thing would be absolutely improper."

By no means, we reply. The use of a generic term and the denoting by it of generic things is quite possible, when the term is used by itself, and there are no such specificatory conditions as a particular context, &c. That is to say, when such a sentence as '*Shvēṭō ḍhāvaṭi*' is pronounced without reference to any context, &c., the person merely hearing it thus pronounced is naturally confused [as to the exact meaning of the sentence—whether it means '*Shvā iṭō ḍhāvāṭi*,' 'the dog is running from here,' or as meaning '*Shvēṭaḥ* the white-skinned man, suffering from leucoderma, *ḍhāvaṭi*', 'washes']; and when there is this confusion, he assigns to it a meaning that was not intended by the speaker, and then opposes the statement. Similarly in the case of an ambiguous word.

The *Sūṭra* has introduced the term '*Arṭha*', '*meaning*,' with a view to preclude the *word*; as Casuistry always pertains to the *meaning* of words, and not to the *words* themselves; for instance, in the case in question the Casuist cannot offer his opposition in the form 'the *word* that you are using is not *navakambala*.'

The meeting of Casuistry is in the following manner:—Whether the opposition is offered knowingly or unknowingly,—in either case it is highly improper; that is to say, if the casuist actually knows what the term '*navakambalaḥ*' means (in the particular context), and yet he urges that 'the boy is not *navakambala*', then he urges something entirely foreign to the subject, thus becoming subject to the Clincher of '*Arṭhānṭara*,' Irrelevancy'; for he comprehends one meaning and urges an altogether different meaning;—if on the other hand, he offers the opposition without knowing what the word actually means, he becomes subject to the Clincher of 'Ignorance.'

Sūtra (13).

(B) GENERALISING CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN THE URGING OF AN ABSURD SIGNIFICATION, WHICH IS RENDERED POSSIBLE BY THE USE OF A TOO GENERIC TERM—(Sūtra 13).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 56, L. 16 to P. 57, L. 10.]

When one man says—'Oh, this Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character', and another replies—'learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmaṇa',—the latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word ('*Brāhmaṇa*') a meaning other than the one intended,—that is by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning;—this opposition being in the following form—'If learning and character are natural to the Brāhmaṇa, then they should be found in the delinquent Brāhmaṇa* also; as he also is a *Brahmaṇa*'.

That word is called 'too generic' which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over-reaches it; *e. g.* the *Brahmaṇahood*—which is denoted by the term '*Brāhmaṇa*'—is sometimes found to be concomitant with 'learning and character', and sometimes it is found to over-reach it, *i. e.* not concomitant with it. And as the opposition offered is based upon this 'too generic' character of the term used, it has been called the '*Generalising* Casuistry.'

This Casuistry is to be met by pointing out that what the speaker (of the second sentence) means is not to propound a reason (for what the previous speaker has said with regard to a particular Brāhmaṇa being endowed with learning and character), but only to make a *reference* (*i. e.* a *representation* of what has been asserted in the previous sentence); as the second assertion is meant to be mere praise (of the *particular* Brāhmana mentioned in the preceding sentence); so that there is no room for the assigning of the absurd signification. For instance, when one says 'corns grow in this field', another man may say 'in this field even seeds do not have to be sown,'—it is

* The Brāhmana who has not gone through the rites and ceremonies essential for all Brāhmaṇas is called a '*vrātya*' 'delinquent.'

certainly not meant that seeds are not to be sown in the field; and yet what is said clearly is that they are not necessary; and by this the field, which is the receptacle of the growing corn, is praised; so that the assertion 'seeds do not have to be sown in this field' is meant to be a *reference* to the particular field with a view to praise it; and though the growing of the corn depends upon the seeds, this is not what is meant to be expressed by the sentence. Similarly in the case in question, by the assertion 'learning and character are only natural to the Brāhmaṇa what is meant is that the particular Brāhmaṇa possesses learning and character, and not that he possesses them *because he is a Brāhmaṇa*; what is meant to be expressed is not the *cause* (of the man's possessing learning and character); the assertion is a reference to a particular object, which it is meant to eulogise; the meaning being that 'it is because the man is a Brāhmaṇa that the causes bringing about learning and character have become effective'; so that when the man praises the particular object, he does not deny the operation of causes leading up to the result (that makes the object worthy of that praise). Thus it is not right to offer opposition to the assertion by assigning to it an absurd signification.

Vārṭika on Sū. 13.

[Page P. 179, L. 13 to L. 17.]

Generalising Casuistry &c.—says the Sūṭra. A word is said to be 'too generic' when it over-reaches what is intended to be spoken of. Example: 'The Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character';—the Opponent opposes this statement by urging that 'the fact of being a 'Brāhmaṇa' cannot be the cause of the possession of *learning and character*.' This opposition is met by showing that the assertion means something entirely different,—being meant to be a praise, and not the statement of a cause. And further, this opposition also is open to the two-fold objection (urged above in connection with first kind of Casuistry, at the end of the *Vārṭika*)—based upon its having been urged knowingly or unknowingly (in either case the opposition being subject to a Clincher).

Sūṭra 14.

(C) A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE SECONDARY (FIGURATIVE) DENOTATION OF WORDS, IF IT IS OPPOSED BY A DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF WHAT IS ASSERTED (ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PRIMARY DENOTATION),—THIS CONSTITUTES FIGURATIVE (OR SHIFTING) CASUISTRY.* *Sūṭra* 14.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 57, L. 12 to P. 58, L. 3.]

By the term '*ḍharma*' in the Sūṭra is meant that property of the word which consists in its use in accordance with its primary denotation; but sometimes [when the primary denotation is found inapplicable] this property (usage) becomes subject to option (in the shape of a second denotation); and this secondary usage consists in using a word, which has been found to have one primary denotation, in a sense different from that denotation;—and when a statement is made in accordance with this secondary denotation, we have what has been called in the *Sūṭra* '*ḍharmavikalpanirḍēsha*'.† *E.g.* When the statment is made 'the platforms are shouting', (which is

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*The meaning of the Sūṭra is not quite clear; the translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Bhāṣya*; according to the *Vārṭika* (on Sū. 16, below), the term अर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध here means 'the denial of the presence of the thing'; and this suggests to the mind a very much simpler interpretation of the Sūṭra itself: 'when the statement is made in regard to the धर्म' *property*, of a thing, if this is opposed by the denial of the *thing* itself, we have the Shifting Casuistry'. This appears to be more in keeping with what follows in the next two *Sūṭras*; and it is also supported by the *Vārṭika* (P. 180, L. 13) where it says that in the Shifting Casuistry what is denied is the *object* 'the *thing*,' *ḍharmin*. Though this statement, not being found to be in keeping with the interpretation of the Bhāṣya, has been twisted by the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi* to mean something totally different.

The explanation of the *Sūṭra* provided by the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* is as follows: 'Dharma' stands for one of the two denotations of a word—primary or secondary; —*ṭasya*, 'of that'—*viviḍhaḥ kalpaḥ*, 'more than one alternative meaning'—*yaṭra*, 'in which'; *nirdēshē*, *vāḍyukṭashabḍē-saṭi* i. e., *the words used by the first party being such as admit of more than one meaning*';—'*arṭhasaḍbhāvēna, ṭāḍrishaikaṭaravṛiṭṭyā sadarṭhaṭāṭparyaprayukṭavākyē, aparavṛṭṭyā 'arṭhānṭaraṭāṭparyakalpanayā praṭishēḍhaḥ*,—*the statement declaring the existence of a thing by one denotation, if the existence of that is denied in accordance with the other denotation,—it constitutes figurative casuistry.*

† The words of the *Bhāṣya* are '*ṭasya nirḍēshē*', 'when there is a statement *of that*'—*i. e.* of the secondary meaning; but as the statement is not *of the meaning*, the *Ṭāṭparya* has taken the words to mean '*ṭena*'—'*ḍharmavikalpēna*'—'*nirḍēshē*'—'*vākyē*'; so that the meaning is 'when there is statement in accordance with the secondary meaning.' The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that all this twisting of the words of the *Bhāṣya* has been done with a view to reconcile the *Bhāṣya* to the *Vārṭika*. But we fail to see much difference between the two.

made on the basis of the secondary meaning of the term 'platforms', which here stands for the *men* on the platforms);—and it is opposed by a denial on the basis of the primary meaning [*i. e.* taking the word as if it had been used in its primary denotation],—this denial being in the form 'Certainly it is the men seated on the platforms that are shouting, and *not the platforms themselves.*'

"But in this case, where is 'the assumption of a contrary meaning' [which, according to *Sūṭra* 1-2-10) is a necessary condition in all Casuistry] ?"

It consists in assigning to the word a meaning different from that with reference to which it has been used; *i. e.*, the word having been used in reference to its secondary meaning, the Opponent assigns to it the primary meaning;—and as this Casuistry pertains to the figurative or secondary signfication of words, it is called 'Figurative Casuistry.'

What is meant by '*upachāra*', 'secondary or figurative denotation' is that meaning which is indicated by such causes as association and the like; and we have the *figurative use* of a word only when there is such a meaning indicated by association &c. [so that figurative significations cannot be had recourse to at random].

This third kind of Casuistry is met in the following manner:—Whenever a statement is made, a concurrence with, or denial of, the words used, and their significations, should be in accordance with the intention of the person making that statement,—and not at random, according to one's own wish.* It is well known in ordinary parlance that a word may be used either in its primary direct sense or in its secondary figurative sense; and when such usage is generally accepted,† if a certain word is used, the concurrence with it, or the denial of it, should be in keeping with the speaker's intention, and not at random; so that when the speaker uses a term in its primary sense, the concurrence with, or denial of, his statement should be in reference to that sense of his words, and not in reference to any sense that the Opponent may choose to impose upon it; similarly if he uses the term in its secondary sense, it is this sense that should be concurred with or denied. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a term

* The *Ṭāṭparya* takes छन्दतः to mean छलना, *by trick.* But the ordinary meaning of छन्द appears to be more suitable. The sense is that you should concur with, or deny, the statement in the form and in the sense in which it is made by the speaker, and you are not to impose your own reading or your own interpretation on it.

† The Puri MS. reads सिद्धे प्रयोगे

in its secondary sense, and his Opponent denies it in reference to its primary sense,—then this denial becomes a mere arbitrary denial, and it cannot be regarded as an opposition to the first party.

Vārṭika on Sū. 14.

[P. 179, L. 20 to P. 180, L. 5].

A statement being made etc. etc.—says the Sūṭra. What the term '*ḍharmavikalpanirḍēshē*' means is that a word has a twofold signification—the primary and the secondary; *e. g.* the word 'platform' primarily signifies a *structure reared up by bringing together pieces of wood*; but when (as occurring in the statement 'the platforms are shouting') that primary signification is found to be incompatible by reason of the impossibility of the action of *shouting* belonging to the *wooden structure*, the word is applied to the *persons seated on the structure* (to whom the *shouting* is applicable); and this forms the 'secondary' signification of the word. Such is the ordinary method of using words; now if one were to oppose the statement made by attributing to it a meaning at variance with the said method,—it would constitute what is called 'Figurative Casuistry.'

Var. P. 128.

This form of Casuistry also is open to the aforesaid retort of having been put up consciously or unconsciously &c. (see end of *Vārṭika* on Sū. 12).

Sūṭra (15).

[An objection is raised]—

"FIGURATIVE CASUISTRY IS ONLY VERBAL CASUISTRY; AS IT DOES NOT DIFFER FROM IT."

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 5 to L. 7].

[An objection is raised]—" Figurative Casuistry does not differ from Verbal Casuistry; as the assigning of a different meaning (from the one intended by the speaker) is common

"to both. For instance, in the example cited,—in the statement 'the platforms are shouting,' the word ('platform') intended to be taken in the secondary sense of *the persons* occupying the place (on the platform) is assumed to have the primary sense of the *place* itself; and the opposition offered is based upon this assumption."

Vārṭikā on Sū. 15.

[P. 180, L. 8 to L. 9].

"Figurative Casuistry is regarded to be the same as Verbal Casuistry, because of there being no difference between the two. In what does the non-difference consist? It consists in this, that, just as there is assumption of a different meaning in the case of Verbal Casuistry, so is there also in the case of Figurative Casuistry."

Sūṭra (16).

[Answer]—

IT IS NOT SO; AS THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN IT.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 9 to L. 11].

[The answer to the objection urged in the preceding *Sūṭra* is that] Figurative Casuistry is not the same as Verbal Casuistry; as in the former, *the denial of the presence of the thing* constitutes a difference. "Difference from what?" From the mere assumption of a different meaning (which is found in Verbal Casuistry); as a matter of fact the 'assumption of a different meaning' is one thing, and the 'total denial of the presence of the thing denoted' is something entirely different.

Vārṭika on Sū (16).

[P. 180, L. 9 to L. 13].

The *Sūṭra* points out that the reason that has been urged in the preceding *Sūṭra*—'because there is no difference'—is one that is *unknown*,—*i. e.* untrue. "Why is the reason untrue?" Because in the case of one (*i. e.* Figurative Casuistry) what is denied is the existence of the denoted

thing,—the meaning of the denial being that *there are no such things as shouting platforms*;—while in the other case (*i. e.* in the case of Verbal Casuistry) the presence of the *thing* itself is admitted,—the possession by the boy of the blanket being accepted,—and what is denied is only the blankets' *property* of 'numerousness'; so that in one case* the *thing* is denied, while in the other the *property*; and this fact constitutes a tremendous difference.

Sūṭra (17).

IF THE TWO WERE TO BE REGARDED AS NON-DIFFERENT ON THE GROUND OF SOME KIND OF SIMILARITY,—THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE KIND OF CASUISTRY.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 13. to L. 16.]

What the Opponent in *Sūṭra* 15 has done is to accept the twofold division of Casuistry and to deny the third kind; this denial being on the ground of some sort of a similarity (between the third and the first kinds). But just as this reason (the presence of some sort of similarity) serves to set aside threefoldness, so ought it to set aside twofoldness

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* Both editions read यत्र. The *Parishuḍḍhi* supplies the correct reading—एकत्र.

The following explanation by the *Ṭāṭparya* is noteworthy :—In the sentence 'the platforms are shouting', the *shouting* is predicated of the *platforms*, whereby the *shouting* is the predominant factor and *platform* the subordinate factor ; that is why the secondary figurative usage applies to the 'platform', and not to the *shouting* ;—hence when the Casuist offers his opposition in the words 'the platforms certainly do not shout', what is denied is the *shouting*, the predominant factor. This is what is meant by the Vārṭika saying that the *thing itself* is denied. In the case of the statement 'this boy is *navakambala*'—the 'navakambala' is predicated of the boy ; and what the Casuist denies is not the entire '*navakambala*', but only the qualifying part of it '*nava*.' So that in the former case the entire predicate, and in the latter only a part of the predicate, is denied. This constitutes the 'tremendous difference.'

The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that the above explanation has been provided by the *Ṭāṭparya* in view of the fact that what the words of the *Vārṭika* apparently mean is not quite right. It is not true that in one case it is the *thing* that is denied, and in another the *property*; because the *shouting* is as much a *property* of the platform, as the *numerousness* is of the blanket.

also; as there is some sort of similarity between these two (first and second kinds) also. If the mere presence of some similarity cannot do away with the twofold division, then it should not do away with the threefold division either.

Vārṭika on Sū. 17.
[P. 180, L. 17 to P. 181, L. 2.]

If the two etc.—says the *Sūṭra.* "What is the meaning of this Sūṭra?" The meaning is that sheer incongruity sets aside the twofold division also, which division is admitted by the Opponent. "By what reasoning do you make out that the twofold division is admitted?" When it is asserted that 'Figurative Casuistry is the same as Verbal Casuistry,' it is implied that the *Generalising Casuistry* (the second kind of Casuistry) is something different (from Verbal Casuistry). And (if the twofold division is set aside, and all Casuistry is held to be of one and the same kind; then) the specification becomes entirely useless; that is to say, if the opinion held by our opponent is that all Casuistry is of one and the same kind, then, in that case, the specification (made in Sūṭra 15)—that 'Figurative Casuistry is the same as Verbal Casuistry, because there is no difference' [which puts forward the non-difference of only two out of the three kinds]—becomes entirely meaningless.

"But in what way could all kinds of Casuistry become regarded as one only?"

If the presence of some sort of similarity were to establish identity, then there would be only one kind of Casuistry; as there is some sort of similarity among all the three kinds, they should all become of one kind only; as there is some sort of similarity among all of them.

Var. P. 181.

"What is that similarity?"

The similarity consists in the 'opposing of the assertion' and in the 'assuming of a different meaning,'—these two conditions being present in all kinds of Casuistry, [as declared in Su. 1-2-10].

LECTURE (4).

[Sūṭras 18—20.]

Defects of Reasoning due to the Incapacity of the Reasoner.

BHAṢYA ON SŪ. 18.

[P. 58, L. 17 to P. 59, L. 3.]

Next to Casuistry—

(*Sūṭra* 18.)

FUTILE REJOINDER IS THAT OBJECTION WHICH IS TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF MERE* SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY. (Sūṭra 18.)

When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that *follows, takes birth* (jāyaṭē)—is called '*Jáṭi*', 'Futile Rejoinder.' This objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial,—on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the Probans put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its *similarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *dissimilarity* (to that Example);—or when the Probans put forward is intended to prove the conclusion through its *dissimilarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *similarity* to it;—we have what is called '*Jāṭi*' (Futile Rejoinder),; because it comes up—*is born*—as an opponent (to the original reasoning).†

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* The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* explains that Futile Rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *only*,—*i. e.* irrespective of any idea of invariable concomitance; in fact, it continues, 'similarity and dissimilarity' do not enter into all cases of Futile Rejoinder; as is clear from the definitions and examples provided under Adh. 5; it makes a Futile Rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern Logicians to define *Jāṭi*, Futile Rejoinder, simply as '*asaṭ uṭṭaram*', 'wrong answer', *i. e.* an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

The *Tāṭparya* has an interesting note. It is not always reprehensible to put forward a Futile Rejoinder; for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a Futile Rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will stave off the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments. But in other cases a Futile Rejoinder is urged only unknowingly.

† In view of the real nature of several Futile Rejoinders—which are not urged on the basis of a similarity or dissimilarity to any *Example* at all,—the *Vārṭika* says that when the *Bhāṣya* talks of similarity or dissimilarity to the Example, it is only by way of illustration. As there are several Futile Rejoinders that are urged on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity to other things also.

Vārṭika on Su. 18.

[P. 181, L. 4 to L. 11.]

Futile Rejoinder is that &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. By speaking of the '*objection taken* on the basis of similarity,' and of the '*objection taken* on the basis of dissimilarity', what is meant is that it is urged against the right view expounded by the first party;—the sense being that when the arguments in support of a view have been propounded, there is a *stand* made *against* that view; and this *standing against* is as if it were an opponent set up against it.

The *Sūṭra* should be taken as it stands, and not as indicating the 'similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example*' (as the *Bhāṣya* has taken it). "Why do you lay stress on this?" Because we wish to make the definition provided by the *Sūṭra* applicable to all cases of Futile Rejoinder. As a matter of fact, every kind of Futile Rejoinder becomes included only when we take it as it stands,—taking it as indicating 'similarity' and 'dissimilarity' to anything (not necessarily to the *Example* only). If a definition does not include all that it is intended to include, it is regarded as defective [and this would be the case with the definition provided by the Sūṭra if it were interpreted according to the *Bhāṣya*; as, in that case, it would not include all those cases of Futile Rejoinder which are urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity to things other than the Example]. It is only by way of illustration that the *Bhāṣya* should be taken as speaking of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example*; the sense being that, just as objection is taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example*, so it is urged also on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity of other things [and it should not be taken as restricting the definition to only such objections as are taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example* only].

Sūṭra (19).

IT IS A CASE OF CLINCHER WHEN THERE IS MISAPPREHENSION, AS ALSO WHEN THERE IS INCOMPREHENSION.* (Sū. 19.)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 59, L. 5 to L. 8.]

'Misapprehension' is that comprehension which is either wrong or reprehensible.† The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated; and 'Clincher' consists in this defeat. It is a case of 'incomprehension' when, the subject being one on which something has to be said, if the person does not say anything; that is, for instance, if he either does not oppose what has been sought to be proved by the other party, or does not meet the objections that have been urged against himself.

The non-compounding (of the words '*vipraṭipaṭṭiḥ*' and '*apraṭipaṭṭiḥ*', whose compounding would have made the Sūṭra terser) is meant to indicate that these two are not the only Clinchers [there being several others, as described in detail in Adh. V, all which become implied by the use of the particle '*cha*'].

Vārṭika on Sū. 19.

[P. 181, L, 12 to L. 19.]

It is a case of Clincher etc.—says the *Sūṭra*; when a thing really exists, or is described, as different (from the man's own idea of it), there is either 'incomprehension' or 'misapprehension'. There are two kinds of 'incomprehen-

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*The *Parishuḍḍhi*, not satisfied with the *Sūṭra* as it stands, takes it as implying the following generalised definition :—' When a controversy has been started, any action that is indicative of either party's ignorance constitutes a *Clincher*.' It further says that Clincher is treated of last, as it puts an end to all controversy ; no further discussion can proceed when once one of the parties falls into a Clincher.

†*A misapprehension is called simply 'wrong', when the subject-matter is something too subtle to be grasped by an ordinary intellect ; it is called 'reprehensible' when it pertains to something gross, an ordinary thing quite within the range of ordinary minds.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

sion'—(1) that non-cognizance in which the predominating element consists of what the other party has said [when, for instance, the man fails to comprehend the proofs adduced by the other party, or the objections urged by him], and (2) that non-cognizance in which one's own part forms the predominating element [when, for instance, the man fails to find arguments for meeting the objections urged by the other party].

"It is possible for a Clincher to be urged even where the "man has put forward a sound argument; how then can "Clincher be said to be indicative of 'misapprehension' or "'incomprehension' [as the reasoning being a sound one, it "should be taken *ipso facto* to have been urged with full know-"ledge and due comprehension of the issues involved]. That "is to say, it may so happen that a man supports his conten-"tion by a perfectly sound argument, and yet when his op-"ponent meets him with a Futile Rejoinder, he becomes con-"founded and fails to find the proper answer to that rejoin-"der;—how can this be said to be a case of either 'misappre-"hension' or 'incomprehension?"

Even in such a case there would be (*a*) 'incomprehension' and (*b*) 'misapprehension' consisting in the man (*a*) *not comprehending* the soundness and strength of his own arguments, and (*b*) in his regarding his own sound arguments as unsound.

Bhāṣya on Sūṭra (20).

[P. 59, L. 8 to L. 17].

A question arises—"*Example* has been described as of one kind only; are Futile Rejoinder and Clincher also each of one kind only? Or are these of diverse kinds, like *Doctrine*?" The answer to this is provided in the following Sūṭra.—

Sūṭra 20.

THERE IS A MULTIPLICITY OF FUTILE REJOINDERS AND CLINCHERS, OWING TWO THERE BEING SEVERAL AND DIVERSE VARIETIES OF BOTH. (Sū. 20).

As 'Objection taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity' can be of several diverse kinds—there must be several varieties of Futile Rejoinder. Similarly as 'misapprehension and incomprehension' are of several diverse kinds,—there must be several varieties of Clincher also. The term '*vikalpa*' stands for *several varieties* or *diverse varieties*.

As examples of the diversity of Clinchers (defined in Sū. 5, 2. 1—24)—the Clinchers of *Ananubhāṣaṇa*, *Ajñāna*, *Apraṭibhā*, *Vikṣēpa*, *Maṭānujñā* and *Paryanuyojyoḷēkṣaṇa*, are indicative of *incomprehension*; while the rest are indicative of *misapprehension*.

Thus have *Pramāṇa* and other categories been (*a*) 'mentioned' (in Sū. 1.1.1) and (*b*) 'defined' in the order of their mention; and they will (in the next four Aḍhyāyas) be (*c*) 'examined' in accordance with their definitions. Thus is the threefold function of the Scientific Treatise to be regarded as duly fulfilled.

Thus ends the first Aḍhyāya of Vāṭsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūṭra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. 20.

[P. 182, L. 1 to L. 11.]

There is a multiplicity, etc. etc.—says the *Sūṭra*. This *Sūṭra* is meant to indicate how many kinds of Futile Rejoinder and Clincher there are; and what is meant is that, inasmuch as objections taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity are several and diverse, there are many kinds of Futile Rejoinder;—and inasmuch as incomprehension and misapprehension are several and diverse, there are many kinds of Clincher. As regards the question—as to which kinds of Futile Rejoinder are urged on the basis of similarity, and which on the basis of dissimilarity,—and as to which kinds of Clincher are indicative of misapprehension and which of incomprehension,—all this should be found in their proper places, where they are described in detail in connection with their detailed definition (in Aḍh. 5).

Thus have Pramāṇa and the other categories been 'mentioned' and 'defined.' And the 'Examination' of these, in accordance with this *mention* and *definition*, will follow.

' In this first *Aḍhyāya* have been described—(*a*) the main theme of philosophy (embodied in Sū. 1.1.1.), (*b*) the process of metempsychosis (described in Sū. 1. 1. 2), (*c*) the cessation of metempsychosis by Knowledge (described in Sū. 1. 1. 2), and (*d*) the mention and definition of the several categories (described in the rest of the Aḍhyāya).

Thus ends the first Aḍhyāya of Uḍyoṭakara's *Vārṭika* on the *Nyāyasūṭra-Bhāṣya*.
